4d9a26498e
Paste a secret, get a link, send it. The first person to open it and press
Reveal sees the secret; the link dies at that moment. The recipient needs a
browser and nothing else — no account, no client, no installed tooling.
The server cannot read what it stores. AES-256-GCM happens in the browser and
the key lives in the URL fragment, which browsers never transmit, so hushd
holds ciphertext and no key material. That is a property of where the key sits
rather than a promise about our conduct, which is why there is deliberately no
endpoint accepting a plaintext secret and no server-side-encryption fallback:
two guarantees behind one URL would be worse than one honest guarantee.
Three decisions carry the design:
* GET /s/{id} touches NO storage, not even to check existence. Slack, Teams,
WhatsApp, iMessage and Outlook Safe Links all fetch a URL before a human
sees it, so destroying on GET would destroy most secrets in transit and the
recipient's "already used" would be indistinguishable from interception.
Only POST /reveal consumes. Bot user-agent detection is an arms race;
removing the side effect from GET is not. Pinned by
TestGettingTheRevealPageNeverConsumesTheSecret.
* Destruction is one Redis GETDEL, which is atomic. GET-then-DEL has a window
where two simultaneous readers both win, and for a one-time secret that
window is the product. The store contract demands atomicity and the same
concurrency test runs against both implementations.
* Missing, already-revealed, expired and evicted are ONE indistinguishable
410. Separating them would confirm to a prober that a given link was real.
The secret id IS the capability, so secret.ID is a struct whose every
accidental path — %v, %s, String(), slog, json.Marshal — emits a redacted
handle or refuses, and the raw value needs an explicit Value(). The first
version tried to prevent leaks by implementing no String() at all; its own test
caught that Go's fmt prints unexported fields anyway, so forbidding the method
had removed the control rather than the leak.
Operationally: structured JSON on stdout in the fleet's wire format, which
Vector already collects with no annotation; six hush_* metrics on the chassis
registry with no id, IP or path in any label; five alert rules wired into
vmalert. The public Ingress enumerates /, /s/ and /api/ so /metrics, /healthz
and /readyz share the port but are unreachable from the internet — no
basic-auth middleware to maintain and get wrong.
Dependencies are vendored because go-chassis is private: the Woodpecker test
step and the in-cluster Kaniko build both run -mod=vendor with GOPROXY=off and
hold no git credential.
cmd/hush-mcp is a stdio MCP server doing the same client-side crypto locally,
so using hush from an agent preserves the same guarantee as using it from a
browser.
61 lines
2.1 KiB
Go
61 lines
2.1 KiB
Go
package maintnotifications
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import (
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"context"
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"slices"
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"github.com/redis/go-redis/v9/internal"
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"github.com/redis/go-redis/v9/internal/maintnotifications/logs"
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"github.com/redis/go-redis/v9/internal/pool"
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"github.com/redis/go-redis/v9/push"
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)
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// LoggingHook is an example hook implementation that logs all notifications.
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type LoggingHook struct {
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LogLevel int // 0=Error, 1=Warn, 2=Info, 3=Debug
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}
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// PreHook logs the notification before processing and allows modification.
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func (lh *LoggingHook) PreHook(ctx context.Context, notificationCtx push.NotificationHandlerContext, notificationType string, notification []interface{}) ([]interface{}, bool) {
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if lh.LogLevel >= 2 { // Info level
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// Log the notification type and content
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connID := uint64(0)
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if conn, ok := notificationCtx.Conn.(*pool.Conn); ok {
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connID = conn.GetID()
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}
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seqID := int64(0)
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if slices.Contains(maintenanceNotificationTypes, notificationType) {
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// seqID is the second element in the notification array
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if len(notification) > 1 {
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if parsedSeqID, ok := notification[1].(int64); !ok {
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seqID = 0
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} else {
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seqID = parsedSeqID
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}
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}
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}
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internal.Logger.Printf(ctx, logs.ProcessingNotification(connID, seqID, notificationType, notification))
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}
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return notification, true // Continue processing with unmodified notification
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}
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// PostHook logs the result after processing.
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func (lh *LoggingHook) PostHook(ctx context.Context, notificationCtx push.NotificationHandlerContext, notificationType string, notification []interface{}, result error) {
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connID := uint64(0)
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if conn, ok := notificationCtx.Conn.(*pool.Conn); ok {
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connID = conn.GetID()
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}
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if result != nil && lh.LogLevel >= 1 { // Warning level
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internal.Logger.Printf(ctx, logs.ProcessingNotificationFailed(connID, notificationType, result, notification))
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} else if lh.LogLevel >= 3 { // Debug level
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internal.Logger.Printf(ctx, logs.ProcessingNotificationSucceeded(connID, notificationType))
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}
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}
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// NewLoggingHook creates a new logging hook with the specified log level.
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// Log levels: 0=Error, 1=Warn, 2=Info, 3=Debug
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func NewLoggingHook(logLevel int) *LoggingHook {
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return &LoggingHook{LogLevel: logLevel}
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}
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