hush/vendor/github.com/redis/go-redis/v9/script.go
jx12n 4d9a26498e hush: one-time secret links the server cannot read
Paste a secret, get a link, send it. The first person to open it and press
Reveal sees the secret; the link dies at that moment. The recipient needs a
browser and nothing else — no account, no client, no installed tooling.

The server cannot read what it stores. AES-256-GCM happens in the browser and
the key lives in the URL fragment, which browsers never transmit, so hushd
holds ciphertext and no key material. That is a property of where the key sits
rather than a promise about our conduct, which is why there is deliberately no
endpoint accepting a plaintext secret and no server-side-encryption fallback:
two guarantees behind one URL would be worse than one honest guarantee.

Three decisions carry the design:

  * GET /s/{id} touches NO storage, not even to check existence. Slack, Teams,
    WhatsApp, iMessage and Outlook Safe Links all fetch a URL before a human
    sees it, so destroying on GET would destroy most secrets in transit and the
    recipient's "already used" would be indistinguishable from interception.
    Only POST /reveal consumes. Bot user-agent detection is an arms race;
    removing the side effect from GET is not. Pinned by
    TestGettingTheRevealPageNeverConsumesTheSecret.
  * Destruction is one Redis GETDEL, which is atomic. GET-then-DEL has a window
    where two simultaneous readers both win, and for a one-time secret that
    window is the product. The store contract demands atomicity and the same
    concurrency test runs against both implementations.
  * Missing, already-revealed, expired and evicted are ONE indistinguishable
    410. Separating them would confirm to a prober that a given link was real.

The secret id IS the capability, so secret.ID is a struct whose every
accidental path — %v, %s, String(), slog, json.Marshal — emits a redacted
handle or refuses, and the raw value needs an explicit Value(). The first
version tried to prevent leaks by implementing no String() at all; its own test
caught that Go's fmt prints unexported fields anyway, so forbidding the method
had removed the control rather than the leak.

Operationally: structured JSON on stdout in the fleet's wire format, which
Vector already collects with no annotation; six hush_* metrics on the chassis
registry with no id, IP or path in any label; five alert rules wired into
vmalert. The public Ingress enumerates /, /s/ and /api/ so /metrics, /healthz
and /readyz share the port but are unreachable from the internet — no
basic-auth middleware to maintain and get wrong.

Dependencies are vendored because go-chassis is private: the Woodpecker test
step and the in-cluster Kaniko build both run -mod=vendor with GOPROXY=off and
hold no git credential.

cmd/hush-mcp is a stdio MCP server doing the same client-side crypto locally,
so using hush from an agent preserves the same guarantee as using it from a
browser.
2026-09-03 00:08:38 -06:00

