feat: Phase 6 UAT - Admission control, HLC recency, cluster coordination
This commit includes comprehensive work on Phase 6 features: ## Admission Control (Phase 6 admission middleware) - AdmissionStore implementation backed by TrustRankStore - PoW verification with tier-based difficulty computation - Trust tier progression (Newcomer → Established → Trusted → Authority) - API integration with admission status endpoints ## HLC Recency Lens (Phase 6C) - HlcRecencyLens for distributed system ordering - Hybrid logical clock integration with causality preservation ## Cluster Coordination (Phase 6C) - Multi-node cluster tests (availability, partition tolerance) - CRDT convergence tests for anti-entropy sync - Gateway handler improvements ## Aphoria Code Linter (Phase 2A) - RFC/OWASP corpus builders with network fetching and caching - Concept hierarchy with auto-alias creation on conflict detection - Multiple security extractors (TLS, JWT, CORS, secrets, rate limiting) ## Code Organization - Split large files into modules to comply with 500-line limit - Improved test organization with separate test modules - Fixed rkyv serialization for EigenTrustState (AgentScore struct) Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
jordan
parent
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commit
d3a88585fe
@ -133,3 +133,4 @@ open target/llvm-cov/html/index.html
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- [Setup Guide](./setup.md)
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- [Rust Guidelines](../backend/rust-guidelines.md)
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- [UAT Reports](./uat-reports.md)
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89
.claude/guides/local/uat-reports.md
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89
.claude/guides/local/uat-reports.md
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@ -0,0 +1,89 @@
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# Writing UAT Reports
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**When to use:** After completing a phase, feature, or release and you need to document what was tested and the outcomes.
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## Prerequisites
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- Completed UAT testing session
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- Access to test results and logs
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- Understanding of what was in scope
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## Quick Start
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```bash
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# Create a UAT report following the template
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cp uat/how-to.md uat/{feature}-{date}.md
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# Edit with your results
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# File naming: uat/phase6-distributed-2026-02-02.md
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```
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## Report Structure
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Every UAT report follows the template in `uat/how-to.md`:
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1. **Header** — Date, phase/feature, tester, overall status
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2. **Summary** — 1-2 sentences on what was tested
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3. **Scope** — What was and wasn't tested
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4. **Environment** — Rust version, OS, commit
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5. **Test Results** — Tables with Expected/Actual/Status
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6. **Issues Found** — Severity, status, description
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7. **Fixes Applied** — Changes made during UAT
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8. **Recommendations** — Future improvements
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9. **Sign-Off** — Checklist for release readiness
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## File Naming
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```
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uat/{feature-or-phase}-{YYYY-MM-DD}.md
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```
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Examples:
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- `uat/phase6-distributed-2026-02-02.md`
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- `uat/skeptic-endpoint-2025-12-15.md`
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- `uat/go-sdk-v2-2026-01-20.md`
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## Test Result Tables
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Use consistent formatting:
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```markdown
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| Test | Expected | Actual | Status |
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|------|----------|--------|--------|
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| Build | Compiles | Compiled in 36s | PASS |
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| Health endpoint | 200 OK | 200 OK | PASS |
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```
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## Issue Severity Levels
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| Severity | Meaning |
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|----------|---------|
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| Critical | Blocks release, data loss risk |
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| High | Major functionality broken |
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| Medium | Functionality degraded but workaround exists |
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| Low | Minor issue, cosmetic, or edge case |
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## Sign-Off Checklist
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Before marking a UAT complete:
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- [ ] All critical tests pass
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- [ ] No blocking issues remain
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- [ ] Documentation updated
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- [ ] Ready for release
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## Troubleshooting
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### Test results are inconsistent
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Check the environment section — version mismatches cause false failures. Re-run in a clean environment.
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### Can't reproduce an issue
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Document what you tried and mark the issue as "intermittent" with reproduction steps attempted.
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## Related
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- [Testing Guide](.claude/guides/local/testing.md)
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- [Quality Checks](.claude/guides/local/quality-checks.md)
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- [UAT Template](uat/how-to.md)
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@ -32,6 +32,8 @@ A probabilistic knowledge graph database that stores Claims, not Facts. Append-o
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| **Integrate with AI tools** | [.claude/guides/integrations/ai-coding-assistant-integration.md](.claude/guides/integrations/ai-coding-assistant-integration.md) |
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| **ADK-Go + Episteme** | [.claude/guides/integrations/adk-go-episteme.md](.claude/guides/integrations/adk-go-episteme.md) |
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| **Distributed architecture** | [docs/research/distributed-write-path.md](docs/research/distributed-write-path.md) |
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| **Write UAT reports** | [.claude/guides/local/uat-reports.md](.claude/guides/local/uat-reports.md) |
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| **Phase 6 UAT results** | [ai-lookup/features/phase6-uat.md](ai-lookup/features/phase6-uat.md) |
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## Critical Rules
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171
ai-lookup/features/admission-control.md
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171
ai-lookup/features/admission-control.md
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# Admission Control (The Shield)
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Phase 7A introduces graduated proof-of-work admission control to defend against spam, Sybil attacks, and knowledge poisoning when Episteme is open to millions of agents.
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## Overview
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New or untrusted agents must solve BLAKE3-based proof-of-work puzzles before their assertions are accepted. As agents demonstrate good behavior, they graduate to higher trust tiers with reduced PoW requirements and increased quotas.
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## Key Concepts
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### Trust Tiers
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| Trust Range | Tier | Quota Multiplier | PoW Required |
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|-------------|------------|------------------|--------------|
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| 0.0-0.3 | Untrusted | 0.1x (1,000/hr) | Yes |
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| 0.3-0.5 | Limited | 0.5x (5,000/hr) | Yes |
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| 0.5-0.7 | Verified | 1.0x (10,000/hr) | No |
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| 0.7-0.9 | Trusted | 2.0x (20,000/hr) | No |
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| 0.9-1.0 | Authority | 10.0x (100k/hr) | No |
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### PoW Graduation
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| Assertions | Trust Score | Difficulty | Approximate Effort |
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|------------|-------------|------------|-------------------|
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| 0-9 | < 0.6 | 16 bits | ~16 seconds |
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| 10-49 | < 0.6 | 1 bit | Trivial |
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| 50+ | any | 0 bits | Exempt |
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| any | >= 0.6 | 0 bits | Exempt |
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## HTTP API
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### GET /v1/admission/status
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Get admission status for an agent.
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**Query Parameters:**
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- `agent_id` (required): Agent's Ed25519 public key (hex, 64 chars)
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**Response:**
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```json
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{
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"agent_id": "abc123...",
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"tier": "Verified",
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"trust_score": 0.55,
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"assertions_count": 42,
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"pow_difficulty": 0,
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"pow_required": false,
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"base_quota_limit": 10000,
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"effective_quota_limit": 10000,
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"quota_multiplier": 1.0,
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"assertions_until_reduced_difficulty": null,
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"assertions_until_exemption": null
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}
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```
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### Request Flow
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1. Agent submits assertion with `X-Agent-Id` header
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2. AdmissionLayer checks trust tier and assertion count
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3. If PoW required:
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- Return HTTP 428 with difficulty in response body
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- Agent solves `BLAKE3(nonce || agent_id || timestamp)` with required leading zeros
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- Agent resubmits with `X-PoW-Nonce` and `X-PoW-Timestamp` headers
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4. PoW verified, request proceeds to MeterLayer
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5. On success, assertion count increments
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### HTTP 428 Response (PoW Required)
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```json
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{
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"error": "Proof-of-Work required",
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"code": "POW_REQUIRED",
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"required_difficulty": 16,
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"pow_required": true,
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"agent_assertions": 3,
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"agent_trust_score": 0.5
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}
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```
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## Headers
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### Request Headers
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| Header | Description |
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|--------|-------------|
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| `X-Agent-Id` | Agent's Ed25519 public key (hex, 64 chars) |
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| `X-PoW-Nonce` | PoW solution nonce (decimal) |
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| `X-PoW-Timestamp` | PoW solution timestamp (Unix seconds) |
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### Response Headers
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| Header | Description |
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|--------|-------------|
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| `X-Trust-Tier` | Agent's trust tier name |
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| `X-PoW-Required` | "true" or "false" |
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| `X-PoW-Difficulty` | Required difficulty in bits |
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| `X-Quota-Multiplier` | Tier quota multiplier |
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## Implementation Details
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### Core Types
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**TrustTier** (`stemedb-core/src/types/trust_tier.rs`):
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- Enum with 5 tiers: Untrusted, Limited, Verified, Trusted, Authority
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- Methods: `from_score()`, `quota_multiplier()`, `requires_pow()`
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**PowProof** (`stemedb-core/src/types/pow.rs`):
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- Struct with `nonce`, `agent_id`, `timestamp`
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- Methods: `verify()`, `compute_hash()`, `leading_zeros()`, `solve()`
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**AdmissionConfig** (`stemedb-core/src/types/pow.rs`):
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- Configurable thresholds and difficulties
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- Default: 16-bit initial, 10 assertions reduced, 50 graduated
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### Storage
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**AdmissionStore** (`stemedb-storage/src/admission_store/`):
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- Wraps TrustRankStore (reuses existing trust score + assertion count)
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- No new storage keys needed
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- Methods: `get_admission_status()`, `verify_pow()`, `record_assertion()`
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### Middleware
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**AdmissionLayer** (`stemedb-api/src/middleware/admission.rs`):
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- Tower middleware applied before MeterLayer
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- Extracts PoW headers, verifies proofs, returns 428 on failure
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- Bypasses health checks and admission status endpoint
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## Client Implementation Guide
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To solve a PoW puzzle:
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```rust
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use stemedb_core::types::PowProof;
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// Get your agent's Ed25519 public key
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let agent_id: [u8; 32] = ...;
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let timestamp = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH)?.as_secs();
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let difficulty = 16; // From 428 response
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// Brute-force search for valid nonce
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let proof = PowProof::solve(agent_id, timestamp, difficulty);
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// Submit with headers
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// X-Agent-Id: {hex(agent_id)}
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// X-PoW-Nonce: {proof.nonce}
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// X-PoW-Timestamp: {proof.timestamp}
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```
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## Router Functions
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Three router variants are available:
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1. `create_router()` - No admission control or metering
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2. `create_router_with_meter()` - Metering only (quotas)
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3. `create_router_with_admission()` - Full protection (PoW + quotas)
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## Security Properties
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- **Replay Prevention**: Proofs expire after 5 minutes
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- **Agent Binding**: Proof includes agent_id, cannot be reused by others
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- **Asymmetric Cost**: O(2^difficulty) to solve, O(1) to verify
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- **Fail Open**: On store errors, requests are allowed (availability > strictness)
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- **Defense in Depth**: API layer primary, ingestion layer secondary
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## Future: Phase 7B (EigenTrust)
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Phase 7B will build on this foundation:
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- Peer-to-peer trust propagation (trust agents you trust)
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- Network-wide reputation scores
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- Dynamic tier adjustments based on global consensus
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44
ai-lookup/features/phase6-uat.md
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44
ai-lookup/features/phase6-uat.md
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# Phase 6 UAT Results
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**Last Updated:** 2026-02-02
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**Confidence:** High
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## Summary
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Full user acceptance testing of Phase 6 (The Mesh — Distributed Writes). All 67 Phase 6 tests pass, existing functionality verified, new cluster node binary works correctly. Two minor issues found and fixed during testing.
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**Key Facts:**
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- All Phase 6 crates tested: merkle (16), rpc (5), sync (10), cluster (28), battery11 (8)
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- New `stemedb-node` binary demonstrates cluster routing
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- Go SDK examples (basic, conflict, skeptic) all pass
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- Single-node API and Swagger UI verified working
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**File Pointer:** `uat/phase6-distributed-2026-02-02.md`
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## Test Coverage
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| Area | Tests | Status |
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|------|-------|--------|
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| stemedb-merkle | 16 | PASS |
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| stemedb-rpc | 5 | PASS |
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| stemedb-sync | 10 | PASS |
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| stemedb-cluster | 28 | PASS |
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| battery11 replication | 8 | PASS |
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| Validation script | 5 checks | PASS |
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| Go SDK examples | 3 | PASS |
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## Issues Found & Fixed
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1. **swim.rs doc comment** (Low) — Missing blank line, fixed
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2. **Health endpoint** (Medium) — Bootstrap node reported unhealthy, fixed to check `joined` only
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## New Artifacts
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- Binary: `crates/stemedb-cluster/src/bin/node.rs`
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- Updated: `quickstart.md` Section 8 (Distributed Mode)
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- Report: `uat/phase6-distributed-2026-02-02.md`
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## Related Topics
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- [Simulation](./simulation.md)
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- [Cluster Node](../services/cluster.md) (if exists)
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@ -34,6 +34,7 @@ Token-efficient fact storage for StemeDB. Query these for quick context without
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| Query Audit | `features/query-audit.md` | High | 2026-01-31 | Trace agent decisions for debugging |
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| TrustRank | `features/trust-rank.md` | High | 2026-01-31 | Agent reputation system with learning loop |
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| Simulation | `features/simulation.md` | High | 2026-01-31 | Agent-based modeling for validation |
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| Phase 6 UAT | `features/phase6-uat.md` | High | 2026-02-02 | Distributed writes UAT results and fixes |
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## Use Cases
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@ -35,6 +35,7 @@ stemedb-core = { path = "../../crates/stemedb-core" }
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stemedb-storage = { path = "../../crates/stemedb-storage" }
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stemedb-ingest = { path = "../../crates/stemedb-ingest" }
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stemedb-query = { path = "../../crates/stemedb-query" }
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stemedb-wal = { path = "../../crates/stemedb-wal" }
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# CLI
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clap = { version = "4.5", features = ["derive"] }
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@ -75,5 +76,8 @@ tracing-subscriber = "0.3"
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rkyv = { version = "0.7", features = ["validation"] }
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bytecheck = "0.6"
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# HTTP client for RFC/OWASP fetching
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ureq = { version = "2.9", features = ["tls"] }
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[dev-dependencies]
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tempfile = "3.10"
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@ -2,308 +2,283 @@
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---
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## Phase 0: StemeDB Foundation
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## Phase 0: StemeDB Foundation ✅
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> **Tracked in:** [roadmap.md § 5D. Concept Hierarchy](../../roadmap.md)
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Changes to the core database that Aphoria depends on. These ship before the CLI and are tracked in the main StemeDB roadmap as **Phase 5D**.
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Changes to the core database that Aphoria depends on. Shipped as **Phase 5D** of the main StemeDB roadmap.
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| Aphoria Phase 0 | StemeDB Phase 5D | Status |
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|-----------------|------------------|--------|
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| 0.1 ConceptPath Type | 5D.1 ConceptPath Type | ⬜ |
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| 0.2 ConceptPath in Assertion | (implicit in 5D.1) | ⬜ |
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| 0.3 Hierarchical Index | 5D.4 Hierarchical Query | ⬜ |
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| 0.4 Alias Store | 5D.3 Alias Store + 5D.5 Alias Resolution | ⬜ |
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| 0.5 Source Class Inference | 5D.6 Source Class Inference | ⬜ |
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| 0.6 Concept API Endpoints | 5D.7 Concept API Endpoints | ⬜ |
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| 0.1 ConceptPath Type | 5D.1 ConceptPath Type | ✅ |
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| 0.2 ConceptPath in Assertion | (implicit in 5D.1) | ✅ |
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| 0.3 Hierarchical Index | 5D.4 Hierarchical Query | ✅ |
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| 0.4 Alias Store | 5D.3 Alias Store + 5D.5 Alias Resolution | ✅ |
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| 0.5 Source Class Inference | 5D.6 Source Class Inference | ✅ |
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| 0.6 Concept API Endpoints | 5D.7 Concept API Endpoints | ✅ |
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**Spec:** [docs/specs/concept-hierarchy.md](../../docs/specs/concept-hierarchy.md)
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---
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## Phase 1: Authoritative Corpus
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## Phase 2: CLI Core ✅
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Before Aphoria can find conflicts, Episteme needs the authoritative sources to conflict against.
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> Phase 2 was built before Phase 1 (authoritative corpus expansion). The CLI pipeline works end-to-end with a bootstrapped corpus of 11 hardcoded assertions covering TLS, JWT, CORS, secrets, and rate limiting.
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### 1.1 RFC Ingester
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| Task | Status |
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|------|--------|
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| 2.1 Project Walker | ✅ `walker/mod.rs`, `walker/path_mapper.rs`, `walker/language.rs` |
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| 2.2 Extractors (7) | ✅ `tls_verify`, `jwt_config`, `hardcoded_secrets`, `timeout_config`, `dep_versions`, `cors_config`, `rate_limit` |
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| 2.3 Ingestion Bridge | ✅ `bridge.rs` — BLAKE3 hashing, Ed25519 signing, claim→assertion conversion |
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| 2.4 Conflict Query | ✅ `episteme.rs` — LocalEpisteme with check_conflicts() |
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| 2.5 Report Output | ✅ `report/` — table (comfy-table), JSON, SARIF 2.1.0, markdown |
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| 2.6 Acknowledge Command | ✅ `lib.rs` acknowledge() |
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| Baseline & Diff | ✅ `lib.rs` set_baseline(), show_diff() |
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| Status Command | ✅ `lib.rs` show_status() |
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A CLI tool (or ingestion module) that:
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- Fetches RFC text from `rfc-editor.org` (text format, no PDF parsing needed)
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- Extracts normative statements (MUST, MUST NOT, SHOULD, SHALL per RFC 2119)
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- Maps each statement to a ConceptPath: `rfc://{number}/{topic}/{claim}`
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- Ingests as Tier 0 assertions
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Start with a curated list of security-relevant RFCs:
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| RFC | Topic |
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|-----|-------|
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| 7519 | JWT |
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| 6749 | OAuth 2.0 |
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| 6750 | Bearer tokens |
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| 8446 | TLS 1.3 |
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| 7525 | TLS best practices |
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| 6238 | TOTP |
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| 7617 | HTTP Basic Auth |
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| 9110 | HTTP Semantics |
|
||||
|
||||
### 1.2 OWASP Ingester
|
||||
|
||||
Parse OWASP Cheat Sheets (markdown source on GitHub):
|
||||
- Extract each recommendation as a claim
|
||||
- Map to `owasp://cheatsheet/{topic}/{claim}`
|
||||
- Ingest as Tier 1 assertions
|
||||
|
||||
Priority cheat sheets: Authentication, JWT, TLS, Secrets Management, Input Validation, Session Management.
|
||||
|
||||
### 1.3 Vendor Docs (Manual Bootstrap)
|
||||
|
||||
For v1, manually curate a small set of vendor doc claims:
|
||||
- Postgres connection pool recommendations
|
||||
- Redis timeout defaults
|
||||
- Common HTTP client library defaults (reqwest, hyper, net/http)
|
||||
|
||||
These are `vendor://{product}/{topic}/{claim}` at Tier 2.
|
||||
|
||||
This doesn't need to be exhaustive. It needs to cover the claims that Aphoria's extractors will actually find in code.
|
||||
118 tests pass. Clippy and fmt clean.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Phase 2: CLI Core
|
||||
## Phase 2A: Concept Matching ✅
|
||||
|
||||
The Aphoria binary itself.
|
||||
> **Status:** Complete. Tail-path matching (2A.1), alias-aware queries (2A.2), and auto-alias creation (2A.3) all implemented.
|
||||
|
||||
### 2.1 Project Walker
|
||||
### 2A.1 Leaf-Based Concept Matching (Aphoria-side fix) ✅
|
||||
|
||||
Input: a project root path.
|
||||
Output: a list of files to scan, each tagged with:
|
||||
- Language (rust, go, python, typescript, yaml, toml, json)
|
||||
- ConceptPath prefix derived from directory structure
|
||||
Implemented in `episteme.rs` via `ConceptIndex`:
|
||||
- `make_key(subject, predicate)` extracts tail 2 path segments + predicate
|
||||
- `build(assertions)` creates in-memory index keyed by tail path
|
||||
- `lookup(subject, predicate)` finds matching authoritative assertions
|
||||
- `check_conflicts()` uses `ConceptIndex` instead of `QueryEngine` for cross-scheme matching
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
crates/citadeldb/src/auth/jwt.rs
|
||||
→ language: rust
|
||||
→ prefix: code://rust/citadeldb/auth/jwt
|
||||
```
|
||||
Integration tests prove TLS and JWT conflicts are detected correctly.
|
||||
|
||||
Normalization rules:
|
||||
- Strip `src/`, `lib/`, `pkg/`, `internal/` (language boilerplate)
|
||||
- Strip `crates/`, `packages/`, `apps/` (monorepo wrappers)
|
||||
- Map `config/`, `deploy/`, `infra/` to `code://config/{project}/...`
|
||||
- File extension determines language, not directory
|
||||
### 2A.2 Alias Resolution in QueryEngine (StemeDB-side fix) ✅
|
||||
|
||||
### 2.2 Extractors
|
||||
Wired `AliasStore` into `QueryEngine.execute()`:
|
||||
- Added `resolve_aliases: bool` field to `Query` (defaults to `false`)
|
||||
- Added `alias_store: Option<Arc<dyn AliasStore>>` to `QueryEngine`
|
||||
- Added `.with_alias_store()` builder method
|
||||
- When `resolve_aliases: true`, expands subject via `AliasStore.resolve_all()` before index lookup
|
||||
- Added `fetch_by_subjects()` and `fetch_by_subjects_predicate()` for multi-subject deduplication
|
||||
- Modified `Query.matches()` to skip subject filtering when aliases are resolved
|
||||
- Skips fast path (MV lookup) when `resolve_aliases: true`
|
||||
- Gracefully degrades when no alias store is configured
|
||||
|
||||
Each extractor is a module that:
|
||||
- Takes a file path + content + language
|
||||
- Returns a `Vec<ExtractedClaim>`
|
||||
7 unit tests in `engine/tests/alias_resolution.rs`. This is the architecturally correct long-term fix that complements leaf matching.
|
||||
|
||||
Ship these extractors in v1:
|
||||
### 2A.3 Auto-Alias Creation ✅
|
||||
|
||||
| Extractor | What it finds | Languages |
|
||||
|-----------|--------------|-----------|
|
||||
| `tls_verify` | TLS certificate verification disabled | rust, go, python, js/ts |
|
||||
| `jwt_config` | JWT validation settings (aud, exp, alg) | rust, go, python, js/ts |
|
||||
| `hardcoded_secrets` | Credentials in source (not .env) | all |
|
||||
| `timeout_config` | HTTP/DB/Redis timeout values | all (config files) |
|
||||
| `dep_versions` | Known-vulnerable dependency versions | Cargo.toml, go.mod, package.json, requirements.txt |
|
||||
| `cors_config` | CORS allow-origin settings | rust, go, js/ts |
|
||||
| `rate_limit` | Rate limiting disabled or unreasonable | rust, go, js/ts |
|
||||
When Aphoria ingests authoritative assertions and code claims that share leaf names, automatically create aliases:
|
||||
- `code://rust/myapp/tls/cert_verification` ↔ `rfc://5246/tls/cert_verification`
|
||||
- `code://rust/myapp/auth/jwt/audience_validation` ↔ `rfc://7519/jwt/audience_validation`
|
||||
|
||||
Extractors use regex + AST patterns, not LLMs. Each extractor declares:
|
||||
- The patterns it searches for
|
||||
- The ConceptPath leaf it maps to
|
||||
- The predicate (e.g., `config_value`, `enabled`, `version`)
|
||||
- How to extract the ObjectValue from the match
|
||||
This bridges 2A.1 (leaf matching) with 2A.2 (alias resolution) — leaf matching identifies candidates, aliases persist the relationship.
|
||||
|
||||
### 2.3 Ingestion Bridge
|
||||
|
||||
Connect extractor output to the Episteme ingestion pipeline:
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
ExtractedClaim {
|
||||
path: code://rust/citadeldb/auth/jwt/audience_validation
|
||||
predicate: "enabled"
|
||||
value: Boolean(false)
|
||||
source_location: "src/auth/jwt.rs:47"
|
||||
confidence: 1.0 // regex match, not heuristic
|
||||
}
|
||||
↓
|
||||
Assertion {
|
||||
subject: ConceptPath::parse("code://rust/citadeldb/auth/jwt/audience_validation")
|
||||
predicate: "enabled"
|
||||
object: ObjectValue::Boolean(false)
|
||||
source_class: SourceClass::Expert // inferred from code:// scheme
|
||||
source_hash: blake3(file_content)
|
||||
source_metadata: { "file": "src/auth/jwt.rs", "line": 47 }
|
||||
confidence: 1.0
|
||||
lifecycle: LifecycleStage::Approved // code is deployed, it's a fact about the code
|
||||
}
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
The bridge handles:
|
||||
- ConceptPath construction from extractor output
|
||||
- Source hash computation (BLAKE3 of the file at scan time)
|
||||
- Source metadata encoding (file path, line number, extraction method)
|
||||
- Signing with the Aphoria agent's keypair
|
||||
|
||||
### 2.4 Conflict Query
|
||||
|
||||
After ingestion, query Episteme for each extracted concept:
|
||||
|
||||
```rust
|
||||
for claim in extracted_claims {
|
||||
let results = query_engine.query(Query {
|
||||
subject: Some(claim.path.to_string()),
|
||||
resolve_aliases: true,
|
||||
hierarchical: false,
|
||||
lens: Some("skeptic"),
|
||||
..Default::default()
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
if results.conflict_score > threshold {
|
||||
report.add_conflict(claim, results);
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
The Skeptic lens returns all claims for the concept across all aliased paths, with a conflict score. If the code claim (Tier 3) contradicts an RFC claim (Tier 0), the conflict score will be high because of the tier spread.
|
||||
|
||||
### 2.5 Report Output
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
$ aphoria scan ./citadeldb --format table
|
||||
|
||||
┌──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
|
||||
│ Aphoria Report: citadeldb │
|
||||
│ Scanned: 142 files │ Claims: 23 │ Conflicts: 3 │
|
||||
├──────────┬───────────────────────────────────────┬──────────┬───────┤
|
||||
│ Verdict │ Concept │ Score │ Tier │
|
||||
├──────────┼───────────────────────────────────────┼──────────┼───────┤
|
||||
│ BLOCK │ auth/jwt/audience_validation │ 0.92 │ 0↔3 │
|
||||
│ BLOCK │ net/tls/cert_verification │ 0.87 │ 1↔3 │
|
||||
│ FLAG │ http/timeout │ 0.54 │ 2↔3 │
|
||||
└──────────┴───────────────────────────────────────┴──────────┴───────┘
|
||||
|
||||
Details:
|
||||
|
||||
BLOCK code://rust/citadeldb/auth/jwt/audience_validation
|
||||
Your code: aud validation disabled (src/auth/jwt.rs:47)
|
||||
RFC 7519: aud validation MUST be enabled (Tier 0)
|
||||
Action: Fix or acknowledge with: aphoria ack <path> --reason "..."
|
||||
|
||||
BLOCK code://rust/citadeldb/net/tls/cert_verification
|
||||
Your code: verify = false (src/net/client.rs:23)
|
||||
OWASP: verification required (Tier 1)
|
||||
Action: Fix or acknowledge with: aphoria ack <path> --reason "..."
|
||||
|
||||
FLAG code://rust/citadeldb/http/timeout
|
||||
Your code: timeout = 0 (infinite) (config/production.yaml:8)
|
||||
reqwest: default timeout 30s (Tier 2)
|
||||
Action: Review recommended
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Output formats: `table` (default), `json`, `sarif` (for CI integration), `markdown`.
|
||||
|
||||
### 2.6 Acknowledge Command
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
$ aphoria ack code://rust/citadeldb/auth/jwt/audience_validation \
|
||||
--reason "Internal service, no external JWT consumers. Accepted risk per SEC-2024-003."
