4d9a26498e
Paste a secret, get a link, send it. The first person to open it and press
Reveal sees the secret; the link dies at that moment. The recipient needs a
browser and nothing else — no account, no client, no installed tooling.
The server cannot read what it stores. AES-256-GCM happens in the browser and
the key lives in the URL fragment, which browsers never transmit, so hushd
holds ciphertext and no key material. That is a property of where the key sits
rather than a promise about our conduct, which is why there is deliberately no
endpoint accepting a plaintext secret and no server-side-encryption fallback:
two guarantees behind one URL would be worse than one honest guarantee.
Three decisions carry the design:
* GET /s/{id} touches NO storage, not even to check existence. Slack, Teams,
WhatsApp, iMessage and Outlook Safe Links all fetch a URL before a human
sees it, so destroying on GET would destroy most secrets in transit and the
recipient's "already used" would be indistinguishable from interception.
Only POST /reveal consumes. Bot user-agent detection is an arms race;
removing the side effect from GET is not. Pinned by
TestGettingTheRevealPageNeverConsumesTheSecret.
* Destruction is one Redis GETDEL, which is atomic. GET-then-DEL has a window
where two simultaneous readers both win, and for a one-time secret that
window is the product. The store contract demands atomicity and the same
concurrency test runs against both implementations.
* Missing, already-revealed, expired and evicted are ONE indistinguishable
410. Separating them would confirm to a prober that a given link was real.
The secret id IS the capability, so secret.ID is a struct whose every
accidental path — %v, %s, String(), slog, json.Marshal — emits a redacted
handle or refuses, and the raw value needs an explicit Value(). The first
version tried to prevent leaks by implementing no String() at all; its own test
caught that Go's fmt prints unexported fields anyway, so forbidding the method
had removed the control rather than the leak.
Operationally: structured JSON on stdout in the fleet's wire format, which
Vector already collects with no annotation; six hush_* metrics on the chassis
registry with no id, IP or path in any label; five alert rules wired into
vmalert. The public Ingress enumerates /, /s/ and /api/ so /metrics, /healthz
and /readyz share the port but are unreachable from the internet — no
basic-auth middleware to maintain and get wrong.
Dependencies are vendored because go-chassis is private: the Woodpecker test
step and the in-cluster Kaniko build both run -mod=vendor with GOPROXY=off and
hold no git credential.
cmd/hush-mcp is a stdio MCP server doing the same client-side crypto locally,
so using hush from an agent preserves the same guarantee as using it from a
browser.
63 lines
2.2 KiB
YAML
63 lines
2.2 KiB
YAML
# hush CI/CD. Origin must be Gitea (git.threesix.ai) — that remote carries the
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# webhook. Pushing to the GitHub mirror does not deploy anything.
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#
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# push to main → test → Kaniko amd64 build → Zot → kubectl set image on `projects`
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clone:
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git:
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image: woodpeckerci/plugin-git
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settings:
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depth: 1
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steps:
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test:
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# 1.26, not the 1.25 in the template: go-chassis declares `go 1.26.0` and an
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# older toolchain refuses to build it.
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image: golang:1.26-alpine
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environment:
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# Hermetic, and deliberately so. go-chassis is a PRIVATE module and this
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# container has no git credential, so a build that reached for the network
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# would fail here — the vendored tree is what makes CI possible at all.
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# GOPROXY=off turns "silently fetched from a proxy" into a hard error.
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GOFLAGS: -mod=vendor
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GOPROXY: "off"
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commands:
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- go vet ./...
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- go test ./...
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# gofmt as a gate, not a suggestion. -l lists offenders; the test fails if
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# the list is non-empty. vendor/ is excluded because it is not ours.
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- test -z "$(gofmt -l ./cmd ./internal)" || { gofmt -l ./cmd ./internal; echo "gofmt"; exit 1; }
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when:
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branch: main
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event: push
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build:
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image: woodpeckerci/plugin-kaniko
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settings:
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registry: registry.threesix.ai
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repo: hush/api
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tags:
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- latest
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# SHA-tagged as well as latest: `latest` cannot pin a rollback.
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- ${CI_COMMIT_SHA:0:8}
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context: .
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dockerfile: Dockerfile
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cache: true
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skip_tls_verify: true # internal Zot registry, self-signed cert
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when:
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branch: main
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event: push
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deploy:
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image: bitnami/kubectl:latest
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commands:
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- kubectl set image deployment/hush hushd=registry.threesix.ai/hush/api:${CI_COMMIT_SHA:0:8} -n projects
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- kubectl rollout status deployment/hush -n projects --timeout=120s
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# Prove the rolled pod actually serves, not merely that it became Ready.
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# A pod can pass readiness and still be the wrong image if `set image`
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# silently matched nothing.
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- kubectl -n projects get deployment hush -o jsonpath='{.spec.template.spec.containers[0].image}{"\n"}'
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when:
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branch: main
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event: push
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