hush/vendor/github.com/prometheus/procfs/proc_limits.go
jx12n 4d9a26498e hush: one-time secret links the server cannot read
Paste a secret, get a link, send it. The first person to open it and press
Reveal sees the secret; the link dies at that moment. The recipient needs a
browser and nothing else — no account, no client, no installed tooling.

The server cannot read what it stores. AES-256-GCM happens in the browser and
the key lives in the URL fragment, which browsers never transmit, so hushd
holds ciphertext and no key material. That is a property of where the key sits
rather than a promise about our conduct, which is why there is deliberately no
endpoint accepting a plaintext secret and no server-side-encryption fallback:
two guarantees behind one URL would be worse than one honest guarantee.

Three decisions carry the design:

  * GET /s/{id} touches NO storage, not even to check existence. Slack, Teams,
    WhatsApp, iMessage and Outlook Safe Links all fetch a URL before a human
    sees it, so destroying on GET would destroy most secrets in transit and the
    recipient's "already used" would be indistinguishable from interception.
    Only POST /reveal consumes. Bot user-agent detection is an arms race;
    removing the side effect from GET is not. Pinned by
    TestGettingTheRevealPageNeverConsumesTheSecret.
  * Destruction is one Redis GETDEL, which is atomic. GET-then-DEL has a window
    where two simultaneous readers both win, and for a one-time secret that
    window is the product. The store contract demands atomicity and the same
    concurrency test runs against both implementations.
  * Missing, already-revealed, expired and evicted are ONE indistinguishable
    410. Separating them would confirm to a prober that a given link was real.

The secret id IS the capability, so secret.ID is a struct whose every
accidental path — %v, %s, String(), slog, json.Marshal — emits a redacted
handle or refuses, and the raw value needs an explicit Value(). The first
version tried to prevent leaks by implementing no String() at all; its own test
caught that Go's fmt prints unexported fields anyway, so forbidding the method
had removed the control rather than the leak.

Operationally: structured JSON on stdout in the fleet's wire format, which
Vector already collects with no annotation; six hush_* metrics on the chassis
registry with no id, IP or path in any label; five alert rules wired into
vmalert. The public Ingress enumerates /, /s/ and /api/ so /metrics, /healthz
and /readyz share the port but are unreachable from the internet — no
basic-auth middleware to maintain and get wrong.

Dependencies are vendored because go-chassis is private: the Woodpecker test
step and the in-cluster Kaniko build both run -mod=vendor with GOPROXY=off and
hold no git credential.

cmd/hush-mcp is a stdio MCP server doing the same client-side crypto locally,
so using hush from an agent preserves the same guarantee as using it from a
browser.
2026-09-03 00:08:38 -06:00

162 lines
4.8 KiB
Go

// Copyright The Prometheus Authors
// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
// You may obtain a copy of the License at
//
// http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
//
// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
// limitations under the License.
package procfs
import (
"bufio"
"fmt"
"os"
"regexp"
"strconv"
"strings"
)
// ProcLimits represents the soft limits for each of the process's resource
// limits. For more information see getrlimit(2):
// http://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/getrlimit.2.html.
type ProcLimits struct {
// CPU time limit in seconds.
CPUTime uint64
// Maximum size of files that the process may create.
FileSize uint64
// Maximum size of the process's data segment (initialized data,
// uninitialized data, and heap).
DataSize uint64
// Maximum size of the process stack in bytes.
StackSize uint64
// Maximum size of a core file.
CoreFileSize uint64
// Limit of the process's resident set in pages.
ResidentSet uint64
// Maximum number of processes that can be created for the real user ID of
// the calling process.
Processes uint64
// Value one greater than the maximum file descriptor number that can be
// opened by this process.
OpenFiles uint64
// Maximum number of bytes of memory that may be locked into RAM.
LockedMemory uint64
// Maximum size of the process's virtual memory address space in bytes.
AddressSpace uint64
// Limit on the combined number of flock(2) locks and fcntl(2) leases that
// this process may establish.
FileLocks uint64
// Limit of signals that may be queued for the real user ID of the calling
// process.
PendingSignals uint64
// Limit on the number of bytes that can be allocated for POSIX message
// queues for the real user ID of the calling process.
MsqqueueSize uint64
// Limit of the nice priority set using setpriority(2) or nice(2).
NicePriority uint64
// Limit of the real-time priority set using sched_setscheduler(2) or
// sched_setparam(2).
RealtimePriority uint64
// Limit (in microseconds) on the amount of CPU time that a process
// scheduled under a real-time scheduling policy may consume without making
// a blocking system call.
RealtimeTimeout uint64
}
const (
limitsFields = 4
limitsUnlimited = "unlimited"
)
var (
limitsMatch = regexp.MustCompile(`(Max \w+\s??\w*\s?\w*)\s{2,}(\w+)\s+(\w+)`)
)
// NewLimits returns the current soft limits of the process.
//
// Deprecated: Use p.Limits() instead.
func (p Proc) NewLimits() (ProcLimits, error) {
return p.Limits()
}
// Limits returns the current soft limits of the process.
func (p Proc) Limits() (ProcLimits, error) {
f, err := os.Open(p.path("limits"))
if err != nil {
return ProcLimits{}, err
}
defer f.Close()
var (
l = ProcLimits{}
s = bufio.NewScanner(f)
)
s.Scan() // Skip limits header
for s.Scan() {
//fields := limitsMatch.Split(s.Text(), limitsFields)
fields := limitsMatch.FindStringSubmatch(s.Text())
if len(fields) != limitsFields {
return ProcLimits{}, fmt.Errorf("%w: couldn't parse %q line %q", ErrFileParse, f.Name(), s.Text())
}
switch strings.TrimSpace(fields[1]) {
case "Max cpu time":
l.CPUTime, err = parseUint(fields[2])
case "Max file size":
l.FileSize, err = parseUint(fields[2])
case "Max data size":
l.DataSize, err = parseUint(fields[2])
case "Max stack size":
l.StackSize, err = parseUint(fields[2])
case "Max core file size":
l.CoreFileSize, err = parseUint(fields[2])
case "Max resident set":
l.ResidentSet, err = parseUint(fields[2])
case "Max processes":
l.Processes, err = parseUint(fields[2])
case "Max open files":
l.OpenFiles, err = parseUint(fields[2])
case "Max locked memory":
l.LockedMemory, err = parseUint(fields[2])
case "Max address space":
l.AddressSpace, err = parseUint(fields[2])
case "Max file locks":
l.FileLocks, err = parseUint(fields[2])
case "Max pending signals":
l.PendingSignals, err = parseUint(fields[2])
case "Max msgqueue size":
l.MsqqueueSize, err = parseUint(fields[2])
case "Max nice priority":
l.NicePriority, err = parseUint(fields[2])
case "Max realtime priority":
l.RealtimePriority, err = parseUint(fields[2])
case "Max realtime timeout":
l.RealtimeTimeout, err = parseUint(fields[2])
}
if err != nil {
return ProcLimits{}, err
}
}
return l, s.Err()
}
func parseUint(s string) (uint64, error) {
if s == limitsUnlimited {
return 18446744073709551615, nil
}
i, err := strconv.ParseUint(s, 10, 64)
if err != nil {
return 0, fmt.Errorf("%w: couldn't parse value %q: %w", ErrFileParse, s, err)
}
return i, nil
}