Paste a secret, get a link, send it. The first person to open it and press
Reveal sees the secret; the link dies at that moment. The recipient needs a
browser and nothing else — no account, no client, no installed tooling.
The server cannot read what it stores. AES-256-GCM happens in the browser and
the key lives in the URL fragment, which browsers never transmit, so hushd
holds ciphertext and no key material. That is a property of where the key sits
rather than a promise about our conduct, which is why there is deliberately no
endpoint accepting a plaintext secret and no server-side-encryption fallback:
two guarantees behind one URL would be worse than one honest guarantee.
Three decisions carry the design:
* GET /s/{id} touches NO storage, not even to check existence. Slack, Teams,
WhatsApp, iMessage and Outlook Safe Links all fetch a URL before a human
sees it, so destroying on GET would destroy most secrets in transit and the
recipient's "already used" would be indistinguishable from interception.
Only POST /reveal consumes. Bot user-agent detection is an arms race;
removing the side effect from GET is not. Pinned by
TestGettingTheRevealPageNeverConsumesTheSecret.
* Destruction is one Redis GETDEL, which is atomic. GET-then-DEL has a window
where two simultaneous readers both win, and for a one-time secret that
window is the product. The store contract demands atomicity and the same
concurrency test runs against both implementations.
* Missing, already-revealed, expired and evicted are ONE indistinguishable
410. Separating them would confirm to a prober that a given link was real.
The secret id IS the capability, so secret.ID is a struct whose every
accidental path — %v, %s, String(), slog, json.Marshal — emits a redacted
handle or refuses, and the raw value needs an explicit Value(). The first
version tried to prevent leaks by implementing no String() at all; its own test
caught that Go's fmt prints unexported fields anyway, so forbidding the method
had removed the control rather than the leak.
Operationally: structured JSON on stdout in the fleet's wire format, which
Vector already collects with no annotation; six hush_* metrics on the chassis
registry with no id, IP or path in any label; five alert rules wired into
vmalert. The public Ingress enumerates /, /s/ and /api/ so /metrics, /healthz
and /readyz share the port but are unreachable from the internet — no
basic-auth middleware to maintain and get wrong.
Dependencies are vendored because go-chassis is private: the Woodpecker test
step and the in-cluster Kaniko build both run -mod=vendor with GOPROXY=off and
hold no git credential.
cmd/hush-mcp is a stdio MCP server doing the same client-side crypto locally,
so using hush from an agent preserves the same guarantee as using it from a
browser.
119 lines
3.9 KiB
HTML
119 lines
3.9 KiB
HTML
{{define "content"}}
|
|
<h1>hush<span>.</span></h1>
|
|
<p class="lede">Someone sent you a secret. It can be opened once.</p>
|
|
|
|
<div id="gate">
|
|
<p class="note">
|
|
Nothing has been read yet. This page has not touched the secret — opening it
|
|
is the button below, so a link preview in a chat app cannot consume it.
|
|
</p>
|
|
<button id="go">Reveal the secret</button>
|
|
<p class="note" id="msg"></p>
|
|
</div>
|
|
|
|
<div id="result" class="hide">
|
|
<label>The secret</label>
|
|
<div class="out" id="plain"></div>
|
|
<div class="row">
|
|
<button id="copy">Copy</button>
|
|
</div>
|
|
<p class="note warn">
|
|
Destroyed. Reloading this page will not show it again — copy it now.
|
|
</p>
|
|
</div>
|
|
{{end}}
|
|
|
|
{{define "script"}}
|
|
<script>
|
|
const $ = (id) => document.getElementById(id);
|
|
|
|
// The id comes from the path and the key from the fragment. Neither is
|
|
// interpolated by the server, so this page renders identically for every secret
|
|
// and reflects nothing.
|
|
const id = location.pathname.replace(/^\/s\//, "");
|
|
const key = location.hash.slice(1);
|
|
|
|
if (!key) {
|
|
$("go").disabled = true;
|
|
$("msg").className = "note err";
|
|
$("msg").textContent =
|
|
"This link is missing its key — the part after '#'. Chat apps and email " +
|
|
"clients sometimes truncate it. Ask the sender for the full link; the " +
|
|
"secret is intact and has not been opened.";
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
async function reveal() {
|
|
$("go").disabled = true;
|
|
$("msg").className = "note";
|
|
$("msg").textContent = "Opening…";
|
|
|
|
let res, body;
|
|
try {
|
|
res = await fetch("/api/secrets/" + encodeURIComponent(id) + "/reveal", { method: "POST" });
|
|
body = await res.json();
|
|
} catch (e) {
|
|
// The secret is very likely consumed at this point, so do not offer a retry
|
|
// that would report "gone" and read as a lie about what happened.
|
|
$("msg").className = "note err";
|
|
$("msg").textContent = "Could not reach hush: " + e.message +
|
|
". If the request left your browser, the secret is already destroyed.";
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (res.status === 410) {
|
|
$("msg").className = "note err";
|
|
$("msg").textContent =
|
|
"Gone. This link was already opened, expired, or never existed. " +
|
|
"If you have not opened it yourself, assume someone else did and ask the " +
|
|
"sender to rotate the secret.";
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
if (!res.ok) {
|
|
$("go").disabled = false;
|
|
$("msg").className = "note err";
|
|
$("msg").textContent = body && body.error ? body.error.message : "Server error (" + res.status + ").";
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
let text;
|
|
try {
|
|
text = await open(body.ciphertext, key);
|
|
} catch {
|
|
// Decryption failed AFTER the server destroyed the ciphertext, so there is
|
|
// nothing to retry. Say so, because the alternative is a user reloading
|
|
// forever against a secret that no longer exists.
|
|
$("msg").className = "note err";
|
|
$("msg").textContent =
|
|
"The key in this link does not open this secret, and the ciphertext has " +
|
|
"now been destroyed. The link was probably altered in transit. Ask the " +
|
|
"sender to create a new one.";
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
$("plain").textContent = text;
|
|
$("gate").classList.add("hide");
|
|
$("result").classList.remove("hide");
|
|
// Drop the key from the address bar so a screenshot, a shoulder-surfer or a
|
|
// later copy of the URL does not carry it. The secret is already destroyed
|
|
// server-side, so this only reduces incidental exposure.
|
|
history.replaceState(null, "", location.pathname);
|
|
$("copy").focus();
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
$("go").addEventListener("click", reveal);
|
|
$("copy").addEventListener("click", async () => {
|
|
try {
|
|
await navigator.clipboard.writeText($("plain").textContent);
|
|
$("copy").textContent = "Copied";
|
|
setTimeout(() => ($("copy").textContent = "Copy"), 1500);
|
|
} catch {
|
|
const r = document.createRange();
|
|
r.selectNodeContents($("plain"));
|
|
getSelection().removeAllRanges();
|
|
getSelection().addRange(r);
|
|
$("copy").textContent = "Selected — press copy";
|
|
}
|
|
});
|
|
</script>
|
|
{{end}}
|