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
This creates a new Assertion:
|
||||
- Subject: `internal://decision/citadeldb/auth/jwt/audience_validation`
|
||||
- Predicate: `deviation_accepted`
|
||||
- Object: Text with the reason
|
||||
- SourceClass: Expert (Tier 3)
|
||||
- Aliased to: `code://rust/citadeldb/auth/jwt/audience_validation`
|
||||
|
||||
The conflict still exists in Episteme, but the acknowledgment is recorded. Next scan, the conflict still shows but with context: "Acknowledged by [agent] on [date]: [reason]." The Skeptic lens sees the acknowledgment as an additional claim in the space.
|
||||
**Implementation:**
|
||||
- Added `auto_create_aliases: bool` config option to `AliasConfig` (defaults to `true`)
|
||||
- Added `AliasOrigin::AutoDetected` variant to `stemedb-core` for tracking auto-created aliases
|
||||
- Wired `GenericAliasStore` into `LocalEpisteme` for alias persistence
|
||||
- In `check_conflicts()`, when a code claim matches an authoritative claim by leaf, calls `AliasStore.set_alias()` to persist the relationship with `AliasOrigin::AutoDetected`
|
||||
- Alias creation is idempotent (skips if alias already exists)
|
||||
- 4 unit tests verify: alias creation on conflict, no creation when disabled, correct origin, idempotency
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Phase 3: Skill Integration
|
||||
## Phase 1: Authoritative Corpus Expansion ✅
|
||||
|
||||
### 3.1 Claude Code Skill
|
||||
> Expanded from 11 hardcoded assertions to a pluggable corpus system with RFC, OWASP, and Vendor sources.
|
||||
|
||||
A `/aphoria` skill that wraps the CLI:
|
||||
### Architecture
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
/aphoria scan Scan current project, report conflicts
|
||||
/aphoria scan --fix Scan and offer to fix each conflict
|
||||
/aphoria ack <path> Acknowledge a conflict with a reason
|
||||
/aphoria status Show current conflict summary
|
||||
/aphoria diff Show new conflicts since last scan
|
||||
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
|
||||
│ aphoria corpus build │
|
||||
│ │
|
||||
│ ┌──────────────┐ ┌──────────────┐ ┌───────────────────────┐ │
|
||||
│ │ RFC Ingester │ │ OWASP │ │ Vendor Bootstrapper │ │
|
||||
│ │ (Tier 0) │ │ Ingester │ │ (Tier 2) │ │
|
||||
│ │ │ │ (Tier 1) │ │ │ │
|
||||
│ └──────┬───────┘ └──────┬───────┘ └───────────┬───────────┘ │
|
||||
│ │ │ │ │
|
||||
│ └─────────────────┼──────────────────────┘ │
|
||||
│ ▼ │
|
||||
│ ┌─────────────────┐ │
|
||||
│ │ CorpusRegistry │ │
|
||||
│ └────────┬────────┘ │
|
||||
│ ▼ │
|
||||
│ ┌─────────────────┐ │
|
||||
│ │ LocalEpisteme │ │
|
||||
│ │ ingest_ │ │
|
||||
│ │ authoritative() │ │
|
||||
│ └─────────────────┘ │
|
||||
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
The skill runs the CLI binary, parses the JSON output, and presents results inline in the Claude Code session.
|
||||
### 1.1 CorpusBuilder Trait ✅
|
||||
|
||||
### 3.2 Agent Pre-Flight Hook
|
||||
| Task | Status |
|
||||
|------|--------|
|
||||
| `CorpusBuilder` trait | ✅ `corpus/mod.rs` — name, scheme, default_tier, build, requires_network |
|
||||
| `CorpusRegistry` | ✅ Manages multiple builders, build_all(), list_builders() |
|
||||
| `CorpusBuildResult` | ✅ Stats per builder, total assertions, success/fail/skip counts |
|
||||
|
||||
A Claude Code hook that runs Aphoria before certain operations:
|
||||
### 1.2 RFC Ingester ✅
|
||||
|
||||
| Task | Status |
|
||||
|------|--------|
|
||||
| `RfcCorpusBuilder` | ✅ `corpus/rfc.rs` |
|
||||
| HTTP fetching | ✅ Via `ureq`, cached to `~/.cache/aphoria/rfc-cache/` |
|
||||
| RFC 2119 keyword parsing | ✅ MUST, MUST NOT, SHOULD, SHALL extraction |
|
||||
| RFC-specific parsers | ✅ JWT (7519), OAuth (6749), Bearer (6750), TLS 1.3 (8446), TLS BCP (7525), TOTP (6238), Basic Auth (7617), HTTP (9110) |
|
||||
| Concept mapping | ✅ `rfc://{number}/{topic}` at Tier 0 (Regulatory) |
|
||||
|
||||
### 1.3 OWASP Ingester ✅
|
||||
|
||||
| Task | Status |
|
||||
|------|--------|
|
||||
| `OwaspCorpusBuilder` | ✅ `corpus/owasp.rs` |
|
||||
| HTTP fetching | ✅ From GitHub raw content, cached to `~/.cache/aphoria/owasp-cache/` |
|
||||
| Markdown parsing | ✅ MUST/SHOULD statements, section context |
|
||||
| Cheat sheet parsers | ✅ Authentication, JWT, TLS, Secrets, Input Validation, Session, CSRF, Password Storage, HTTP Headers |
|
||||
| Concept mapping | ✅ `owasp://cheatsheet/{topic}/{claim}` at Tier 1 (Clinical) |
|
||||
|
||||
### 1.4 Vendor Docs ✅
|
||||
|
||||
| Task | Status |
|
||||
|------|--------|
|
||||
| `VendorCorpusBuilder` | ✅ `corpus/vendor.rs` |
|
||||
| PostgreSQL claims | ✅ pool_size, idle_timeout, ssl_mode |
|
||||
| Redis claims | ✅ timeout, max_retries, tls |
|
||||
| reqwest claims | ✅ cert_verification, connect_timeout, request_timeout |
|
||||
| hyper claims | ✅ keep_alive_timeout, max_concurrent_streams |
|
||||
| Go net/http claims | ✅ read_timeout, write_timeout, idle_timeout, min_tls_version |
|
||||
| tokio-postgres claims | ✅ pool_size, ssl_mode |
|
||||
| SQLx claims | ✅ max_connections, idle_timeout |
|
||||
| Concept mapping | ✅ `vendor://{product}/{topic}/{claim}` at Tier 2 (Observational) |
|
||||
|
||||
### 1.5 Hardcoded Refactor ✅
|
||||
|
||||
| Task | Status |
|
||||
|------|--------|
|
||||
| `HardcodedCorpusBuilder` | ✅ `corpus/hardcoded.rs` — original 11 assertions |
|
||||
| `create_authoritative_assertion()` | ✅ Made public in `episteme.rs` for corpus builders |
|
||||
|
||||
### 1.6 CLI Integration ✅
|
||||
|
||||
| Task | Status |
|
||||
|------|--------|
|
||||
| `aphoria corpus build` | ✅ Fetches and ingests from all sources |
|
||||
| `--only rfc,owasp,vendor` | ✅ Filter to specific sources |
|
||||
| `--offline` | ✅ Skip network-requiring sources |
|
||||
| `--clear-cache` | ✅ Clear cache before building |
|
||||
| `aphoria corpus list` | ✅ List available corpus sources |
|
||||
| `CorpusConfig` | ✅ cache_dir, include_*, rfc_list options |
|
||||
|
||||
### 1.7 Error Handling ✅
|
||||
|
||||
| Task | Status |
|
||||
|------|--------|
|
||||
| `RfcFetch` error | ✅ Per-RFC fetch failures with context |
|
||||
| `OwaspFetch` error | ✅ Per-cheat-sheet fetch failures with context |
|
||||
| `CorpusBuild` error | ✅ General corpus build failures |
|
||||
| Graceful degradation | ✅ Continue with other sources if one fails |
|
||||
|
||||
**Files:** `corpus/mod.rs`, `corpus/hardcoded.rs`, `corpus/rfc.rs`, `corpus/owasp.rs`, `corpus/vendor.rs`
|
||||
|
||||
**Tests:** 118 tests pass. Clippy and fmt clean.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Phase 3: Skill Integration ✅
|
||||
|
||||
> Complete. Aphoria is now usable in Claude Code agent workflows.
|
||||
|
||||
### 3.1 Claude Code Skill ✅
|
||||
|
||||
| Task | Status |
|
||||
|------|--------|
|
||||
| `skill/SKILL.md` | ✅ Comprehensive skill definition with all commands |
|
||||
| `/aphoria scan` | ✅ Scan project, show conflicts grouped by verdict |
|
||||
| `/aphoria scan --fix` | ✅ Interactive fix workflow |
|
||||
| `/aphoria ack` | ✅ Acknowledge conflicts as intentional |
|
||||
| `/aphoria status` | ✅ Show status and baseline |
|
||||
| `/aphoria diff` | ✅ Show changes since baseline |
|
||||
| `/aphoria init` | ✅ Initialize Aphoria |
|
||||
| `/aphoria baseline` | ✅ Set baseline |
|
||||
| `skill/install.sh` | ✅ Install script for `~/.claude/skills/aphoria/` |
|
||||
|
||||
**Files:** `skill/SKILL.md`, `skill/install.sh`, `skill/hooks.json`
|
||||
|
||||
### 3.2 Agent Pre-Flight Hook ✅
|
||||
|
||||
| Task | Status |
|
||||
|------|--------|
|
||||
| `--exit-code` flag | ✅ Returns 2 for BLOCK, 1 for FLAG only, 0 for clean |
|
||||
| `--strict` flag | ✅ Lower thresholds (FLAG at 0.3, BLOCK at 0.5) |
|
||||
| Hook template | ✅ `skill/hooks.json` with PreCommit and PrePush examples |
|
||||
|
||||
**Usage:**
|
||||
```json
|
||||
{
|
||||
"hooks": {
|
||||
"pre-commit": "aphoria scan --format sarif --exit-code",
|
||||
"pre-deploy": "aphoria scan --strict --exit-code"
|
||||
"PreCommit": [{"command": "aphoria scan --format sarif --exit-code"}],
|
||||
"PrePush": [{"command": "aphoria scan --strict --exit-code"}]
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
`--exit-code` returns non-zero if any BLOCK verdicts exist, preventing the commit or deploy.
|
||||
### 3.3 Alias Suggestion Workflow ✅
|
||||
|
||||
### 3.3 Alias Suggestion Workflow
|
||||
Auto-alias creation is now automatic (Phase 2A.3). When Aphoria scans:
|
||||
1. Tail-path matching finds authoritative assertions
|
||||
2. Aliases are auto-created with `AliasOrigin::AutoDetected`
|
||||
3. Future queries use the alias automatically
|
||||
|
||||
When Aphoria scans a new project and finds concepts that share leaf names with existing authoritative paths, it prompts:
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
New concept detected: code://rust/newproject/auth/jwt/audience_validation
|
||||
|
||||
Suggested alias:
|
||||
→ rfc://7519/jwt/audience_validation (Tier 0, RFC 7519 Section 4.1.3)
|
||||
|
||||
Accept? [y/n/defer]
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Accepting creates the alias. Deferring flags it for later review. Rejecting records that these are intentionally different concepts.
|
||||
The skill documents the suggestion flow for manual alias management:
|
||||
- **y (Accept)**: Creates alias
|
||||
- **n (Reject)**: Records intentional difference
|
||||
- **defer**: Flags for later review
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Phase 4: CI Integration
|
||||
## Phase 4: Pre-Commit Integration ⬜
|
||||
|
||||
### 4.1 GitHub Action
|
||||
> Depends on Phase 3 (skill validates the UX before hook automation).
|
||||
|
||||
### 4.1 Git Pre-Commit Hook ⬜
|
||||
|
||||
A git pre-commit hook that runs Aphoria before every commit:
|
||||
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
#!/bin/sh
|
||||
# .git/hooks/pre-commit
|
||||
|
||||
aphoria scan --exit-code --format table
|
||||
|
||||
if [ $? -eq 2 ]; then
|
||||
echo "BLOCKED: Fix conflicts before committing"
|
||||
exit 1
|
||||
fi
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Or using pre-commit framework (`.pre-commit-config.yaml`):
|
||||
|
||||
```yaml
|
||||
- name: Aphoria Scan
|
||||
uses: orchard9/aphoria-action@v1
|
||||
with:
|
||||
episteme-url: ${{ secrets.EPISTEME_URL }}
|
||||
fail-on: block
|
||||
format: sarif
|
||||
repos:
|
||||
- repo: local
|
||||
hooks:
|
||||
- id: aphoria
|
||||
name: Aphoria Security Lint
|
||||
entry: aphoria scan --exit-code
|
||||
language: system
|
||||
pass_filenames: false
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Publishes SARIF results to GitHub Security tab. BLOCK verdicts fail the check. FLAG verdicts appear as warnings.
|
||||
### 4.2 Baseline Mode ✅
|
||||
|
||||
### 4.2 PR Comment Bot
|
||||
|
||||
On pull request, Aphoria scans the diff (not the whole project) and comments:
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
## Aphoria Report
|
||||
|
||||
This PR introduces 1 new conflict:
|
||||
|
||||
| File | Conflict | Score |
|
||||
|------|----------|-------|
|
||||
| src/auth/jwt.rs:47 | Disables aud validation (RFC 7519 requires it) | 0.92 |
|
||||
|
||||
Run `aphoria ack` to acknowledge, or fix before merge.
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
### 4.3 Baseline Mode
|
||||
|
||||
For existing projects with many conflicts, `aphoria baseline` records the current state. Subsequent scans only report *new* conflicts. This prevents the "500 warnings so we ignore all of them" problem.
|
||||
Already implemented in Phase 2. For existing projects with many conflicts:
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
$ aphoria baseline
|
||||
@ -311,9 +286,25 @@ Baseline recorded: 12 existing conflicts frozen.
|
||||
Future scans will only report new conflicts.
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
### 4.3 Diff-Only Scanning ⬜
|
||||
|
||||
Scan only changed files instead of the whole project:
|
||||
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
# Scan only staged files
|
||||
aphoria scan --staged
|
||||
|
||||
# Scan only files changed since baseline
|
||||
aphoria scan --since-baseline
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
This makes pre-commit hooks fast even in large projects.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Phase 5: Research Agent Loop
|
||||
## Phase 5: Research Agent Loop ⬜
|
||||
|
||||
> Depends on gap data accumulating from project scans.
|
||||
|
||||
### 5.1 Gap Detection
|
||||
|
||||
@ -347,13 +338,21 @@ Users who run Aphoria can opt in to contribute their alias mappings and acknowle
|
||||
|
||||
## Milestone Summary
|
||||
|
||||
| Phase | Deliverable | Depends On |
|
||||
|-------|-------------|------------|
|
||||
| 0 | ConceptPath in StemeDB | concept-hierarchy spec |
|
||||
| 1 | Authoritative corpus (RFCs, OWASP) | Phase 0 |
|
||||
| 2 | Aphoria CLI (scan, report, ack) | Phase 0, Phase 1 |
|
||||
| 3 | Claude Code skill + hooks | Phase 2 |
|
||||
| 4 | CI integration (GitHub Action, PR bot) | Phase 2 |
|
||||
| 5 | Research agent loop | Phase 2, Phase 4 (gap data) |
|
||||
| Phase | Deliverable | Depends On | Status |
|
||||
|-------|-------------|------------|--------|
|
||||
| 0 | ConceptPath in StemeDB | concept-hierarchy spec | ✅ |
|
||||
| 2 | Aphoria CLI (scan, report, ack) | Phase 0 | ✅ |
|
||||
| 2A.1 | Leaf-based concept matching | Phase 2 | ✅ |
|
||||
| 2A.2 | Alias resolution in QueryEngine | Phase 2 | ✅ |
|
||||
| 2A.3 | Auto-alias creation | Phase 2A.2 | ✅ |
|
||||
| 1 | Authoritative corpus expansion | Phase 0 | ✅ |
|
||||
| 3 | Claude Code skill + hooks | Phase 2A | ✅ |
|
||||
| **4** | **Pre-commit integration (git hooks, diff scanning)** | **Phase 3** | **⬜ NEXT** |
|
||||
| 5 | Research agent loop | Phase 4 (gap data) | ⬜ |
|
||||
|
||||
Phase 0 and Phase 1 can run in parallel — the corpus ingestion uses the ConceptPath types as they're built. Phase 2 is the critical path. Everything after Phase 2 is distribution and flywheel.
|
||||
**Current state:**
|
||||
- Phase 1 is complete: RFC, OWASP, and Vendor corpus builders with `aphoria corpus build` CLI
|
||||
- Phase 2A is complete: conflict detection via tail-path matching, alias-aware QueryEngine, and auto-alias creation
|
||||
- Phase 3 is complete: `/aphoria` skill installed to `~/.claude/skills/aphoria/`, hook templates ready
|
||||
|
||||
**Next:** Phase 4 — Pre-commit integration (git hooks, diff-only scanning).
|
||||
|
||||
302
applications/aphoria/skill/SKILL.md
Normal file
302
applications/aphoria/skill/SKILL.md
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,302 @@
|
||||
---
|
||||
name: aphoria
|
||||
description: Code-level truth linter powered by Episteme. Scans codebase for conflicts with authoritative sources (RFCs, OWASP). Use when checking security configurations, validating code against specs, or auditing for compliance issues.
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
# Aphoria
|
||||
|
||||
## Identity
|
||||
|
||||
You are a security-minded code reviewer who checks configuration decisions against authoritative sources. You find where code *does* something that contradicts what specs *say* should be done. You present conflicts clearly with actionable guidance.
|
||||
|
||||
## Commands
|
||||
|
||||
| Command | Usage | Description |
|
||||
|---------|-------|-------------|
|
||||
| `/aphoria` | `/aphoria` | Scan current project, show conflicts |
|
||||
| `/aphoria scan` | `/aphoria scan` | Scan current project, show conflicts |
|
||||
| `/aphoria scan --fix` | `/aphoria scan --fix` | Scan and interactively offer to fix each conflict |
|
||||
| `/aphoria ack` | `/aphoria ack <concept_path> <reason>` | Acknowledge a conflict as intentional |
|
||||
| `/aphoria status` | `/aphoria status` | Show current conflict summary and baseline |
|
||||
| `/aphoria diff` | `/aphoria diff` | Show new conflicts since last baseline |
|
||||
| `/aphoria init` | `/aphoria init` | Initialize Aphoria in current project |
|
||||
| `/aphoria baseline` | `/aphoria baseline` | Set current scan as baseline |
|
||||
|
||||
## Protocol
|
||||
|
||||
### On `/aphoria` or `/aphoria scan`
|
||||
|
||||
1. **Run the scan:**
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
aphoria scan --format json 2>/dev/null
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
2. **Parse the JSON output** and extract:
|
||||
- `files_scanned`: Number of files analyzed
|
||||
- `claims_extracted`: Number of code claims found
|
||||
- `conflicts`: Array of conflict results
|
||||
|
||||
3. **Present conflicts grouped by verdict:**
|
||||
- **BLOCK** (red): Must fix before deploy
|
||||
- **FLAG** (yellow): Should review
|
||||
- **PASS** (green): No action needed
|
||||
|
||||
4. **For each conflict, show:**
|
||||
- File and line number
|
||||
- What the code does (extracted claim)
|
||||
- What the spec says (authoritative source)
|
||||
- Conflict score and verdict
|
||||
- Suggested fix or acknowledgment path
|
||||
|
||||
### On `/aphoria scan --fix`
|
||||
|
||||
1. Run scan as above
|
||||
2. For each BLOCK conflict:
|
||||
- Show the conflict details
|
||||
- Ask: "Fix this? [y/n/skip/ack]"
|
||||
- If **y**: Provide a code fix suggestion and apply if confirmed
|
||||
- If **n**: Continue to next
|
||||
- If **skip**: Skip remaining, show summary
|
||||
- If **ack**: Run `/aphoria ack <path> <reason>` with user's reason
|
||||
|
||||
### On `/aphoria ack <concept_path> <reason>`
|
||||
|
||||
1. **Run acknowledgment:**
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
aphoria ack "<concept_path>" "<reason>"
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
2. **Confirm success** and note the conflict will now appear as ACK in future scans
|
||||
|
||||
### On `/aphoria status`
|
||||
|
||||
1. **Run status check:**
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
aphoria status
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
2. **Present:**
|
||||
- Data directory location
|
||||
- Project root
|
||||
- Whether baseline exists
|
||||
- Agent key status
|
||||
|
||||
### On `/aphoria diff`
|
||||
|
||||
1. **Run diff:**
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
aphoria diff
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
2. **Present:**
|
||||
- New conflicts since baseline
|
||||
- Resolved conflicts since baseline
|
||||
- Net change summary
|
||||
|
||||
## Output Format
|
||||
|
||||
### Scan Results
|
||||
|
||||
```markdown
|
||||
## Aphoria Scan Results
|
||||
|
||||
**Project:** {project_name}
|
||||
**Files scanned:** {files_scanned}
|
||||
**Claims extracted:** {claims_extracted}
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
### BLOCK ({count})
|
||||
|
||||
These conflicts prevent deployment and require immediate attention.
|
||||
|
||||
#### 1. TLS Certificate Verification Disabled
|
||||
|
||||
**File:** `src/client.rs:42`
|
||||
**Code says:** `danger_accept_invalid_certs(true)` (verification disabled)
|
||||
**RFC 5246 says:** TLS certificate verification MUST be enabled
|
||||
|
||||
**Conflict score:** 0.95 (high confidence)
|
||||
|
||||
**Options:**
|
||||
1. **Fix:** Remove or set to `false`:
|
||||
```rust
|
||||
.danger_accept_invalid_certs(false)
|
||||
```
|
||||
2. **Acknowledge:** If this is intentional (e.g., internal testing):
|
||||
```
|
||||
/aphoria ack "code://rust/myapp/tls/cert_verification" "Internal test environment only"
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
### FLAG ({count})
|
||||
|
||||
These should be reviewed but don't block deployment.
|
||||
|
||||
#### 1. Rate Limiting Not Detected
|
||||
|
||||
**File:** `src/api/mod.rs`
|
||||
**Code says:** No rate limiting configuration found
|
||||
**OWASP says:** Rate limiting SHOULD be enabled for API endpoints
|
||||
|
||||
**Conflict score:** 0.55 (medium confidence)
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
### Summary
|
||||
|
||||
| Verdict | Count |
|
||||
|---------|-------|
|
||||
| BLOCK | {block_count} |
|
||||
| FLAG | {flag_count} |
|
||||
| PASS | {pass_count} |
|
||||
|
||||
**Exit code:** {0 if no blocks, 1 if blocks exist}
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
## Conflict Categories
|
||||
|
||||
Aphoria detects conflicts in these domains:
|
||||
|
||||
| Domain | What It Checks | Authoritative Sources |
|
||||
|--------|---------------|----------------------|
|
||||
| **TLS** | Certificate verification, protocol versions | RFC 5246, RFC 8446, OWASP |
|
||||
| **JWT** | Audience validation, signature verification, algorithm restrictions | RFC 7519, OWASP |
|
||||
| **Secrets** | Hardcoded API keys, passwords, tokens | OWASP Secrets Management |
|
||||
| **CORS** | Wildcard origins, credentials with wildcard | OWASP, Security Best Practices |
|
||||
| **Timeouts** | Unreasonably high/low connection timeouts | Vendor recommendations |
|
||||
| **Rate Limiting** | Missing or unreasonable rate limits | OWASP API Security |
|
||||
|
||||
## Fix Suggestions
|
||||
|
||||
When offering fixes, prioritize:
|
||||
|
||||
1. **Direct fix**: Change the code to comply with the spec
|
||||
2. **Configuration**: Move the decision to environment/config
|
||||
3. **Acknowledgment**: Document why the deviation is intentional
|
||||
|
||||
### Example Fix Patterns
|
||||
|
||||
**TLS verification disabled:**
|
||||
```rust
|
||||
// BEFORE
|
||||
.danger_accept_invalid_certs(true)
|
||||
|
||||
// AFTER (if testing)
|
||||
.danger_accept_invalid_certs(cfg!(test))
|
||||
|
||||
// AFTER (if must disable, make explicit)
|
||||
// SECURITY: TLS verification disabled for internal service mesh
|
||||
// Tracked in: JIRA-1234
|
||||
.danger_accept_invalid_certs(std::env::var("DISABLE_TLS_VERIFY").is_ok())
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
**JWT audience not validated:**
|
||||
```rust
|
||||
// BEFORE
|
||||
validation.validate_aud = false;
|
||||
|
||||
// AFTER
|
||||
validation.validate_aud = true;
|
||||
validation.set_audience(&["https://api.myservice.com"]);
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
**Hardcoded secrets:**
|
||||
```rust
|
||||
// BEFORE
|
||||
let api_key = "sk-1234567890abcdef";
|
||||
|
||||
// AFTER
|
||||
let api_key = std::env::var("API_KEY")
|
||||
.expect("API_KEY must be set");
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
## Integration with Hooks
|
||||
|
||||
Aphoria can run as a pre-commit hook:
|
||||
|
||||
```json
|
||||
// .claude/settings.json
|
||||
{
|
||||
"hooks": {
|
||||
"PreCommit": [
|
||||
{
|
||||
"command": "aphoria scan --format sarif --exit-code",
|
||||
"when": "always"
|
||||
}
|
||||
]
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
The `--exit-code` flag returns non-zero if any BLOCK verdicts exist.
|
||||
|
||||
## Do
|
||||
|
||||
1. Run the actual `aphoria` CLI - don't simulate results
|
||||
2. Present conflicts with clear file:line references
|
||||
3. Explain why each conflict matters (cite the spec)
|
||||
4. Offer concrete fixes, not vague suggestions
|
||||
5. Support acknowledgment for intentional deviations
|
||||
6. Group results by severity for quick triage
|
||||
|
||||
## Do Not
|
||||
|
||||
1. Guess at scan results - always run the CLI
|
||||
2. Show all details for every conflict (summarize, expand on request)
|
||||
3. Recommend disabling security features without strong justification
|
||||
4. Skip the authoritative source citation
|
||||
5. Mark something as BLOCK that's really a FLAG
|
||||
|
||||
## Constraints
|
||||
|
||||
- ALWAYS run `aphoria` CLI commands, don't fabricate results
|
||||
- ALWAYS cite the authoritative source for each conflict
|
||||
- ALWAYS offer acknowledgment as an option for intentional deviations
|
||||
- NEVER recommend `unwrap()` or `expect()` in suggested fixes
|
||||
- NEVER suggest disabling security without explicit user confirmation
|
||||
- WHEN offering fixes, provide production-quality code
|
||||
|
||||
## Error Handling
|
||||
|
||||
**If aphoria is not installed:**
|
||||
```
|
||||
Aphoria CLI not found. Install with:
|
||||
cargo install --path /path/to/stemedb/applications/aphoria
|
||||
|
||||
Or build from source:
|
||||
cd /path/to/stemedb/applications/aphoria
|
||||
cargo build --release
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
**If scan fails:**
|
||||
```
|
||||
Scan failed: {error_message}
|
||||
|
||||
Common issues:
|
||||
- Not in a project directory (no Cargo.toml, package.json, etc.)
|
||||
- Insufficient permissions to read files
|
||||
- Episteme data directory not writable
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
## Alias Suggestions (Phase 3.3)
|
||||
|
||||
When Aphoria detects a new concept path that matches an authoritative path by leaf name:
|
||||
|
||||
```markdown
|
||||
**New concept detected:** `code://rust/newproject/auth/jwt/audience_validation`
|
||||
|
||||
**Suggested alias:**
|
||||
-> `rfc://7519/jwt/audience_validation` (Tier 0, RFC 7519 Section 4.1.3)
|
||||
|
||||
This will link your code path to the authoritative RFC path, enabling:
|
||||
- Faster conflict detection in future scans
|
||||
- Automatic alias resolution in queries
|
||||
|
||||
**Accept?** [y/n/defer]
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
- **y (Accept)**: Creates the alias, bridges code to spec
|
||||
- **n (Reject)**: Records that these are intentionally different concepts
|
||||
- **defer**: Flags for later review (appears in `/aphoria status`)
|
||||
25
applications/aphoria/skill/hooks.json
Normal file
25
applications/aphoria/skill/hooks.json
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
|
||||
{
|
||||
"$schema": "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/anthropics/claude-code/main/schemas/hooks.json",
|
||||
"description": "Aphoria hook configurations for Claude Code",
|
||||
"hooks": {
|
||||
"PreCommit": [
|
||||
{
|
||||
"command": "aphoria scan --format sarif --exit-code",
|
||||
"description": "Check for conflicts with authoritative sources before commit",
|
||||
"when": "always"
|
||||
}
|
||||
],
|
||||
"PrePush": [
|
||||
{
|
||||
"command": "aphoria scan --strict --exit-code",
|
||||
"description": "Strict conflict check before pushing to remote",
|
||||
"when": "always"
|
||||
}
|
||||
]
|
||||
},
|
||||
"notes": {
|
||||
"PreCommit": "Runs on every commit. Exit code 2 = BLOCK conflicts found, 1 = FLAG only",
|
||||
"PrePush": "Stricter thresholds (FLAG at 0.3, BLOCK at 0.5) for remote pushes",
|
||||
"installation": "Copy this to .claude/settings.json in your project or ~/.claude/settings.json for global"
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
77
applications/aphoria/skill/install.sh
Executable file
77
applications/aphoria/skill/install.sh
Executable file
@ -0,0 +1,77 @@
|
||||
#!/bin/bash
|
||||
# Aphoria Claude Code Skill Installer
|
||||
#
|
||||
# This script installs the Aphoria skill to ~/.claude/skills/aphoria/
|
||||
# making /aphoria commands available in Claude Code sessions.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Usage:
|
||||
# ./install.sh # Install skill only
|
||||
# ./install.sh --build # Build aphoria binary first, then install skill
|
||||
|
||||
set -e
|
||||
|
||||
SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
|
||||
APHORIA_DIR="$(dirname "$SCRIPT_DIR")"
|
||||
SKILL_DEST="$HOME/.claude/skills/aphoria"
|
||||
|
||||
# Colors for output
|
||||
RED='\033[0;31m'
|
||||
GREEN='\033[0;32m'
|
||||
YELLOW='\033[1;33m'
|
||||
NC='\033[0m' # No Color
|
||||
|
||||
echo "Aphoria Skill Installer"
|
||||
echo "======================="
|
||||
echo ""
|
||||
|
||||
# Build aphoria if requested
|
||||
if [[ "$1" == "--build" ]]; then
|
||||
echo -e "${YELLOW}Building aphoria binary...${NC}"
|
||||
cd "$APHORIA_DIR"
|
||||
cargo build --release
|
||||
|
||||
# Copy binary to cargo bin (optional, makes `aphoria` available globally)
|
||||
if [[ -d "$HOME/.cargo/bin" ]]; then
|
||||
cp "$APHORIA_DIR/target/release/aphoria" "$HOME/.cargo/bin/"
|
||||
echo -e "${GREEN}Installed aphoria binary to ~/.cargo/bin/aphoria${NC}"
|
||||
fi
|
||||
echo ""
|
||||
fi
|
||||
|
||||
# Check if aphoria binary exists
|
||||
if ! command -v aphoria &> /dev/null; then
|
||||
if [[ -f "$APHORIA_DIR/target/release/aphoria" ]]; then
|
||||
echo -e "${YELLOW}Note: aphoria binary found at $APHORIA_DIR/target/release/aphoria${NC}"
|
||||
echo "Consider adding to PATH or running with --build flag."
|
||||
else
|
||||
echo -e "${YELLOW}Warning: aphoria binary not found.${NC}"
|
||||
echo "The skill will be installed, but you'll need to build aphoria first:"
|
||||
echo " cd $APHORIA_DIR && cargo build --release"
|
||||
echo ""
|
||||
fi
|
||||
fi
|
||||
|
||||
# Create skill directory
|
||||
echo "Installing skill to $SKILL_DEST..."
|
||||
mkdir -p "$SKILL_DEST"
|
||||
|
||||
# Copy skill files
|
||||
cp "$SCRIPT_DIR/SKILL.md" "$SKILL_DEST/SKILL.md"
|
||||
|
||||
# Verify installation
|
||||
if [[ -f "$SKILL_DEST/SKILL.md" ]]; then
|
||||
echo -e "${GREEN}Skill installed successfully!${NC}"
|
||||
echo ""
|
||||
echo "Available commands:"
|
||||
echo " /aphoria - Scan current project"
|
||||
echo " /aphoria scan - Scan current project"
|
||||
echo " /aphoria scan --fix - Scan and offer fixes"
|
||||
echo " /aphoria ack - Acknowledge a conflict"
|
||||
echo " /aphoria status - Show status"
|
||||
echo " /aphoria diff - Show changes since baseline"
|
||||
echo ""
|
||||
echo "To use in Claude Code, just type /aphoria in a project directory."
|
||||
else
|
||||
echo -e "${RED}Installation failed!${NC}"
|
||||
exit 1
|
||||
fi
|
||||
187
applications/aphoria/src/bridge.rs
Normal file
187
applications/aphoria/src/bridge.rs
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,187 @@
|
||||
//! Bridge between ExtractedClaim and Episteme Assertion.
|
||||
//!
|
||||
//! Converts claims extracted from source code into Episteme assertions
|
||||
//! that can be ingested into the knowledge graph.
|
||||
|
||||
use blake3::Hasher;
|
||||
use ed25519_dalek::{Signer, SigningKey};
|
||||
use stemedb_core::types::{
|
||||
Assertion, Hash, HlcTimestamp, LifecycleStage, SignatureEntry, SourceClass,
|
||||
};
|
||||
use tracing::instrument;
|
||||
|
||||
use crate::types::ExtractedClaim;
|
||||
|
||||
/// Convert an ExtractedClaim to an Episteme Assertion.
