Paste a secret, get a link, send it. The first person to open it and press
Reveal sees the secret; the link dies at that moment. The recipient needs a
browser and nothing else — no account, no client, no installed tooling.
The server cannot read what it stores. AES-256-GCM happens in the browser and
the key lives in the URL fragment, which browsers never transmit, so hushd
holds ciphertext and no key material. That is a property of where the key sits
rather than a promise about our conduct, which is why there is deliberately no
endpoint accepting a plaintext secret and no server-side-encryption fallback:
two guarantees behind one URL would be worse than one honest guarantee.
Three decisions carry the design:
* GET /s/{id} touches NO storage, not even to check existence. Slack, Teams,
WhatsApp, iMessage and Outlook Safe Links all fetch a URL before a human
sees it, so destroying on GET would destroy most secrets in transit and the
recipient's "already used" would be indistinguishable from interception.
Only POST /reveal consumes. Bot user-agent detection is an arms race;
removing the side effect from GET is not. Pinned by
TestGettingTheRevealPageNeverConsumesTheSecret.
* Destruction is one Redis GETDEL, which is atomic. GET-then-DEL has a window
where two simultaneous readers both win, and for a one-time secret that
window is the product. The store contract demands atomicity and the same
concurrency test runs against both implementations.
* Missing, already-revealed, expired and evicted are ONE indistinguishable
410. Separating them would confirm to a prober that a given link was real.
The secret id IS the capability, so secret.ID is a struct whose every
accidental path — %v, %s, String(), slog, json.Marshal — emits a redacted
handle or refuses, and the raw value needs an explicit Value(). The first
version tried to prevent leaks by implementing no String() at all; its own test
caught that Go's fmt prints unexported fields anyway, so forbidding the method
had removed the control rather than the leak.
Operationally: structured JSON on stdout in the fleet's wire format, which
Vector already collects with no annotation; six hush_* metrics on the chassis
registry with no id, IP or path in any label; five alert rules wired into
vmalert. The public Ingress enumerates /, /s/ and /api/ so /metrics, /healthz
and /readyz share the port but are unreachable from the internet — no
basic-auth middleware to maintain and get wrong.
Dependencies are vendored because go-chassis is private: the Woodpecker test
step and the in-cluster Kaniko build both run -mod=vendor with GOPROXY=off and
hold no git credential.
cmd/hush-mcp is a stdio MCP server doing the same client-side crypto locally,
so using hush from an agent preserves the same guarantee as using it from a
browser.
118 lines
4.2 KiB
Go
118 lines
4.2 KiB
Go
package store
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import (
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"context"
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"errors"
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"fmt"
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"time"
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"github.com/redis/go-redis/v9"
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"github.com/orchard9/hush/internal/secret"
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)
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// Redis is the production store. It keeps one key per secret and lets Redis own
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// expiry, so nothing in hush sweeps, scans, or holds a timer.
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type Redis struct {
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client *redis.Client
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}
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// NewRedis dials Redis from a URL of the form
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// redis://user:password@host:6379/5 — the ACL user, the password and the db
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// index all ride in the URL, matching every other orchard9 service.
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func NewRedis(url string) (*Redis, error) {
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opt, err := redis.ParseURL(url)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("parse redis url: %w", err)
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}
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// A secret write must not hang a request behind a slow dependency: the
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// chassis request timeout would fire and the caller would see a 500 with no
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// idea whether the secret was stored. Short, explicit timeouts make the
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// failure fast and unambiguous.
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opt.DialTimeout = 3 * time.Second
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opt.ReadTimeout = 2 * time.Second
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opt.WriteTimeout = 2 * time.Second
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opt.MaxRetries = 2
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return &Redis{client: redis.NewClient(opt)}, nil
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}
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// Put stores ciphertext with SET ... EX ttl NX.
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//
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// NX is what makes an id collision an error instead of a silent overwrite of a
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// live secret. It cannot fire by chance at 256 bits, which is exactly why a
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// false return is worth surfacing: it means something is wrong with id
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// generation, and the alternative is destroying a secret somebody is waiting on.
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func (r *Redis) Put(ctx context.Context, id secret.ID, ciphertext string, ttl time.Duration) error {
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ok, err := r.client.SetNX(ctx, id.StorageKey(), ciphertext, ttl).Result()
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if err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("redis set: %w", err)
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}
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if !ok {
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return ErrIDCollision
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}
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return nil
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}
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// Take reads and destroys in ONE command.
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//
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// GETDEL (Redis 6.2+) is atomic, which is the entire one-time guarantee. A
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// GET followed by a DEL has a window between the two round trips where two
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// simultaneous readers both get the plaintext, and for this service that window
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// is the product. Redis 7.4.8 runs in the cluster; the ACL user must carry
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// `+getdel` or every reveal returns NOPERM.
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//
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// redis.Nil covers all four "not available" causes and collapses to ErrGone —
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// see the doc comment on ErrGone for why they are not separated.
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func (r *Redis) Take(ctx context.Context, id secret.ID) (string, error) {
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v, err := r.client.GetDel(ctx, id.StorageKey()).Result()
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switch {
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case errors.Is(err, redis.Nil):
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return "", ErrGone
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case err != nil:
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return "", fmt.Errorf("redis getdel: %w", err)
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}
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return v, nil
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}
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// Ping backs /readyz. It is the reason a Redis outage takes the pod out of the
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// Service rather than serving 500s from a pod the load balancer still trusts.
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func (r *Redis) Ping(ctx context.Context) error {
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return r.client.Ping(ctx).Err()
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}
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// Close shuts the pool down.
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func (r *Redis) Close() error { return r.client.Close() }
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// AllowN implements a fixed-window rate limit in Redis: INCR the window key,
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// set its expiry on first use, and refuse once the count passes the limit.
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//
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// Fixed window rather than a sliding one because it costs two commands, needs
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// no Lua, and the failure it permits — up to 2x the limit across a window
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// boundary — is irrelevant for an abuse control whose job is to stop bulk
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// automation, not to meter precisely.
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//
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// It lives in Redis rather than in process memory so the limit still holds if
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// hush is ever scaled past one replica, and so a restart cannot be used to
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// reset it.
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func (r *Redis) AllowN(ctx context.Context, key string, limit int, window time.Duration) (bool, time.Duration, error) {
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full := "hush:rl:" + key
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pipe := r.client.Pipeline()
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incr := pipe.Incr(ctx, full)
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// NX so a long-running window is not extended by later requests inside it;
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// without it a steady stream of calls would push the expiry forward forever
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// and the window would never reset.
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pipe.ExpireNX(ctx, full, window)
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if _, err := pipe.Exec(ctx); err != nil {
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return false, 0, fmt.Errorf("redis ratelimit: %w", err)
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}
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count := incr.Val()
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if count > int64(limit) {
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retry, err := r.client.PTTL(ctx, full).Result()
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if err != nil || retry < 0 {
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retry = window
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}
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return false, retry, nil
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}
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return true, 0, nil
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}
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