hush/vendor/google.golang.org/protobuf/internal/impl/checkinit.go
jx12n 4d9a26498e hush: one-time secret links the server cannot read
Paste a secret, get a link, send it. The first person to open it and press
Reveal sees the secret; the link dies at that moment. The recipient needs a
browser and nothing else — no account, no client, no installed tooling.

The server cannot read what it stores. AES-256-GCM happens in the browser and
the key lives in the URL fragment, which browsers never transmit, so hushd
holds ciphertext and no key material. That is a property of where the key sits
rather than a promise about our conduct, which is why there is deliberately no
endpoint accepting a plaintext secret and no server-side-encryption fallback:
two guarantees behind one URL would be worse than one honest guarantee.

Three decisions carry the design:

  * GET /s/{id} touches NO storage, not even to check existence. Slack, Teams,
    WhatsApp, iMessage and Outlook Safe Links all fetch a URL before a human
    sees it, so destroying on GET would destroy most secrets in transit and the
    recipient's "already used" would be indistinguishable from interception.
    Only POST /reveal consumes. Bot user-agent detection is an arms race;
    removing the side effect from GET is not. Pinned by
    TestGettingTheRevealPageNeverConsumesTheSecret.
  * Destruction is one Redis GETDEL, which is atomic. GET-then-DEL has a window
    where two simultaneous readers both win, and for a one-time secret that
    window is the product. The store contract demands atomicity and the same
    concurrency test runs against both implementations.
  * Missing, already-revealed, expired and evicted are ONE indistinguishable
    410. Separating them would confirm to a prober that a given link was real.

The secret id IS the capability, so secret.ID is a struct whose every
accidental path — %v, %s, String(), slog, json.Marshal — emits a redacted
handle or refuses, and the raw value needs an explicit Value(). The first
version tried to prevent leaks by implementing no String() at all; its own test
caught that Go's fmt prints unexported fields anyway, so forbidding the method
had removed the control rather than the leak.

Operationally: structured JSON on stdout in the fleet's wire format, which
Vector already collects with no annotation; six hush_* metrics on the chassis
registry with no id, IP or path in any label; five alert rules wired into
vmalert. The public Ingress enumerates /, /s/ and /api/ so /metrics, /healthz
and /readyz share the port but are unreachable from the internet — no
basic-auth middleware to maintain and get wrong.

Dependencies are vendored because go-chassis is private: the Woodpecker test
step and the in-cluster Kaniko build both run -mod=vendor with GOPROXY=off and
hold no git credential.

cmd/hush-mcp is a stdio MCP server doing the same client-side crypto locally,
so using hush from an agent preserves the same guarantee as using it from a
browser.
2026-09-03 00:08:38 -06:00

175 lines
4.3 KiB
Go

// Copyright 2019 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
package impl
import (
"sync"
"google.golang.org/protobuf/internal/errors"
"google.golang.org/protobuf/reflect/protoreflect"
"google.golang.org/protobuf/runtime/protoiface"
)
func (mi *MessageInfo) checkInitialized(in protoiface.CheckInitializedInput) (protoiface.CheckInitializedOutput, error) {
var p pointer
if ms, ok := in.Message.(*messageState); ok {
p = ms.pointer()
} else {
p = in.Message.(*messageReflectWrapper).pointer()
}
return protoiface.CheckInitializedOutput{}, mi.checkInitializedPointer(p)
}
func (mi *MessageInfo) checkInitializedPointer(p pointer) error {
mi.init()
if !mi.needsInitCheck {
return nil
}
if p.IsNil() {
for _, f := range mi.orderedCoderFields {
if f.isRequired {
return errors.RequiredNotSet(string(mi.Desc.Fields().ByNumber(f.num).FullName()))
}
}
return nil
}
var presence presence
if mi.presenceOffset.IsValid() {
presence = p.Apply(mi.presenceOffset).PresenceInfo()
}
if mi.extensionOffset.IsValid() {
e := p.Apply(mi.extensionOffset).Extensions()
if err := mi.isInitExtensions(e); err != nil {
return err
}
}
for _, f := range mi.orderedCoderFields {
if !f.isRequired && f.funcs.isInit == nil {
continue
}
if f.presenceIndex != noPresence {
if !presence.Present(f.presenceIndex) {
if f.isRequired {
return errors.RequiredNotSet(string(mi.Desc.Fields().ByNumber(f.num).FullName()))
}
continue
}
if f.funcs.isInit != nil {
f.mi.init()
if f.mi.needsInitCheck {
if f.isLazy && p.Apply(f.offset).AtomicGetPointer().IsNil() {
lazy := *p.Apply(mi.lazyOffset).LazyInfoPtr()
if !lazy.AllowedPartial() {
// Nothing to see here, it was checked on unmarshal
continue
}
mi.lazyUnmarshal(p, f.num)
}
if err := f.funcs.isInit(p.Apply(f.offset), f); err != nil {
return err
}
}
}
continue
}
fptr := p.Apply(f.offset)
if f.isPointer && fptr.Elem().IsNil() {
if f.isRequired {
return errors.RequiredNotSet(string(mi.Desc.Fields().ByNumber(f.num).FullName()))
}
continue
}
if f.funcs.isInit == nil {
continue
}
if err := f.funcs.isInit(fptr, f); err != nil {
return err
}
}
return nil
}
func (mi *MessageInfo) isInitExtensions(ext *map[int32]ExtensionField) error {
if ext == nil {
return nil
}
for _, x := range *ext {
ei := getExtensionFieldInfo(x.Type())
if ei.funcs.isInit == nil || x.isUnexpandedLazy() {
continue
}
v := x.Value()
if !v.IsValid() {
continue
}
if err := ei.funcs.isInit(v); err != nil {
return err
}
}
return nil
}
var (
needsInitCheckMu sync.Mutex
needsInitCheckMap sync.Map
)
// needsInitCheck reports whether a message needs to be checked for partial initialization.
//
// It returns true if the message transitively includes any required or extension fields.
func needsInitCheck(md protoreflect.MessageDescriptor) bool {
if v, ok := needsInitCheckMap.Load(md); ok {
if has, ok := v.(bool); ok {
return has
}
}
needsInitCheckMu.Lock()
defer needsInitCheckMu.Unlock()
return needsInitCheckLocked(md)
}
func needsInitCheckLocked(md protoreflect.MessageDescriptor) (has bool) {
if v, ok := needsInitCheckMap.Load(md); ok {
// If has is true, we've previously determined that this message
// needs init checks.
//
// If has is false, we've previously determined that it can never
// be uninitialized.
//
// If has is not a bool, we've just encountered a cycle in the
// message graph. In this case, it is safe to return false: If
// the message does have required fields, we'll detect them later
// in the graph traversal.
has, ok := v.(bool)
return ok && has
}
needsInitCheckMap.Store(md, struct{}{}) // avoid cycles while descending into this message
defer func() {
needsInitCheckMap.Store(md, has)
}()
if md.RequiredNumbers().Len() > 0 {
return true
}
if md.ExtensionRanges().Len() > 0 {
return true
}
for i := 0; i < md.Fields().Len(); i++ {
fd := md.Fields().Get(i)
// Map keys are never messages, so just consider the map value.
if fd.IsMap() {
fd = fd.MapValue()
}
fmd := fd.Message()
if fmd != nil && needsInitCheckLocked(fmd) {
return true
}
}
return false
}