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// The assertion is signed with the provided keypair and timestamped.
|
||||
#[instrument(skip(signing_key), fields(concept_path = %claim.concept_path, predicate = %claim.predicate))]
|
||||
pub fn claim_to_assertion(
|
||||
claim: &ExtractedClaim,
|
||||
signing_key: &SigningKey,
|
||||
timestamp: u64,
|
||||
) -> Assertion {
|
||||
// Build source metadata
|
||||
let source_metadata = serde_json::json!({
|
||||
"file": claim.file,
|
||||
"line": claim.line,
|
||||
"matched_text": claim.matched_text,
|
||||
"scan_tool": "aphoria",
|
||||
"scan_version": env!("CARGO_PKG_VERSION"),
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
// Compute source hash from file:line:matched_text
|
||||
let source_hash = compute_source_hash(&claim.file, claim.line, &claim.matched_text);
|
||||
|
||||
// Create signature (version 1: signs subject:predicate)
|
||||
let message = format!("{}:{}", claim.concept_path, claim.predicate);
|
||||
let signature = signing_key.sign(message.as_bytes());
|
||||
let verifying_key = signing_key.verifying_key();
|
||||
|
||||
let signature_entry = SignatureEntry {
|
||||
agent_id: verifying_key.to_bytes(),
|
||||
signature: signature.to_bytes(),
|
||||
timestamp,
|
||||
version: 1,
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
Assertion {
|
||||
subject: claim.concept_path.clone(),
|
||||
predicate: claim.predicate.clone(),
|
||||
object: claim.value.clone(),
|
||||
parent_hash: None,
|
||||
source_hash,
|
||||
source_class: SourceClass::Expert, // code:// scheme = Expert (Tier 3)
|
||||
visual_hash: None,
|
||||
epoch: None,
|
||||
source_metadata: serde_json::to_vec(&source_metadata).ok(),
|
||||
lifecycle: LifecycleStage::Approved,
|
||||
signatures: vec![signature_entry],
|
||||
confidence: claim.confidence,
|
||||
timestamp,
|
||||
hlc_timestamp: HlcTimestamp::default(),
|
||||
vector: None,
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Compute the content hash of an assertion for deduplication.
|
||||
#[allow(dead_code)]
|
||||
pub fn compute_assertion_hash(assertion: &Assertion) -> Hash {
|
||||
let mut hasher = Hasher::new();
|
||||
hasher.update(assertion.subject.as_bytes());
|
||||
hasher.update(assertion.predicate.as_bytes());
|
||||
hasher.update(format!("{:?}", assertion.object).as_bytes());
|
||||
hasher.update(&assertion.source_hash);
|
||||
hasher.update(&[assertion.source_class.tier()]);
|
||||
*hasher.finalize().as_bytes()
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Compute the source hash from file location and matched text.
|
||||
fn compute_source_hash(file: &str, line: usize, matched_text: &str) -> Hash {
|
||||
let mut hasher = Hasher::new();
|
||||
hasher.update(file.as_bytes());
|
||||
hasher.update(&line.to_le_bytes());
|
||||
hasher.update(matched_text.as_bytes());
|
||||
*hasher.finalize().as_bytes()
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Generate a new Ed25519 signing key for an Aphoria agent.
|
||||
pub fn generate_signing_key() -> SigningKey {
|
||||
use rand::rngs::OsRng;
|
||||
SigningKey::generate(&mut OsRng)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Load or generate the project's signing key.
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// The key is stored at `.aphoria/agent.key` in the project root.
|
||||
pub fn load_or_generate_key(project_root: &std::path::Path) -> std::io::Result<SigningKey> {
|
||||
let aphoria_dir = project_root.join(".aphoria");
|
||||
let key_path = aphoria_dir.join("agent.key");
|
||||
|
||||
if key_path.exists() {
|
||||
let key_bytes = std::fs::read(&key_path)?;
|
||||
if key_bytes.len() == 32 {
|
||||
let mut arr = [0u8; 32];
|
||||
arr.copy_from_slice(&key_bytes);
|
||||
Ok(SigningKey::from_bytes(&arr))
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
// Invalid key file, regenerate
|
||||
let key = generate_signing_key();
|
||||
std::fs::create_dir_all(&aphoria_dir)?;
|
||||
std::fs::write(&key_path, key.to_bytes())?;
|
||||
Ok(key)
|
||||
}
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
// Generate new key
|
||||
let key = generate_signing_key();
|
||||
std::fs::create_dir_all(&aphoria_dir)?;
|
||||
std::fs::write(&key_path, key.to_bytes())?;
|
||||
Ok(key)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[cfg(test)]
|
||||
mod tests {
|
||||
use super::*;
|
||||
use stemedb_core::types::ObjectValue;
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_claim_to_assertion() {
|
||||
let claim = ExtractedClaim {
|
||||
concept_path: "code://rust/myapp/tls/cert_verification".to_string(),
|
||||
predicate: "enabled".to_string(),
|
||||
value: ObjectValue::Boolean(false),
|
||||
file: "src/client.rs".to_string(),
|
||||
line: 42,
|
||||
matched_text: "danger_accept_invalid_certs(true)".to_string(),
|
||||
confidence: 1.0,
|
||||
description: "TLS verification disabled".to_string(),
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
let key = generate_signing_key();
|
||||
let timestamp = 1706832000;
|
||||
|
||||
let assertion = claim_to_assertion(&claim, &key, timestamp);
|
||||
|
||||
assert_eq!(assertion.subject, claim.concept_path);
|
||||
assert_eq!(assertion.predicate, "enabled");
|
||||
assert_eq!(assertion.object, ObjectValue::Boolean(false));
|
||||
assert_eq!(assertion.source_class, SourceClass::Expert);
|
||||
assert_eq!(assertion.confidence, 1.0);
|
||||
assert_eq!(assertion.timestamp, timestamp);
|
||||
assert!(!assertion.signatures.is_empty());
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_assertion_hash_deterministic() {
|
||||
let claim = ExtractedClaim {
|
||||
concept_path: "code://rust/myapp/tls/cert_verification".to_string(),
|
||||
predicate: "enabled".to_string(),
|
||||
value: ObjectValue::Boolean(false),
|
||||
file: "src/client.rs".to_string(),
|
||||
line: 42,
|
||||
matched_text: "danger_accept_invalid_certs(true)".to_string(),
|
||||
confidence: 1.0,
|
||||
description: "TLS verification disabled".to_string(),
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
let key = generate_signing_key();
|
||||
let assertion1 = claim_to_assertion(&claim, &key, 1000);
|
||||
let assertion2 = claim_to_assertion(&claim, &key, 1000);
|
||||
|
||||
let hash1 = compute_assertion_hash(&assertion1);
|
||||
let hash2 = compute_assertion_hash(&assertion2);
|
||||
|
||||
assert_eq!(hash1, hash2);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_load_or_generate_key() {
|
||||
let temp_dir = tempfile::tempdir().expect("create temp dir");
|
||||
let key1 = load_or_generate_key(temp_dir.path()).expect("generate key");
|
||||
let key2 = load_or_generate_key(temp_dir.path()).expect("load key");
|
||||
|
||||
// Same key should be loaded
|
||||
assert_eq!(key1.to_bytes(), key2.to_bytes());
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
@ -29,6 +29,9 @@ pub struct AphoriaConfig {
|
||||
|
||||
/// Alias suggestion settings.
|
||||
pub aliases: AliasConfig,
|
||||
|
||||
/// Corpus builder settings.
|
||||
pub corpus: CorpusConfig,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
impl AphoriaConfig {
|
||||
@ -194,11 +197,54 @@ pub struct AliasConfig {
|
||||
|
||||
/// Whether to auto-accept aliases to Tier 0 sources.
|
||||
pub auto_accept_tier0: bool,
|
||||
|
||||
/// Whether to automatically create aliases when conflicts are detected.
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// When enabled, tail-path matching during conflict detection will
|
||||
/// persist aliases (e.g., `code://rust/tls/cert_verification` →
|
||||
/// `rfc://5246/tls/cert_verification`) for faster future queries.
|
||||
pub auto_create_aliases: bool,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
impl Default for AliasConfig {
|
||||
fn default() -> Self {
|
||||
Self { auto_suggest: true, auto_accept_tier0: true }
|
||||
Self { auto_suggest: true, auto_accept_tier0: true, auto_create_aliases: true }
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Corpus builder configuration.
|
||||
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Deserialize)]
|
||||
#[serde(default)]
|
||||
pub struct CorpusConfig {
|
||||
/// Directory for caching downloaded RFCs and OWASP cheat sheets.
|
||||
pub cache_dir: PathBuf,
|
||||
|
||||
/// Whether to include the hardcoded corpus (built-in assertions).
|
||||
pub include_hardcoded: bool,
|
||||
|
||||
/// Whether to include RFC normative statements.
|
||||
pub include_rfc: bool,
|
||||
|
||||
/// Whether to include OWASP cheat sheet recommendations.
|
||||
pub include_owasp: bool,
|
||||
|
||||
/// Whether to include vendor documentation claims.
|
||||
pub include_vendor: bool,
|
||||
|
||||
/// Override the default RFC list (if None, uses default list).
|
||||
pub rfc_list: Option<Vec<u32>>,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
impl Default for CorpusConfig {
|
||||
fn default() -> Self {
|
||||
Self {
|
||||
cache_dir: dirs_default_cache_dir(),
|
||||
include_hardcoded: true,
|
||||
include_rfc: true,
|
||||
include_owasp: true,
|
||||
include_vendor: true,
|
||||
rfc_list: None,
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@ -220,6 +266,17 @@ fn dirs_default_advisory_db() -> PathBuf {
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Get the default cache directory for corpus downloads.
|
||||
fn dirs_default_cache_dir() -> PathBuf {
|
||||
if let Some(cache) = dirs::cache_dir() {
|
||||
cache.join("aphoria")
|
||||
} else if let Some(home) = dirs::home_dir() {
|
||||
home.join(".cache").join("aphoria")
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
PathBuf::from(".aphoria/cache")
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[cfg(test)]
|
||||
mod tests {
|
||||
use super::*;
|
||||
|
||||
260
applications/aphoria/src/corpus/hardcoded.rs
Normal file
260
applications/aphoria/src/corpus/hardcoded.rs
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,260 @@
|
||||
//! Hardcoded authoritative corpus for common security patterns.
|
||||
//!
|
||||
//! This builder provides the built-in assertions that Aphoria ships with,
|
||||
//! covering essential security requirements from RFCs and OWASP guidance.
|
||||
//! These assertions are always available and don't require network access.
|
||||
|
||||
use ed25519_dalek::SigningKey;
|
||||
use stemedb_core::types::{Assertion, ObjectValue, SourceClass};
|
||||
use tracing::instrument;
|
||||
|
||||
use super::CorpusBuilder;
|
||||
use crate::config::CorpusConfig;
|
||||
use crate::episteme::create_authoritative_assertion;
|
||||
use crate::AphoriaError;
|
||||
|
||||
/// Builder for the hardcoded authoritative corpus.
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// Contains 11+ built-in assertions covering:
|
||||
/// - TLS certificate verification (RFC 5246)
|
||||
/// - JWT validation (RFC 7519)
|
||||
/// - Secrets management (OWASP)
|
||||
/// - CORS security (OWASP)
|
||||
/// - Rate limiting (OWASP)
|
||||
pub struct HardcodedCorpusBuilder;
|
||||
|
||||
impl HardcodedCorpusBuilder {
|
||||
/// Create a new hardcoded corpus builder.
|
||||
pub fn new() -> Self {
|
||||
Self
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
impl Default for HardcodedCorpusBuilder {
|
||||
fn default() -> Self {
|
||||
Self::new()
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
impl CorpusBuilder for HardcodedCorpusBuilder {
|
||||
fn name(&self) -> &str {
|
||||
"Hardcoded"
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fn scheme(&self) -> &str {
|
||||
"rfc,owasp"
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fn default_tier(&self) -> u8 {
|
||||
0 // Mix of Tier 0 (Regulatory) and Tier 1 (Clinical)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fn requires_network(&self) -> bool {
|
||||
false
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fn source_ids(&self) -> Vec<String> {
|
||||
vec![
|
||||
"rfc://5246".to_string(),
|
||||
"rfc://7519".to_string(),
|
||||
"owasp://transport_layer".to_string(),
|
||||
"owasp://secrets".to_string(),
|
||||
"owasp://cors".to_string(),
|
||||
"owasp://rate_limit".to_string(),
|
||||
]
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[instrument(skip(self, signing_key, _config), fields(builder = "Hardcoded"))]
|
||||
fn build(
|
||||
&self,
|
||||
signing_key: &SigningKey,
|
||||
timestamp: u64,
|
||||
_config: &CorpusConfig,
|
||||
) -> Result<Vec<Assertion>, AphoriaError> {
|
||||
Ok(build_hardcoded_corpus(signing_key, timestamp))
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Build the hardcoded authoritative corpus.
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// This is the same corpus that was previously in `create_authoritative_corpus()`,
|
||||
/// now encapsulated in a CorpusBuilder for consistency.
|
||||
#[allow(clippy::vec_init_then_push)]
|
||||
fn build_hardcoded_corpus(signing_key: &SigningKey, timestamp: u64) -> Vec<Assertion> {
|
||||
let mut assertions = Vec::new();
|
||||
|
||||
// TLS verification requirements
|
||||
assertions.push(create_authoritative_assertion(
|
||||
signing_key,
|
||||
"rfc://5246/tls/cert_verification",
|
||||
"enabled",
|
||||
ObjectValue::Boolean(true),
|
||||
SourceClass::Regulatory,
|
||||
"TLS certificate verification MUST be enabled (RFC 5246)",
|
||||
timestamp,
|
||||
));
|
||||
|
||||
// OWASP TLS guidance
|
||||
assertions.push(create_authoritative_assertion(
|
||||
signing_key,
|
||||
"owasp://transport_layer/tls/cert_verification",
|
||||
"enabled",
|
||||
ObjectValue::Boolean(true),
|
||||
SourceClass::Clinical, // Tier 1
|
||||
"OWASP: Always verify TLS certificates",
|
||||
timestamp,
|
||||
));
|
||||
|
||||
// JWT audience validation (RFC 7519)
|
||||
assertions.push(create_authoritative_assertion(
|
||||
signing_key,
|
||||
"rfc://7519/jwt/audience_validation",
|
||||
"enabled",
|
||||
ObjectValue::Boolean(true),
|
||||
SourceClass::Regulatory,
|
||||
"JWT audience claim MUST be validated (RFC 7519 Section 4.1.3)",
|
||||
timestamp,
|
||||
));
|
||||
|
||||
// JWT expiry validation
|
||||
assertions.push(create_authoritative_assertion(
|
||||
signing_key,
|
||||
"rfc://7519/jwt/expiry_validation",
|
||||
"enabled",
|
||||
ObjectValue::Boolean(true),
|
||||
SourceClass::Regulatory,
|
||||
"JWT expiry claim MUST be validated (RFC 7519 Section 4.1.4)",
|
||||
timestamp,
|
||||
));
|
||||
|
||||
// JWT signature verification
|
||||
assertions.push(create_authoritative_assertion(
|
||||
signing_key,
|
||||
"rfc://7519/jwt/signature_verification",
|
||||
"enabled",
|
||||
ObjectValue::Boolean(true),
|
||||
SourceClass::Regulatory,
|
||||
"JWT signatures MUST be verified (RFC 7519)",
|
||||
timestamp,
|
||||
));
|
||||
|
||||
// JWT algorithm restriction
|
||||
assertions.push(create_authoritative_assertion(
|
||||
signing_key,
|
||||
"rfc://7519/jwt/algorithm_restriction",
|
||||
"config_value",
|
||||
ObjectValue::Text("explicit_list".to_string()),
|
||||
SourceClass::Regulatory,
|
||||
"JWT algorithm MUST be explicitly specified, 'none' algorithm forbidden",
|
||||
timestamp,
|
||||
));
|
||||
|
||||
// OWASP secrets management
|
||||
assertions.push(create_authoritative_assertion(
|
||||
signing_key,
|
||||
"owasp://secrets/api_key",
|
||||
"storage_method",
|
||||
ObjectValue::Text("environment_or_vault".to_string()),
|
||||
SourceClass::Clinical,
|
||||
"OWASP: Never hardcode API keys in source code",
|
||||
timestamp,
|
||||
));
|
||||
|
||||
assertions.push(create_authoritative_assertion(
|
||||
signing_key,
|
||||
"owasp://secrets/password",
|
||||
"storage_method",
|
||||
ObjectValue::Text("environment_or_vault".to_string()),
|
||||
SourceClass::Clinical,
|
||||
"OWASP: Never hardcode passwords in source code",
|
||||
timestamp,
|
||||
));
|
||||
|
||||
// CORS security
|
||||
assertions.push(create_authoritative_assertion(
|
||||
signing_key,
|
||||
"owasp://cors/allow_origin",
|
||||
"config_value",
|
||||
ObjectValue::Text("explicit_list".to_string()),
|
||||
SourceClass::Clinical,
|
||||
"OWASP: Never use wildcard (*) for CORS Allow-Origin in production",
|
||||
timestamp,
|
||||
));
|
||||
|
||||
assertions.push(create_authoritative_assertion(
|
||||
signing_key,
|
||||
"owasp://cors/credentials_with_wildcard",
|
||||
"enabled",
|
||||
ObjectValue::Boolean(false),
|
||||
SourceClass::Regulatory,
|
||||
"CORS credentials MUST NOT be allowed with wildcard origin (security vulnerability)",
|
||||
timestamp,
|
||||
));
|
||||
|
||||
// Rate limiting
|
||||
assertions.push(create_authoritative_assertion(
|
||||
signing_key,
|
||||
"owasp://rate_limit/enabled",
|
||||
"enabled",
|
||||
ObjectValue::Boolean(true),
|
||||
SourceClass::Clinical,
|
||||
"OWASP: Rate limiting SHOULD be enabled for API endpoints",
|
||||
timestamp,
|
||||
));
|
||||
|
||||
assertions
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[cfg(test)]
|
||||
mod tests {
|
||||
use super::*;
|
||||
use crate::bridge::generate_signing_key;
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_hardcoded_builder_builds() {
|
||||
let builder = HardcodedCorpusBuilder::new();
|
||||
let key = generate_signing_key();
|
||||
let config = CorpusConfig::default();
|
||||
|
||||
let assertions = builder.build(&key, 1706832000, &config).expect("build");
|
||||
|
||||
assert_eq!(assertions.len(), 11);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_hardcoded_builder_no_network() {
|
||||
let builder = HardcodedCorpusBuilder::new();
|
||||
assert!(!builder.requires_network());
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_hardcoded_assertions_content() {
|
||||
let key = generate_signing_key();
|
||||
let assertions = build_hardcoded_corpus(&key, 1706832000);
|
||||
|
||||
// Check TLS assertion
|
||||
let tls_assertion = assertions.iter().find(|a| a.subject.contains("tls/cert_verification"));
|
||||
assert!(tls_assertion.is_some());
|
||||
let tls = tls_assertion.expect("tls assertion");
|
||||
assert_eq!(tls.predicate, "enabled");
|
||||
assert_eq!(tls.object, ObjectValue::Boolean(true));
|
||||
|
||||
// Check JWT assertion
|
||||
let jwt_assertion =
|
||||
assertions.iter().find(|a| a.subject.contains("jwt/audience_validation"));
|
||||
assert!(jwt_assertion.is_some());
|
||||
let jwt = jwt_assertion.expect("jwt assertion");
|
||||
assert_eq!(jwt.predicate, "enabled");
|
||||
assert_eq!(jwt.source_class, SourceClass::Regulatory);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_hardcoded_source_ids() {
|
||||
let builder = HardcodedCorpusBuilder::new();
|
||||
let ids = builder.source_ids();
|
||||
|
||||
assert!(ids.iter().any(|id| id.contains("rfc://5246")));
|
||||
assert!(ids.iter().any(|id| id.contains("rfc://7519")));
|
||||
assert!(ids.iter().any(|id| id.contains("owasp://")));
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
370
applications/aphoria/src/corpus/mod.rs
Normal file
370
applications/aphoria/src/corpus/mod.rs
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,370 @@
|
||||
//! Authoritative corpus management for Aphoria.
|
||||
//!
|
||||
//! This module provides a unified interface for building and managing the authoritative
|
||||
//! corpus that Aphoria uses to detect conflicts. The corpus consists of assertions from
|
||||
//! multiple sources:
|
||||
//!
|
||||
//! - **Hardcoded** (Tier 0-1): Built-in RFC/OWASP assertions for common security patterns
|
||||
//! - **RFC** (Tier 0): Normative statements from IETF RFCs
|
||||
//! - **OWASP** (Tier 1): Recommendations from OWASP Cheat Sheets
|
||||
//! - **Vendor** (Tier 2): Best practices from vendor documentation
|
||||
//!
|
||||
//! # Architecture
|
||||
//!
|
||||
//! ```text
|
||||
//! ┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
|
||||
//! │ aphoria corpus build │
|
||||
//! │ │
|
||||
//! │ ┌──────────────┐ ┌──────────────┐ ┌───────────────────────┐ │
|
||||
//! │ │ RFC Ingester │ │ OWASP │ │ Vendor Bootstrapper │ │
|
||||
//! │ │ (Tier 0) │ │ Ingester │ │ (Tier 2) │ │
|
||||
//! │ │ │ │ (Tier 1) │ │ │ │
|
||||
//! │ └──────┬───────┘ └──────┬───────┘ └───────────┬───────────┘ │
|
||||
//! │ │ │ │ │
|
||||
//! │ └─────────────────┼──────────────────────┘ │
|
||||
//! │ ▼ │
|
||||
//! │ ┌─────────────────┐ │
|
||||
//! │ │ CorpusRegistry │ │
|
||||
//! │ └────────┬────────┘ │
|
||||
//! │ ▼ │
|
||||
//! │ ┌─────────────────┐ │
|
||||
//! │ │ Vec<Assertion> │ │
|
||||
//! │ └─────────────────┘ │
|
||||
//! └─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
|
||||
//! ```
|
||||
|
||||
mod hardcoded;
|
||||
mod owasp;
|
||||
mod rfc;
|
||||
mod vendor;
|
||||
|
||||
pub use hardcoded::HardcodedCorpusBuilder;
|
||||
pub use owasp::OwaspCorpusBuilder;
|
||||
pub use rfc::RfcCorpusBuilder;
|
||||
pub use vendor::VendorCorpusBuilder;
|
||||
|
||||
use ed25519_dalek::SigningKey;
|
||||
use stemedb_core::types::Assertion;
|
||||
use tracing::{info, instrument};
|
||||
|
||||
use crate::config::CorpusConfig;
|
||||
use crate::AphoriaError;
|
||||
|
||||
/// A builder that produces authoritative assertions from a specific source.
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// Each corpus builder is responsible for:
|
||||
/// 1. Fetching or loading source material (RFCs, OWASP docs, vendor docs)
|
||||
/// 2. Parsing relevant claims from that material
|
||||
/// 3. Converting claims to signed Episteme assertions
|
||||
pub trait CorpusBuilder: Send + Sync {
|
||||
/// Human-readable name for this corpus source.
|
||||
fn name(&self) -> &str;
|
||||
|
||||
/// URI scheme used by this corpus (e.g., "rfc", "owasp", "vendor").
|
||||
fn scheme(&self) -> &str;
|
||||
|
||||
/// Default source tier for assertions from this corpus.
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// - Tier 0: Regulatory (RFCs with MUST/SHALL)
|
||||
/// - Tier 1: Clinical (OWASP, security best practices)
|
||||
/// - Tier 2: Observational (Vendor documentation)
|
||||
fn default_tier(&self) -> u8;
|
||||
|
||||
/// Build assertions from this corpus source.
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// # Arguments
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// * `signing_key` - Ed25519 key for signing assertions
|
||||
/// * `timestamp` - Unix timestamp for assertion creation
|
||||
/// * `config` - Corpus configuration (cache paths, options)
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// # Returns
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// A vector of signed assertions, or an error if building fails.
|
||||
fn build(
|
||||
&self,
|
||||
signing_key: &SigningKey,
|
||||
timestamp: u64,
|
||||
config: &CorpusConfig,
|
||||
) -> Result<Vec<Assertion>, AphoriaError>;
|
||||
|
||||
/// Whether this builder requires network access.
|
||||
fn requires_network(&self) -> bool {
|
||||
false
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// List of source identifiers this builder will fetch.
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// For RFC builder, this might be `["7519", "6749", "8446"]`.
|
||||
/// For OWASP builder, this might be `["Authentication", "JWT", "TLS"]`.
|
||||
fn source_ids(&self) -> Vec<String> {
|
||||
vec![]
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Registry for managing multiple corpus builders.
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// The registry handles:
|
||||
/// - Builder registration and lookup
|
||||
/// - Coordinated corpus building across all sources
|
||||
/// - Filtering by source type (--only flag)
|
||||
pub struct CorpusRegistry {
|
||||
builders: Vec<Box<dyn CorpusBuilder>>,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
impl CorpusRegistry {
|
||||
/// Create a new empty registry.
|
||||
pub fn new() -> Self {
|
||||
Self { builders: Vec::new() }
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Create a registry with default builders.
|
||||
pub fn with_defaults(config: &CorpusConfig) -> Self {
|
||||
let mut registry = Self::new();
|
||||
|
||||
if config.include_hardcoded {
|
||||
registry.register(Box::new(HardcodedCorpusBuilder::new()));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if config.include_rfc {
|
||||
registry.register(Box::new(RfcCorpusBuilder::new(&config.rfc_list)));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if config.include_owasp {
|
||||
registry.register(Box::new(OwaspCorpusBuilder::new()));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if config.include_vendor {
|
||||
registry.register(Box::new(VendorCorpusBuilder::new()));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
registry
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Register a corpus builder.
|
||||
pub fn register(&mut self, builder: Box<dyn CorpusBuilder>) {
|
||||
self.builders.push(builder);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Get registered builder names.
|
||||
pub fn builder_names(&self) -> Vec<&str> {
|
||||
self.builders.iter().map(|b| b.name()).collect()
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Get builder info for listing.
|
||||
pub fn list_builders(&self) -> Vec<CorpusBuilderInfo> {
|
||||
self.builders
|
||||
.iter()
|
||||
.map(|b| CorpusBuilderInfo {
|
||||
name: b.name().to_string(),
|
||||
scheme: b.scheme().to_string(),
|
||||
tier: b.default_tier(),
|
||||
requires_network: b.requires_network(),
|
||||
source_ids: b.source_ids(),
|
||||
})
|
||||
.collect()
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Build assertions from all registered corpus sources.
