Commit Graph

4 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
jx12n
d7cd57f330 serve the MCP install instructions at /mcp
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Using hush from an agent needed a clone and docs/MCP.md. It now needs one
command, and the instructions are served by the deployment itself.

`go install github.com/orchard9/hush/cmd/hush-mcp@latest` is the whole
install: cmd/hush-mcp imports only the standard library, so module graph
pruning never reaches the private go-chassis dependency cmd/hushd needs.
Verified against an empty module cache and the public proxy, then create ->
reveal end to end against production with the resulting binary.

The page carries the per-client configuration for Claude Code, Codex CLI,
Gemini CLI, VS Code, Claude Desktop, Cursor and omp. Each command was run
against the installed client rather than copied from documentation, which is
how the differences on it are there at all: VS Code's wrapper key is
`servers`, not `mcpServers`; gemini defaults to project scope, not user;
Claude Code rejects `--env` immediately before the server name.

The shared browser crypto moves from base.html into templates/crypto.html,
which the two pages that encrypt parse and this one does not. An empty
`{{define}}` cannot replace a non-empty one — text/template reads an empty
body as no definition — so the shell holds the call and the partial holds the
code, and the docs page ships no script at all.

Three things this exposed, fixed here:

- The public Ingress enumerates paths, so a handler without one 404s at the
  edge while working in `make dev`. The Ingress is now its own manifest:
  hush.yaml pins a `:bootstrap` image that does not exist, so re-applying it
  to publish a path would roll the workload onto an unpullable image.
  `make deploy-ingress` applies the route alone.
- release.sh guarded HEAD against `@{upstream}`, which is the GitHub mirror
  here, while Kaniko clones Gitea. A commit pushed to one and not the other
  would have built the previous commit silently. It now fetches and compares
  the branch that actually gets built.
- smoke.sh checks that /mcp serves the install command, so a stale rollout or
  an unexecutable template fails the release instead of being found later.
  Confirmed it fails: against production before this deploy it reported 404.
2026-09-05 14:03:34 -06:00
jx12n
ac52fbe0b9 CI is activated; point the docs at the token that works
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The Woodpecker claim in DEPLOY.md and release.sh was wrong within an hour of
being written. Corrected at the source rather than annotated:

  * jordan/hush is active in Woodpecker (repo 139) with the Gitea webhook
    installed, so a push to main builds and deploys.
  * Activation takes the NUMERIC gitea repo id in forge_remote_id, not
    owner/name — worth recording, because passing the wrong shape and passing a
    dead token both come back 401 and look identical. GET /api/user separates
    them: it is auth-only, so 401 there is the token and 200 there means the
    request was the problem.
  * The credential is $THREE_SIX_WOODPECKER (and $THREE_SIX_GITEA), in the
    operator's environment.
  * The stale copy that caused the original 401 is fixed where it lives:
    k3sf-rdev-admin-key in GCP Secret Manager, property WOODPECKER_API_TOKEN,
    every other property preserved. ESO resynced and the token read out of
    rdev/rdev-credentials now answers 200. Documented alongside it: do not patch
    that k8s Secret directly, it is ESO-owned and a direct edit is reverted on
    the next refresh.

make release stays, with its reason updated — it is now the hotfix/rollback path
and the answer to "CI is down", rather than the only way to deploy.
2026-09-03 00:41:33 -06:00
jx12n
d32283e36a make release: deployment that needs no CI credential
Woodpecker is not activated for this repo — the WOODPECKER_API_TOKEN in
rdev-credentials returns 401 on /api/user, so it is the token and not the
request shape, and minting a new one needs a browser login I cannot do. That
left `git push` silently not deploying, which is a trap for whoever pushes next.

So `make release` does what the pipeline's build and deploy steps do: a Kaniko
Job for an amd64 image from the pushed git ref, `kubectl set image`, rollout,
then the production smoke. When Woodpecker is activated this becomes redundant,
and stays useful as the manual path for a hotfix or a rollback when CI is down.

Two refusals in it are the interesting part, both for failures that are
otherwise silent:

  * A dirty or unpushed tree is refused. Kaniko builds from the GIT CONTEXT, not
    the working tree, so uncommitted work would produce an image that does not
    contain it while every log line says success.
  * After the rollout it asserts the live image equals the one just built.
    `kubectl set image` matching no container is silent, and the rollout then
    "succeeds" against the old pod.
2026-09-03 00:22:13 -06:00
jx12n
62c95f8c2f docs, ops scripts, and the MCP install
Written after the service was live, so every command and every number here was
run against the real deployment rather than assumed:

  * DEPLOY.md records the things a rebuild needs and git does not hold — the
    Redis ACL user (and why +getdel is the one to notice), the GCP Secret
    Manager entry, the DNS record, and the three coordinated edits vmalert
    needs because it has no ConfigMap auto-discovery.
  * It also records two blockers rather than hiding them: Woodpecker is NOT
    activated (the token in rdev-credentials returns 401), so pushes do not
    deploy yet and the Kaniko Job is the interim path; and the host is
    hush.threesix.ai rather than hush.orchard9.ai because orchard9.ai is on
    GoDaddy and no GoDaddy credential exists anywhere I can reach.
  * OPERATIONS.md is one section per alert, plus the failure modes that are not
    alerts — chiefly that "gone" cannot distinguish already-revealed from
    expired from LRU-evicted, on purpose, so the operator's default reading of
    an unexpected "gone" is that the secret is compromised and should be
    rotated.
  * scripts/logs.sh and alerts-check.sh verify rather than assert:
    alerts-check asks vmalert what it actually loaded AND checks each rule's
    series exists, because a rule reading a metric nothing exports can never
    fire and looks exactly like a healthy service.
  * scripts/smoke.sh is a real client — it generates a key, encrypts, posts only
    ciphertext, reveals, decrypts, then asserts the second reveal is 410, that
    three GETs did not consume the secret, that missing and malformed ids are
    indistinguishable, and that a plaintext field is refused.

install-mcp.sh proves the MCP handshake before writing any config, backs up
mcp.json, and rewrites only hush's entry — a config pointing at a broken server
surfaces as an opaque host-side connect failure, which is worth one extra check
to avoid.
2026-09-03 00:18:53 -06:00