Paste a secret, get a link, send it. The first person to open it and press
Reveal sees the secret; the link dies at that moment. The recipient needs a
browser and nothing else — no account, no client, no installed tooling.
The server cannot read what it stores. AES-256-GCM happens in the browser and
the key lives in the URL fragment, which browsers never transmit, so hushd
holds ciphertext and no key material. That is a property of where the key sits
rather than a promise about our conduct, which is why there is deliberately no
endpoint accepting a plaintext secret and no server-side-encryption fallback:
two guarantees behind one URL would be worse than one honest guarantee.
Three decisions carry the design:
* GET /s/{id} touches NO storage, not even to check existence. Slack, Teams,
WhatsApp, iMessage and Outlook Safe Links all fetch a URL before a human
sees it, so destroying on GET would destroy most secrets in transit and the
recipient's "already used" would be indistinguishable from interception.
Only POST /reveal consumes. Bot user-agent detection is an arms race;
removing the side effect from GET is not. Pinned by
TestGettingTheRevealPageNeverConsumesTheSecret.
* Destruction is one Redis GETDEL, which is atomic. GET-then-DEL has a window
where two simultaneous readers both win, and for a one-time secret that
window is the product. The store contract demands atomicity and the same
concurrency test runs against both implementations.
* Missing, already-revealed, expired and evicted are ONE indistinguishable
410. Separating them would confirm to a prober that a given link was real.
The secret id IS the capability, so secret.ID is a struct whose every
accidental path — %v, %s, String(), slog, json.Marshal — emits a redacted
handle or refuses, and the raw value needs an explicit Value(). The first
version tried to prevent leaks by implementing no String() at all; its own test
caught that Go's fmt prints unexported fields anyway, so forbidding the method
had removed the control rather than the leak.
Operationally: structured JSON on stdout in the fleet's wire format, which
Vector already collects with no annotation; six hush_* metrics on the chassis
registry with no id, IP or path in any label; five alert rules wired into
vmalert. The public Ingress enumerates /, /s/ and /api/ so /metrics, /healthz
and /readyz share the port but are unreachable from the internet — no
basic-auth middleware to maintain and get wrong.
Dependencies are vendored because go-chassis is private: the Woodpecker test
step and the in-cluster Kaniko build both run -mod=vendor with GOPROXY=off and
hold no git credential.
cmd/hush-mcp is a stdio MCP server doing the same client-side crypto locally,
so using hush from an agent preserves the same guarantee as using it from a
browser.
108 lines
2.8 KiB
Go
108 lines
2.8 KiB
Go
// Copyright 2015 The Prometheus Authors
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// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
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// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
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// You may obtain a copy of the License at
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//
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// http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
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//
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// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
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// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
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// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
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// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
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// limitations under the License.
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package model
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import (
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"encoding/json"
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"errors"
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"fmt"
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"regexp"
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"time"
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)
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// Matcher describes a matches the value of a given label.
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type Matcher struct {
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Name LabelName `json:"name"`
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Value string `json:"value"`
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IsRegex bool `json:"isRegex"`
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}
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func (m *Matcher) UnmarshalJSON(b []byte) error {
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type plain Matcher
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if err := json.Unmarshal(b, (*plain)(m)); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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if len(m.Name) == 0 {
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return errors.New("label name in matcher must not be empty")
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}
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if m.IsRegex {
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if _, err := regexp.Compile(m.Value); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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}
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return nil
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}
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// Validate returns true iff all fields of the matcher have valid values.
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func (m *Matcher) Validate() error {
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if !m.Name.IsValid() {
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return fmt.Errorf("invalid name %q", m.Name)
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}
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if m.IsRegex {
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if _, err := regexp.Compile(m.Value); err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("invalid regular expression %q", m.Value)
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}
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} else if !LabelValue(m.Value).IsValid() || len(m.Value) == 0 {
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return fmt.Errorf("invalid value %q", m.Value)
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}
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return nil
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}
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// Silence defines the representation of a silence definition in the Prometheus
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// eco-system.
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type Silence struct {
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ID uint64 `json:"id,omitempty"`
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Matchers []*Matcher `json:"matchers"`
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StartsAt time.Time `json:"startsAt"`
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EndsAt time.Time `json:"endsAt"`
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CreatedAt time.Time `json:"createdAt,omitempty"`
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CreatedBy string `json:"createdBy"`
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Comment string `json:"comment,omitempty"`
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}
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// Validate returns true iff all fields of the silence have valid values.
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func (s *Silence) Validate() error {
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if len(s.Matchers) == 0 {
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return errors.New("at least one matcher required")
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}
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for _, m := range s.Matchers {
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if err := m.Validate(); err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("invalid matcher: %w", err)
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}
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}
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if s.StartsAt.IsZero() {
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return errors.New("start time missing")
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}
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if s.EndsAt.IsZero() {
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return errors.New("end time missing")
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}
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if s.EndsAt.Before(s.StartsAt) {
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return errors.New("start time must be before end time")
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}
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if s.CreatedBy == "" {
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return errors.New("creator information missing")
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}
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if s.Comment == "" {
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return errors.New("comment missing")
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}
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if s.CreatedAt.IsZero() {
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return errors.New("creation timestamp missing")
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}
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return nil
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}
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