hush/vendor/github.com/prometheus/procfs/arp.go
jx12n 4d9a26498e hush: one-time secret links the server cannot read
Paste a secret, get a link, send it. The first person to open it and press
Reveal sees the secret; the link dies at that moment. The recipient needs a
browser and nothing else — no account, no client, no installed tooling.

The server cannot read what it stores. AES-256-GCM happens in the browser and
the key lives in the URL fragment, which browsers never transmit, so hushd
holds ciphertext and no key material. That is a property of where the key sits
rather than a promise about our conduct, which is why there is deliberately no
endpoint accepting a plaintext secret and no server-side-encryption fallback:
two guarantees behind one URL would be worse than one honest guarantee.

Three decisions carry the design:

  * GET /s/{id} touches NO storage, not even to check existence. Slack, Teams,
    WhatsApp, iMessage and Outlook Safe Links all fetch a URL before a human
    sees it, so destroying on GET would destroy most secrets in transit and the
    recipient's "already used" would be indistinguishable from interception.
    Only POST /reveal consumes. Bot user-agent detection is an arms race;
    removing the side effect from GET is not. Pinned by
    TestGettingTheRevealPageNeverConsumesTheSecret.
  * Destruction is one Redis GETDEL, which is atomic. GET-then-DEL has a window
    where two simultaneous readers both win, and for a one-time secret that
    window is the product. The store contract demands atomicity and the same
    concurrency test runs against both implementations.
  * Missing, already-revealed, expired and evicted are ONE indistinguishable
    410. Separating them would confirm to a prober that a given link was real.

The secret id IS the capability, so secret.ID is a struct whose every
accidental path — %v, %s, String(), slog, json.Marshal — emits a redacted
handle or refuses, and the raw value needs an explicit Value(). The first
version tried to prevent leaks by implementing no String() at all; its own test
caught that Go's fmt prints unexported fields anyway, so forbidding the method
had removed the control rather than the leak.

Operationally: structured JSON on stdout in the fleet's wire format, which
Vector already collects with no annotation; six hush_* metrics on the chassis
registry with no id, IP or path in any label; five alert rules wired into
vmalert. The public Ingress enumerates /, /s/ and /api/ so /metrics, /healthz
and /readyz share the port but are unreachable from the internet — no
basic-auth middleware to maintain and get wrong.

Dependencies are vendored because go-chassis is private: the Woodpecker test
step and the in-cluster Kaniko build both run -mod=vendor with GOPROXY=off and
hold no git credential.

cmd/hush-mcp is a stdio MCP server doing the same client-side crypto locally,
so using hush from an agent preserves the same guarantee as using it from a
browser.
2026-09-03 00:08:38 -06:00

118 lines
2.9 KiB
Go

// Copyright The Prometheus Authors
// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
// You may obtain a copy of the License at
//
// http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
//
// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
// limitations under the License.
package procfs
import (
"fmt"
"net"
"os"
"strconv"
"strings"
)
// Learned from include/uapi/linux/if_arp.h.
const (
// Completed entry (ha valid).
ATFComplete = 0x02
// Permanent entry.
ATFPermanent = 0x04
// Publish entry.
ATFPublish = 0x08
// Has requested trailers.
ATFUseTrailers = 0x10
// Obsoleted: Want to use a netmask (only for proxy entries).
ATFNetmask = 0x20
// Don't answer this addresses.
ATFDontPublish = 0x40
)
// ARPEntry contains a single row of the columnar data represented in
// /proc/net/arp.
type ARPEntry struct {
// IP address
IPAddr net.IP
// MAC address
HWAddr net.HardwareAddr
// Name of the device
Device string
// Flags
Flags byte
}
// GatherARPEntries retrieves all the ARP entries, parse the relevant columns,
// and then return a slice of ARPEntry's.
func (fs FS) GatherARPEntries() ([]ARPEntry, error) {
data, err := os.ReadFile(fs.proc.Path("net/arp"))
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: error reading arp %s: %w", ErrFileRead, fs.proc.Path("net/arp"), err)
}
return parseARPEntries(data)
}
func parseARPEntries(data []byte) ([]ARPEntry, error) {
lines := strings.Split(string(data), "\n")
entries := make([]ARPEntry, 0)
var err error
const (
expectedDataWidth = 6
expectedHeaderWidth = 9
)
for _, line := range lines {
columns := strings.Fields(line)
width := len(columns)
switch width {
case expectedHeaderWidth, 0:
continue
case expectedDataWidth:
entry, err := parseARPEntry(columns)
if err != nil {
return []ARPEntry{}, fmt.Errorf("%w: Failed to parse ARP entry: %v: %w", ErrFileParse, entry, err)
}
entries = append(entries, entry)
default:
return []ARPEntry{}, fmt.Errorf("%w: %d columns found, but expected %d: %w", ErrFileParse, width, expectedDataWidth, err)
}
}
return entries, err
}
func parseARPEntry(columns []string) (ARPEntry, error) {
entry := ARPEntry{Device: columns[5]}
ip := net.ParseIP(columns[0])
entry.IPAddr = ip
if mac, err := net.ParseMAC(columns[3]); err == nil {
entry.HWAddr = mac
} else {
return ARPEntry{}, err
}
if flags, err := strconv.ParseUint(columns[2], 0, 8); err == nil {
entry.Flags = byte(flags)
} else {
return ARPEntry{}, err
}
return entry, nil
}
// IsComplete returns true if ARP entry is marked with complete flag.
func (entry *ARPEntry) IsComplete() bool {
return entry.Flags&ATFComplete != 0
}