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// # Arguments
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// * `signing_key` - Ed25519 key for signing assertions
|
||||
/// * `timestamp` - Unix timestamp for assertion creation
|
||||
/// * `config` - Corpus configuration
|
||||
/// * `offline` - If true, skip builders that require network access
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// # Returns
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// A combined vector of assertions from all sources, along with build statistics.
|
||||
#[instrument(skip(self, signing_key, config), fields(builders = self.builders.len()))]
|
||||
pub fn build_all(
|
||||
&self,
|
||||
signing_key: &SigningKey,
|
||||
timestamp: u64,
|
||||
config: &CorpusConfig,
|
||||
offline: bool,
|
||||
) -> Result<CorpusBuildResult, AphoriaError> {
|
||||
let mut all_assertions = Vec::new();
|
||||
let mut stats = Vec::new();
|
||||
|
||||
for builder in &self.builders {
|
||||
// Skip network-requiring builders in offline mode
|
||||
if offline && builder.requires_network() {
|
||||
info!(builder = builder.name(), "Skipping (offline mode)");
|
||||
stats.push(CorpusBuilderStats {
|
||||
name: builder.name().to_string(),
|
||||
scheme: builder.scheme().to_string(),
|
||||
assertions_built: 0,
|
||||
skipped: true,
|
||||
error: None,
|
||||
});
|
||||
continue;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
info!(builder = builder.name(), scheme = builder.scheme(), "Building corpus");
|
||||
|
||||
match builder.build(signing_key, timestamp, config) {
|
||||
Ok(assertions) => {
|
||||
let count = assertions.len();
|
||||
info!(builder = builder.name(), assertions = count, "Corpus built");
|
||||
stats.push(CorpusBuilderStats {
|
||||
name: builder.name().to_string(),
|
||||
scheme: builder.scheme().to_string(),
|
||||
assertions_built: count,
|
||||
skipped: false,
|
||||
error: None,
|
||||
});
|
||||
all_assertions.extend(assertions);
|
||||
}
|
||||
Err(e) => {
|
||||
tracing::warn!(builder = builder.name(), error = %e, "Corpus build failed");
|
||||
stats.push(CorpusBuilderStats {
|
||||
name: builder.name().to_string(),
|
||||
scheme: builder.scheme().to_string(),
|
||||
assertions_built: 0,
|
||||
skipped: false,
|
||||
error: Some(e.to_string()),
|
||||
});
|
||||
// Continue with other builders even if one fails
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
Ok(CorpusBuildResult { assertions: all_assertions, stats })
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
impl Default for CorpusRegistry {
|
||||
fn default() -> Self {
|
||||
Self::new()
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Information about a corpus builder.
|
||||
#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
|
||||
pub struct CorpusBuilderInfo {
|
||||
/// Human-readable name.
|
||||
pub name: String,
|
||||
/// URI scheme.
|
||||
pub scheme: String,
|
||||
/// Default source tier.
|
||||
pub tier: u8,
|
||||
/// Whether network access is required.
|
||||
pub requires_network: bool,
|
||||
/// Source identifiers (RFC numbers, cheat sheet names, etc.).
|
||||
pub source_ids: Vec<String>,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Statistics for a single corpus builder.
|
||||
#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
|
||||
pub struct CorpusBuilderStats {
|
||||
/// Builder name.
|
||||
pub name: String,
|
||||
/// URI scheme.
|
||||
pub scheme: String,
|
||||
/// Number of assertions built.
|
||||
pub assertions_built: usize,
|
||||
/// Whether the builder was skipped (e.g., offline mode).
|
||||
pub skipped: bool,
|
||||
/// Error message if build failed.
|
||||
pub error: Option<String>,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Result of building the full corpus.
|
||||
#[derive(Debug)]
|
||||
pub struct CorpusBuildResult {
|
||||
/// All assertions from all builders.
|
||||
pub assertions: Vec<Assertion>,
|
||||
/// Per-builder statistics.
|
||||
pub stats: Vec<CorpusBuilderStats>,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
impl CorpusBuildResult {
|
||||
/// Get total assertion count.
|
||||
pub fn total_assertions(&self) -> usize {
|
||||
self.assertions.len()
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Get count of successful builders.
|
||||
pub fn successful_builders(&self) -> usize {
|
||||
self.stats.iter().filter(|s| s.error.is_none() && !s.skipped).count()
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Get count of failed builders.
|
||||
pub fn failed_builders(&self) -> usize {
|
||||
self.stats.iter().filter(|s| s.error.is_some()).count()
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Get count of skipped builders.
|
||||
pub fn skipped_builders(&self) -> usize {
|
||||
self.stats.iter().filter(|s| s.skipped).count()
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[cfg(test)]
|
||||
mod tests {
|
||||
use super::*;
|
||||
use crate::bridge::generate_signing_key;
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_registry_default_empty() {
|
||||
let registry = CorpusRegistry::new();
|
||||
assert!(registry.builder_names().is_empty());
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_registry_with_defaults() {
|
||||
let config = CorpusConfig::default();
|
||||
let registry = CorpusRegistry::with_defaults(&config);
|
||||
|
||||
// Should have all four default builders
|
||||
let names = registry.builder_names();
|
||||
assert!(names.contains(&"Hardcoded"));
|
||||
assert!(names.contains(&"RFC"));
|
||||
assert!(names.contains(&"OWASP"));
|
||||
assert!(names.contains(&"Vendor"));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_registry_selective_builders() {
|
||||
let config =
|
||||
CorpusConfig { include_rfc: false, include_owasp: false, ..Default::default() };
|
||||
|
||||
let registry = CorpusRegistry::with_defaults(&config);
|
||||
let names = registry.builder_names();
|
||||
|
||||
assert!(names.contains(&"Hardcoded"));
|
||||
assert!(names.contains(&"Vendor"));
|
||||
assert!(!names.contains(&"RFC"));
|
||||
assert!(!names.contains(&"OWASP"));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_build_all_offline() {
|
||||
let config = CorpusConfig::default();
|
||||
let registry = CorpusRegistry::with_defaults(&config);
|
||||
let key = generate_signing_key();
|
||||
let timestamp = 1706832000;
|
||||
|
||||
let result = registry.build_all(&key, timestamp, &config, true).expect("build_all");
|
||||
|
||||
// In offline mode, network-requiring builders should be skipped
|
||||
// but hardcoded and vendor should still work
|
||||
assert!(result.total_assertions() > 0);
|
||||
// In offline mode some builders may be skipped - this is expected behavior
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_corpus_builder_info() {
|
||||
let config = CorpusConfig::default();
|
||||
let registry = CorpusRegistry::with_defaults(&config);
|
||||
let infos = registry.list_builders();
|
||||
|
||||
for info in &infos {
|
||||
assert!(!info.name.is_empty());
|
||||
assert!(!info.scheme.is_empty());
|
||||
assert!(info.tier <= 3);
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
231
applications/aphoria/src/corpus/owasp/mod.rs
Normal file
231
applications/aphoria/src/corpus/owasp/mod.rs
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,231 @@
|
||||
//! OWASP Cheat Sheet corpus builder.
|
||||
//!
|
||||
//! This builder fetches OWASP Cheat Sheets from GitHub and extracts security
|
||||
//! recommendations to create authoritative assertions.
|
||||
//!
|
||||
//! # Caching
|
||||
//!
|
||||
//! Cheat sheets are cached to `~/.cache/aphoria/owasp-cache/{filename}` to
|
||||
//! minimize network requests.
|
||||
//!
|
||||
//! # Target Cheat Sheets
|
||||
//!
|
||||
//! | Filename | Topic |
|
||||
//! |---------------------------------------|-----------------|
|
||||
//! | Authentication_Cheat_Sheet.md | authentication |
|
||||
//! | JSON_Web_Token_for_Java_Cheat_Sheet.md | jwt |
|
||||
//! | Transport_Layer_Security_Cheat_Sheet.md | tls |
|
||||
//! | Secrets_Management_Cheat_Sheet.md | secrets |
|
||||
//! | Input_Validation_Cheat_Sheet.md | input_validation|
|
||||
//! | Session_Management_Cheat_Sheet.md | session |
|
||||
|
||||
mod parsers;
|
||||
#[cfg(test)]
|
||||
mod tests;
|
||||
|
||||
use std::fs;
|
||||
use std::thread;
|
||||
use std::time::Duration;
|
||||
|
||||
use ed25519_dalek::SigningKey;
|
||||
use stemedb_core::types::{Assertion, SourceClass};
|
||||
use tracing::{debug, info, instrument, warn};
|
||||
|
||||
use super::CorpusBuilder;
|
||||
use crate::config::CorpusConfig;
|
||||
use crate::episteme::create_authoritative_assertion;
|
||||
use crate::AphoriaError;
|
||||
use parsers::parse_cheatsheet;
|
||||
|
||||
/// Target OWASP cheat sheets to fetch.
|
||||
const TARGET_CHEAT_SHEETS: &[(&str, &str)] = &[
|
||||
("Authentication_Cheat_Sheet.md", "authentication"),
|
||||
("JSON_Web_Token_for_Java_Cheat_Sheet.md", "jwt"),
|
||||
("Transport_Layer_Security_Cheat_Sheet.md", "tls"),
|
||||
("Secrets_Management_Cheat_Sheet.md", "secrets"),
|
||||
("Input_Validation_Cheat_Sheet.md", "input_validation"),
|
||||
("Session_Management_Cheat_Sheet.md", "session"),
|
||||
("Cross-Site_Request_Forgery_Prevention_Cheat_Sheet.md", "csrf"),
|
||||
("Password_Storage_Cheat_Sheet.md", "password_storage"),
|
||||
("HTTP_Headers_Cheat_Sheet.md", "http_headers"),
|
||||
];
|
||||
|
||||
/// Base URL for OWASP CheatSheetSeries raw content.
|
||||
const OWASP_BASE_URL: &str =
|
||||
"https://raw.githubusercontent.com/OWASP/CheatSheetSeries/master/cheatsheets/";
|
||||
|
||||
/// HTTP timeout for fetching cheat sheets.
|
||||
const FETCH_TIMEOUT_SECS: u64 = 30;
|
||||
|
||||
/// Rate limit delay between requests (milliseconds).
|
||||
const RATE_LIMIT_MS: u64 = 500;
|
||||
|
||||
/// Builder for OWASP Cheat Sheet corpus.
|
||||
pub struct OwaspCorpusBuilder {
|
||||
/// Cheat sheets to fetch.
|
||||
sheets: Vec<(String, String)>,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
impl OwaspCorpusBuilder {
|
||||
/// Create a new OWASP corpus builder with default cheat sheets.
|
||||
pub fn new() -> Self {
|
||||
let sheets =
|
||||
TARGET_CHEAT_SHEETS.iter().map(|(f, t)| (f.to_string(), t.to_string())).collect();
|
||||
Self { sheets }
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Create a builder with custom cheat sheets.
|
||||
#[allow(dead_code)]
|
||||
pub fn with_sheets(sheets: Vec<(String, String)>) -> Self {
|
||||
Self { sheets }
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
impl Default for OwaspCorpusBuilder {
|
||||
fn default() -> Self {
|
||||
Self::new()
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
impl CorpusBuilder for OwaspCorpusBuilder {
|
||||
fn name(&self) -> &str {
|
||||
"OWASP"
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fn scheme(&self) -> &str {
|
||||
"owasp"
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fn default_tier(&self) -> u8 {
|
||||
1 // Clinical
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fn requires_network(&self) -> bool {
|
||||
true // Needs to fetch cheat sheets (unless cached)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fn source_ids(&self) -> Vec<String> {
|
||||
self.sheets.iter().map(|(_, topic)| format!("OWASP {}", topic)).collect()
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[instrument(skip(self, signing_key, config), fields(builder = "OWASP", sheets = self.sheets.len()))]
|
||||
fn build(
|
||||
&self,
|
||||
signing_key: &SigningKey,
|
||||
timestamp: u64,
|
||||
config: &CorpusConfig,
|
||||
) -> Result<Vec<Assertion>, AphoriaError> {
|
||||
let cache_dir = config.cache_dir.join("owasp-cache");
|
||||
fs::create_dir_all(&cache_dir)?;
|
||||
|
||||
let mut all_assertions = Vec::new();
|
||||
|
||||
for (i, (filename, topic)) in self.sheets.iter().enumerate() {
|
||||
// Rate limiting between requests
|
||||
if i > 0 {
|
||||
thread::sleep(Duration::from_millis(RATE_LIMIT_MS));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
match fetch_and_parse_cheatsheet(filename, topic, &cache_dir, signing_key, timestamp) {
|
||||
Ok(assertions) => {
|
||||
info!(filename, topic, assertions = assertions.len(), "Parsed cheat sheet");
|
||||
all_assertions.extend(assertions);
|
||||
}
|
||||
Err(e) => {
|
||||
warn!(filename, topic, error = %e, "Failed to process cheat sheet");
|
||||
// Continue with other sheets
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
Ok(all_assertions)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Fetch a cheat sheet and parse security recommendations.
|
||||
fn fetch_and_parse_cheatsheet(
|
||||
filename: &str,
|
||||
topic: &str,
|
||||
cache_dir: &std::path::Path,
|
||||
signing_key: &SigningKey,
|
||||
timestamp: u64,
|
||||
) -> Result<Vec<Assertion>, AphoriaError> {
|
||||
let content = fetch_cheatsheet_content(filename, cache_dir)?;
|
||||
let recommendations = parse_cheatsheet(&content, topic);
|
||||
|
||||
let assertions = recommendations
|
||||
.into_iter()
|
||||
.map(|rec| {
|
||||
create_authoritative_assertion(
|
||||
signing_key,
|
||||
&rec.subject,
|
||||
&rec.predicate,
|
||||
rec.value,
|
||||
SourceClass::Clinical, // Tier 1
|
||||
&rec.description,
|
||||
timestamp,
|
||||
)
|
||||
})
|
||||
.collect();
|
||||
|
||||
Ok(assertions)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Fetch cheat sheet content, using cache if available.
|
||||
fn fetch_cheatsheet_content(
|
||||
filename: &str,
|
||||
cache_dir: &std::path::Path,
|
||||
) -> Result<String, AphoriaError> {
|
||||
let cache_path = cache_dir.join(filename);
|
||||
|
||||
// Check cache first
|
||||
if cache_path.exists() {
|
||||
debug!(filename, "Loading from cache");
|
||||
return fs::read_to_string(&cache_path).map_err(|e| AphoriaError::OwaspFetch {
|
||||
sheet: filename.to_string(),
|
||||
message: e.to_string(),
|
||||
});
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Fetch from network
|
||||
let url = format!("{}{}", OWASP_BASE_URL, filename);
|
||||
info!(filename, url = %url, "Fetching cheat sheet");
|
||||
|
||||
let response =
|
||||
ureq::get(&url).timeout(Duration::from_secs(FETCH_TIMEOUT_SECS)).call().map_err(|e| {
|
||||
AphoriaError::OwaspFetch { sheet: filename.to_string(), message: e.to_string() }
|
||||
})?;
|
||||
|
||||
let content = response.into_string().map_err(|e| AphoriaError::OwaspFetch {
|
||||
sheet: filename.to_string(),
|
||||
message: e.to_string(),
|
||||
})?;
|
||||
|
||||
// Cache the result
|
||||
if let Err(e) = fs::write(&cache_path, &content) {
|
||||
warn!(filename, error = %e, "Failed to cache cheat sheet");
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
Ok(content)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[cfg(test)]
|
||||
mod tests {
|
||||
use super::*;
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_owasp_builder_source_ids() {
|
||||
let builder = OwaspCorpusBuilder::new();
|
||||
let ids = builder.source_ids();
|
||||
|
||||
assert!(ids.iter().any(|id| id.contains("authentication")));
|
||||
assert!(ids.iter().any(|id| id.contains("jwt")));
|
||||
assert!(ids.iter().any(|id| id.contains("tls")));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_owasp_builder_requires_network() {
|
||||
let builder = OwaspCorpusBuilder::new();
|
||||
assert!(builder.requires_network());
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
494
applications/aphoria/src/corpus/owasp/parsers.rs
Normal file
494
applications/aphoria/src/corpus/owasp/parsers.rs
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,494 @@
|
||||
//! OWASP cheat sheet parsers.
|
||||
//!
|
||||
//! Contains topic-specific parsers for extracting security recommendations
|
||||
//! from OWASP Cheat Sheets.
|
||||
|
||||
use regex::Regex;
|
||||
use stemedb_core::types::ObjectValue;
|
||||
|
||||
/// A parsed security recommendation from a cheat sheet.
|
||||
pub(super) struct Recommendation {
|
||||
/// Subject path (owasp://cheatsheet/{topic}/{section}/{claim}).
|
||||
pub subject: String,
|
||||
/// Predicate for the recommendation.
|
||||
pub predicate: String,
|
||||
/// Value extracted from the recommendation.
|
||||
pub value: ObjectValue,
|
||||
/// Human-readable description.
|
||||
pub description: String,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Parse security recommendations from cheat sheet markdown.
|
||||
pub(super) fn parse_cheatsheet(content: &str, topic: &str) -> Vec<Recommendation> {
|
||||
let mut recommendations = Vec::new();
|
||||
|
||||
// Parse based on topic
|
||||
match topic {
|
||||
"authentication" => recommendations.extend(parse_authentication_sheet(content)),
|
||||
"jwt" => recommendations.extend(parse_jwt_sheet(content)),
|
||||
"tls" => recommendations.extend(parse_tls_sheet(content)),
|
||||
"secrets" => recommendations.extend(parse_secrets_sheet(content)),
|
||||
"input_validation" => recommendations.extend(parse_input_validation_sheet(content)),
|
||||
"session" => recommendations.extend(parse_session_sheet(content)),
|
||||
"csrf" => recommendations.extend(parse_csrf_sheet(content)),
|
||||
"password_storage" => recommendations.extend(parse_password_storage_sheet(content)),
|
||||
"http_headers" => recommendations.extend(parse_http_headers_sheet(content)),
|
||||
_ => recommendations.extend(parse_generic_sheet(content, topic)),
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
recommendations
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Parse authentication cheat sheet.
|
||||
fn parse_authentication_sheet(content: &str) -> Vec<Recommendation> {
|
||||
let mut recs = Vec::new();
|
||||
|
||||
// Multi-factor authentication
|
||||
if content.contains("multi-factor") || content.contains("MFA") || content.contains("2FA") {
|
||||
recs.push(Recommendation {
|
||||
subject: "owasp://cheatsheet/authentication/mfa".to_string(),
|
||||
predicate: "enabled".to_string(),
|
||||
value: ObjectValue::Boolean(true),
|
||||
description: "OWASP: Multi-factor authentication SHOULD be implemented".to_string(),
|
||||
});
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Password requirements
|
||||
if content.contains("password") && content.contains("minimum") {
|
||||
recs.push(Recommendation {
|
||||
subject: "owasp://cheatsheet/authentication/password_length".to_string(),
|
||||
predicate: "config_value".to_string(),
|
||||
value: ObjectValue::Number(8.0),
|
||||
description: "OWASP: Minimum password length of 8 characters".to_string(),
|
||||
});
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Account lockout
|
||||
if content.contains("lockout") || content.contains("brute") {
|
||||
recs.push(Recommendation {
|
||||
subject: "owasp://cheatsheet/authentication/account_lockout".to_string(),
|
||||
predicate: "enabled".to_string(),
|
||||
value: ObjectValue::Boolean(true),
|
||||
description: "OWASP: Account lockout SHOULD be enabled for brute force protection"
|
||||
.to_string(),
|
||||
});
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Secure password storage
|
||||
if content.contains("bcrypt") || content.contains("Argon2") || content.contains("hash") {
|
||||
recs.push(Recommendation {
|
||||
subject: "owasp://cheatsheet/authentication/password_hashing".to_string(),
|
||||
predicate: "config_value".to_string(),
|
||||
value: ObjectValue::Text("bcrypt_or_argon2".to_string()),
|
||||
description: "OWASP: Use bcrypt or Argon2 for password hashing".to_string(),
|
||||
});
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
recs
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Parse JWT cheat sheet.
|
||||
fn parse_jwt_sheet(content: &str) -> Vec<Recommendation> {
|
||||
let mut recs = Vec::new();
|
||||
|
||||
// Algorithm validation
|
||||
if content.contains("algorithm") || content.contains("alg") {
|
||||
recs.push(Recommendation {
|
||||
subject: "owasp://cheatsheet/jwt/algorithm_validation".to_string(),
|
||||
predicate: "enabled".to_string(),
|
||||
value: ObjectValue::Boolean(true),
|
||||
description: "OWASP: JWT algorithm MUST be validated server-side".to_string(),
|
||||
});
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// None algorithm rejection
|
||||
if content.contains("\"none\"") || content.contains("none algorithm") {
|
||||
recs.push(Recommendation {
|
||||
subject: "owasp://cheatsheet/jwt/none_algorithm".to_string(),
|
||||
predicate: "enabled".to_string(),
|
||||
value: ObjectValue::Boolean(false),
|
||||
description: "OWASP: JWT 'none' algorithm MUST be rejected".to_string(),
|
||||
});
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Expiration validation
|
||||
if content.contains("expiration") || content.contains("exp") {
|
||||
recs.push(Recommendation {
|
||||
subject: "owasp://cheatsheet/jwt/expiration".to_string(),
|
||||
predicate: "enabled".to_string(),
|
||||
value: ObjectValue::Boolean(true),
|
||||
description: "OWASP: JWT expiration MUST be validated".to_string(),
|
||||
});
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Signature verification
|
||||
if content.contains("signature") && content.contains("verify") {
|
||||
recs.push(Recommendation {
|
||||
subject: "owasp://cheatsheet/jwt/signature_verification".to_string(),
|
||||
predicate: "enabled".to_string(),
|
||||
value: ObjectValue::Boolean(true),
|
||||
description: "OWASP: JWT signatures MUST be verified".to_string(),
|
||||
});
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
recs
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Parse TLS cheat sheet.
|
||||
fn parse_tls_sheet(content: &str) -> Vec<Recommendation> {
|
||||
let mut recs = Vec::new();
|
||||
|
||||
// TLS version
|
||||
if content.contains("TLS 1.2") || content.contains("TLS 1.3") {
|
||||
recs.push(Recommendation {
|
||||
subject: "owasp://cheatsheet/tls/min_version".to_string(),
|
||||
predicate: "config_value".to_string(),
|
||||
value: ObjectValue::Text("TLS1.2".to_string()),
|
||||
description: "OWASP: Minimum TLS version should be 1.2".to_string(),
|
||||
});
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Certificate verification
|
||||
if content.contains("certificate") && content.contains("verify") {
|
||||
recs.push(Recommendation {
|
||||
subject: "owasp://cheatsheet/tls/cert_verification".to_string(),
|
||||
predicate: "enabled".to_string(),
|
||||
value: ObjectValue::Boolean(true),
|
||||
description: "OWASP: TLS certificates MUST be verified".to_string(),
|
||||
});
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Cipher suites
|
||||
if content.contains("cipher") {
|
||||
recs.push(Recommendation {
|
||||
subject: "owasp://cheatsheet/tls/cipher_suites".to_string(),
|
||||
predicate: "config_value".to_string(),
|
||||
value: ObjectValue::Text("strong_ciphers_only".to_string()),
|
||||
description: "OWASP: Only strong cipher suites should be enabled".to_string(),
|
||||
});
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// HSTS
|
||||
if content.contains("HSTS") || content.contains("Strict-Transport-Security") {
|
||||
recs.push(Recommendation {
|
||||
subject: "owasp://cheatsheet/tls/hsts".to_string(),
|
||||
predicate: "enabled".to_string(),
|
||||
value: ObjectValue::Boolean(true),
|
||||
description: "OWASP: HSTS header SHOULD be enabled".to_string(),
|
||||
});
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
recs
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Parse secrets management cheat sheet.
|
||||
fn parse_secrets_sheet(content: &str) -> Vec<Recommendation> {
|
||||
let mut recs = Vec::new();
|
||||
|
||||
// No hardcoded secrets
|
||||
if content.contains("hardcoded") || content.contains("hardcode") {
|
||||
recs.push(Recommendation {
|
||||
subject: "owasp://cheatsheet/secrets/hardcoded".to_string(),
|
||||
predicate: "enabled".to_string(),
|
||||
value: ObjectValue::Boolean(false),
|
||||
description: "OWASP: Secrets MUST NOT be hardcoded".to_string(),
|
||||
});
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Environment variables or vault
|
||||
if content.contains("environment") || content.contains("vault") {
|
||||
recs.push(Recommendation {
|
||||
subject: "owasp://cheatsheet/secrets/storage_method".to_string(),
|
||||
predicate: "config_value".to_string(),
|
||||
value: ObjectValue::Text("environment_or_vault".to_string()),
|
||||
description: "OWASP: Secrets SHOULD be stored in environment variables or vault"
|
||||
.to_string(),
|
||||
});
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// API key rotation
|
||||
if content.contains("rotation") || content.contains("rotate") {
|
||||
recs.push(Recommendation {
|
||||
subject: "owasp://cheatsheet/secrets/rotation".to_string(),
|
||||
predicate: "enabled".to_string(),
|
||||
value: ObjectValue::Boolean(true),
|
||||
description: "OWASP: Secrets SHOULD be rotated regularly".to_string(),
|
||||
});
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Encryption at rest
|
||||
if content.contains("encrypt") && content.contains("rest") {
|
||||
recs.push(Recommendation {
|
||||
subject: "owasp://cheatsheet/secrets/encryption_at_rest".to_string(),
|
||||
predicate: "enabled".to_string(),
|
||||
value: ObjectValue::Boolean(true),
|
||||
description: "OWASP: Secrets SHOULD be encrypted at rest".to_string(),
|
||||
});
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
recs
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Parse input validation cheat sheet.
|
||||
fn parse_input_validation_sheet(content: &str) -> Vec<Recommendation> {
|
||||
let mut recs = Vec::new();
|
||||
|
||||
// Server-side validation
|
||||
if content.contains("server-side") || content.contains("server side") {
|
||||
recs.push(Recommendation {
|
||||
subject: "owasp://cheatsheet/input_validation/server_side".to_string(),
|
||||
predicate: "enabled".to_string(),
|
||||
value: ObjectValue::Boolean(true),
|
||||
description: "OWASP: Input validation MUST be performed server-side".to_string(),
|
||||
});
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Allow list over deny list
|
||||
if content.contains("allowlist") || content.contains("whitelist") {
|
||||
recs.push(Recommendation {
|
||||
subject: "owasp://cheatsheet/input_validation/allowlist".to_string(),
|
||||
predicate: "enabled".to_string(),
|
||||
value: ObjectValue::Boolean(true),
|
||||
description: "OWASP: Prefer allowlist over denylist for input validation".to_string(),
|
||||
});
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// SQL injection prevention
|
||||
if content.contains("SQL") && content.contains("parameter") {
|
||||
recs.push(Recommendation {
|
||||
subject: "owasp://cheatsheet/input_validation/parameterized_queries".to_string(),
|
||||
predicate: "enabled".to_string(),
|
||||
value: ObjectValue::Boolean(true),
|
||||
description: "OWASP: Use parameterized queries to prevent SQL injection".to_string(),
|
||||
});
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// XSS prevention
|
||||
if content.contains("XSS") || content.contains("cross-site scripting") {
|
||||
recs.push(Recommendation {
|
||||
subject: "owasp://cheatsheet/input_validation/output_encoding".to_string(),
|
||||
predicate: "enabled".to_string(),
|
||||
value: ObjectValue::Boolean(true),
|
||||
description: "OWASP: Output encoding MUST be used to prevent XSS".to_string(),
|
||||
});
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
recs
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Parse session management cheat sheet.
|
||||
fn parse_session_sheet(content: &str) -> Vec<Recommendation> {
|
||||
let mut recs = Vec::new();
|
||||
|
||||
// Secure cookie flag
|
||||
if content.contains("Secure") && content.contains("cookie") {
|
||||
recs.push(Recommendation {
|
||||
subject: "owasp://cheatsheet/session/secure_cookie".to_string(),
|
||||
predicate: "enabled".to_string(),
|
||||
value: ObjectValue::Boolean(true),
|
||||
description: "OWASP: Session cookies MUST have Secure flag".to_string(),
|
||||
});
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// HttpOnly cookie flag
|
||||
if content.contains("HttpOnly") {
|
||||
recs.push(Recommendation {
|
||||
subject: "owasp://cheatsheet/session/httponly_cookie".to_string(),
|
||||
predicate: "enabled".to_string(),
|
||||
value: ObjectValue::Boolean(true),
|
||||
description: "OWASP: Session cookies MUST have HttpOnly flag".to_string(),
|
||||
});
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Session timeout
|
||||
if content.contains("timeout") || content.contains("expiration") {
|
||||
recs.push(Recommendation {
|
||||
subject: "owasp://cheatsheet/session/timeout".to_string(),
|
||||
predicate: "enabled".to_string(),
|
||||
value: ObjectValue::Boolean(true),
|
||||
description: "OWASP: Session timeout SHOULD be configured".to_string(),
|
||||
});
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Session regeneration
|
||||
if content.contains("regenerate") {
|
||||
recs.push(Recommendation {
|
||||
subject: "owasp://cheatsheet/session/regeneration".to_string(),
|
||||
predicate: "enabled".to_string(),
|
||||
value: ObjectValue::Boolean(true),
|
||||
description: "OWASP: Session ID SHOULD be regenerated after authentication".to_string(),
|
||||
});
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
recs
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Parse CSRF prevention cheat sheet.
|
||||
fn parse_csrf_sheet(content: &str) -> Vec<Recommendation> {
|
||||
let mut recs = Vec::new();
|
||||
|
||||
// CSRF tokens
|
||||
if content.contains("token") {
|
||||
recs.push(Recommendation {
|
||||
subject: "owasp://cheatsheet/csrf/token".to_string(),
|
||||
predicate: "enabled".to_string(),
|
||||
value: ObjectValue::Boolean(true),
|
||||
description: "OWASP: CSRF tokens SHOULD be used".to_string(),
|
||||
});
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// SameSite cookies
|
||||
if content.contains("SameSite") {
|
||||
recs.push(Recommendation {
|
||||
subject: "owasp://cheatsheet/csrf/samesite_cookie".to_string(),
|
||||
predicate: "config_value".to_string(),
|
||||
value: ObjectValue::Text("Strict".to_string()),
|
||||
description: "OWASP: SameSite cookie attribute SHOULD be Strict or Lax".to_string(),
|
||||
});
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Origin header validation
|
||||
if content.contains("Origin") && content.contains("header") {
|
||||
recs.push(Recommendation {
|
||||
subject: "owasp://cheatsheet/csrf/origin_validation".to_string(),
|
||||
predicate: "enabled".to_string(),
|
||||
value: ObjectValue::Boolean(true),
|
||||
description: "OWASP: Origin header SHOULD be validated".to_string(),
|
||||
});
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
recs
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Parse password storage cheat sheet.
|
||||
fn parse_password_storage_sheet(content: &str) -> Vec<Recommendation> {
|
||||
let mut recs = Vec::new();
|
||||
|
||||
// Argon2
|
||||
if content.contains("Argon2") {
|
||||
recs.push(Recommendation {
|
||||
subject: "owasp://cheatsheet/password_storage/algorithm".to_string(),
|
||||
predicate: "config_value".to_string(),
|
||||
value: ObjectValue::Text("Argon2id".to_string()),
|
||||
description: "OWASP: Argon2id is the recommended password hashing algorithm"
|
||||
.to_string(),
|
||||
});
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Salt
|
||||
if content.contains("salt") {
|
||||
recs.push(Recommendation {
|
||||
subject: "owasp://cheatsheet/password_storage/salt".to_string(),
|
||||
predicate: "enabled".to_string(),
|
||||
value: ObjectValue::Boolean(true),
|
||||
description: "OWASP: Passwords MUST be salted before hashing".to_string(),
|
||||
});
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Work factor
|
||||
if content.contains("work factor") || content.contains("iterations") {
|
||||
recs.push(Recommendation {
|
||||
subject: "owasp://cheatsheet/password_storage/work_factor".to_string(),
|
||||
predicate: "enabled".to_string(),
|
||||
value: ObjectValue::Boolean(true),
|
||||
description: "OWASP: Password hashing work factor SHOULD be configured".to_string(),
|
||||
});
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
recs
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Parse HTTP headers cheat sheet.
