hush/vendor/github.com/redis/go-redis/v9/acl_commands.go
jx12n 4d9a26498e hush: one-time secret links the server cannot read
Paste a secret, get a link, send it. The first person to open it and press
Reveal sees the secret; the link dies at that moment. The recipient needs a
browser and nothing else — no account, no client, no installed tooling.

The server cannot read what it stores. AES-256-GCM happens in the browser and
the key lives in the URL fragment, which browsers never transmit, so hushd
holds ciphertext and no key material. That is a property of where the key sits
rather than a promise about our conduct, which is why there is deliberately no
endpoint accepting a plaintext secret and no server-side-encryption fallback:
two guarantees behind one URL would be worse than one honest guarantee.

Three decisions carry the design:

  * GET /s/{id} touches NO storage, not even to check existence. Slack, Teams,
    WhatsApp, iMessage and Outlook Safe Links all fetch a URL before a human
    sees it, so destroying on GET would destroy most secrets in transit and the
    recipient's "already used" would be indistinguishable from interception.
    Only POST /reveal consumes. Bot user-agent detection is an arms race;
    removing the side effect from GET is not. Pinned by
    TestGettingTheRevealPageNeverConsumesTheSecret.
  * Destruction is one Redis GETDEL, which is atomic. GET-then-DEL has a window
    where two simultaneous readers both win, and for a one-time secret that
    window is the product. The store contract demands atomicity and the same
    concurrency test runs against both implementations.
  * Missing, already-revealed, expired and evicted are ONE indistinguishable
    410. Separating them would confirm to a prober that a given link was real.

The secret id IS the capability, so secret.ID is a struct whose every
accidental path — %v, %s, String(), slog, json.Marshal — emits a redacted
handle or refuses, and the raw value needs an explicit Value(). The first
version tried to prevent leaks by implementing no String() at all; its own test
caught that Go's fmt prints unexported fields anyway, so forbidding the method
had removed the control rather than the leak.

Operationally: structured JSON on stdout in the fleet's wire format, which
Vector already collects with no annotation; six hush_* metrics on the chassis
registry with no id, IP or path in any label; five alert rules wired into
vmalert. The public Ingress enumerates /, /s/ and /api/ so /metrics, /healthz
and /readyz share the port but are unreachable from the internet — no
basic-auth middleware to maintain and get wrong.

Dependencies are vendored because go-chassis is private: the Woodpecker test
step and the in-cluster Kaniko build both run -mod=vendor with GOPROXY=off and
hold no git credential.

cmd/hush-mcp is a stdio MCP server doing the same client-side crypto locally,
so using hush from an agent preserves the same guarantee as using it from a
browser.
2026-09-03 00:08:38 -06:00

117 lines
3.0 KiB
Go

package redis
import "context"
type ACLCmdable interface {
ACLDryRun(ctx context.Context, username string, command ...interface{}) *StringCmd
ACLLog(ctx context.Context, count int64) *ACLLogCmd
ACLLogReset(ctx context.Context) *StatusCmd
ACLGenPass(ctx context.Context, bit int) *StringCmd
ACLSetUser(ctx context.Context, username string, rules ...string) *StatusCmd
ACLDelUser(ctx context.Context, username string) *IntCmd
ACLUsers(ctx context.Context) *StringSliceCmd
ACLWhoAmI(ctx context.Context) *StringCmd
ACLList(ctx context.Context) *StringSliceCmd
ACLCat(ctx context.Context) *StringSliceCmd
ACLCatArgs(ctx context.Context, options *ACLCatArgs) *StringSliceCmd
}
type ACLCatArgs struct {
Category string
}
func (c cmdable) ACLDryRun(ctx context.Context, username string, command ...interface{}) *StringCmd {
args := make([]interface{}, 0, 3+len(command))
args = append(args, "acl", "dryrun", username)
args = append(args, command...)
cmd := NewStringCmd(ctx, args...)
_ = c(ctx, cmd)
return cmd
}
func (c cmdable) ACLLog(ctx context.Context, count int64) *ACLLogCmd {
args := make([]interface{}, 0, 3)
args = append(args, "acl", "log")
if count > 0 {
args = append(args, count)
}
cmd := NewACLLogCmd(ctx, args...)
_ = c(ctx, cmd)
return cmd
}
func (c cmdable) ACLLogReset(ctx context.Context) *StatusCmd {
cmd := NewStatusCmd(ctx, "acl", "log", "reset")
_ = c(ctx, cmd)
return cmd
}
func (c cmdable) ACLDelUser(ctx context.Context, username string) *IntCmd {
cmd := NewIntCmd(ctx, "acl", "deluser", username)
_ = c(ctx, cmd)
return cmd
}
func (c cmdable) ACLSetUser(ctx context.Context, username string, rules ...string) *StatusCmd {
args := make([]interface{}, 3+len(rules))
args[0] = "acl"
args[1] = "setuser"
args[2] = username
for i, rule := range rules {
args[i+3] = rule
}
cmd := NewStatusCmd(ctx, args...)
_ = c(ctx, cmd)
return cmd
}
func (c cmdable) ACLGenPass(ctx context.Context, bit int) *StringCmd {
args := make([]interface{}, 0, 3)
args = append(args, "acl", "genpass")
if bit > 0 {
args = append(args, bit)
}
cmd := NewStringCmd(ctx, args...)
_ = c(ctx, cmd)
return cmd
}
func (c cmdable) ACLUsers(ctx context.Context) *StringSliceCmd {
cmd := NewStringSliceCmd(ctx, "acl", "users")
_ = c(ctx, cmd)
return cmd
}
func (c cmdable) ACLWhoAmI(ctx context.Context) *StringCmd {
cmd := NewStringCmd(ctx, "acl", "whoami")
_ = c(ctx, cmd)
return cmd
}
func (c cmdable) ACLList(ctx context.Context) *StringSliceCmd {
cmd := NewStringSliceCmd(ctx, "acl", "list")
_ = c(ctx, cmd)
return cmd
}
func (c cmdable) ACLCat(ctx context.Context) *StringSliceCmd {
cmd := NewStringSliceCmd(ctx, "acl", "cat")
_ = c(ctx, cmd)
return cmd
}
func (c cmdable) ACLCatArgs(ctx context.Context, options *ACLCatArgs) *StringSliceCmd {
// if there is a category passed, build new cmd, if there isn't - use the ACLCat method
if options != nil && options.Category != "" {
cmd := NewStringSliceCmd(ctx, "acl", "cat", options.Category)
_ = c(ctx, cmd)
return cmd
}
return c.ACLCat(ctx)
}