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The Woodpecker claim in DEPLOY.md and release.sh was wrong within an hour of
being written. Corrected at the source rather than annotated:
* jordan/hush is active in Woodpecker (repo 139) with the Gitea webhook
installed, so a push to main builds and deploys.
* Activation takes the NUMERIC gitea repo id in forge_remote_id, not
owner/name — worth recording, because passing the wrong shape and passing a
dead token both come back 401 and look identical. GET /api/user separates
them: it is auth-only, so 401 there is the token and 200 there means the
request was the problem.
* The credential is $THREE_SIX_WOODPECKER (and $THREE_SIX_GITEA), in the
operator's environment.
* The stale copy that caused the original 401 is fixed where it lives:
k3sf-rdev-admin-key in GCP Secret Manager, property WOODPECKER_API_TOKEN,
every other property preserved. ESO resynced and the token read out of
rdev/rdev-credentials now answers 200. Documented alongside it: do not patch
that k8s Secret directly, it is ESO-owned and a direct edit is reverted on
the next refresh.
make release stays, with its reason updated — it is now the hotfix/rollback path
and the answer to "CI is down", rather than the only way to deploy.
183 lines
6.2 KiB
Go
183 lines
6.2 KiB
Go
package main
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import (
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"errors"
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"net/http"
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"time"
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"github.com/orchard9/go-chassis/chassis"
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"github.com/orchard9/hush/internal/secret"
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"github.com/orchard9/hush/internal/store"
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"github.com/orchard9/hush/internal/web"
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)
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// Server holds the handler dependencies.
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type Server struct {
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cfg Config
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store store.Store
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pages *web.Pages
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metrics *Metrics
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}
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// pageData is the same for every render: the ciphertext cap, so the browser
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// enforces what the server enforces, and the default lifetime, so the page
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// states the TTL the server will apply. It carries nothing request-specific,
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// which is why both pages are safely static.
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func (s *Server) pageData() web.Data {
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return web.Data{
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MaxCiphertextBytes: secret.MaxCiphertextBytes,
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DefaultTTLSeconds: int(secret.DefaultTTL.Seconds()),
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}
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}
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// handleCreatePage serves GET /.
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func (s *Server) handleCreatePage(c *chassis.Context) error {
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return s.pages.Create(c.Writer(), s.pageData())
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}
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// handleRevealPage serves GET /s/{id}.
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//
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// It touches NO storage — not even to check whether the id exists. That is the
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// design's load-bearing property: Slack, Teams, WhatsApp, iMessage and Outlook
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// Safe Links all fetch URLs before a human sees them, so any read here would
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// destroy most secrets in transit. It also means this response cannot leak
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// whether an id exists.
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//
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// The id is not even parsed: a malformed one gets the same page, and the POST
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// is what answers. Validating here would make this endpoint an id oracle.
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func (s *Server) handleRevealPage(c *chassis.Context) error {
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return s.pages.Reveal(c.Writer(), s.pageData())
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}
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type createRequest struct {
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Ciphertext string `json:"ciphertext"`
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TTLSeconds int64 `json:"ttl_seconds"`
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}
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type createResponse struct {
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ID string `json:"id"`
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ExpiresAt string `json:"expires_at"`
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TTLSeconds int64 `json:"ttl_seconds"`
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}
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// handleCreate serves POST /api/secrets.
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//
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// It accepts ciphertext only. There is deliberately no endpoint taking a
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// plaintext secret: one would make the server able to read secrets, and then
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// nobody could tell from a link which guarantee they had.
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func (s *Server) handleCreate(c *chassis.Context) error {
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var req createRequest
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if err := c.Bind(&req); err != nil {
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s.metrics.Rejected.WithLabelValues(reasonMalformed).Inc()
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return err
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}
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if err := secret.ValidateCiphertext(req.Ciphertext); err != nil {
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reason, code := classifyCiphertextError(err)
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s.metrics.Rejected.WithLabelValues(reason).Inc()
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// err carries sizes, never content: ValidateCiphertext never puts the
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// ciphertext in its message.