|
||||
fn parse_http_headers_sheet(content: &str) -> Vec<Recommendation> {
|
||||
let mut recs = Vec::new();
|
||||
|
||||
// Content-Security-Policy
|
||||
if content.contains("Content-Security-Policy") || content.contains("CSP") {
|
||||
recs.push(Recommendation {
|
||||
subject: "owasp://cheatsheet/http_headers/csp".to_string(),
|
||||
predicate: "enabled".to_string(),
|
||||
value: ObjectValue::Boolean(true),
|
||||
description: "OWASP: Content-Security-Policy header SHOULD be set".to_string(),
|
||||
});
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// X-Content-Type-Options
|
||||
if content.contains("X-Content-Type-Options") {
|
||||
recs.push(Recommendation {
|
||||
subject: "owasp://cheatsheet/http_headers/content_type_options".to_string(),
|
||||
predicate: "config_value".to_string(),
|
||||
value: ObjectValue::Text("nosniff".to_string()),
|
||||
description: "OWASP: X-Content-Type-Options SHOULD be 'nosniff'".to_string(),
|
||||
});
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// X-Frame-Options
|
||||
if content.contains("X-Frame-Options") {
|
||||
recs.push(Recommendation {
|
||||
subject: "owasp://cheatsheet/http_headers/frame_options".to_string(),
|
||||
predicate: "config_value".to_string(),
|
||||
value: ObjectValue::Text("DENY".to_string()),
|
||||
description: "OWASP: X-Frame-Options SHOULD be 'DENY' or 'SAMEORIGIN'".to_string(),
|
||||
});
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Referrer-Policy
|
||||
if content.contains("Referrer-Policy") {
|
||||
recs.push(Recommendation {
|
||||
subject: "owasp://cheatsheet/http_headers/referrer_policy".to_string(),
|
||||
predicate: "enabled".to_string(),
|
||||
value: ObjectValue::Boolean(true),
|
||||
description: "OWASP: Referrer-Policy header SHOULD be set".to_string(),
|
||||
});
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
recs
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Parse a generic cheat sheet using keyword matching.
|
||||
fn parse_generic_sheet(content: &str, topic: &str) -> Vec<Recommendation> {
|
||||
let mut recs = Vec::new();
|
||||
let Ok(must_pattern) = Regex::new(r"(?i)\bMUST\b[^.]+\.") else { return recs };
|
||||
let Ok(should_pattern) = Regex::new(r"(?i)\bSHOULD\b[^.]+\.") else { return recs };
|
||||
|
||||
for (i, cap) in must_pattern.captures_iter(content).enumerate().take(5) {
|
||||
let slug = create_slug(cap.get(0).map(|m| m.as_str()).unwrap_or(""));
|
||||
recs.push(Recommendation {
|
||||
subject: format!("owasp://cheatsheet/{}/must_{}", topic, i),
|
||||
predicate: "required".to_string(),
|
||||
value: ObjectValue::Boolean(true),
|
||||
description: format!("OWASP {}: {}", topic, truncate_description(&slug, 100)),
|
||||
});
|
||||
}
|
||||
for (i, cap) in should_pattern.captures_iter(content).enumerate().take(5) {
|
||||
let slug = create_slug(cap.get(0).map(|m| m.as_str()).unwrap_or(""));
|
||||
recs.push(Recommendation {
|
||||
subject: format!("owasp://cheatsheet/{}/should_{}", topic, i),
|
||||
predicate: "recommended".to_string(),
|
||||
value: ObjectValue::Boolean(true),
|
||||
description: format!("OWASP {}: {}", topic, truncate_description(&slug, 100)),
|
||||
});
|
||||
}
|
||||
recs
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Create a URL-safe slug from text.
|
||||
pub(super) fn create_slug(text: &str) -> String {
|
||||
text.to_lowercase()
|
||||
.chars()
|
||||
.map(|c| if c.is_alphanumeric() || c == ' ' { c } else { ' ' })
|
||||
.collect::<String>()
|
||||
.split_whitespace()
|
||||
.take(10)
|
||||
.collect::<Vec<_>>()
|
||||
.join("_")
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Truncate description to max length.
|
||||
pub(super) fn truncate_description(text: &str, max_len: usize) -> String {
|
||||
if text.len() <= max_len {
|
||||
text.to_string()
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
format!("{}...", &text[..max_len - 3])
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
114
applications/aphoria/src/corpus/owasp/tests.rs
Normal file
114
applications/aphoria/src/corpus/owasp/tests.rs
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,114 @@
|
||||
//! Tests for OWASP cheat sheet parsers.
|
||||
|
||||
use super::parsers::{create_slug, parse_cheatsheet, truncate_description};
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_parse_authentication_sheet() {
|
||||
let content = r#"
|
||||
# Authentication Best Practices
|
||||
|
||||
## Multi-Factor Authentication
|
||||
|
||||
Multi-factor authentication (MFA) or 2FA should be implemented.
|
||||
|
||||
## Password Requirements
|
||||
|
||||
The minimum password length should be at least 8 characters.
|
||||
|
||||
## Account Lockout
|
||||
|
||||
Account lockout should be enabled to prevent brute force attacks.
|
||||
|
||||
Use bcrypt or Argon2 for password hashing.
|
||||
"#;
|
||||
|
||||
let recs = parse_cheatsheet(content, "authentication");
|
||||
|
||||
assert!(recs.iter().any(|r| r.subject.contains("mfa")), "Should find MFA recommendation");
|
||||
assert!(
|
||||
recs.iter().any(|r| r.subject.contains("password_length")),
|
||||
"Should find password length"
|
||||
);
|
||||
assert!(
|
||||
recs.iter().any(|r| r.subject.contains("account_lockout")),
|
||||
"Should find account lockout"
|
||||
);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_parse_jwt_sheet() {
|
||||
let content = r#"
|
||||
# JWT Security
|
||||
|
||||
The algorithm header must be validated.
|
||||
The "none" algorithm must not be accepted.
|
||||
Verify the signature before trusting the claims.
|
||||
Check the expiration claim.
|
||||
"#;
|
||||
|
||||
let recs = parse_cheatsheet(content, "jwt");
|
||||
|
||||
assert!(
|
||||
recs.iter().any(|r| r.subject.contains("algorithm")),
|
||||
"Should find algorithm validation"
|
||||
);
|
||||
assert!(
|
||||
recs.iter().any(|r| r.subject.contains("none_algorithm")),
|
||||
"Should find none algorithm rejection"
|
||||
);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_parse_tls_sheet() {
|
||||
let content = r#"
|
||||
# TLS Configuration
|
||||
|
||||
Use TLS 1.2 or TLS 1.3.
|
||||
Always verify the certificate chain.
|
||||
Configure strong cipher suites.
|
||||
Enable HSTS.
|
||||
"#;
|
||||
|
||||
let recs = parse_cheatsheet(content, "tls");
|
||||
|
||||
assert!(recs.iter().any(|r| r.subject.contains("min_version")), "Should find min version");
|
||||
assert!(
|
||||
recs.iter().any(|r| r.subject.contains("cert_verification")),
|
||||
"Should find cert verification"
|
||||
);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_parse_secrets_sheet() {
|
||||
let content = r#"
|
||||
# Secrets Management
|
||||
|
||||
Never hardcode secrets in your code.
|
||||
Store secrets in environment variables or a vault.
|
||||
Rotate secrets regularly.
|
||||
Encrypt secrets at rest.
|
||||
"#;
|
||||
|
||||
let recs = parse_cheatsheet(content, "secrets");
|
||||
|
||||
assert!(recs.iter().any(|r| r.subject.contains("hardcoded")), "Should find hardcoded warning");
|
||||
assert!(
|
||||
recs.iter().any(|r| r.subject.contains("storage_method")),
|
||||
"Should find storage method"
|
||||
);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_create_slug() {
|
||||
assert_eq!(create_slug("Hello World!"), "hello_world");
|
||||
assert_eq!(create_slug("Use TLS 1.2"), "use_tls_1_2");
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_truncate_description() {
|
||||
assert_eq!(truncate_description("short", 100), "short");
|
||||
assert_eq!(
|
||||
truncate_description("a".repeat(150).as_str(), 100),
|
||||
format!("{}...", "a".repeat(97))
|
||||
);
|
||||
}
|
||||
231
applications/aphoria/src/corpus/rfc/mod.rs
Normal file
231
applications/aphoria/src/corpus/rfc/mod.rs
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,231 @@
|
||||
//! RFC normative statement corpus builder.
|
||||
//!
|
||||
//! This builder fetches RFCs from the IETF RFC Editor and extracts normative
|
||||
//! statements (MUST, SHALL, SHOULD per RFC 2119) to create authoritative
|
||||
//! assertions.
|
||||
//!
|
||||
//! # Caching
|
||||
//!
|
||||
//! RFC text is cached to `~/.cache/aphoria/rfc-cache/rfc{number}.txt` to
|
||||
//! minimize network requests.
|
||||
//!
|
||||
//! # Target RFCs
|
||||
//!
|
||||
//! | RFC | Topic | Priority Claims |
|
||||
//! |------|------------------------|----------------------------------------------------|
|
||||
//! | 7519 | JWT | audience_validation, expiry_validation, signature |
|
||||
//! | 6749 | OAuth 2.0 | redirect_uri_validation, state_parameter |
|
||||
//! | 6750 | Bearer tokens | transport_security |
|
||||
//! | 8446 | TLS 1.3 | cert_verification, cipher_selection |
|
||||
//! | 7525 | TLS best practices | hostname_verification |
|
||||
//! | 6238 | TOTP | time_step, validation_window |
|
||||
//! | 7617 | HTTP Basic Auth | transport_security |
|
||||
//! | 9110 | HTTP Semantics | timeout_handling |
|
||||
|
||||
mod parsers;
|
||||
#[cfg(test)]
|
||||
mod tests;
|
||||
|
||||
use std::fs;
|
||||
use std::time::Duration;
|
||||
|
||||
use ed25519_dalek::SigningKey;
|
||||
use stemedb_core::types::{Assertion, SourceClass};
|
||||
use tracing::{debug, info, instrument, warn};
|
||||
|
||||
use super::CorpusBuilder;
|
||||
use crate::config::CorpusConfig;
|
||||
use crate::episteme::create_authoritative_assertion;
|
||||
use crate::AphoriaError;
|
||||
use parsers::parse_normative_statements;
|
||||
|
||||
/// Default RFCs to fetch when none are specified.
|
||||
const DEFAULT_RFCS: &[u32] = &[
|
||||
7519, // JWT
|
||||
6749, // OAuth 2.0
|
||||
6750, // Bearer tokens
|
||||
8446, // TLS 1.3
|
||||
7525, // TLS best practices
|
||||
6238, // TOTP
|
||||
7617, // HTTP Basic Auth
|
||||
9110, // HTTP Semantics
|
||||
];
|
||||
|
||||
/// HTTP timeout for fetching RFCs.
|
||||
const FETCH_TIMEOUT_SECS: u64 = 30;
|
||||
|
||||
/// Builder for RFC normative statement corpus.
|
||||
pub struct RfcCorpusBuilder {
|
||||
/// List of RFC numbers to fetch.
|
||||
rfc_list: Vec<u32>,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
impl RfcCorpusBuilder {
|
||||
/// Create a new RFC corpus builder with specified RFCs.
|
||||
pub fn new(rfc_list: &Option<Vec<u32>>) -> Self {
|
||||
let list = rfc_list.clone().unwrap_or_else(|| DEFAULT_RFCS.to_vec());
|
||||
Self { rfc_list: list }
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Create a builder with default RFC list.
|
||||
pub fn with_defaults() -> Self {
|
||||
Self { rfc_list: DEFAULT_RFCS.to_vec() }
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
impl Default for RfcCorpusBuilder {
|
||||
fn default() -> Self {
|
||||
Self::with_defaults()
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
impl CorpusBuilder for RfcCorpusBuilder {
|
||||
fn name(&self) -> &str {
|
||||
"RFC"
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fn scheme(&self) -> &str {
|
||||
"rfc"
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fn default_tier(&self) -> u8 {
|
||||
0 // Regulatory
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fn requires_network(&self) -> bool {
|
||||
true // Needs to fetch RFCs (unless cached)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fn source_ids(&self) -> Vec<String> {
|
||||
self.rfc_list.iter().map(|n| format!("RFC {}", n)).collect()
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[instrument(skip(self, signing_key, config), fields(builder = "RFC", rfcs = ?self.rfc_list))]
|
||||
fn build(
|
||||
&self,
|
||||
signing_key: &SigningKey,
|
||||
timestamp: u64,
|
||||
config: &CorpusConfig,
|
||||
) -> Result<Vec<Assertion>, AphoriaError> {
|
||||
let cache_dir = config.cache_dir.join("rfc-cache");
|
||||
fs::create_dir_all(&cache_dir)?;
|
||||
|
||||
let mut all_assertions = Vec::new();
|
||||
|
||||
for &rfc_num in &self.rfc_list {
|
||||
match fetch_and_parse_rfc(rfc_num, &cache_dir, signing_key, timestamp) {
|
||||
Ok(assertions) => {
|
||||
info!(rfc = rfc_num, assertions = assertions.len(), "Parsed RFC");
|
||||
all_assertions.extend(assertions);
|
||||
}
|
||||
Err(e) => {
|
||||
warn!(rfc = rfc_num, error = %e, "Failed to process RFC");
|
||||
// Continue with other RFCs
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
Ok(all_assertions)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Fetch an RFC and parse its normative statements.
|
||||
fn fetch_and_parse_rfc(
|
||||
rfc_num: u32,
|
||||
cache_dir: &std::path::Path,
|
||||
signing_key: &SigningKey,
|
||||
timestamp: u64,
|
||||
) -> Result<Vec<Assertion>, AphoriaError> {
|
||||
let text = fetch_rfc_text(rfc_num, cache_dir)?;
|
||||
let statements = parse_normative_statements(&text, rfc_num);
|
||||
|
||||
let assertions = statements
|
||||
.into_iter()
|
||||
.map(|stmt| {
|
||||
create_authoritative_assertion(
|
||||
signing_key,
|
||||
&stmt.subject,
|
||||
&stmt.predicate,
|
||||
stmt.value,
|
||||
SourceClass::Regulatory, // Tier 0
|
||||
&stmt.description,
|
||||
timestamp,
|
||||
)
|
||||
})
|
||||
.collect();
|
||||
|
||||
Ok(assertions)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Fetch RFC text, using cache if available.
|
||||
fn fetch_rfc_text(rfc_num: u32, cache_dir: &std::path::Path) -> Result<String, AphoriaError> {
|
||||
let cache_path = cache_dir.join(format!("rfc{}.txt", rfc_num));
|
||||
|
||||
// Check cache first
|
||||
if cache_path.exists() {
|
||||
debug!(rfc = rfc_num, "Loading from cache");
|
||||
return fs::read_to_string(&cache_path).map_err(|e| AphoriaError::RfcFetch {
|
||||
rfc: rfc_num,
|
||||
message: e.to_string(),
|
||||
});
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Fetch from network
|
||||
let url = format!("https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc{}.txt", rfc_num);
|
||||
info!(rfc = rfc_num, url = %url, "Fetching RFC");
|
||||
|
||||
let response =
|
||||
ureq::get(&url).timeout(Duration::from_secs(FETCH_TIMEOUT_SECS)).call().map_err(|e| {
|
||||
AphoriaError::RfcFetch { rfc: rfc_num, message: e.to_string() }
|
||||
})?;
|
||||
|
||||
let text = response.into_string().map_err(|e| AphoriaError::RfcFetch {
|
||||
rfc: rfc_num,
|
||||
message: e.to_string(),
|
||||
})?;
|
||||
|
||||
// Cache the result
|
||||
if let Err(e) = fs::write(&cache_path, &text) {
|
||||
warn!(rfc = rfc_num, error = %e, "Failed to cache RFC");
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
Ok(text)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[cfg(test)]
|
||||
mod tests {
|
||||
use super::*;
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_rfc_builder_source_ids() {
|
||||
let builder = RfcCorpusBuilder::with_defaults();
|
||||
let ids = builder.source_ids();
|
||||
|
||||
assert!(ids.iter().any(|id| id.contains("7519")));
|
||||
assert!(ids.iter().any(|id| id.contains("8446")));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_rfc_builder_requires_network() {
|
||||
let builder = RfcCorpusBuilder::with_defaults();
|
||||
assert!(builder.requires_network());
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_custom_rfc_list() {
|
||||
let custom_list = Some(vec![7519, 8446]);
|
||||
let builder = RfcCorpusBuilder::new(&custom_list);
|
||||
|
||||
assert_eq!(builder.rfc_list.len(), 2);
|
||||
assert!(builder.rfc_list.contains(&7519));
|
||||
assert!(builder.rfc_list.contains(&8446));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_rfc_builder_offline_skipped() {
|
||||
// Test that the builder correctly reports it requires network
|
||||
// (actual network testing would need integration tests)
|
||||
let builder = RfcCorpusBuilder::with_defaults();
|
||||
assert!(builder.requires_network());
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
453
applications/aphoria/src/corpus/rfc/parsers.rs
Normal file
453
applications/aphoria/src/corpus/rfc/parsers.rs
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,453 @@
|
||||
//! RFC normative statement parsers.
|
||||
//!
|
||||
//! Contains RFC-specific parsers for extracting normative statements
|
||||
//! (MUST, SHALL, SHOULD per RFC 2119) from RFC documents.
|
||||
|
||||
use std::collections::HashMap;
|
||||
|
||||
use regex::Regex;
|
||||
use stemedb_core::types::ObjectValue;
|
||||
|
||||
/// A parsed normative statement from an RFC.
|
||||
pub(super) struct NormativeStatement {
|
||||
/// Subject path (rfc://{number}/{topic}).
|
||||
pub subject: String,
|
||||
/// Predicate for the statement.
|
||||
pub predicate: String,
|
||||
/// Value extracted from the statement.
|
||||
pub value: ObjectValue,
|
||||
/// Human-readable description.
|
||||
pub description: String,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Parse normative statements from RFC text.
|
||||
pub(super) fn parse_normative_statements(text: &str, rfc_num: u32) -> Vec<NormativeStatement> {
|
||||
let mut statements = Vec::new();
|
||||
|
||||
// RFC-specific parsing based on content
|
||||
match rfc_num {
|
||||
7519 => statements.extend(parse_rfc7519_jwt(text)),
|
||||
6749 => statements.extend(parse_rfc6749_oauth(text)),
|
||||
6750 => statements.extend(parse_rfc6750_bearer(text)),
|
||||
8446 => statements.extend(parse_rfc8446_tls13(text)),
|
||||
7525 => statements.extend(parse_rfc7525_tls_practices(text)),
|
||||
6238 => statements.extend(parse_rfc6238_totp(text)),
|
||||
7617 => statements.extend(parse_rfc7617_basic_auth(text)),
|
||||
9110 => statements.extend(parse_rfc9110_http(text)),
|
||||
_ => {
|
||||
// Generic parsing for unknown RFCs
|
||||
statements.extend(parse_generic_rfc(text, rfc_num));
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
statements
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Parse RFC 7519 (JWT) normative statements.
|
||||
fn parse_rfc7519_jwt(text: &str) -> Vec<NormativeStatement> {
|
||||
let mut statements = Vec::new();
|
||||
|
||||
// Audience validation (Section 4.1.3)
|
||||
if contains_normative(text, "aud", "MUST") {
|
||||
statements.push(NormativeStatement {
|
||||
subject: "rfc://7519/jwt/audience_validation".to_string(),
|
||||
predicate: "enabled".to_string(),
|
||||
value: ObjectValue::Boolean(true),
|
||||
description: "JWT audience claim MUST be validated (RFC 7519 Section 4.1.3)".to_string(),
|
||||
});
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Expiry validation (Section 4.1.4)
|
||||
if contains_normative(text, "exp", "MUST") {
|
||||
statements.push(NormativeStatement {
|
||||
subject: "rfc://7519/jwt/expiry_validation".to_string(),
|
||||
predicate: "enabled".to_string(),
|
||||
value: ObjectValue::Boolean(true),
|
||||
description: "JWT expiry claim MUST be validated (RFC 7519 Section 4.1.4)".to_string(),
|
||||
});
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Signature verification
|
||||
if text.contains("signature") && text.contains("MUST") {
|
||||
statements.push(NormativeStatement {
|
||||
subject: "rfc://7519/jwt/signature_verification".to_string(),
|
||||
predicate: "enabled".to_string(),
|
||||
value: ObjectValue::Boolean(true),
|
||||
description: "JWT signatures MUST be verified (RFC 7519)".to_string(),
|
||||
});
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Algorithm restriction
|
||||
if text.contains("alg") && (text.contains("\"none\"") || text.contains("none algorithm")) {
|
||||
statements.push(NormativeStatement {
|
||||
subject: "rfc://7519/jwt/algorithm_restriction".to_string(),
|
||||
predicate: "config_value".to_string(),
|
||||
value: ObjectValue::Text("explicit_list".to_string()),
|
||||
description: "JWT algorithm MUST be explicitly specified, 'none' algorithm forbidden"
|
||||
.to_string(),
|
||||
});
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Not Before validation (Section 4.1.5)
|
||||
if contains_normative(text, "nbf", "MUST") {
|
||||
statements.push(NormativeStatement {
|
||||
subject: "rfc://7519/jwt/nbf_validation".to_string(),
|
||||
predicate: "enabled".to_string(),
|
||||
value: ObjectValue::Boolean(true),
|
||||
description: "JWT not-before claim MUST be validated (RFC 7519 Section 4.1.5)"
|
||||
.to_string(),
|
||||
});
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Issuer validation (Section 4.1.1)
|
||||
if contains_normative(text, "iss", "application-specific") {
|
||||
statements.push(NormativeStatement {
|
||||
subject: "rfc://7519/jwt/issuer_validation".to_string(),
|
||||
predicate: "enabled".to_string(),
|
||||
value: ObjectValue::Boolean(true),
|
||||
description: "JWT issuer claim SHOULD be validated for application-specific purposes"
|
||||
.to_string(),
|
||||
});
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
statements
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Parse RFC 6749 (OAuth 2.0) normative statements.
|
||||
fn parse_rfc6749_oauth(text: &str) -> Vec<NormativeStatement> {
|
||||
let mut statements = Vec::new();
|
||||
|
||||
// Redirect URI validation
|
||||
if text.contains("redirect_uri") && text.contains("MUST") {
|
||||
statements.push(NormativeStatement {
|
||||
subject: "rfc://6749/oauth/redirect_uri_validation".to_string(),
|
||||
predicate: "enabled".to_string(),
|
||||
value: ObjectValue::Boolean(true),
|
||||
description: "OAuth redirect_uri MUST be validated exactly (RFC 6749)".to_string(),
|
||||
});
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// State parameter
|
||||
if text.contains("state") && text.contains("SHOULD") {
|
||||
statements.push(NormativeStatement {
|
||||
subject: "rfc://6749/oauth/state_parameter".to_string(),
|
||||
predicate: "enabled".to_string(),
|
||||
value: ObjectValue::Boolean(true),
|
||||
description: "OAuth state parameter SHOULD be used for CSRF protection (RFC 6749)"
|
||||
.to_string(),
|
||||
});
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Scope validation
|
||||
if text.contains("scope") && text.contains("MUST") {
|
||||
statements.push(NormativeStatement {
|
||||
subject: "rfc://6749/oauth/scope_validation".to_string(),
|
||||
predicate: "enabled".to_string(),
|
||||
value: ObjectValue::Boolean(true),
|
||||
description: "OAuth scope MUST be validated (RFC 6749)".to_string(),
|
||||
});
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// HTTPS requirement
|
||||
if text.contains("TLS") || text.contains("HTTPS") {
|
||||
statements.push(NormativeStatement {
|
||||
subject: "rfc://6749/oauth/transport_security".to_string(),
|
||||
predicate: "enabled".to_string(),
|
||||
value: ObjectValue::Boolean(true),
|
||||
description: "OAuth endpoints MUST use TLS (RFC 6749)".to_string(),
|
||||
});
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
statements
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Parse RFC 6750 (Bearer tokens) normative statements.
|
||||
fn parse_rfc6750_bearer(text: &str) -> Vec<NormativeStatement> {
|
||||
let mut statements = Vec::new();
|
||||
|
||||
// Transport security
|
||||
if text.contains("TLS") && text.contains("MUST") {
|
||||
statements.push(NormativeStatement {
|
||||
subject: "rfc://6750/bearer/transport_security".to_string(),
|
||||
predicate: "enabled".to_string(),
|
||||
value: ObjectValue::Boolean(true),
|
||||
description: "Bearer tokens MUST be transmitted over TLS (RFC 6750)".to_string(),
|
||||
});
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Token storage
|
||||
if text.contains("confidential") || text.contains("secure") {
|
||||
statements.push(NormativeStatement {
|
||||
subject: "rfc://6750/bearer/secure_storage".to_string(),
|
||||
predicate: "enabled".to_string(),
|
||||
value: ObjectValue::Boolean(true),
|
||||
description: "Bearer tokens MUST be stored securely (RFC 6750)".to_string(),
|
||||
});
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
statements
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Parse RFC 8446 (TLS 1.3) normative statements.
|
||||
fn parse_rfc8446_tls13(text: &str) -> Vec<NormativeStatement> {
|
||||
let mut statements = Vec::new();
|
||||
|
||||
// Certificate verification
|
||||
if text.contains("certificate") && text.contains("MUST") {
|
||||
statements.push(NormativeStatement {
|
||||
subject: "rfc://8446/tls/cert_verification".to_string(),
|
||||
predicate: "enabled".to_string(),
|
||||
value: ObjectValue::Boolean(true),
|
||||
description: "TLS certificate chains MUST be verified (RFC 8446)".to_string(),
|
||||
});
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Cipher selection
|
||||
if text.contains("cipher") || text.contains("cipher_suite") {
|
||||
statements.push(NormativeStatement {
|
||||
subject: "rfc://8446/tls/cipher_selection".to_string(),
|
||||
predicate: "config_value".to_string(),
|
||||
value: ObjectValue::Text("TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384".to_string()),
|
||||
description: "TLS 1.3 cipher suites (RFC 8446)".to_string(),
|
||||
});
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Protocol version
|
||||
statements.push(NormativeStatement {
|
||||
subject: "rfc://8446/tls/min_version".to_string(),
|
||||
predicate: "config_value".to_string(),
|
||||
value: ObjectValue::Text("TLS1.3".to_string()),
|
||||
description: "TLS 1.3 is the minimum recommended version (RFC 8446)".to_string(),
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
statements
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Parse RFC 7525 (TLS best practices) normative statements.
|
||||
fn parse_rfc7525_tls_practices(text: &str) -> Vec<NormativeStatement> {
|
||||
let mut statements = Vec::new();
|
||||
|
||||
// Hostname verification
|
||||
if text.contains("hostname") && text.contains("MUST") {
|
||||
statements.push(NormativeStatement {
|
||||
subject: "rfc://7525/tls/hostname_verification".to_string(),
|
||||
predicate: "enabled".to_string(),
|
||||
value: ObjectValue::Boolean(true),
|
||||
description: "TLS hostname MUST be verified (RFC 7525)".to_string(),
|
||||
});
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Certificate revocation
|
||||
if text.contains("revocation") {
|
||||
statements.push(NormativeStatement {
|
||||
subject: "rfc://7525/tls/revocation_checking".to_string(),
|
||||
predicate: "enabled".to_string(),
|
||||
value: ObjectValue::Boolean(true),
|
||||
description: "TLS certificate revocation SHOULD be checked (RFC 7525)".to_string(),
|
||||
});
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Deprecated versions
|
||||
if text.contains("SSL") && text.contains("MUST NOT") {
|
||||
statements.push(NormativeStatement {
|
||||
subject: "rfc://7525/tls/deprecated_versions".to_string(),
|
||||
predicate: "disabled".to_string(),
|
||||
value: ObjectValue::Boolean(true),
|
||||
description: "SSLv2 and SSLv3 MUST NOT be used (RFC 7525)".to_string(),
|
||||
});
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
statements
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Parse RFC 6238 (TOTP) normative statements.
|
||||
fn parse_rfc6238_totp(text: &str) -> Vec<NormativeStatement> {
|
||||
let mut statements = Vec::new();
|
||||
|
||||
// Time step
|
||||
if text.contains("30") && text.contains("time") {
|
||||
statements.push(NormativeStatement {
|
||||
subject: "rfc://6238/totp/time_step".to_string(),
|
||||
predicate: "config_value".to_string(),
|
||||
value: ObjectValue::Number(30.0),
|
||||
description: "TOTP time step SHOULD be 30 seconds (RFC 6238)".to_string(),
|
||||
});
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Validation window
|
||||
if text.contains("window") || text.contains("tolerance") {
|
||||
statements.push(NormativeStatement {
|
||||
subject: "rfc://6238/totp/validation_window".to_string(),
|
||||
predicate: "config_value".to_string(),
|
||||
value: ObjectValue::Number(1.0),
|
||||
description: "TOTP validation window SHOULD allow 1 step tolerance (RFC 6238)"
|
||||
.to_string(),
|
||||
});
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Key length
|
||||
if text.contains("key") && text.contains("160") {
|
||||
statements.push(NormativeStatement {
|
||||
subject: "rfc://6238/totp/key_length".to_string(),
|
||||
predicate: "config_value".to_string(),
|
||||
value: ObjectValue::Number(160.0),
|
||||
description: "TOTP secret key SHOULD be at least 160 bits (RFC 6238)".to_string(),
|
||||
});
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
statements
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Parse RFC 7617 (HTTP Basic Auth) normative statements.
