Paste a secret, get a link, send it. The first person to open it and press
Reveal sees the secret; the link dies at that moment. The recipient needs a
browser and nothing else — no account, no client, no installed tooling.
The server cannot read what it stores. AES-256-GCM happens in the browser and
the key lives in the URL fragment, which browsers never transmit, so hushd
holds ciphertext and no key material. That is a property of where the key sits
rather than a promise about our conduct, which is why there is deliberately no
endpoint accepting a plaintext secret and no server-side-encryption fallback:
two guarantees behind one URL would be worse than one honest guarantee.
Three decisions carry the design:
* GET /s/{id} touches NO storage, not even to check existence. Slack, Teams,
WhatsApp, iMessage and Outlook Safe Links all fetch a URL before a human
sees it, so destroying on GET would destroy most secrets in transit and the
recipient's "already used" would be indistinguishable from interception.
Only POST /reveal consumes. Bot user-agent detection is an arms race;
removing the side effect from GET is not. Pinned by
TestGettingTheRevealPageNeverConsumesTheSecret.
* Destruction is one Redis GETDEL, which is atomic. GET-then-DEL has a window
where two simultaneous readers both win, and for a one-time secret that
window is the product. The store contract demands atomicity and the same
concurrency test runs against both implementations.
* Missing, already-revealed, expired and evicted are ONE indistinguishable
410. Separating them would confirm to a prober that a given link was real.
The secret id IS the capability, so secret.ID is a struct whose every
accidental path — %v, %s, String(), slog, json.Marshal — emits a redacted
handle or refuses, and the raw value needs an explicit Value(). The first
version tried to prevent leaks by implementing no String() at all; its own test
caught that Go's fmt prints unexported fields anyway, so forbidding the method
had removed the control rather than the leak.
Operationally: structured JSON on stdout in the fleet's wire format, which
Vector already collects with no annotation; six hush_* metrics on the chassis
registry with no id, IP or path in any label; five alert rules wired into
vmalert. The public Ingress enumerates /, /s/ and /api/ so /metrics, /healthz
and /readyz share the port but are unreachable from the internet — no
basic-auth middleware to maintain and get wrong.
Dependencies are vendored because go-chassis is private: the Woodpecker test
step and the in-cluster Kaniko build both run -mod=vendor with GOPROXY=off and
hold no git credential.
cmd/hush-mcp is a stdio MCP server doing the same client-side crypto locally,
so using hush from an agent preserves the same guarantee as using it from a
browser.
99 lines
3.6 KiB
Go
99 lines
3.6 KiB
Go
// Copyright The Prometheus Authors
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// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
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// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
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// You may obtain a copy of the License at
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//
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// http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
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//
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// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
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// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
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// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
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// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
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// limitations under the License.
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package procfs
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import (
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"bufio"
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"bytes"
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"fmt"
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"strconv"
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"strings"
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"github.com/prometheus/procfs/internal/util"
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)
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// Cgroup models one line from /proc/[pid]/cgroup. Each Cgroup struct describes the placement of a PID inside a
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// specific control hierarchy. The kernel has two cgroup APIs, v1 and v2. The v1 has one hierarchy per available resource
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// controller, while v2 has one unified hierarchy shared by all controllers. Regardless of v1 or v2, all hierarchies
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// contain all running processes, so the question answerable with a Cgroup struct is 'where is this process in
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// this hierarchy' (where==what path on the specific cgroupfs). By prefixing this path with the mount point of
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// *this specific* hierarchy, you can locate the relevant pseudo-files needed to read/set the data for this PID
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// in this hierarchy
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//
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// Also see http://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man7/cgroups.7.html
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type Cgroup struct {
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// HierarchyID that can be matched to a named hierarchy using /proc/cgroups. Cgroups V2 only has one
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// hierarchy, so HierarchyID is always 0. For cgroups v1 this is a unique ID number
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HierarchyID int
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// Controllers using this hierarchy of processes. Controllers are also known as subsystems. For
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// Cgroups V2 this may be empty, as all active controllers use the same hierarchy
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Controllers []string
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// Path of this control group, relative to the mount point of the cgroupfs representing this specific
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// hierarchy
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Path string
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}
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// parseCgroupString parses each line of the /proc/[pid]/cgroup file
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// Line format is hierarchyID:[controller1,controller2]:path.
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func parseCgroupString(cgroupStr string) (*Cgroup, error) {
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var err error
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fields := strings.SplitN(cgroupStr, ":", 3)
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if len(fields) < 3 {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: 3+ fields required, found %d fields in cgroup string: %s", ErrFileParse, len(fields), cgroupStr)
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}
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cgroup := &Cgroup{
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Path: fields[2],
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Controllers: nil,
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}
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cgroup.HierarchyID, err = strconv.Atoi(fields[0])
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if err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: hierarchy ID: %q", ErrFileParse, fields[0])
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}
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if fields[1] != "" {
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ssNames := strings.Split(fields[1], ",")
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cgroup.Controllers = append(cgroup.Controllers, ssNames...)
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}
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return cgroup, nil
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}
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// parseCgroups reads each line of the /proc/[pid]/cgroup file.
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func parseCgroups(data []byte) ([]Cgroup, error) {
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var cgroups []Cgroup
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scanner := bufio.NewScanner(bytes.NewReader(data))
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for scanner.Scan() {
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mountString := scanner.Text()
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parsedMounts, err := parseCgroupString(mountString)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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cgroups = append(cgroups, *parsedMounts)
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}
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err := scanner.Err()
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return cgroups, err
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}
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// Cgroups reads from /proc/<pid>/cgroups and returns a []*Cgroup struct locating this PID in each process
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// control hierarchy running on this system. On every system (v1 and v2), all hierarchies contain all processes,
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// so the len of the returned struct is equal to the number of active hierarchies on this system.
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func (p Proc) Cgroups() ([]Cgroup, error) {
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data, err := util.ReadFileNoStat(p.path("cgroup"))
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if err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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return parseCgroups(data)
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}
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