hush/internal/web/templates/reveal.html
jx12n 4d9a26498e hush: one-time secret links the server cannot read
Paste a secret, get a link, send it. The first person to open it and press
Reveal sees the secret; the link dies at that moment. The recipient needs a
browser and nothing else — no account, no client, no installed tooling.

The server cannot read what it stores. AES-256-GCM happens in the browser and
the key lives in the URL fragment, which browsers never transmit, so hushd
holds ciphertext and no key material. That is a property of where the key sits
rather than a promise about our conduct, which is why there is deliberately no
endpoint accepting a plaintext secret and no server-side-encryption fallback:
two guarantees behind one URL would be worse than one honest guarantee.

Three decisions carry the design:

  * GET /s/{id} touches NO storage, not even to check existence. Slack, Teams,
    WhatsApp, iMessage and Outlook Safe Links all fetch a URL before a human
    sees it, so destroying on GET would destroy most secrets in transit and the
    recipient's "already used" would be indistinguishable from interception.
    Only POST /reveal consumes. Bot user-agent detection is an arms race;
    removing the side effect from GET is not. Pinned by
    TestGettingTheRevealPageNeverConsumesTheSecret.
  * Destruction is one Redis GETDEL, which is atomic. GET-then-DEL has a window
    where two simultaneous readers both win, and for a one-time secret that
    window is the product. The store contract demands atomicity and the same
    concurrency test runs against both implementations.
  * Missing, already-revealed, expired and evicted are ONE indistinguishable
    410. Separating them would confirm to a prober that a given link was real.

The secret id IS the capability, so secret.ID is a struct whose every
accidental path — %v, %s, String(), slog, json.Marshal — emits a redacted
handle or refuses, and the raw value needs an explicit Value(). The first
version tried to prevent leaks by implementing no String() at all; its own test
caught that Go's fmt prints unexported fields anyway, so forbidding the method
had removed the control rather than the leak.

Operationally: structured JSON on stdout in the fleet's wire format, which
Vector already collects with no annotation; six hush_* metrics on the chassis
registry with no id, IP or path in any label; five alert rules wired into
vmalert. The public Ingress enumerates /, /s/ and /api/ so /metrics, /healthz
and /readyz share the port but are unreachable from the internet — no
basic-auth middleware to maintain and get wrong.

Dependencies are vendored because go-chassis is private: the Woodpecker test
step and the in-cluster Kaniko build both run -mod=vendor with GOPROXY=off and
hold no git credential.

cmd/hush-mcp is a stdio MCP server doing the same client-side crypto locally,
so using hush from an agent preserves the same guarantee as using it from a
browser.
2026-09-03 00:08:38 -06:00

119 lines
3.9 KiB
HTML

{{define "content"}}
<h1>hush<span>.</span></h1>
<p class="lede">Someone sent you a secret. It can be opened once.</p>
<div id="gate">
<p class="note">
Nothing has been read yet. This page has not touched the secret — opening it
is the button below, so a link preview in a chat app cannot consume it.
</p>
<button id="go">Reveal the secret</button>
<p class="note" id="msg"></p>
</div>
<div id="result" class="hide">
<label>The secret</label>
<div class="out" id="plain"></div>
<div class="row">
<button id="copy">Copy</button>
</div>
<p class="note warn">
Destroyed. Reloading this page will not show it again — copy it now.
</p>
</div>
{{end}}
{{define "script"}}
<script>
const $ = (id) => document.getElementById(id);
// The id comes from the path and the key from the fragment. Neither is
// interpolated by the server, so this page renders identically for every secret
// and reflects nothing.
const id = location.pathname.replace(/^\/s\//, "");
const key = location.hash.slice(1);
if (!key) {
$("go").disabled = true;
$("msg").className = "note err";
$("msg").textContent =
"This link is missing its key — the part after '#'. Chat apps and email " +
"clients sometimes truncate it. Ask the sender for the full link; the " +
"secret is intact and has not been opened.";
}
async function reveal() {
$("go").disabled = true;
$("msg").className = "note";
$("msg").textContent = "Opening…";
let res, body;
try {
res = await fetch("/api/secrets/" + encodeURIComponent(id) + "/reveal", { method: "POST" });
body = await res.json();
} catch (e) {
// The secret is very likely consumed at this point, so do not offer a retry
// that would report "gone" and read as a lie about what happened.
$("msg").className = "note err";
$("msg").textContent = "Could not reach hush: " + e.message +
". If the request left your browser, the secret is already destroyed.";
return;
}
if (res.status === 410) {
$("msg").className = "note err";
$("msg").textContent =
"Gone. This link was already opened, expired, or never existed. " +
"If you have not opened it yourself, assume someone else did and ask the " +
"sender to rotate the secret.";
return;
}
if (!res.ok) {
$("go").disabled = false;
$("msg").className = "note err";
$("msg").textContent = body && body.error ? body.error.message : "Server error (" + res.status + ").";
return;
}
let text;
try {
text = await open(body.ciphertext, key);
} catch {
// Decryption failed AFTER the server destroyed the ciphertext, so there is
// nothing to retry. Say so, because the alternative is a user reloading
// forever against a secret that no longer exists.
$("msg").className = "note err";
$("msg").textContent =
"The key in this link does not open this secret, and the ciphertext has " +
"now been destroyed. The link was probably altered in transit. Ask the " +
"sender to create a new one.";
return;
}
$("plain").textContent = text;
$("gate").classList.add("hide");
$("result").classList.remove("hide");
// Drop the key from the address bar so a screenshot, a shoulder-surfer or a
// later copy of the URL does not carry it. The secret is already destroyed
// server-side, so this only reduces incidental exposure.
history.replaceState(null, "", location.pathname);
$("copy").focus();
}
$("go").addEventListener("click", reveal);
$("copy").addEventListener("click", async () => {
try {
await navigator.clipboard.writeText($("plain").textContent);
$("copy").textContent = "Copied";
setTimeout(() => ($("copy").textContent = "Copy"), 1500);
} catch {
const r = document.createRange();
r.selectNodeContents($("plain"));
getSelection().removeAllRanges();
getSelection().addRange(r);
$("copy").textContent = "Selected — press copy";
}
});
</script>
{{end}}