ac52fbe0b9
2 Commits
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jx12n
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ac52fbe0b9 |
CI is activated; point the docs at the token that works
All checks were successful
ci/woodpecker/push/woodpecker Pipeline was successful
The Woodpecker claim in DEPLOY.md and release.sh was wrong within an hour of
being written. Corrected at the source rather than annotated:
* jordan/hush is active in Woodpecker (repo 139) with the Gitea webhook
installed, so a push to main builds and deploys.
* Activation takes the NUMERIC gitea repo id in forge_remote_id, not
owner/name — worth recording, because passing the wrong shape and passing a
dead token both come back 401 and look identical. GET /api/user separates
them: it is auth-only, so 401 there is the token and 200 there means the
request was the problem.
* The credential is $THREE_SIX_WOODPECKER (and $THREE_SIX_GITEA), in the
operator's environment.
* The stale copy that caused the original 401 is fixed where it lives:
k3sf-rdev-admin-key in GCP Secret Manager, property WOODPECKER_API_TOKEN,
every other property preserved. ESO resynced and the token read out of
rdev/rdev-credentials now answers 200. Documented alongside it: do not patch
that k8s Secret directly, it is ESO-owned and a direct edit is reverted on
the next refresh.
make release stays, with its reason updated — it is now the hotfix/rollback path
and the answer to "CI is down", rather than the only way to deploy.
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jx12n
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4d9a26498e |
hush: one-time secret links the server cannot read
Paste a secret, get a link, send it. The first person to open it and press
Reveal sees the secret; the link dies at that moment. The recipient needs a
browser and nothing else — no account, no client, no installed tooling.
The server cannot read what it stores. AES-256-GCM happens in the browser and
the key lives in the URL fragment, which browsers never transmit, so hushd
holds ciphertext and no key material. That is a property of where the key sits
rather than a promise about our conduct, which is why there is deliberately no
endpoint accepting a plaintext secret and no server-side-encryption fallback:
two guarantees behind one URL would be worse than one honest guarantee.
Three decisions carry the design:
* GET /s/{id} touches NO storage, not even to check existence. Slack, Teams,
WhatsApp, iMessage and Outlook Safe Links all fetch a URL before a human
sees it, so destroying on GET would destroy most secrets in transit and the
recipient's "already used" would be indistinguishable from interception.
Only POST /reveal consumes. Bot user-agent detection is an arms race;
removing the side effect from GET is not. Pinned by
TestGettingTheRevealPageNeverConsumesTheSecret.
* Destruction is one Redis GETDEL, which is atomic. GET-then-DEL has a window
where two simultaneous readers both win, and for a one-time secret that
window is the product. The store contract demands atomicity and the same
concurrency test runs against both implementations.
* Missing, already-revealed, expired and evicted are ONE indistinguishable
410. Separating them would confirm to a prober that a given link was real.
The secret id IS the capability, so secret.ID is a struct whose every
accidental path — %v, %s, String(), slog, json.Marshal — emits a redacted
handle or refuses, and the raw value needs an explicit Value(). The first
version tried to prevent leaks by implementing no String() at all; its own test
caught that Go's fmt prints unexported fields anyway, so forbidding the method
had removed the control rather than the leak.
Operationally: structured JSON on stdout in the fleet's wire format, which
Vector already collects with no annotation; six hush_* metrics on the chassis
registry with no id, IP or path in any label; five alert rules wired into
vmalert. The public Ingress enumerates /, /s/ and /api/ so /metrics, /healthz
and /readyz share the port but are unreachable from the internet — no
basic-auth middleware to maintain and get wrong.
Dependencies are vendored because go-chassis is private: the Woodpecker test
step and the in-cluster Kaniko build both run -mod=vendor with GOPROXY=off and
hold no git credential.
cmd/hush-mcp is a stdio MCP server doing the same client-side crypto locally,
so using hush from an agent preserves the same guarantee as using it from a
browser.
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