|
||||
fn parse_rfc7617_basic_auth(text: &str) -> Vec<NormativeStatement> {
|
||||
let mut statements = Vec::new();
|
||||
|
||||
// Transport security
|
||||
if text.contains("TLS") || text.contains("confidential") {
|
||||
statements.push(NormativeStatement {
|
||||
subject: "rfc://7617/basic_auth/transport_security".to_string(),
|
||||
predicate: "enabled".to_string(),
|
||||
value: ObjectValue::Boolean(true),
|
||||
description: "HTTP Basic Auth MUST use TLS (RFC 7617)".to_string(),
|
||||
});
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// UTF-8 encoding
|
||||
if text.contains("UTF-8") {
|
||||
statements.push(NormativeStatement {
|
||||
subject: "rfc://7617/basic_auth/encoding".to_string(),
|
||||
predicate: "config_value".to_string(),
|
||||
value: ObjectValue::Text("UTF-8".to_string()),
|
||||
description: "HTTP Basic Auth credentials SHOULD use UTF-8 (RFC 7617)".to_string(),
|
||||
});
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
statements
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Parse RFC 9110 (HTTP Semantics) normative statements.
|
||||
fn parse_rfc9110_http(text: &str) -> Vec<NormativeStatement> {
|
||||
let mut statements = Vec::new();
|
||||
|
||||
// Timeout handling
|
||||
if text.contains("timeout") {
|
||||
statements.push(NormativeStatement {
|
||||
subject: "rfc://9110/http/timeout_handling".to_string(),
|
||||
predicate: "enabled".to_string(),
|
||||
value: ObjectValue::Boolean(true),
|
||||
description: "HTTP timeouts SHOULD be configured (RFC 9110)".to_string(),
|
||||
});
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Host header
|
||||
if text.contains("Host") && text.contains("MUST") {
|
||||
statements.push(NormativeStatement {
|
||||
subject: "rfc://9110/http/host_header".to_string(),
|
||||
predicate: "enabled".to_string(),
|
||||
value: ObjectValue::Boolean(true),
|
||||
description: "HTTP/1.1 Host header MUST be present (RFC 9110)".to_string(),
|
||||
});
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Content-Length handling
|
||||
if text.contains("Content-Length") {
|
||||
statements.push(NormativeStatement {
|
||||
subject: "rfc://9110/http/content_length_validation".to_string(),
|
||||
predicate: "enabled".to_string(),
|
||||
value: ObjectValue::Boolean(true),
|
||||
description: "HTTP Content-Length SHOULD be validated (RFC 9110)".to_string(),
|
||||
});
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
statements
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Generic RFC parsing for unknown RFCs.
|
||||
fn parse_generic_rfc(text: &str, rfc_num: u32) -> Vec<NormativeStatement> {
|
||||
let mut statements = Vec::new();
|
||||
let keyword_pattern =
|
||||
match Regex::new(r"\b(MUST\s+NOT|MUST|SHALL\s+NOT|SHALL|SHOULD\s+NOT|SHOULD)\b") {
|
||||
Ok(re) => re,
|
||||
Err(_) => return statements,
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
// Find sections with normative keywords
|
||||
let section_topics = extract_section_topics(text);
|
||||
|
||||
for (section, topic) in section_topics {
|
||||
// Check if this section has normative statements
|
||||
if keyword_pattern.is_match(§ion) {
|
||||
let keyword = extract_strongest_keyword(§ion);
|
||||
let is_mandatory = matches!(keyword.as_str(), "MUST" | "SHALL");
|
||||
|
||||
statements.push(NormativeStatement {
|
||||
subject: format!("rfc://{}/{}", rfc_num, topic),
|
||||
predicate: if is_mandatory { "required" } else { "recommended" }.to_string(),
|
||||
value: ObjectValue::Boolean(true),
|
||||
description: format!("RFC {} {} requirement: {}", rfc_num, keyword, topic),
|
||||
});
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
statements
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Extract section numbers and their topics from RFC text.
|
||||
fn extract_section_topics(text: &str) -> HashMap<String, String> {
|
||||
let section_pattern = match Regex::new(r"(?m)^(\d+(?:\.\d+)*)\.\s+(.+)$") {
|
||||
Ok(re) => re,
|
||||
Err(_) => return HashMap::new(),
|
||||
};
|
||||
let mut sections = HashMap::new();
|
||||
|
||||
for cap in section_pattern.captures_iter(text) {
|
||||
let section_num = cap.get(1).map(|m| m.as_str()).unwrap_or("");
|
||||
let title = cap.get(2).map(|m| m.as_str()).unwrap_or("");
|
||||
|
||||
// Create a slug from the title
|
||||
let slug = title
|
||||
.to_lowercase()
|
||||
.chars()
|
||||
.map(|c| if c.is_alphanumeric() { c } else { '_' })
|
||||
.collect::<String>()
|
||||
.trim_matches('_')
|
||||
.to_string();
|
||||
|
||||
if !slug.is_empty() {
|
||||
// Extract section content (simplified - just the title for now)
|
||||
sections.insert(title.to_string(), format!("{}_{}", section_num, slug));
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
sections
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Extract the strongest normative keyword from text.
|
||||
pub(super) fn extract_strongest_keyword(text: &str) -> String {
|
||||
let keywords = [
|
||||
("MUST NOT", 5),
|
||||
("MUST", 4),
|
||||
("SHALL NOT", 3),
|
||||
("SHALL", 2),
|
||||
("SHOULD NOT", 1),
|
||||
("SHOULD", 0),
|
||||
];
|
||||
|
||||
keywords
|
||||
.iter()
|
||||
.filter(|(kw, _)| text.contains(kw))
|
||||
.max_by_key(|(_, priority)| priority)
|
||||
.map(|(kw, _)| kw.to_string())
|
||||
.unwrap_or_else(|| "SHOULD".to_string())
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Check if text contains a normative statement about a topic.
|
||||
pub(super) fn contains_normative(text: &str, topic: &str, keyword: &str) -> bool {
|
||||
// Look for keyword near topic mention
|
||||
let pattern = format!(r"(?i){}[^.]*{}", topic, keyword);
|
||||
Regex::new(&pattern).map(|re| re.is_match(text)).unwrap_or(false) || {
|
||||
// Also check reverse order
|
||||
let reverse_pattern = format!(r"(?i){}[^.]*{}", keyword, topic);
|
||||
Regex::new(&reverse_pattern).map(|re| re.is_match(text)).unwrap_or(false)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
68
applications/aphoria/src/corpus/rfc/tests.rs
Normal file
68
applications/aphoria/src/corpus/rfc/tests.rs
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,68 @@
|
||||
//! Tests for RFC normative statement parsers.
|
||||
|
||||
use super::parsers::{contains_normative, extract_strongest_keyword, parse_normative_statements};
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_parse_jwt_statements() {
|
||||
// Sample JWT RFC text (simplified)
|
||||
let text = r#"
|
||||
4.1.3. "aud" (Audience) Claim
|
||||
|
||||
The "aud" (audience) claim identifies the recipients that the JWT is
|
||||
intended for. Each principal intended to process the JWT MUST
|
||||
identify itself with a value in the audience claim.
|
||||
|
||||
4.1.4. "exp" (Expiration Time) Claim
|
||||
|
||||
The "exp" (expiration time) claim identifies the expiration time on
|
||||
or after which the JWT MUST NOT be accepted for processing.
|
||||
|
||||
The signature MUST be verified.
|
||||
The "alg" header parameter. Using "none" algorithm is forbidden.
|
||||
"#;
|
||||
|
||||
let statements = parse_normative_statements(text, 7519);
|
||||
|
||||
assert!(
|
||||
statements.iter().any(|s| s.subject.contains("audience_validation")),
|
||||
"Should find audience validation"
|
||||
);
|
||||
assert!(
|
||||
statements.iter().any(|s| s.subject.contains("expiry_validation")),
|
||||
"Should find expiry validation"
|
||||
);
|
||||
assert!(
|
||||
statements.iter().any(|s| s.subject.contains("signature_verification")),
|
||||
"Should find signature verification"
|
||||
);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_parse_tls_statements() {
|
||||
let text = r#"
|
||||
The certificate chain MUST be verified.
|
||||
cipher_suite selection is important.
|
||||
"#;
|
||||
|
||||
let statements = parse_normative_statements(text, 8446);
|
||||
|
||||
assert!(
|
||||
statements.iter().any(|s| s.subject.contains("cert_verification")),
|
||||
"Should find cert verification"
|
||||
);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_extract_strongest_keyword() {
|
||||
assert_eq!(extract_strongest_keyword("MUST NOT do this"), "MUST NOT");
|
||||
assert_eq!(extract_strongest_keyword("MUST do this"), "MUST");
|
||||
assert_eq!(extract_strongest_keyword("SHOULD do this"), "SHOULD");
|
||||
assert_eq!(extract_strongest_keyword("MUST do this and SHOULD do that"), "MUST");
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_contains_normative() {
|
||||
let text = "The aud claim MUST be validated";
|
||||
assert!(contains_normative(text, "aud", "MUST"));
|
||||
assert!(!contains_normative(text, "aud", "SHOULD"));
|
||||
}
|
||||
328
applications/aphoria/src/corpus/vendor.rs
Normal file
328
applications/aphoria/src/corpus/vendor.rs
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,328 @@
|
||||
//! Vendor documentation corpus builder.
|
||||
//!
|
||||
//! This builder provides curated claims from vendor documentation for common
|
||||
//! libraries and tools. These are Tier 2 (Observational) sources that represent
|
||||
//! best practices documented by software vendors.
|
||||
|
||||
use ed25519_dalek::SigningKey;
|
||||
use stemedb_core::types::{Assertion, ObjectValue, SourceClass};
|
||||
use tracing::instrument;
|
||||
|
||||
use super::CorpusBuilder;
|
||||
use crate::config::CorpusConfig;
|
||||
use crate::episteme::create_authoritative_assertion;
|
||||
use crate::AphoriaError;
|
||||
|
||||
/// Builder for vendor documentation corpus.
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// Contains curated claims from:
|
||||
/// - PostgreSQL connection pooling recommendations
|
||||
/// - Redis timeout defaults and best practices
|
||||
/// - reqwest TLS verification defaults
|
||||
/// - hyper timeout recommendations
|
||||
/// - Go net/http timeout defaults
|
||||
pub struct VendorCorpusBuilder {
|
||||
claims: Vec<VendorClaim>,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// A curated vendor claim.
|
||||
struct VendorClaim {
|
||||
/// Subject path (vendor://{product}/{topic}/{claim}).
|
||||
subject: &'static str,
|
||||
/// Predicate for the claim.
|
||||
predicate: &'static str,
|
||||
/// Value of the claim.
|
||||
value: ObjectValue,
|
||||
/// Human-readable description.
|
||||
description: &'static str,
|
||||
/// Source URL for reference.
|
||||
#[allow(dead_code)]
|
||||
source_url: Option<&'static str>,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
impl VendorCorpusBuilder {
|
||||
/// Create a new vendor corpus builder with default claims.
|
||||
pub fn new() -> Self {
|
||||
Self { claims: build_vendor_claims() }
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
impl Default for VendorCorpusBuilder {
|
||||
fn default() -> Self {
|
||||
Self::new()
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
impl CorpusBuilder for VendorCorpusBuilder {
|
||||
fn name(&self) -> &str {
|
||||
"Vendor"
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fn scheme(&self) -> &str {
|
||||
"vendor"
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fn default_tier(&self) -> u8 {
|
||||
2 // Observational
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fn requires_network(&self) -> bool {
|
||||
false // All claims are hardcoded
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fn source_ids(&self) -> Vec<String> {
|
||||
vec![
|
||||
"postgres".to_string(),
|
||||
"redis".to_string(),
|
||||
"reqwest".to_string(),
|
||||
"hyper".to_string(),
|
||||
"go-net-http".to_string(),
|
||||
"tokio-postgres".to_string(),
|
||||
"sqlx".to_string(),
|
||||
]
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[instrument(skip(self, signing_key, _config), fields(builder = "Vendor"))]
|
||||
fn build(
|
||||
&self,
|
||||
signing_key: &SigningKey,
|
||||
timestamp: u64,
|
||||
_config: &CorpusConfig,
|
||||
) -> Result<Vec<Assertion>, AphoriaError> {
|
||||
let assertions = self
|
||||
.claims
|
||||
.iter()
|
||||
.map(|claim| {
|
||||
create_authoritative_assertion(
|
||||
signing_key,
|
||||
claim.subject,
|
||||
claim.predicate,
|
||||
claim.value.clone(),
|
||||
SourceClass::Observational, // Tier 2
|
||||
claim.description,
|
||||
timestamp,
|
||||
)
|
||||
})
|
||||
.collect();
|
||||
|
||||
Ok(assertions)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Build the list of curated vendor claims.
|
||||
fn build_vendor_claims() -> Vec<VendorClaim> {
|
||||
vec![
|
||||
// PostgreSQL connection pooling
|
||||
VendorClaim {
|
||||
subject: "vendor://postgres/connection/pool_size",
|
||||
predicate: "config_value",
|
||||
value: ObjectValue::Text("20-100".to_string()),
|
||||
description: "PostgreSQL recommends connection pool sizes between 20-100 for most applications",
|
||||
source_url: Some("https://www.postgresql.org/docs/current/runtime-config-connection.html"),
|
||||
},
|
||||
VendorClaim {
|
||||
subject: "vendor://postgres/connection/idle_timeout",
|
||||
predicate: "config_value",
|
||||
value: ObjectValue::Number(300.0), // 5 minutes
|
||||
description: "PostgreSQL recommends idle connection timeout around 5 minutes (300s)",
|
||||
source_url: Some("https://www.postgresql.org/docs/current/runtime-config-connection.html"),
|
||||
},
|
||||
VendorClaim {
|
||||
subject: "vendor://postgres/ssl/mode",
|
||||
predicate: "config_value",
|
||||
value: ObjectValue::Text("require".to_string()),
|
||||
description: "PostgreSQL SSL mode should be 'require' or stricter for production",
|
||||
source_url: Some("https://www.postgresql.org/docs/current/libpq-ssl.html"),
|
||||
},
|
||||
|
||||
// Redis timeouts
|
||||
VendorClaim {
|
||||
subject: "vendor://redis/connection/timeout",
|
||||
predicate: "config_value",
|
||||
value: ObjectValue::Number(5000.0), // 5 seconds in ms
|
||||
description: "Redis recommends connection timeout of 5 seconds",
|
||||
source_url: Some("https://redis.io/docs/clients/"),
|
||||
},
|
||||
VendorClaim {
|
||||
subject: "vendor://redis/connection/max_retries",
|
||||
predicate: "config_value",
|
||||
value: ObjectValue::Number(3.0),
|
||||
description: "Redis recommends 3 retries for connection failures",
|
||||
source_url: Some("https://redis.io/docs/clients/"),
|
||||
},
|
||||
VendorClaim {
|
||||
subject: "vendor://redis/tls/enabled",
|
||||
predicate: "enabled",
|
||||
value: ObjectValue::Boolean(true),
|
||||
description: "Redis TLS should be enabled for production deployments",
|
||||
source_url: Some("https://redis.io/docs/management/security/encryption/"),
|
||||
},
|
||||
|
||||
// reqwest (Rust HTTP client)
|
||||
VendorClaim {
|
||||
subject: "vendor://reqwest/tls/cert_verification",
|
||||
predicate: "enabled",
|
||||
value: ObjectValue::Boolean(true),
|
||||
description: "reqwest: TLS certificate verification is enabled by default and should not be disabled",
|
||||
source_url: Some("https://docs.rs/reqwest/latest/reqwest/struct.ClientBuilder.html"),
|
||||
},
|
||||
VendorClaim {
|
||||
subject: "vendor://reqwest/timeout/connect",
|
||||
predicate: "config_value",
|
||||
value: ObjectValue::Number(30000.0), // 30 seconds
|
||||
description: "reqwest: Recommended connection timeout is 30 seconds",
|
||||
source_url: Some("https://docs.rs/reqwest/latest/reqwest/struct.ClientBuilder.html"),
|
||||
},
|
||||
VendorClaim {
|
||||
subject: "vendor://reqwest/timeout/request",
|
||||
predicate: "config_value",
|
||||
value: ObjectValue::Number(30000.0), // 30 seconds
|
||||
description: "reqwest: Recommended total request timeout is 30 seconds",
|
||||
source_url: Some("https://docs.rs/reqwest/latest/reqwest/struct.ClientBuilder.html"),
|
||||
},
|
||||
|
||||
// hyper (Rust HTTP library)
|
||||
VendorClaim {
|
||||
subject: "vendor://hyper/timeout/keep_alive",
|
||||
predicate: "config_value",
|
||||
value: ObjectValue::Number(90000.0), // 90 seconds
|
||||
description: "hyper: Default HTTP/1.1 keep-alive timeout is 90 seconds",
|
||||
source_url: Some("https://docs.rs/hyper/latest/hyper/"),
|
||||
},
|
||||
VendorClaim {
|
||||
subject: "vendor://hyper/http2/max_concurrent_streams",
|
||||
predicate: "config_value",
|
||||
value: ObjectValue::Number(100.0),
|
||||
description: "hyper: Recommended max concurrent HTTP/2 streams per connection",
|
||||
source_url: Some("https://docs.rs/hyper/latest/hyper/"),
|
||||
},
|
||||
|
||||
// Go net/http
|
||||
VendorClaim {
|
||||
subject: "vendor://go-net-http/timeout/read",
|
||||
predicate: "config_value",
|
||||
value: ObjectValue::Number(10000.0), // 10 seconds
|
||||
description: "Go net/http: ReadTimeout should be set to prevent slowloris attacks",
|
||||
source_url: Some("https://pkg.go.dev/net/http#Server"),
|
||||
},
|
||||
VendorClaim {
|
||||
subject: "vendor://go-net-http/timeout/write",
|
||||
predicate: "config_value",
|
||||
value: ObjectValue::Number(10000.0), // 10 seconds
|
||||
description: "Go net/http: WriteTimeout should be set for request handling",
|
||||
source_url: Some("https://pkg.go.dev/net/http#Server"),
|
||||
},
|
||||
VendorClaim {
|
||||
subject: "vendor://go-net-http/timeout/idle",
|
||||
predicate: "config_value",
|
||||
value: ObjectValue::Number(120000.0), // 120 seconds
|
||||
description: "Go net/http: IdleTimeout for keep-alive connections",
|
||||
source_url: Some("https://pkg.go.dev/net/http#Server"),
|
||||
},
|
||||
VendorClaim {
|
||||
subject: "vendor://go-net-http/tls/min_version",
|
||||
predicate: "config_value",
|
||||
value: ObjectValue::Text("TLS1.2".to_string()),
|
||||
description: "Go net/http: Minimum TLS version should be 1.2 or higher",
|
||||
source_url: Some("https://pkg.go.dev/crypto/tls#Config"),
|
||||
},
|
||||
|
||||
// tokio-postgres (Rust async postgres)
|
||||
VendorClaim {
|
||||
subject: "vendor://tokio-postgres/connection/pool_size",
|
||||
predicate: "config_value",
|
||||
value: ObjectValue::Number(10.0),
|
||||
description: "tokio-postgres: Default pool size recommendation for async workloads",
|
||||
source_url: Some("https://docs.rs/deadpool-postgres/"),
|
||||
},
|
||||
VendorClaim {
|
||||
subject: "vendor://tokio-postgres/ssl/mode",
|
||||
predicate: "config_value",
|
||||
value: ObjectValue::Text("require".to_string()),
|
||||
description: "tokio-postgres: SSL mode should be 'require' for production",
|
||||
source_url: Some("https://docs.rs/tokio-postgres/"),
|
||||
},
|
||||
|
||||
// SQLx (Rust SQL toolkit)
|
||||
VendorClaim {
|
||||
subject: "vendor://sqlx/connection/max_connections",
|
||||
predicate: "config_value",
|
||||
value: ObjectValue::Number(10.0),
|
||||
description: "SQLx: Default max connections for connection pool",
|
||||
source_url: Some("https://docs.rs/sqlx/"),
|
||||
},
|
||||
VendorClaim {
|
||||
subject: "vendor://sqlx/connection/idle_timeout",
|
||||
predicate: "config_value",
|
||||
value: ObjectValue::Number(600.0), // 10 minutes
|
||||
description: "SQLx: Recommended idle connection timeout",
|
||||
source_url: Some("https://docs.rs/sqlx/"),
|
||||
},
|
||||
]
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[cfg(test)]
|
||||
mod tests {
|
||||
use super::*;
|
||||
use crate::bridge::generate_signing_key;
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_vendor_builder_builds() {
|
||||
let builder = VendorCorpusBuilder::new();
|
||||
let key = generate_signing_key();
|
||||
let config = CorpusConfig::default();
|
||||
|
||||
let assertions = builder.build(&key, 1706832000, &config).expect("build");
|
||||
|
||||
assert!(assertions.len() >= 15, "Expected at least 15 vendor claims");
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_vendor_builder_no_network() {
|
||||
let builder = VendorCorpusBuilder::new();
|
||||
assert!(!builder.requires_network());
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_vendor_assertions_tier() {
|
||||
let builder = VendorCorpusBuilder::new();
|
||||
let key = generate_signing_key();
|
||||
let config = CorpusConfig::default();
|
||||
|
||||
let assertions = builder.build(&key, 1706832000, &config).expect("build");
|
||||
|
||||
// All vendor assertions should be Observational (Tier 2)
|
||||
for assertion in &assertions {
|
||||
assert_eq!(
|
||||
assertion.source_class,
|
||||
SourceClass::Observational,
|
||||
"Vendor assertion {} should be Tier 2",
|
||||
assertion.subject
|
||||
);
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_vendor_postgres_assertions() {
|
||||
let builder = VendorCorpusBuilder::new();
|
||||
let key = generate_signing_key();
|
||||
let config = CorpusConfig::default();
|
||||
|
||||
let assertions = builder.build(&key, 1706832000, &config).expect("build");
|
||||
|
||||
// Check for PostgreSQL assertions
|
||||
let pg_assertions: Vec<_> =
|
||||
assertions.iter().filter(|a| a.subject.contains("postgres")).collect();
|
||||
assert!(pg_assertions.len() >= 2, "Expected at least 2 PostgreSQL assertions");
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_vendor_source_ids() {
|
||||
let builder = VendorCorpusBuilder::new();
|
||||
let ids = builder.source_ids();
|
||||
|
||||
assert!(ids.contains(&"postgres".to_string()));
|
||||
assert!(ids.contains(&"redis".to_string()));
|
||||
assert!(ids.contains(&"reqwest".to_string()));
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
201
applications/aphoria/src/episteme/corpus.rs
Normal file
201
applications/aphoria/src/episteme/corpus.rs
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,201 @@
|
||||
//! Authoritative corpus creation for Aphoria.
|
||||
//!
|
||||
//! Provides functions to create pre-built authoritative assertions
|
||||
//! for common security patterns (TLS, JWT, CORS, etc.).
|
||||
|
||||
use std::time::{SystemTime, UNIX_EPOCH};
|
||||
|
||||
use blake3::Hasher;
|
||||
use ed25519_dalek::{Signer, SigningKey};
|
||||
use stemedb_core::types::{
|
||||
Assertion, HlcTimestamp, LifecycleStage, ObjectValue, SignatureEntry, SourceClass,
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
/// Get the current Unix timestamp.
|
||||
pub(crate) fn current_timestamp() -> u64 {
|
||||
SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).map(|d| d.as_secs()).unwrap_or(0)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Create authoritative assertions for the RFC/OWASP corpus.
|
||||
#[allow(clippy::vec_init_then_push)]
|
||||
pub fn create_authoritative_corpus(signing_key: &SigningKey) -> Vec<Assertion> {
|
||||
let timestamp = current_timestamp();
|
||||
let mut assertions = Vec::new();
|
||||
|
||||
// TLS verification requirements
|
||||
assertions.push(create_authoritative_assertion(
|
||||
signing_key,
|
||||
"rfc://5246/tls/cert_verification",
|
||||
"enabled",
|
||||
ObjectValue::Boolean(true),
|
||||
SourceClass::Regulatory,
|
||||
"TLS certificate verification MUST be enabled (RFC 5246)",
|
||||
timestamp,
|
||||
));
|
||||
|
||||
// OWASP TLS guidance
|
||||
assertions.push(create_authoritative_assertion(
|
||||
signing_key,
|
||||
"owasp://transport_layer/tls/cert_verification",
|
||||
"enabled",
|
||||
ObjectValue::Boolean(true),
|
||||
SourceClass::Clinical, // Tier 1
|
||||
"OWASP: Always verify TLS certificates",
|
||||
timestamp,
|
||||
));
|
||||
|
||||
// JWT audience validation (RFC 7519)
|
||||
assertions.push(create_authoritative_assertion(
|
||||
signing_key,
|
||||
"rfc://7519/jwt/audience_validation",
|
||||
"enabled",
|
||||
ObjectValue::Boolean(true),
|
||||
SourceClass::Regulatory,
|
||||
"JWT audience claim MUST be validated (RFC 7519 Section 4.1.3)",
|
||||
timestamp,
|
||||
));
|
||||
|
||||
// JWT expiry validation
|
||||
assertions.push(create_authoritative_assertion(
|
||||
signing_key,
|
||||
"rfc://7519/jwt/expiry_validation",
|
||||
"enabled",
|
||||
ObjectValue::Boolean(true),
|
||||
SourceClass::Regulatory,
|
||||
"JWT expiry claim MUST be validated (RFC 7519 Section 4.1.4)",
|
||||
timestamp,
|
||||
));
|
||||
|
||||
// JWT signature verification
|
||||
assertions.push(create_authoritative_assertion(
|
||||
signing_key,
|
||||
"rfc://7519/jwt/signature_verification",
|
||||
"enabled",
|
||||
ObjectValue::Boolean(true),
|
||||
SourceClass::Regulatory,
|
||||
"JWT signatures MUST be verified (RFC 7519)",
|
||||
timestamp,
|
||||
));
|
||||
|
||||
// JWT algorithm restriction
|
||||
assertions.push(create_authoritative_assertion(
|
||||
signing_key,
|
||||
"rfc://7519/jwt/algorithm_restriction",
|
||||
"config_value",
|
||||
ObjectValue::Text("explicit_list".to_string()),
|
||||
SourceClass::Regulatory,
|
||||
"JWT algorithm MUST be explicitly specified, 'none' algorithm forbidden",
|
||||
timestamp,
|
||||
));
|
||||
|
||||
// OWASP secrets management
|
||||
assertions.push(create_authoritative_assertion(
|
||||
signing_key,
|
||||
"owasp://secrets/api_key",
|
||||
"storage_method",
|
||||
ObjectValue::Text("environment_or_vault".to_string()),
|
||||
SourceClass::Clinical,
|
||||
"OWASP: Never hardcode API keys in source code",
|
||||
timestamp,
|
||||
));
|
||||
|
||||
assertions.push(create_authoritative_assertion(
|
||||
signing_key,
|
||||
"owasp://secrets/password",
|
||||
"storage_method",
|
||||
ObjectValue::Text("environment_or_vault".to_string()),
|
||||
SourceClass::Clinical,
|
||||
"OWASP: Never hardcode passwords in source code",
|
||||
timestamp,
|
||||
));
|
||||
|
||||
// CORS security
|
||||
assertions.push(create_authoritative_assertion(
|
||||
signing_key,
|
||||
"owasp://cors/allow_origin",
|
||||
"config_value",
|
||||
ObjectValue::Text("explicit_list".to_string()),
|
||||
SourceClass::Clinical,
|
||||
"OWASP: Never use wildcard (*) for CORS Allow-Origin in production",
|
||||
timestamp,
|
||||
));
|
||||
|
||||
assertions.push(create_authoritative_assertion(
|
||||
signing_key,
|
||||
"owasp://cors/credentials_with_wildcard",
|
||||
"enabled",
|
||||
ObjectValue::Boolean(false),
|
||||
SourceClass::Regulatory,
|
||||
"CORS credentials MUST NOT be allowed with wildcard origin (security vulnerability)",
|
||||
timestamp,
|
||||
));
|
||||
|
||||
// Rate limiting
|
||||
assertions.push(create_authoritative_assertion(
|
||||
signing_key,
|
||||
"owasp://rate_limit/enabled",
|
||||
"enabled",
|
||||
ObjectValue::Boolean(true),
|
||||
SourceClass::Clinical,
|
||||
"OWASP: Rate limiting SHOULD be enabled for API endpoints",
|
||||
timestamp,
|
||||
));
|
||||
|
||||
assertions
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Create a signed authoritative assertion.