222 lines
5.7 KiB
Go

package redis
import (
"context"
"crypto/sha1"
"encoding/hex"
"errors"
"io"
"sync"
)
type Scripter interface {
Eval(ctx context.Context, script string, keys []string, args ...interface{}) *Cmd
EvalSha(ctx context.Context, sha1 string, keys []string, args ...interface{}) *Cmd
EvalRO(ctx context.Context, script string, keys []string, args ...interface{}) *Cmd
EvalShaRO(ctx context.Context, sha1 string, keys []string, args ...interface{}) *Cmd
ScriptExists(ctx context.Context, hashes ...string) *BoolSliceCmd
ScriptLoad(ctx context.Context, script string) *StringCmd
}
var (
_ Scripter = (*Client)(nil)
_ Scripter = (*Ring)(nil)
_ Scripter = (*ClusterClient)(nil)
)
type Script struct {
src string
mu sync.RWMutex
hash string
serverSHA bool // if true: do not compute SHA-1 in Go; load digest from Redis (SCRIPT LOAD)
}
func NewScript(src string) *Script {
h := sha1.New()
_, _ = io.WriteString(h, src)
return &Script{
src: src,
hash: hex.EncodeToString(h.Sum(nil)),
serverSHA: false,
}
}
// NewScriptServerSHA creates a Script that avoids computing SHA-1 in Go.
// The digest is obtained from Redis via SCRIPT LOAD (server-side hashing),
// then EVALSHA/EVALSHA_RO is used.
func NewScriptServerSHA(src string) *Script {
return &Script{
src: src,
serverSHA: true,
}
}
func (s *Script) Hash() string {
s.mu.RLock()
defer s.mu.RUnlock()
return s.hash
}
func (s *Script) Load(ctx context.Context, c Scripter) *StringCmd {
cmd := c.ScriptLoad(ctx, s.src)
if err := cmd.Err(); err == nil {
s.mu.Lock()
s.hash = cmd.Val()
s.mu.Unlock()
}
return cmd
}
func (s *Script) Exists(ctx context.Context, c Scripter) *BoolSliceCmd {
s.mu.RLock()
hash := s.hash
serverSHA := s.serverSHA
s.mu.RUnlock()
if hash == "" && serverSHA {
// For server-side scripts, obtain digest from Redis first.
// If hash is empty, it means SCRIPT LOAD was not called yet, so we check existence of empty hash which will return false.
// This avoids unnecessary SCRIPT LOAD just to check existence.
if err := s.ensureHash(ctx, c); err != nil {
return c.ScriptExists(ctx, "")
}
s.mu.RLock()
hash = s.hash
s.mu.RUnlock()
}
if hash == "" {
return c.ScriptExists(ctx, "")
}
return c.ScriptExists(ctx, hash)
}
func (s *Script) Eval(ctx context.Context, c Scripter, keys []string, args ...interface{}) *Cmd {
return c.Eval(ctx, s.src, keys, args...)
}
func (s *Script) EvalRO(ctx context.Context, c Scripter, keys []string, args ...interface{}) *Cmd {
return c.EvalRO(ctx, s.src, keys, args...)
}
// ensureHash ensures that s.hash is populated by using SCRIPT LOAD.
// It never calls SHA-1 in Go; Redis computes and returns the digest.
func (s *Script) ensureHash(ctx context.Context, c Scripter) error {
// Fast path: read lock, return if hash is already set.
s.mu.RLock()
if s.hash != "" {
s.mu.RUnlock()
return nil
}
s.mu.RUnlock()
// Slow path: acquire write lock and load.
s.mu.Lock()
if s.hash != "" {
s.mu.Unlock()
return nil
}
cmd := c.ScriptLoad(ctx, s.src)
if err := cmd.Err(); err != nil {
s.mu.Unlock()
return err
}
s.hash = cmd.Val()
s.mu.Unlock()
return nil
}
func (s *Script) EvalSha(ctx context.Context, c Scripter, keys []string, args ...interface{}) *Cmd {
// Default behavior: use client-side SHA-1 computed in NewScript.
if !s.serverSHA {
s.mu.RLock()
hash := s.hash
s.mu.RUnlock()
return c.EvalSha(ctx, hash, keys, args...)
}
// Server-side SHA via SCRIPT LOAD + EVALSHA.
if err := s.ensureHash(ctx, c); err != nil {
return s.Eval(ctx, c, keys, args...)
}
s.mu.RLock()
hash := s.hash
s.mu.RUnlock()
r := c.EvalSha(ctx, hash, keys, args...)
if HasErrorPrefix(r.Err(), "NOSCRIPT") {
// Script cache was flushed; reload and retry once.
if err := s.ensureHash(ctx, c); err != nil {
return s.Eval(ctx, c, keys, args...)
}
s.mu.RLock()
hash = s.hash
s.mu.RUnlock()
return c.EvalSha(ctx, hash, keys, args...)
}
return r
}
func (s *Script) EvalShaRO(ctx context.Context, c Scripter, keys []string, args ...interface{}) *Cmd {
if !s.serverSHA {
s.mu.RLock()
hash := s.hash
s.mu.RUnlock()
return c.EvalShaRO(ctx, hash, keys, args...)
}
if err := s.ensureHash(ctx, c); err != nil {
return s.EvalRO(ctx, c, keys, args...)
}
s.mu.RLock()
hash := s.hash
s.mu.RUnlock()
r := c.EvalShaRO(ctx, hash, keys, args...)
if HasErrorPrefix(r.Err(), "NOSCRIPT") {
if err := s.ensureHash(ctx, c); err != nil {
return s.EvalRO(ctx, c, keys, args...)
}
s.mu.RLock()
hash = s.hash
s.mu.RUnlock()
return c.EvalShaRO(ctx, hash, keys, args...)
}
return r
}
// Run optimistically uses EVALSHA to run the script. If script does not exist
// it is retried using EVAL.
func (s *Script) Run(ctx context.Context, c Scripter, keys []string, args ...interface{}) *Cmd {
r := s.EvalSha(ctx, c, keys, args...)
if isNoScriptErr(r.Err()) {
return s.Eval(ctx, c, keys, args...)
}
return r
}
// RunRO optimistically uses EVALSHA_RO to run the script. If script does not exist
// it is retried using EVAL_RO.
func (s *Script) RunRO(ctx context.Context, c Scripter, keys []string, args ...interface{}) *Cmd {
r := s.EvalShaRO(ctx, c, keys, args...)
if isNoScriptErr(r.Err()) {
return s.EvalRO(ctx, c, keys, args...)
}
return r
}
// isNoScriptErr reports whether err means "this digest is not cached", whether
// it arrived already normalized to ErrNoScript or as the server's raw NOSCRIPT
// error. Both are accepted because the Eval wrappers only normalize when the
// result is readable without blocking — on the deferred autopipeline face the
// raw error reaches here untouched (see cmdable.eval).
func isNoScriptErr(err error) bool {
if err == nil {
return false
}
return errors.Is(err, ErrNoScript) || HasErrorPrefix(err, "NOSCRIPT")
}