4d9a26498e
Paste a secret, get a link, send it. The first person to open it and press
Reveal sees the secret; the link dies at that moment. The recipient needs a
browser and nothing else — no account, no client, no installed tooling.
The server cannot read what it stores. AES-256-GCM happens in the browser and
the key lives in the URL fragment, which browsers never transmit, so hushd
holds ciphertext and no key material. That is a property of where the key sits
rather than a promise about our conduct, which is why there is deliberately no
endpoint accepting a plaintext secret and no server-side-encryption fallback:
two guarantees behind one URL would be worse than one honest guarantee.
Three decisions carry the design:
* GET /s/{id} touches NO storage, not even to check existence. Slack, Teams,
WhatsApp, iMessage and Outlook Safe Links all fetch a URL before a human
sees it, so destroying on GET would destroy most secrets in transit and the
recipient's "already used" would be indistinguishable from interception.
Only POST /reveal consumes. Bot user-agent detection is an arms race;
removing the side effect from GET is not. Pinned by
TestGettingTheRevealPageNeverConsumesTheSecret.
* Destruction is one Redis GETDEL, which is atomic. GET-then-DEL has a window
where two simultaneous readers both win, and for a one-time secret that
window is the product. The store contract demands atomicity and the same
concurrency test runs against both implementations.
* Missing, already-revealed, expired and evicted are ONE indistinguishable
410. Separating them would confirm to a prober that a given link was real.
The secret id IS the capability, so secret.ID is a struct whose every
accidental path — %v, %s, String(), slog, json.Marshal — emits a redacted
handle or refuses, and the raw value needs an explicit Value(). The first
version tried to prevent leaks by implementing no String() at all; its own test
caught that Go's fmt prints unexported fields anyway, so forbidding the method
had removed the control rather than the leak.
Operationally: structured JSON on stdout in the fleet's wire format, which
Vector already collects with no annotation; six hush_* metrics on the chassis
registry with no id, IP or path in any label; five alert rules wired into
vmalert. The public Ingress enumerates /, /s/ and /api/ so /metrics, /healthz
and /readyz share the port but are unreachable from the internet — no
basic-auth middleware to maintain and get wrong.
Dependencies are vendored because go-chassis is private: the Woodpecker test
step and the in-cluster Kaniko build both run -mod=vendor with GOPROXY=off and
hold no git credential.
cmd/hush-mcp is a stdio MCP server doing the same client-side crypto locally,
so using hush from an agent preserves the same guarantee as using it from a
browser.
44 lines
1018 B
Go
44 lines
1018 B
Go
// Copyright 2019 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
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// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
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// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
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package proto
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import (
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"fmt"
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"google.golang.org/protobuf/reflect/protoreflect"
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)
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// Reset clears every field in the message.
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// The resulting message shares no observable memory with its previous state
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// other than the memory for the message itself.
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func Reset(m Message) {
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if mr, ok := m.(interface{ Reset() }); ok && hasProtoMethods {
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mr.Reset()
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return
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}
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resetMessage(m.ProtoReflect())
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}
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func resetMessage(m protoreflect.Message) {
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if !m.IsValid() {
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panic(fmt.Sprintf("cannot reset invalid %v message", m.Descriptor().FullName()))
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}
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// Clear all known fields.
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fds := m.Descriptor().Fields()
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for i := 0; i < fds.Len(); i++ {
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m.Clear(fds.Get(i))
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}
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// Clear extension fields.
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m.Range(func(fd protoreflect.FieldDescriptor, _ protoreflect.Value) bool {
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m.Clear(fd)
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return true
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})
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// Clear unknown fields.
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m.SetUnknown(nil)
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}
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