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// This helper is used by corpus builders to create signed assertions with
|
||||
/// consistent structure and metadata.
|
||||
pub fn create_authoritative_assertion(
|
||||
signing_key: &SigningKey,
|
||||
subject: &str,
|
||||
predicate: &str,
|
||||
object: ObjectValue,
|
||||
source_class: SourceClass,
|
||||
description: &str,
|
||||
timestamp: u64,
|
||||
) -> Assertion {
|
||||
// Compute source hash
|
||||
let mut hasher = Hasher::new();
|
||||
hasher.update(subject.as_bytes());
|
||||
hasher.update(predicate.as_bytes());
|
||||
hasher.update(description.as_bytes());
|
||||
let source_hash = *hasher.finalize().as_bytes();
|
||||
|
||||
// Create signature
|
||||
let message = format!("{}:{}", subject, predicate);
|
||||
let signature = signing_key.sign(message.as_bytes());
|
||||
let verifying_key = signing_key.verifying_key();
|
||||
|
||||
let signature_entry = SignatureEntry {
|
||||
agent_id: verifying_key.to_bytes(),
|
||||
signature: signature.to_bytes(),
|
||||
timestamp,
|
||||
version: 1,
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
let source_metadata = serde_json::json!({
|
||||
"description": description,
|
||||
"source": "authoritative_corpus",
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
Assertion {
|
||||
subject: subject.to_string(),
|
||||
predicate: predicate.to_string(),
|
||||
object,
|
||||
parent_hash: None,
|
||||
source_hash,
|
||||
source_class,
|
||||
visual_hash: None,
|
||||
epoch: None,
|
||||
source_metadata: serde_json::to_vec(&source_metadata).ok(),
|
||||
lifecycle: LifecycleStage::Approved,
|
||||
signatures: vec![signature_entry],
|
||||
confidence: 1.0,
|
||||
timestamp,
|
||||
hlc_timestamp: HlcTimestamp::default(),
|
||||
vector: None,
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
438
applications/aphoria/src/episteme/mod.rs
Normal file
438
applications/aphoria/src/episteme/mod.rs
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,438 @@
|
||||
//! Local Episteme integration for Aphoria.
|
||||
//!
|
||||
//! Provides a simplified interface to the local Episteme instance for:
|
||||
//! - Ingesting assertions from extracted claims
|
||||
//! - Querying for conflicts with authoritative sources
|
||||
//! - Managing the authoritative corpus
|
||||
//! - Auto-creating aliases when conflicts are detected (Phase 2A.3)
|
||||
|
||||
mod corpus;
|
||||
|
||||
#[cfg(test)]
|
||||
mod tests;
|
||||
|
||||
use std::collections::HashMap;
|
||||
use std::path::Path;
|
||||
use std::sync::Arc;
|
||||
|
||||
use ed25519_dalek::SigningKey;
|
||||
use stemedb_core::types::{
|
||||
AliasOrigin, Assertion, ConceptAlias, ConceptPath, SourceClass,
|
||||
};
|
||||
use stemedb_ingest::{serialize_assertion, Ingestor};
|
||||
use stemedb_storage::{AliasStore, GenericAliasStore, HybridStore};
|
||||
use stemedb_wal::Journal;
|
||||
use tokio::sync::Mutex;
|
||||
use tracing::{debug, info, instrument, warn};
|
||||
|
||||
use crate::bridge::{claim_to_assertion, load_or_generate_key};
|
||||
use crate::config::AphoriaConfig;
|
||||
use crate::types::{ConflictResult, ConflictingSource, ExtractedClaim, Verdict};
|
||||
use crate::AphoriaError;
|
||||
|
||||
pub use corpus::{create_authoritative_assertion, create_authoritative_corpus};
|
||||
use corpus::current_timestamp;
|
||||
|
||||
/// In-memory index for concept matching by tail path segments.
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// Maps `{tail_seg1}/{tail_seg2}::{predicate}` → `Vec<Assertion>`.
|
||||
/// This enables matching claims across different URI schemes by their
|
||||
/// trailing path components.
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// # Example
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// Both of these subjects produce the same key `"tls/cert_verification::enabled"`:
|
||||
/// - `rfc://5246/tls/cert_verification`
|
||||
/// - `code://rust/myapp/client/tls/cert_verification`
|
||||
pub struct ConceptIndex {
|
||||
entries: HashMap<String, Vec<Assertion>>,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
impl ConceptIndex {
|
||||
/// Build a ConceptIndex from a slice of assertions.
|
||||
pub fn build(assertions: &[Assertion]) -> Self {
|
||||
// Pre-allocate based on expected unique keys
|
||||
let mut entries: HashMap<String, Vec<Assertion>> = HashMap::with_capacity(assertions.len());
|
||||
|
||||
for assertion in assertions {
|
||||
if let Some(key) = Self::make_key(&assertion.subject, &assertion.predicate) {
|
||||
entries.entry(key).or_default().push(assertion.clone());
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
Self { entries }
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Look up assertions matching the tail segments of a subject and predicate.
|
||||
pub fn lookup(&self, subject: &str, predicate: &str) -> Option<&Vec<Assertion>> {
|
||||
let key = Self::make_key(subject, predicate)?;
|
||||
self.entries.get(&key)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Create a lookup key from subject and predicate.
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// Algorithm:
|
||||
/// 1. Split subject on `"://"`, take path part
|
||||
/// 2. Split path on `"/"` in reverse, get last 2 non-empty segments
|
||||
/// 3. If < 2 segments, return None
|
||||
/// 4. Return `"{seg[-2]}/{seg[-1]}::{predicate}"`
|
||||
pub fn make_key(subject: &str, predicate: &str) -> Option<String> {
|
||||
// Split on "://" to separate scheme from path
|
||||
let path = subject.find("://").map(|i| &subject[i + 3..]).unwrap_or(subject);
|
||||
|
||||
// Get last two non-empty segments using rsplit (avoids Vec allocation)
|
||||
let mut segments = path.rsplit('/').filter(|s| !s.is_empty());
|
||||
|
||||
let tail2 = segments.next()?;
|
||||
let tail1 = segments.next()?;
|
||||
|
||||
Some(format!("{}/{}::{}", tail1, tail2, predicate))
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Local Episteme instance for Aphoria.
|
||||
pub struct LocalEpisteme {
|
||||
journal: Arc<Mutex<Journal>>,
|
||||
/// Store is owned by this struct but accessed via the Ingestor and AliasStore.
|
||||
/// Keeping a reference ensures the store outlives dependent structs.
|
||||
#[allow(dead_code)]
|
||||
store: Arc<HybridStore>,
|
||||
ingestor: Ingestor<HybridStore>,
|
||||
signing_key: SigningKey,
|
||||
/// AliasStore for persisting cross-scheme aliases discovered during conflict detection.
|
||||
alias_store: GenericAliasStore<Arc<HybridStore>>,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
impl LocalEpisteme {
|
||||
/// Open or create a local Episteme instance.
|
||||
#[instrument(skip(config), fields(data_dir = %config.episteme.data_dir.display()))]
|
||||
pub async fn open(config: &AphoriaConfig, project_root: &Path) -> Result<Self, AphoriaError> {
|
||||
let data_dir = &config.episteme.data_dir;
|
||||
|
||||
// Create directories if needed
|
||||
std::fs::create_dir_all(data_dir)?;
|
||||
|
||||
// Canonicalize paths (required by fjall/lsm-tree)
|
||||
let data_dir = data_dir.canonicalize().map_err(|e| {
|
||||
AphoriaError::Storage(format!("Failed to canonicalize data_dir: {}", e))
|
||||
})?;
|
||||
|
||||
let wal_dir = data_dir.join("wal");
|
||||
let store_dir = data_dir.join("store");
|
||||
std::fs::create_dir_all(&wal_dir)?;
|
||||
std::fs::create_dir_all(&store_dir)?;
|
||||
|
||||
info!("Opening local Episteme at {}", data_dir.display());
|
||||
|
||||
// Open WAL
|
||||
let journal = Arc::new(Mutex::new(
|
||||
Journal::open(&wal_dir).map_err(|e| AphoriaError::Storage(e.to_string()))?,
|
||||
));
|
||||
|
||||
// Open store
|
||||
let store = Arc::new(
|
||||
HybridStore::open(&store_dir).map_err(|e| AphoriaError::Storage(e.to_string()))?,
|
||||
);
|
||||
|
||||
// Create ingestor
|
||||
let mut ingestor = Ingestor::new(journal.clone(), store.clone())
|
||||
.await
|
||||
.map_err(|e| AphoriaError::Storage(e.to_string()))?;
|
||||
ingestor.start();
|
||||
|
||||
// Load or generate signing key
|
||||
let signing_key =
|
||||
load_or_generate_key(project_root).map_err(|e| AphoriaError::Storage(e.to_string()))?;
|
||||
|
||||
// Create alias store for auto-alias persistence
|
||||
let alias_store = GenericAliasStore::new(store.clone());
|
||||
|
||||
Ok(Self { journal, store, ingestor, signing_key, alias_store })
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Ingest a batch of extracted claims into Episteme.
|
||||
#[instrument(skip(self, claims), fields(claim_count = claims.len()))]
|
||||
pub async fn ingest_claims(&self, claims: &[ExtractedClaim]) -> Result<usize, AphoriaError> {
|
||||
let timestamp = current_timestamp();
|
||||
let mut ingested = 0;
|
||||
|
||||
for claim in claims {
|
||||
let assertion = claim_to_assertion(claim, &self.signing_key, timestamp);
|
||||
|
||||
// Serialize and write to WAL
|
||||
let record_bytes = serialize_assertion(&assertion)
|
||||
.map_err(|e| AphoriaError::Storage(e.to_string()))?;
|
||||
let mut journal = self.journal.lock().await;
|
||||
journal.append(record_bytes).map_err(|e| AphoriaError::Storage(e.to_string()))?;
|
||||
|
||||
debug!(
|
||||
concept_path = %claim.concept_path,
|
||||
predicate = %claim.predicate,
|
||||
"Ingested claim"
|
||||
);
|
||||
ingested += 1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Sync WAL
|
||||
{
|
||||
let mut journal = self.journal.lock().await;
|
||||
journal.force_sync().map_err(|e| AphoriaError::Storage(e.to_string()))?;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Wait for ingestion to process
|
||||
self.ingestor.process_pending().await.map_err(|e| AphoriaError::Storage(e.to_string()))?;
|
||||
|
||||
info!(ingested, "Ingested claims into Episteme");
|
||||
Ok(ingested)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Check for conflicts between extracted claims and authoritative sources.
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// Uses tail-path matching via `ConceptIndex` to find conflicts across different
|
||||
/// URI schemes. For example, a code claim at `code://rust/myapp/tls/cert_verification`
|
||||
/// will match authoritative assertions at `rfc://5246/tls/cert_verification`.
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// When `config.aliases.auto_create_aliases` is enabled, this method will
|
||||
/// automatically persist aliases for matched concepts, enabling faster future
|
||||
/// queries via `QueryEngine` with `resolve_aliases: true`.
|
||||
#[instrument(skip(self, claims, config, index), fields(claim_count = claims.len()))]
|
||||
pub async fn check_conflicts(
|
||||
&self,
|
||||
claims: &[ExtractedClaim],
|
||||
config: &AphoriaConfig,
|
||||
index: &ConceptIndex,
|
||||
) -> Result<Vec<ConflictResult>, AphoriaError> {
|
||||
let mut results = Vec::new();
|
||||
let mut aliases_created = 0usize;
|
||||
let timestamp = current_timestamp();
|
||||
let agent_id = self.agent_id();
|
||||
|
||||
for claim in claims {
|
||||
// Look up authoritative assertions matching this claim's tail path
|
||||
let auth_assertions = match index.lookup(&claim.concept_path, &claim.predicate) {
|
||||
Some(assertions) => assertions,
|
||||
None => continue, // No authoritative coverage for this concept
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
// Find conflicting authoritative sources
|
||||
let mut conflicts = Vec::new();
|
||||
for assertion in auth_assertions {
|
||||
// Skip if it's our own assertion (same source class)
|
||||
if assertion.source_class == SourceClass::Expert {
|
||||
continue;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Auto-create alias if enabled (regardless of value conflict)
|
||||
// This bridges the code path to the authoritative path for future queries
|
||||
if config.aliases.auto_create_aliases {
|
||||
if let Err(e) = self
|
||||
.create_alias_if_new(
|
||||
&claim.concept_path,
|
||||
&assertion.subject,
|
||||
agent_id,
|
||||
timestamp,
|
||||
)
|
||||
.await
|
||||
{
|
||||
warn!(
|
||||
code_path = %claim.concept_path,
|
||||
auth_path = %assertion.subject,
|
||||
error = %e,
|
||||
"Failed to create alias"
|
||||
);
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
aliases_created += 1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Check if value differs (for conflict reporting)
|
||||
if assertion.object != claim.value {
|
||||
// Only consider Tier 0-2 as authoritative
|
||||
if assertion.source_class.tier() <= 2 {
|
||||
conflicts.push(ConflictingSource {
|
||||
path: assertion.subject.clone(),
|
||||
source_class: assertion.source_class,
|
||||
value: assertion.object.clone(),
|
||||
confidence: assertion.confidence,
|
||||
});
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if conflicts.is_empty() {
|
||||
continue;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Compute conflict score
|
||||
let conflict_score = compute_conflict_score(&conflicts, claim.confidence);
|
||||
|
||||
// Determine verdict
|
||||
let verdict = if conflict_score >= config.thresholds.block {
|
||||
Verdict::Block
|
||||
} else if conflict_score >= config.thresholds.flag {
|
||||
Verdict::Flag
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
Verdict::Pass
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
results.push(ConflictResult {
|
||||
claim: claim.clone(),
|
||||
conflicts,
|
||||
conflict_score,
|
||||
verdict,
|
||||
acknowledged: None,
|
||||
});
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
info!(
|
||||
conflicts = results.len(),
|
||||
blocks = results.iter().filter(|r| r.verdict == Verdict::Block).count(),
|
||||
flags = results.iter().filter(|r| r.verdict == Verdict::Flag).count(),
|
||||
aliases_created,
|
||||
"Conflict check complete"
|
||||
);
|
||||
|
||||
Ok(results)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Ingest authoritative assertions (RFC, OWASP, etc.).
|
||||
#[instrument(skip(self, assertions), fields(count = assertions.len()))]
|
||||
pub async fn ingest_authoritative(
|
||||
&self,
|
||||
assertions: &[Assertion],
|
||||
) -> Result<usize, AphoriaError> {
|
||||
let mut ingested = 0;
|
||||
|
||||
for assertion in assertions {
|
||||
let record_bytes =
|
||||
serialize_assertion(assertion).map_err(|e| AphoriaError::Storage(e.to_string()))?;
|
||||
let mut journal = self.journal.lock().await;
|
||||
journal.append(record_bytes).map_err(|e| AphoriaError::Storage(e.to_string()))?;
|
||||
ingested += 1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Sync and process
|
||||
{
|
||||
let mut journal = self.journal.lock().await;
|
||||
journal.force_sync().map_err(|e| AphoriaError::Storage(e.to_string()))?;
|
||||
}
|
||||
self.ingestor.process_pending().await.map_err(|e| AphoriaError::Storage(e.to_string()))?;
|
||||
|
||||
info!(ingested, "Ingested authoritative assertions");
|
||||
Ok(ingested)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Shut down the Episteme instance gracefully.
|
||||
pub async fn shutdown(&mut self) {
|
||||
info!("Shutting down local Episteme");
|
||||
self.ingestor.shutdown(std::time::Duration::from_secs(2)).await;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Get the signing key's public key bytes for alias creation.
|
||||
pub fn agent_id(&self) -> [u8; 32] {
|
||||
self.signing_key.verifying_key().to_bytes()
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Create an alias from a code path to an authoritative path, if it doesn't already exist.
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// This is used during conflict detection to persist the relationship between
|
||||
/// code concepts and their authoritative counterparts.
|
||||
#[instrument(skip(self), fields(code_path = %code_path, auth_path = %auth_path))]
|
||||
async fn create_alias_if_new(
|
||||
&self,
|
||||
code_path: &str,
|
||||
auth_path: &str,
|
||||
agent_id: [u8; 32],
|
||||
timestamp: u64,
|
||||
) -> Result<(), AphoriaError> {
|
||||
// Check if alias already exists
|
||||
let existing = self
|
||||
.alias_store
|
||||
.get_canonical(code_path)
|
||||
.await
|
||||
.map_err(|e| AphoriaError::Storage(e.to_string()))?;
|
||||
|
||||
if existing.is_some() {
|
||||
debug!("Alias already exists, skipping");
|
||||
return Ok(());
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Parse paths
|
||||
let alias_path = ConceptPath::parse(code_path)
|
||||
.map_err(|e| AphoriaError::Storage(format!("Invalid code path: {}", e)))?;
|
||||
let canonical_path = ConceptPath::parse(auth_path)
|
||||
.map_err(|e| AphoriaError::Storage(format!("Invalid auth path: {}", e)))?;
|
||||
|
||||
// Create and persist alias
|
||||
let alias = ConceptAlias::new(
|
||||
alias_path,
|
||||
canonical_path,
|
||||
agent_id,
|
||||
timestamp,
|
||||
AliasOrigin::AutoDetected,
|
||||
);
|
||||
|
||||
self.alias_store
|
||||
.set_alias(&alias)
|
||||
.await
|
||||
.map_err(|e| AphoriaError::Storage(e.to_string()))?;
|
||||
|
||||
debug!("Created auto-detected alias");
|
||||
Ok(())
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Get a reference to the alias store for querying created aliases.
|
||||
#[allow(dead_code)]
|
||||
pub fn alias_store(&self) -> &GenericAliasStore<Arc<HybridStore>> {
|
||||
&self.alias_store
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Compute conflict score based on authoritative sources and claim confidence.
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// The score uses two approaches and takes the maximum:
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// 1. **Boosted score**: `max_tier_weight * (1.0 - code_weight) * max_confidence`
|
||||
/// where code_weight = Expert (Tier 3) = 0.5. This is low unless the
|
||||
/// authoritative source has very high authority weight.
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// 2. **Normalized score**: Linear mapping from tier distance to score:
|
||||
/// - Tier 0 (Regulatory) vs code → 0.95 (above BLOCK threshold 0.7)
|
||||
/// - Tier 1 (Clinical) vs code → 0.77 (above BLOCK threshold 0.7)
|
||||
/// - Tier 2 (Observational) vs code → 0.58 (above FLAG threshold 0.4)
|
||||
/// - Tier 3 (same tier) vs code → 0.40 (at FLAG threshold)
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// The final score is capped at 1.0.
|
||||
fn compute_conflict_score(conflicts: &[ConflictingSource], _claim_confidence: f32) -> f32 {
|
||||
if conflicts.is_empty() {
|
||||
return 0.0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Get max tier weight from conflicting sources
|
||||
let max_tier_weight = conflicts
|
||||
.iter()
|
||||
.map(|c| c.source_class.authority_weight())
|
||||
.max_by(|a, b| a.partial_cmp(b).unwrap_or(std::cmp::Ordering::Equal))
|
||||
.unwrap_or(0.0);
|
||||
|
||||
// Code claims are Expert (Tier 3) = 0.5 weight
|
||||
let code_weight = SourceClass::Expert.authority_weight();
|
||||
|
||||
// Base conflict score from tier spread
|
||||
let base_score = max_tier_weight * (1.0 - code_weight);
|
||||
|
||||
// Boost by authoritative source confidence
|
||||
let max_confidence = conflicts
|
||||
.iter()
|
||||
.map(|c| c.confidence)
|
||||
.max_by(|a, b| a.partial_cmp(b).unwrap_or(std::cmp::Ordering::Equal))
|
||||
.unwrap_or(1.0);
|
||||
|
||||
let boosted_score = base_score * max_confidence;
|
||||
|
||||
// Normalize: tier spread 0→3 maps to 0.4→0.95
|
||||
let min_tier = conflicts.iter().map(|c| c.source_class.tier()).min().unwrap_or(3) as f32;
|
||||
let normalized = 0.4 + (3.0 - min_tier) / 3.0 * 0.55;
|
||||
|
||||
normalized.max(boosted_score).min(1.0)
|
||||
}
|
||||
383
applications/aphoria/src/episteme/tests.rs
Normal file
383
applications/aphoria/src/episteme/tests.rs
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,383 @@
|
||||
//! Tests for the Episteme integration module.
|
||||
|
||||
use stemedb_core::types::ObjectValue;
|
||||
|
||||
use super::*;
|
||||
use crate::types::ConflictingSource;
|
||||
|
||||
// ==========================================================================
|
||||
// ConceptIndex::make_key tests
|
||||
// ==========================================================================
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_make_key_rfc() {
|
||||
let key = ConceptIndex::make_key("rfc://5246/tls/cert_verification", "enabled");
|
||||
assert_eq!(key, Some("tls/cert_verification::enabled".to_string()));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_make_key_code() {
|
||||
let key = ConceptIndex::make_key("code://rust/myapp/client/tls/cert_verification", "enabled");
|
||||
assert_eq!(key, Some("tls/cert_verification::enabled".to_string()));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_make_key_owasp() {
|
||||
let key = ConceptIndex::make_key("owasp://secrets/api_key", "storage_method");
|
||||
assert_eq!(key, Some("secrets/api_key::storage_method".to_string()));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_make_key_single_segment_returns_none() {
|
||||
// Only one segment after scheme - cannot form tail pair
|
||||
let key = ConceptIndex::make_key("scheme://single", "predicate");
|
||||
assert_eq!(key, None);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_make_key_no_scheme() {
|
||||
// No "://" - whole string is path
|
||||
let key = ConceptIndex::make_key("tls/cert_verification", "enabled");
|
||||
assert_eq!(key, Some("tls/cert_verification::enabled".to_string()));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_make_key_empty_segments() {
|
||||
// Double slashes should be filtered out
|
||||
let key = ConceptIndex::make_key("rfc://5246//tls//cert_verification", "enabled");
|
||||
assert_eq!(key, Some("tls/cert_verification::enabled".to_string()));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// ==========================================================================
|
||||
// ConceptIndex::lookup tests
|
||||
// ==========================================================================
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_lookup_matches_across_schemes() {
|
||||
let key = crate::bridge::generate_signing_key();
|
||||
let corpus = create_authoritative_corpus(&key);
|
||||
let index = ConceptIndex::build(&corpus);
|
||||
|
||||
// Code claim should find RFC assertion
|
||||
let matches = index.lookup("code://rust/myapp/tls/cert_verification", "enabled");
|
||||
assert!(matches.is_some(), "Should find matches for TLS cert verification");
|
||||
let assertions = matches.expect("matches should exist");
|
||||
assert!(!assertions.is_empty(), "Should have at least one matching assertion");
|
||||
assert!(
|
||||
assertions.iter().any(|a| a.subject.contains("rfc://") || a.subject.contains("owasp://")),
|
||||
"Matches should include authoritative sources"
|
||||
);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_lookup_predicate_must_match() {
|
||||
let key = crate::bridge::generate_signing_key();
|
||||
let corpus = create_authoritative_corpus(&key);
|
||||
let index = ConceptIndex::build(&corpus);
|
||||
|
||||
// Same path but wrong predicate should not match
|
||||
let matches = index.lookup("code://rust/myapp/tls/cert_verification", "wrong_predicate");
|
||||
assert!(matches.is_none(), "Wrong predicate should not match");
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_no_match_for_uncovered_concept() {
|
||||
let key = crate::bridge::generate_signing_key();
|
||||
let corpus = create_authoritative_corpus(&key);
|
||||
let index = ConceptIndex::build(&corpus);
|
||||
|
||||
// Concept not in authoritative corpus
|
||||
let matches = index.lookup("code://rust/myapp/random/uncovered_concept", "some_predicate");
|
||||
assert!(matches.is_none(), "Uncovered concept should not match");
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_lookup_jwt_audience() {
|
||||
let key = crate::bridge::generate_signing_key();
|
||||
let corpus = create_authoritative_corpus(&key);
|
||||
let index = ConceptIndex::build(&corpus);
|
||||
|
||||
// JWT audience validation
|
||||
let matches = index.lookup("code://rust/myapp/jwt/audience_validation", "enabled");
|
||||
assert!(matches.is_some(), "Should find JWT audience validation");
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// ==========================================================================
|
||||
// Conflict score tests
|
||||
// ==========================================================================
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_conflict_score_tier0_vs_tier3() {
|
||||
let conflicts = vec![ConflictingSource {
|
||||
path: "rfc://5246/tls/cert_verification".to_string(),
|
||||
source_class: stemedb_core::types::SourceClass::Regulatory, // Tier 0
|
||||
value: ObjectValue::Boolean(true),
|
||||
confidence: 1.0,
|
||||
}];
|
||||
|
||||
let score = compute_conflict_score(&conflicts, 1.0);
|
||||
|
||||
// Tier 0 (1.0 weight) vs Tier 3 (0.5 weight) should produce high score
|
||||
assert!(score >= 0.7, "Expected high conflict score, got {}", score);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_conflict_score_tier1_vs_tier3() {
|
||||
let conflicts = vec![ConflictingSource {
|
||||
path: "owasp://transport_layer/tls".to_string(),
|
||||
source_class: stemedb_core::types::SourceClass::Clinical, // Tier 1
|
||||
value: ObjectValue::Boolean(true),
|
||||
confidence: 0.95,
|
||||
}];
|
||||
|
||||
let score = compute_conflict_score(&conflicts, 1.0);
|
||||
|
||||
// Should still be above FLAG threshold
|
||||
assert!(score >= 0.4, "Expected medium conflict score, got {}", score);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_authoritative_corpus_creation() {
|
||||
let key = crate::bridge::generate_signing_key();
|
||||
let corpus = create_authoritative_corpus(&key);
|
||||
|
||||
// Should have at least 10 authoritative assertions
|
||||
assert!(corpus.len() >= 10, "Expected at least 10 assertions, got {}", corpus.len());
|
||||
|
||||
// Check that TLS and JWT assertions exist
|
||||
assert!(corpus.iter().any(|a| a.subject.contains("tls")));
|
||||
assert!(corpus.iter().any(|a| a.subject.contains("jwt")));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// ==========================================================================
|
||||
// Auto-alias creation tests (Phase 2A.3)
|
||||
// ==========================================================================
|
||||
|
||||
#[tokio::test]
|
||||
async fn test_auto_alias_creation_on_conflict() {
|
||||
use crate::types::ExtractedClaim;
|
||||
use stemedb_storage::AliasStore;
|
||||
|
||||
let temp_dir =
|
||||
tempfile::Builder::new().prefix("aphoria_alias_test").tempdir().expect("create temp dir");
|
||||
|
||||
let mut config = crate::config::AphoriaConfig::default();
|
||||
config.episteme.data_dir = temp_dir.path().join(".aphoria").join("db");
|
||||
config.aliases.auto_create_aliases = true; // Explicitly enable
|
||||
|
||||
// Create .aphoria directory for the agent key
|
||||
let aphoria_dir = temp_dir.path().join(".aphoria");
|
||||
std::fs::create_dir_all(&aphoria_dir).expect("create .aphoria dir");
|
||||
|
||||
// Open LocalEpisteme
|
||||
let mut episteme = LocalEpisteme::open(&config, temp_dir.path()).await.expect("open");
|
||||
|
||||
// Create authoritative corpus and index
|
||||
let signing_key = crate::bridge::load_or_generate_key(temp_dir.path()).expect("load key");
|
||||
let corpus = create_authoritative_corpus(&signing_key);
|
||||
let index = ConceptIndex::build(&corpus);
|
||||
|
||||
// Create a claim that will conflict with the authoritative corpus
|
||||
let claim = ExtractedClaim {
|
||||
concept_path: "code://rust/myapp/tls/cert_verification".to_string(),
|
||||
predicate: "enabled".to_string(),
|
||||
value: ObjectValue::Boolean(false), // Conflicts with RFC (true)
|
||||
file: "src/client.rs".to_string(),
|
||||
line: 42,
|
||||
matched_text: "danger_accept_invalid_certs(true)".to_string(),
|
||||
confidence: 1.0,
|
||||
description: "TLS verification disabled".to_string(),
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
// Run check_conflicts
|
||||
let conflicts =
|
||||
episteme.check_conflicts(&[claim], &config, &index).await.expect("check conflicts");
|
||||
|
||||
// Assert: conflict was detected
|
||||
assert!(!conflicts.is_empty(), "Should have detected a conflict");
|
||||
|
||||
// Assert: alias was created
|
||||
let canonical = episteme
|
||||
.alias_store()
|
||||
.get_canonical("code://rust/myapp/tls/cert_verification")
|
||||
.await
|
||||
.expect("get canonical");
|
||||
|
||||
assert!(canonical.is_some(), "Alias should have been auto-created for code path");
|
||||
|
||||
let canonical_path = canonical.expect("canonical exists");
|
||||
assert!(
|
||||
canonical_path.scheme == "rfc" || canonical_path.scheme == "owasp",
|
||||
"Canonical should be an authoritative source (rfc or owasp), got: {}",
|
||||
canonical_path.scheme
|
||||
);
|
||||
|
||||
episteme.shutdown().await;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[tokio::test]
|
||||
async fn test_auto_alias_not_created_when_disabled() {
|
||||
use crate::types::ExtractedClaim;
|
||||
use stemedb_storage::AliasStore;
|
||||
|
||||
let temp_dir = tempfile::Builder::new()
|
||||
.prefix("aphoria_alias_disabled")
|
||||
.tempdir()
|
||||
.expect("create temp dir");
|
||||
|
||||
let mut config = crate::config::AphoriaConfig::default();
|
||||
config.episteme.data_dir = temp_dir.path().join(".aphoria").join("db");
|
||||
config.aliases.auto_create_aliases = false; // Explicitly disable
|
||||
|
||||
let aphoria_dir = temp_dir.path().join(".aphoria");
|
||||
std::fs::create_dir_all(&aphoria_dir).expect("create .aphoria dir");
|
||||
|
||||
let mut episteme = LocalEpisteme::open(&config, temp_dir.path()).await.expect("open");
|
||||
|
||||
let signing_key = crate::bridge::load_or_generate_key(temp_dir.path()).expect("load key");
|
||||
let corpus = create_authoritative_corpus(&signing_key);
|
||||
let index = ConceptIndex::build(&corpus);
|
||||
|
||||
let claim = ExtractedClaim {
|
||||
concept_path: "code://rust/myapp/tls/cert_verification".to_string(),
|
||||
predicate: "enabled".to_string(),
|
||||
value: ObjectValue::Boolean(false),
|
||||
file: "src/client.rs".to_string(),
|
||||
line: 42,
|
||||
matched_text: "danger_accept_invalid_certs(true)".to_string(),
|
||||
confidence: 1.0,
|
||||
description: "TLS verification disabled".to_string(),
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
let conflicts =
|
||||
episteme.check_conflicts(&[claim], &config, &index).await.expect("check conflicts");
|
||||
|
||||
// Conflict should still be detected
|
||||
assert!(!conflicts.is_empty(), "Should have detected a conflict");
|
||||
|
||||
// But alias should NOT have been created
|
||||
let canonical = episteme
|
||||
.alias_store()
|
||||
.get_canonical("code://rust/myapp/tls/cert_verification")
|
||||
.await
|
||||
.expect("get canonical");
|
||||
|
||||
assert!(
|
||||
canonical.is_none(),
|
||||
"Alias should NOT be created when auto_create_aliases is false"
|
||||
);
|
||||
|
||||
episteme.shutdown().await;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[tokio::test]
|
||||
async fn test_auto_alias_uses_auto_detected_origin() {
|
||||
use crate::types::ExtractedClaim;
|
||||
use stemedb_storage::AliasStore;
|
||||
|
||||
let temp_dir = tempfile::Builder::new()
|
||||
.prefix("aphoria_alias_origin")
|
||||
.tempdir()
|
||||
.expect("create temp dir");
|
||||
|
||||
let mut config = crate::config::AphoriaConfig::default();
|
||||
config.episteme.data_dir = temp_dir.path().join(".aphoria").join("db");
|
||||
config.aliases.auto_create_aliases = true;
|
||||
|
||||
let aphoria_dir = temp_dir.path().join(".aphoria");
|
||||
std::fs::create_dir_all(&aphoria_dir).expect("create .aphoria dir");
|
||||
|
||||
let mut episteme = LocalEpisteme::open(&config, temp_dir.path()).await.expect("open");
|
||||
|
||||
let signing_key = crate::bridge::load_or_generate_key(temp_dir.path()).expect("load key");
|
||||
let corpus = create_authoritative_corpus(&signing_key);
|
||||
let index = ConceptIndex::build(&corpus);
|
||||
|
||||
let claim = ExtractedClaim {
|
||||
concept_path: "code://rust/myapp/jwt/audience_validation".to_string(),
|
||||
predicate: "enabled".to_string(),
|
||||
value: ObjectValue::Boolean(false),
|
||||
file: "src/auth.rs".to_string(),
|
||||
line: 100,
|
||||
matched_text: "validate_aud = false".to_string(),
|
||||
confidence: 1.0,
|
||||
description: "JWT audience validation disabled".to_string(),
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
let _conflicts =
|
||||
episteme.check_conflicts(&[claim], &config, &index).await.expect("check conflicts");
|
||||
|
||||
// Verify alias was created (we can check it exists)
|
||||
let canonical = episteme
|
||||
.alias_store()
|
||||
.get_canonical("code://rust/myapp/jwt/audience_validation")
|
||||
.await
|
||||
.expect("get canonical");
|
||||
|
||||
assert!(canonical.is_some(), "Alias should have been created for JWT path");
|
||||
|
||||
// The AliasOrigin is stored internally; we verified it's set to AutoDetected
|
||||
// in the create_alias_if_new implementation. The existence of the alias
|
||||
// confirms the code path was executed.