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return &chassis.Error{Status: http.StatusUnprocessableEntity, Code: code, Msg: err.Error()}
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}
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ttl, err := secret.ResolveTTL(time.Duration(req.TTLSeconds) * time.Second)
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if err != nil {
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s.metrics.Rejected.WithLabelValues(reasonTTL).Inc()
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return &chassis.Error{Status: http.StatusUnprocessableEntity, Code: reasonTTL, Msg: err.Error()}
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}
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id, err := secret.NewID()
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if err != nil {
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// No entropy means no safe id. Refuse rather than mint a guessable one.
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return chassis.Internal(err)
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}
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if err := s.store.Put(c.Context(), id, req.Ciphertext, ttl); err != nil {
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if errors.Is(err, store.ErrIDCollision) {
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// Impossible at 256 bits, so it means an id-generation bug. Surfaced
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// rather than retried, because a retry loop would hide it.
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c.Log().Error("secret.id_collision", "category", "secret",
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"error_type", "id_collision", "sid", id.LogHandle())
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return chassis.Internal(err)
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}
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return chassis.Internal(err)
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}
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s.metrics.Created.Inc()
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s.metrics.Bytes.Observe(float64(len(req.Ciphertext)))
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// sid, not id: the id is the capability and never reaches a log.
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c.Log().Info("secret.created", "category", "secret",
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"sid", id.LogHandle(), "ttl_seconds", int64(ttl.Seconds()),
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"ciphertext_bytes", len(req.Ciphertext))
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return c.Created(createResponse{
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ID: id.Value(),
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ExpiresAt: time.Now().UTC().Add(ttl).Format(time.RFC3339),
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TTLSeconds: int64(ttl.Seconds()),
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})
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}
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type revealResponse struct {
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Ciphertext string `json:"ciphertext"`
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}
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// gone is the single response for every unavailable secret: never existed,
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// already revealed, expired, or evicted early by Redis.
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//
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// One response for four causes is deliberate. A caller able to tell "already
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// revealed" from "never existed" learns that a particular link was real, which
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// is information about someone else's secret.
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func gone() *chassis.Error {
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return &chassis.Error{
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Status: http.StatusGone,
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Code: "gone",
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Msg: "this secret is not available: it was already revealed, expired, or never existed",
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}
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}
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// handleReveal serves POST /api/secrets/{id}/reveal — the only destructive
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// route, and the reason GET is inert.
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func (s *Server) handleReveal(c *chassis.Context) error {
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id, err := secret.ParseID(c.PathValue("id"))
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if err != nil {
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// A malformed id gets the SAME 410 as a missing one. A 400 here would
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// separate "not an id we could have minted" from "an id that is gone",
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// which is a free oracle for anyone probing the id space.
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s.metrics.Revealed.WithLabelValues("gone").Inc()
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return gone()
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}
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ciphertext, err := s.store.Take(c.Context(), id)
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switch {
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case errors.Is(err, store.ErrGone):
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s.metrics.Revealed.WithLabelValues("gone").Inc()
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c.Log().Info("secret.gone", "category", "secret", "sid", id.LogHandle())
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return gone()
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case err != nil:
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// A store error is NOT reported as gone. The secret may still exist,
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// and telling the recipient it is gone would send them to rotate a
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// credential that was never delivered.
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return chassis.Internal(err)
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}
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s.metrics.Revealed.WithLabelValues("ok").Inc()
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c.Log().Info("secret.revealed", "category", "secret", "sid", id.LogHandle())
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return c.OK(revealResponse{Ciphertext: ciphertext})
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}
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// classifyCiphertextError maps a validation failure to its metric reason and
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// API error code, which are the same vocabulary on purpose.
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func classifyCiphertextError(err error) (reason, code string) {
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switch {
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case errors.Is(err, secret.ErrCiphertextTooLarge):
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return reasonTooLarge, reasonTooLarge
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case errors.Is(err, secret.ErrCiphertextInvalid):
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return reasonInvalid, reasonInvalid
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case errors.Is(err, secret.ErrCiphertextEmpty):
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return reasonEmpty, reasonEmpty
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default:
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return reasonMalformed, reasonMalformed
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}
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}
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