hush/vendor/github.com/redis/go-redis/v9/internal/log.go
jx12n 4d9a26498e hush: one-time secret links the server cannot read
Paste a secret, get a link, send it. The first person to open it and press
Reveal sees the secret; the link dies at that moment. The recipient needs a
browser and nothing else — no account, no client, no installed tooling.

The server cannot read what it stores. AES-256-GCM happens in the browser and
the key lives in the URL fragment, which browsers never transmit, so hushd
holds ciphertext and no key material. That is a property of where the key sits
rather than a promise about our conduct, which is why there is deliberately no
endpoint accepting a plaintext secret and no server-side-encryption fallback:
two guarantees behind one URL would be worse than one honest guarantee.

Three decisions carry the design:

  * GET /s/{id} touches NO storage, not even to check existence. Slack, Teams,
    WhatsApp, iMessage and Outlook Safe Links all fetch a URL before a human
    sees it, so destroying on GET would destroy most secrets in transit and the
    recipient's "already used" would be indistinguishable from interception.
    Only POST /reveal consumes. Bot user-agent detection is an arms race;
    removing the side effect from GET is not. Pinned by
    TestGettingTheRevealPageNeverConsumesTheSecret.
  * Destruction is one Redis GETDEL, which is atomic. GET-then-DEL has a window
    where two simultaneous readers both win, and for a one-time secret that
    window is the product. The store contract demands atomicity and the same
    concurrency test runs against both implementations.
  * Missing, already-revealed, expired and evicted are ONE indistinguishable
    410. Separating them would confirm to a prober that a given link was real.

The secret id IS the capability, so secret.ID is a struct whose every
accidental path — %v, %s, String(), slog, json.Marshal — emits a redacted
handle or refuses, and the raw value needs an explicit Value(). The first
version tried to prevent leaks by implementing no String() at all; its own test
caught that Go's fmt prints unexported fields anyway, so forbidding the method
had removed the control rather than the leak.

Operationally: structured JSON on stdout in the fleet's wire format, which
Vector already collects with no annotation; six hush_* metrics on the chassis
registry with no id, IP or path in any label; five alert rules wired into
vmalert. The public Ingress enumerates /, /s/ and /api/ so /metrics, /healthz
and /readyz share the port but are unreachable from the internet — no
basic-auth middleware to maintain and get wrong.

Dependencies are vendored because go-chassis is private: the Woodpecker test
step and the in-cluster Kaniko build both run -mod=vendor with GOPROXY=off and
hold no git credential.

cmd/hush-mcp is a stdio MCP server doing the same client-side crypto locally,
so using hush from an agent preserves the same guarantee as using it from a
browser.
2026-09-03 00:08:38 -06:00

80 lines
1.7 KiB
Go

package internal
import (
"context"
"fmt"
"log"
"os"
)
// TODO (ned): Revisit logging
// Add more standardized approach with log levels and configurability
type Logging interface {
Printf(ctx context.Context, format string, v ...interface{})
}
type DefaultLogger struct {
log *log.Logger
}
func (l *DefaultLogger) Printf(ctx context.Context, format string, v ...interface{}) {
_ = l.log.Output(2, fmt.Sprintf(format, v...))
}
func NewDefaultLogger() Logging {
return &DefaultLogger{
log: log.New(os.Stderr, "redis: ", log.LstdFlags|log.Lshortfile),
}
}
// Logger calls Output to print to the stderr.
// Arguments are handled in the manner of fmt.Print.
var Logger Logging = NewDefaultLogger()
var LogLevel LogLevelT = LogLevelError
// LogLevelT represents the logging level
type LogLevelT int
// Log level constants for the entire go-redis library
const (
LogLevelError LogLevelT = iota // 0 - errors only
LogLevelWarn // 1 - warnings and errors
LogLevelInfo // 2 - info, warnings, and errors
LogLevelDebug // 3 - debug, info, warnings, and errors
)
// String returns the string representation of the log level
func (l LogLevelT) String() string {
switch l {
case LogLevelError:
return "ERROR"
case LogLevelWarn:
return "WARN"
case LogLevelInfo:
return "INFO"
case LogLevelDebug:
return "DEBUG"
default:
return "UNKNOWN"
}
}
// IsValid returns true if the log level is valid
func (l LogLevelT) IsValid() bool {
return l >= LogLevelError && l <= LogLevelDebug
}
func (l LogLevelT) WarnOrAbove() bool {
return l >= LogLevelWarn
}
func (l LogLevelT) InfoOrAbove() bool {
return l >= LogLevelInfo
}
func (l LogLevelT) DebugOrAbove() bool {
return l >= LogLevelDebug
}