Paste a secret, get a link, send it. The first person to open it and press
Reveal sees the secret; the link dies at that moment. The recipient needs a
browser and nothing else — no account, no client, no installed tooling.
The server cannot read what it stores. AES-256-GCM happens in the browser and
the key lives in the URL fragment, which browsers never transmit, so hushd
holds ciphertext and no key material. That is a property of where the key sits
rather than a promise about our conduct, which is why there is deliberately no
endpoint accepting a plaintext secret and no server-side-encryption fallback:
two guarantees behind one URL would be worse than one honest guarantee.
Three decisions carry the design:
* GET /s/{id} touches NO storage, not even to check existence. Slack, Teams,
WhatsApp, iMessage and Outlook Safe Links all fetch a URL before a human
sees it, so destroying on GET would destroy most secrets in transit and the
recipient's "already used" would be indistinguishable from interception.
Only POST /reveal consumes. Bot user-agent detection is an arms race;
removing the side effect from GET is not. Pinned by
TestGettingTheRevealPageNeverConsumesTheSecret.
* Destruction is one Redis GETDEL, which is atomic. GET-then-DEL has a window
where two simultaneous readers both win, and for a one-time secret that
window is the product. The store contract demands atomicity and the same
concurrency test runs against both implementations.
* Missing, already-revealed, expired and evicted are ONE indistinguishable
410. Separating them would confirm to a prober that a given link was real.
The secret id IS the capability, so secret.ID is a struct whose every
accidental path — %v, %s, String(), slog, json.Marshal — emits a redacted
handle or refuses, and the raw value needs an explicit Value(). The first
version tried to prevent leaks by implementing no String() at all; its own test
caught that Go's fmt prints unexported fields anyway, so forbidding the method
had removed the control rather than the leak.
Operationally: structured JSON on stdout in the fleet's wire format, which
Vector already collects with no annotation; six hush_* metrics on the chassis
registry with no id, IP or path in any label; five alert rules wired into
vmalert. The public Ingress enumerates /, /s/ and /api/ so /metrics, /healthz
and /readyz share the port but are unreachable from the internet — no
basic-auth middleware to maintain and get wrong.
Dependencies are vendored because go-chassis is private: the Woodpecker test
step and the in-cluster Kaniko build both run -mod=vendor with GOPROXY=off and
hold no git credential.
cmd/hush-mcp is a stdio MCP server doing the same client-side crypto locally,
so using hush from an agent preserves the same guarantee as using it from a
browser.
210 lines
4.6 KiB
Go
210 lines
4.6 KiB
Go
// Copyright The Prometheus Authors
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// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
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// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
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// You may obtain a copy of the License at
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//
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// http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
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//
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// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
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// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
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// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
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// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
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// limitations under the License.
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//go:build (aix || darwin || dragonfly || freebsd || linux || netbsd || openbsd || solaris) && !js
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package procfs
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import (
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"bufio"
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"fmt"
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"os"
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"strconv"
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"strings"
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"golang.org/x/sys/unix"
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)
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// ProcMapPermissions contains permission settings read from `/proc/[pid]/maps`.
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type ProcMapPermissions struct {
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// mapping has the [R]ead flag set
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Read bool
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// mapping has the [W]rite flag set
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Write bool
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// mapping has the [X]ecutable flag set
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Execute bool
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// mapping has the [S]hared flag set
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Shared bool
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// mapping is marked as [P]rivate (copy on write)
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Private bool
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}
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// ProcMap contains the process memory-mappings of the process
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// read from `/proc/[pid]/maps`.
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type ProcMap struct {
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// The start address of current mapping.
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StartAddr uintptr
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// The end address of the current mapping
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EndAddr uintptr
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// The permissions for this mapping
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Perms *ProcMapPermissions
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// The current offset into the file/fd (e.g., shared libs)
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Offset int64
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// Device owner of this mapping (major:minor) in Mkdev format.
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Dev uint64
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// The inode of the device above
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Inode uint64
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// The file or psuedofile (or empty==anonymous)
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Pathname string
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}
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// parseDevice parses the device token of a line and converts it to a dev_t
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// (mkdev) like structure.
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func parseDevice(s string) (uint64, error) {
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i := strings.Index(s, ":")
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if i == -1 {
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return 0, fmt.Errorf("%w: expected separator `:` in %s", ErrFileParse, s)
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}
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major, err := strconv.ParseUint(s[0:i], 16, 0)
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if err != nil {
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return 0, err
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}
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minor, err := strconv.ParseUint(s[i+1:], 16, 0)
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if err != nil {
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return 0, err
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}
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return unix.Mkdev(uint32(major), uint32(minor)), nil
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}
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// parseAddress converts a hex-string to a uintptr.
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func parseAddress(s string) (uintptr, error) {
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a, err := strconv.ParseUint(s, 16, 0)
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if err != nil {
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return 0, err
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}
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return uintptr(a), nil
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}
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// parseAddresses parses the start-end address.
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func parseAddresses(s string) (uintptr, uintptr, error) {
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idx := strings.Index(s, "-")
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if idx == -1 {
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return 0, 0, fmt.Errorf("%w: expected separator `-` in %s", ErrFileParse, s)
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}
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saddr, err := parseAddress(s[0:idx])
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if err != nil {
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return 0, 0, err
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}
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eaddr, err := parseAddress(s[idx+1:])
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if err != nil {
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return 0, 0, err
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}
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return saddr, eaddr, nil
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}
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// parsePermissions parses a token and returns any that are set.
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func parsePermissions(s string) (*ProcMapPermissions, error) {
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if len(s) < 4 {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: invalid permissions token", ErrFileParse)
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}
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perms := ProcMapPermissions{}
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for _, ch := range s {
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switch ch {
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case 'r':
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perms.Read = true
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case 'w':
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perms.Write = true
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case 'x':
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perms.Execute = true
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case 'p':
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perms.Private = true
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case 's':
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perms.Shared = true
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}
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}
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return &perms, nil
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}
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// parseProcMap will attempt to parse a single line within a proc/[pid]/maps
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// buffer.
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func parseProcMap(text string) (*ProcMap, error) {
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fields := strings.Fields(text)
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if len(fields) < 5 {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: truncated procmap entry", ErrFileParse)
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}
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saddr, eaddr, err := parseAddresses(fields[0])
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if err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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perms, err := parsePermissions(fields[1])
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if err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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offset, err := strconv.ParseInt(fields[2], 16, 0)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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device, err := parseDevice(fields[3])
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if err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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inode, err := strconv.ParseUint(fields[4], 10, 0)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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pathname := ""
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if len(fields) >= 5 {
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pathname = strings.Join(fields[5:], " ")
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}
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return &ProcMap{
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StartAddr: saddr,
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EndAddr: eaddr,
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Perms: perms,
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Offset: offset,
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Dev: device,
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Inode: inode,
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Pathname: pathname,
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}, nil
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}
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// ProcMaps reads from /proc/[pid]/maps to get the memory-mappings of the
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// process.
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func (p Proc) ProcMaps() ([]*ProcMap, error) {
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file, err := os.Open(p.path("maps"))
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if err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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defer file.Close()
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maps := []*ProcMap{}
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scan := bufio.NewScanner(file)
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for scan.Scan() {
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m, err := parseProcMap(scan.Text())
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if err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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maps = append(maps, m)
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}
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return maps, nil
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}
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