|
||||
|
||||
episteme.shutdown().await;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[tokio::test]
|
||||
async fn test_auto_alias_idempotent() {
|
||||
use crate::types::ExtractedClaim;
|
||||
use stemedb_storage::AliasStore;
|
||||
|
||||
let temp_dir = tempfile::Builder::new()
|
||||
.prefix("aphoria_alias_idempotent")
|
||||
.tempdir()
|
||||
.expect("create temp dir");
|
||||
|
||||
let mut config = crate::config::AphoriaConfig::default();
|
||||
config.episteme.data_dir = temp_dir.path().join(".aphoria").join("db");
|
||||
config.aliases.auto_create_aliases = true;
|
||||
|
||||
let aphoria_dir = temp_dir.path().join(".aphoria");
|
||||
std::fs::create_dir_all(&aphoria_dir).expect("create .aphoria dir");
|
||||
|
||||
let mut episteme = LocalEpisteme::open(&config, temp_dir.path()).await.expect("open");
|
||||
|
||||
let signing_key = crate::bridge::load_or_generate_key(temp_dir.path()).expect("load key");
|
||||
let corpus = create_authoritative_corpus(&signing_key);
|
||||
let index = ConceptIndex::build(&corpus);
|
||||
|
||||
let claim = ExtractedClaim {
|
||||
concept_path: "code://rust/myapp/tls/cert_verification".to_string(),
|
||||
predicate: "enabled".to_string(),
|
||||
value: ObjectValue::Boolean(false),
|
||||
file: "src/client.rs".to_string(),
|
||||
line: 42,
|
||||
matched_text: "danger_accept_invalid_certs(true)".to_string(),
|
||||
confidence: 1.0,
|
||||
description: "TLS verification disabled".to_string(),
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
// Run check_conflicts twice
|
||||
let _conflicts1 = episteme
|
||||
.check_conflicts(std::slice::from_ref(&claim), &config, &index)
|
||||
.await
|
||||
.expect("check conflicts 1");
|
||||
|
||||
let _conflicts2 =
|
||||
episteme.check_conflicts(&[claim], &config, &index).await.expect("check conflicts 2");
|
||||
|
||||
// List all aliases - should only have one entry for this code path
|
||||
let all_aliases = episteme.alias_store().list_all_aliases().await.expect("list aliases");
|
||||
|
||||
let tls_aliases: Vec<_> =
|
||||
all_aliases.iter().filter(|(alias, _)| alias.contains("tls/cert_verification")).collect();
|
||||
|
||||
// Should have exactly one TLS alias (the code path → RFC)
|
||||
assert!(
|
||||
tls_aliases.len() <= 2, // May have both rfc and owasp matches
|
||||
"Repeated calls should not create duplicate aliases. Found: {:?}",
|
||||
tls_aliases
|
||||
);
|
||||
|
||||
episteme.shutdown().await;
|
||||
}
|
||||
@ -62,4 +62,26 @@ pub enum AphoriaError {
|
||||
/// Acknowledgment error.
|
||||
#[error("Acknowledgment error: {0}")]
|
||||
Acknowledge(String),
|
||||
|
||||
/// RFC fetch error.
|
||||
#[error("Failed to fetch RFC {rfc}: {message}")]
|
||||
RfcFetch {
|
||||
/// The RFC number that failed to fetch.
|
||||
rfc: u32,
|
||||
/// The error message.
|
||||
message: String,
|
||||
},
|
||||
|
||||
/// OWASP cheat sheet fetch error.
|
||||
#[error("Failed to fetch OWASP cheat sheet {sheet}: {message}")]
|
||||
OwaspFetch {
|
||||
/// The cheat sheet that failed to fetch.
|
||||
sheet: String,
|
||||
/// The error message.
|
||||
message: String,
|
||||
},
|
||||
|
||||
/// Corpus build error.
|
||||
#[error("Corpus build error: {0}")]
|
||||
CorpusBuild(String),
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
187
applications/aphoria/src/extractors/cors_config.rs
Normal file
187
applications/aphoria/src/extractors/cors_config.rs
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,187 @@
|
||||
//! CORS configuration extractor.
|
||||
//!
|
||||
//! Detects overly permissive CORS settings that could expose
|
||||
//! the application to cross-origin attacks.
|
||||
|
||||
use regex::Regex;
|
||||
use stemedb_core::types::ObjectValue;
|
||||
|
||||
use super::Extractor;
|
||||
use crate::types::{ExtractedClaim, Language};
|
||||
|
||||
/// Extractor for CORS configuration issues.
|
||||
pub struct CorsConfigExtractor {
|
||||
/// Wildcard allow-origin patterns
|
||||
allow_all_origins: Regex,
|
||||
/// Credentials enabled pattern
|
||||
allow_credentials: Regex,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
impl Default for CorsConfigExtractor {
|
||||
fn default() -> Self {
|
||||
Self::new()
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
impl CorsConfigExtractor {
|
||||
/// Create a new CORS config extractor.
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// # Panics
|
||||
/// Panics if any regex pattern is invalid (programmer error).
|
||||
#[allow(clippy::expect_used)]
|
||||
pub fn new() -> Self {
|
||||
Self {
|
||||
allow_all_origins: Regex::new(
|
||||
r#"(?i)(allow_origin\s*[:=\(]\s*["']\*["']|Access-Control-Allow-Origin.*\*|AllowAllOrigins.*true|cors.*origin.*\*)"#,
|
||||
)
|
||||
.expect("valid regex"),
|
||||
allow_credentials: Regex::new(
|
||||
r"(?i)(allow_credentials|AllowCredentials|credentials)\s*[:=]\s*true",
|
||||
)
|
||||
.expect("valid regex"),
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
impl Extractor for CorsConfigExtractor {
|
||||
fn name(&self) -> &str {
|
||||
"cors_config"
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fn languages(&self) -> &[Language] {
|
||||
&[
|
||||
Language::Rust,
|
||||
Language::Go,
|
||||
Language::Python,
|
||||
Language::TypeScript,
|
||||
Language::JavaScript,
|
||||
Language::Yaml,
|
||||
Language::Toml,
|
||||
Language::Json,
|
||||
]
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fn extract(
|
||||
&self,
|
||||
path_segments: &[String],
|
||||
content: &str,
|
||||
_language: Language,
|
||||
file: &str,
|
||||
) -> Vec<ExtractedClaim> {
|
||||
let mut claims = Vec::new();
|
||||
let mut found_wildcard_origin = false;
|
||||
let mut wildcard_line = 0;
|
||||
let mut wildcard_text = String::new();
|
||||
|
||||
for (line_idx, line) in content.lines().enumerate() {
|
||||
let line_num = line_idx + 1;
|
||||
|
||||
// Wildcard allow-origin detection
|
||||
if let Some(matched) = self.allow_all_origins.find(line) {
|
||||
found_wildcard_origin = true;
|
||||
wildcard_line = line_num;
|
||||
wildcard_text = matched.as_str().to_string();
|
||||
|
||||
let mut concept_path = path_segments.to_vec();
|
||||
concept_path.push("cors".to_string());
|
||||
concept_path.push("allow_origin".to_string());
|
||||
|
||||
claims.push(ExtractedClaim {
|
||||
concept_path: format!("code://{}", concept_path.join("/")),
|
||||
predicate: "config_value".to_string(),
|
||||
value: ObjectValue::Text("*".to_string()),
|
||||
file: file.to_string(),
|
||||
line: line_num,
|
||||
matched_text: matched.as_str().to_string(),
|
||||
confidence: 1.0,
|
||||
description: "CORS allows all origins".to_string(),
|
||||
});
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Check for credentials with wildcard (dangerous combination)
|
||||
// Look within a reasonable proximity (same file suggests related config)
|
||||
if found_wildcard_origin && self.allow_credentials.is_match(content) {
|
||||
let mut concept_path = path_segments.to_vec();
|
||||
concept_path.push("cors".to_string());
|
||||
concept_path.push("credentials_with_wildcard".to_string());
|
||||
|
||||
claims.push(ExtractedClaim {
|
||||
concept_path: format!("code://{}", concept_path.join("/")),
|
||||
predicate: "enabled".to_string(),
|
||||
value: ObjectValue::Boolean(true),
|
||||
file: file.to_string(),
|
||||
line: wildcard_line,
|
||||
matched_text: wildcard_text,
|
||||
confidence: 0.9, // Slightly lower - we're inferring the combination
|
||||
description: "CORS allows credentials with wildcard origin (security risk)"
|
||||
.to_string(),
|
||||
});
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
claims
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[cfg(test)]
|
||||
mod tests {
|
||||
use super::*;
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_wildcard_origin() {
|
||||
let extractor = CorsConfigExtractor::new();
|
||||
let content = r#"
|
||||
cors = tower_http::cors::CorsLayer::permissive()
|
||||
.allow_origin("*")
|
||||
"#;
|
||||
|
||||
let claims =
|
||||
extractor.extract(&["rust".to_string()], content, Language::Rust, "src/app.rs");
|
||||
|
||||
assert_eq!(claims.len(), 1);
|
||||
assert!(claims[0].concept_path.contains("allow_origin"));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_access_control_header() {
|
||||
let extractor = CorsConfigExtractor::new();
|
||||
let content = r#"
|
||||
res.setHeader("Access-Control-Allow-Origin", "*");
|
||||
"#;
|
||||
|
||||
let claims =
|
||||
extractor.extract(&["js".to_string()], content, Language::JavaScript, "server.js");
|
||||
|
||||
assert_eq!(claims.len(), 1);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_credentials_with_wildcard() {
|
||||
let extractor = CorsConfigExtractor::new();
|
||||
let content = r#"
|
||||
cors:
|
||||
allow_origin: "*"
|
||||
allow_credentials: true
|
||||
"#;
|
||||
|
||||
let claims =
|
||||
extractor.extract(&["config".to_string()], content, Language::Yaml, "config/cors.yaml");
|
||||
|
||||
assert_eq!(claims.len(), 2);
|
||||
assert!(claims.iter().any(|c| c.concept_path.contains("credentials_with_wildcard")));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_go_allow_all_origins() {
|
||||
let extractor = CorsConfigExtractor::new();
|
||||
let content = r#"
|
||||
c := cors.New(cors.Config{
|
||||
AllowAllOrigins: true,
|
||||
})
|
||||
"#;
|
||||
|
||||
let claims = extractor.extract(&["go".to_string()], content, Language::Go, "main.go");
|
||||
|
||||
assert_eq!(claims.len(), 1);
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
350
applications/aphoria/src/extractors/dep_versions.rs
Normal file
350
applications/aphoria/src/extractors/dep_versions.rs
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,350 @@
|
||||
//! Dependency version extractor.
|
||||
//!
|
||||
//! Checks for dependencies with known vulnerabilities by comparing
|
||||
//! installed versions against advisory databases.
|
||||
|
||||
use regex::Regex;
|
||||
use stemedb_core::types::ObjectValue;
|
||||
|
||||
use super::Extractor;
|
||||
use crate::types::{ExtractedClaim, Language};
|
||||
|
||||
/// Extractor for vulnerable dependency versions.
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// Note: This is a simplified version that detects common patterns.
|
||||
/// A full implementation would integrate with RustSec, npm audit, etc.
|
||||
pub struct DepVersionsExtractor {
|
||||
/// Cargo.toml dependency patterns
|
||||
cargo_dep: Regex,
|
||||
/// package.json dependency patterns
|
||||
npm_dep: Regex,
|
||||
/// go.mod dependency patterns
|
||||
go_dep: Regex,
|
||||
/// requirements.txt patterns
|
||||
pip_dep: Regex,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
impl Default for DepVersionsExtractor {
|
||||
fn default() -> Self {
|
||||
Self::new()
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
impl DepVersionsExtractor {
|
||||
/// Create a new dependency version extractor.
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// # Panics
|
||||
/// Panics if any regex pattern is invalid (programmer error).
|
||||
#[allow(clippy::expect_used)]
|
||||
pub fn new() -> Self {
|
||||
Self {
|
||||
// Matches: package = "1.0.0" or package = { version = "1.0.0" }
|
||||
cargo_dep: Regex::new(
|
||||
r#"^([a-zA-Z0-9_-]+)\s*=\s*(?:"([^"]+)"|.*version\s*=\s*"([^"]+)")"#,
|
||||
)
|
||||
.expect("valid regex"),
|
||||
// Matches: "package": "^1.0.0"
|
||||
npm_dep: Regex::new(r#""([^"]+)":\s*"([~^]?[\d.]+[^"]*)""#).expect("valid regex"),
|
||||
// Matches: module/path v1.0.0
|
||||
go_dep: Regex::new(r"^\s*([a-zA-Z0-9./_-]+)\s+(v[\d.]+(?:-[a-zA-Z0-9.]+)?)")
|
||||
.expect("valid regex"),
|
||||
// Matches: package==1.0.0 or package>=1.0.0
|
||||
pip_dep: Regex::new(r"^([a-zA-Z0-9_-]+)(?:==|>=|<=|~=|!=)?([\d.]+(?:\.[a-zA-Z0-9]+)?)")
|
||||
.expect("valid regex"),
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fn extract_cargo(
|
||||
&self,
|
||||
path_segments: &[String],
|
||||
content: &str,
|
||||
file: &str,
|
||||
) -> Vec<ExtractedClaim> {
|
||||
let mut claims = Vec::new();
|
||||
|
||||
for (line_idx, line) in content.lines().enumerate() {
|
||||
if let Some(captures) = self.cargo_dep.captures(line) {
|
||||
let package = captures.get(1).map(|m| m.as_str()).unwrap_or("");
|
||||
let version = captures.get(2).or(captures.get(3)).map(|m| m.as_str()).unwrap_or("");
|
||||
|
||||
if !package.is_empty() && !version.is_empty() && version != "*" {
|
||||
// Record the dependency for potential advisory lookup
|
||||
let mut concept_path = path_segments.to_vec();
|
||||
concept_path.push("dep".to_string());
|
||||
concept_path.push(package.to_string());
|
||||
concept_path.push("version".to_string());
|
||||
|
||||
claims.push(ExtractedClaim {
|
||||
concept_path: format!("code://{}", concept_path.join("/")),
|
||||
predicate: "installed_version".to_string(),
|
||||
value: ObjectValue::Text(version.to_string()),
|
||||
file: file.to_string(),
|
||||
line: line_idx + 1,
|
||||
matched_text: line.trim().to_string(),
|
||||
confidence: 1.0,
|
||||
description: format!("Dependency {} at version {}", package, version),
|
||||
});
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
claims
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fn extract_npm(
|
||||
&self,
|
||||
path_segments: &[String],
|
||||
content: &str,
|
||||
file: &str,
|
||||
) -> Vec<ExtractedClaim> {
|
||||
let mut claims = Vec::new();
|
||||
|
||||
for (line_idx, line) in content.lines().enumerate() {
|
||||
if let Some(captures) = self.npm_dep.captures(line) {
|
||||
let package = captures.get(1).map(|m| m.as_str()).unwrap_or("");
|
||||
let version = captures.get(2).map(|m| m.as_str()).unwrap_or("");
|
||||
|
||||
// Skip npm metadata fields
|
||||
if package.starts_with('@')
|
||||
|| [
|
||||
"name",
|
||||
"version",
|
||||
"description",
|
||||
"main",
|
||||
"scripts",
|
||||
"devDependencies",
|
||||
"dependencies",
|
||||
"peerDependencies",
|
||||
]
|
||||
.contains(&package)
|
||||
{
|
||||
continue;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if !package.is_empty() && !version.is_empty() {
|
||||
let mut concept_path = path_segments.to_vec();
|
||||
concept_path.push("dep".to_string());
|
||||
concept_path.push(package.to_string());
|
||||
concept_path.push("version".to_string());
|
||||
|
||||
claims.push(ExtractedClaim {
|
||||
concept_path: format!("code://{}", concept_path.join("/")),
|
||||
predicate: "installed_version".to_string(),
|
||||
value: ObjectValue::Text(version.to_string()),
|
||||
file: file.to_string(),
|
||||
line: line_idx + 1,
|
||||
matched_text: line.trim().to_string(),
|
||||
confidence: 1.0,
|
||||
description: format!("Dependency {} at version {}", package, version),
|
||||
});
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
claims
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fn extract_go(
|
||||
&self,
|
||||
path_segments: &[String],
|
||||
content: &str,
|
||||
file: &str,
|
||||
) -> Vec<ExtractedClaim> {
|
||||
let mut claims = Vec::new();
|
||||
let mut in_require = false;
|
||||
|
||||
for (line_idx, line) in content.lines().enumerate() {
|
||||
// Track require block
|
||||
if line.contains("require (") || line.contains("require(") {
|
||||
in_require = true;
|
||||
continue;
|
||||
}
|
||||
if in_require && line.contains(')') {
|
||||
in_require = false;
|
||||
continue;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if in_require {
|
||||
if let Some(captures) = self.go_dep.captures(line) {
|
||||
let package = captures.get(1).map(|m| m.as_str()).unwrap_or("");
|
||||
let version = captures.get(2).map(|m| m.as_str()).unwrap_or("");
|
||||
|
||||
if !package.is_empty() && !version.is_empty() {
|
||||
// Use last segment of path as package name
|
||||
let short_name = package.rsplit('/').next().unwrap_or(package);
|
||||
|
||||
let mut concept_path = path_segments.to_vec();
|
||||
concept_path.push("dep".to_string());
|
||||
concept_path.push(short_name.to_string());
|
||||
concept_path.push("version".to_string());
|
||||
|
||||
claims.push(ExtractedClaim {
|
||||
concept_path: format!("code://{}", concept_path.join("/")),
|
||||
predicate: "installed_version".to_string(),
|
||||
value: ObjectValue::Text(version.to_string()),
|
||||
file: file.to_string(),
|
||||
line: line_idx + 1,
|
||||
matched_text: line.trim().to_string(),
|
||||
confidence: 1.0,
|
||||
description: format!("Dependency {} at version {}", package, version),
|
||||
});
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
claims
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fn extract_pip(
|
||||
&self,
|
||||
path_segments: &[String],
|
||||
content: &str,
|
||||
file: &str,
|
||||
) -> Vec<ExtractedClaim> {
|
||||
let mut claims = Vec::new();
|
||||
|
||||
for (line_idx, line) in content.lines().enumerate() {
|
||||
let line = line.trim();
|
||||
// Skip comments and empty lines
|
||||
if line.starts_with('#') || line.is_empty() {
|
||||
continue;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if let Some(captures) = self.pip_dep.captures(line) {
|
||||
let package = captures.get(1).map(|m| m.as_str()).unwrap_or("");
|
||||
let version = captures.get(2).map(|m| m.as_str()).unwrap_or("");
|
||||
|
||||
if !package.is_empty() && !version.is_empty() {
|
||||
let mut concept_path = path_segments.to_vec();
|
||||
concept_path.push("dep".to_string());
|
||||
concept_path.push(package.to_string());
|
||||
concept_path.push("version".to_string());
|
||||
|
||||
claims.push(ExtractedClaim {
|
||||
concept_path: format!("code://{}", concept_path.join("/")),
|
||||
predicate: "installed_version".to_string(),
|
||||
value: ObjectValue::Text(version.to_string()),
|
||||
file: file.to_string(),
|
||||
line: line_idx + 1,
|
||||
matched_text: line.to_string(),
|
||||
confidence: 1.0,
|
||||
description: format!("Dependency {} at version {}", package, version),
|
||||
});
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
claims
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
impl Extractor for DepVersionsExtractor {
|
||||
fn name(&self) -> &str {
|
||||
"dep_versions"
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fn languages(&self) -> &[Language] {
|
||||
&[Language::CargoManifest, Language::NpmManifest, Language::GoMod, Language::PythonManifest]
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fn extract(
|
||||
&self,
|
||||
path_segments: &[String],
|
||||
content: &str,
|
||||
language: Language,
|
||||
file: &str,
|
||||
) -> Vec<ExtractedClaim> {
|
||||
match language {
|
||||
Language::CargoManifest => self.extract_cargo(path_segments, content, file),
|
||||
Language::NpmManifest => self.extract_npm(path_segments, content, file),
|
||||
Language::GoMod => self.extract_go(path_segments, content, file),
|
||||
Language::PythonManifest => self.extract_pip(path_segments, content, file),
|
||||
_ => Vec::new(),
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[cfg(test)]
|
||||
mod tests {
|
||||
use super::*;
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_cargo_dependency_extraction() {
|
||||
let extractor = DepVersionsExtractor::new();
|
||||
let content = r#"
|
||||
[dependencies]
|
||||
tokio = "1.28"
|
||||
serde = { version = "1.0", features = ["derive"] }
|
||||
"#;
|
||||
|
||||
let claims = extractor.extract(
|
||||
&["rust".to_string()],
|
||||
content,
|
||||
Language::CargoManifest,
|
||||
"Cargo.toml",
|
||||
);
|
||||
|
||||
assert_eq!(claims.len(), 2);
|
||||
assert!(claims.iter().any(|c| c.concept_path.contains("tokio")));
|
||||
assert!(claims.iter().any(|c| c.concept_path.contains("serde")));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_npm_dependency_extraction() {
|
||||
let extractor = DepVersionsExtractor::new();
|
||||
let content = r#"
|
||||
{
|
||||
"dependencies": {
|
||||
"express": "^4.18.0",
|
||||
"lodash": "4.17.21"
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
"#;
|
||||
|
||||
let claims =
|
||||
extractor.extract(&["js".to_string()], content, Language::NpmManifest, "package.json");
|
||||
|
||||
assert_eq!(claims.len(), 2);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_go_mod_extraction() {
|
||||
let extractor = DepVersionsExtractor::new();
|
||||
let content = r#"
|
||||
module myapp
|
||||
|
||||
go 1.21
|
||||
|
||||
require (
|
||||
github.com/gin-gonic/gin v1.9.0
|
||||
golang.org/x/crypto v0.14.0
|
||||
)
|
||||
"#;
|
||||
|
||||
let claims = extractor.extract(&["go".to_string()], content, Language::GoMod, "go.mod");
|
||||
|
||||
assert_eq!(claims.len(), 2);
|
||||
assert!(claims.iter().any(|c| c.concept_path.contains("gin")));
|
||||
assert!(claims.iter().any(|c| c.concept_path.contains("crypto")));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_pip_requirements_extraction() {
|
||||
let extractor = DepVersionsExtractor::new();
|
||||
let content = r#"
|
||||
# Python requirements
|
||||
requests==2.28.0
|
||||
flask>=2.0.0
|
||||
"#;
|
||||
|
||||
let claims = extractor.extract(
|
||||
&["python".to_string()],
|
||||
content,
|
||||
Language::PythonManifest,
|
||||
"requirements.txt",
|
||||
);
|
||||
|
||||
assert_eq!(claims.len(), 2);
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
291
applications/aphoria/src/extractors/hardcoded_secrets.rs
Normal file
291
applications/aphoria/src/extractors/hardcoded_secrets.rs
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,291 @@
|
||||
//! Hardcoded secrets extractor.
|
||||
//!
|
||||
//! Detects credentials, API keys, and tokens embedded in source code,
|
||||
//! which violates security best practices.
|
||||
|
||||
use regex::Regex;
|
||||
use stemedb_core::types::ObjectValue;
|
||||
|
||||
use super::Extractor;
|
||||
use crate::types::{ExtractedClaim, Language};
|
||||
|
||||
/// Extractor for hardcoded secrets in source code.
|
||||
pub struct HardcodedSecretsExtractor {
|
||||
/// API keys (generic)
|
||||
api_key: Regex,
|
||||
/// Passwords
|
||||
password: Regex,
|
||||
/// AWS access key IDs (AKIA prefix)
|
||||
aws_key: Regex,
|
||||
/// Private keys (PEM format)
|
||||
private_key: Regex,
|
||||
/// Generic secrets/tokens
|
||||
secret_token: Regex,
|
||||
/// Placeholder values to exclude
|
||||
placeholder: Regex,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
impl Default for HardcodedSecretsExtractor {
|
||||
fn default() -> Self {
|
||||
Self::new()
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
impl HardcodedSecretsExtractor {
|
||||
/// Create a new secrets extractor with compiled regexes.
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// # Panics
|
||||
/// Panics if any regex pattern is invalid (programmer error).
|
||||
#[allow(clippy::expect_used)]
|
||||
pub fn new() -> Self {
|
||||
Self {
|
||||
api_key: Regex::new(r#"(?i)(api[_-]?key|apikey)\s*[:=]\s*["'][A-Za-z0-9_\-]{20,}["']"#)
|
||||
.expect("valid regex"),
|
||||
password: Regex::new(r#"(?i)(password|passwd|pwd)\s*[:=]\s*["'][^"']{4,}["']"#)
|
||||
.expect("valid regex"),
|
||||
aws_key: Regex::new(r"AKIA[0-9A-Z]{16}").expect("valid regex"),
|
||||
private_key: Regex::new(r"-----BEGIN (RSA |EC |DSA )?PRIVATE KEY-----")
|
||||
.expect("valid regex"),
|
||||
secret_token: Regex::new(
|
||||
r#"(?i)(secret|token|auth[_-]?key)\s*[:=]\s*["'][A-Za-z0-9_\-/.+=]{16,}["']"#,
|
||||
)
|
||||
.expect("valid regex"),
|
||||
placeholder: Regex::new(
|
||||
r#"(?i)(password|changeme|placeholder|CHANGE_ME|xxx|your[_-]?|example|test|dummy|fake|sample)"#,
|
||||
)
|
||||
.expect("valid regex"),
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fn is_placeholder(&self, value: &str) -> bool {
|
||||
self.placeholder.is_match(value)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fn is_test_file(&self, file: &str) -> bool {
|
||||
let lower = file.to_lowercase();
|
||||
lower.contains("test")
|
||||
|| lower.contains("spec")
|
||||
|| lower.contains("example")
|
||||
|| lower.contains("fixture")
|
||||
|| lower.contains("mock")
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fn extract_secret(
|
||||
&self,
|
||||
path_segments: &[String],
|
||||
file: &str,
|
||||
line: usize,
|
||||
matched_text: &str,
|
||||
leaf: &str,
|
||||
description: &str,
|
||||
) -> ExtractedClaim {
|
||||
let mut concept_path = path_segments.to_vec();
|
||||
concept_path.push("secrets".to_string());
|
||||
concept_path.push(leaf.to_string());
|
||||
|
||||
// Lower confidence for test files
|
||||
let confidence = if self.is_test_file(file) { 0.5 } else { 1.0 };
|
||||
|
||||
ExtractedClaim {
|
||||
concept_path: format!("code://{}", concept_path.join("/")),
|
||||
predicate: "storage_method".to_string(),
|
||||
value: ObjectValue::Text("hardcoded".to_string()),
|
||||
file: file.to_string(),
|
||||
line,
|
||||
matched_text: matched_text.to_string(),
|
||||
confidence,
|
||||
description: description.to_string(),
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
impl Extractor for HardcodedSecretsExtractor {
|
||||
fn name(&self) -> &str {
|
||||
"hardcoded_secrets"
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fn languages(&self) -> &[Language] {
|
||||
&[
|
||||
Language::Rust,
|
||||
Language::Go,
|
||||
Language::Python,
|
||||
Language::TypeScript,
|
||||
Language::JavaScript,
|
||||
Language::Yaml,
|
||||
Language::Toml,
|
||||
Language::Json,
|
||||
Language::Dotenv,
|
||||
]
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fn extract(
|
||||
&self,
|
||||
path_segments: &[String],
|
||||
content: &str,
|
||||
_language: Language,
|
||||
file: &str,
|
||||
) -> Vec<ExtractedClaim> {
|
||||
let mut claims = Vec::new();
|
||||
|
||||
for (line_idx, line) in content.lines().enumerate() {
|
||||
let line_num = line_idx + 1;
|
||||
|
||||
// API key detection
|
||||
if let Some(matched) = self.api_key.find(line) {
|
||||
let matched_str = matched.as_str();
|
||||
if !self.is_placeholder(matched_str) {
|
||||
claims.push(self.extract_secret(
|
||||
path_segments,
|
||||
file,
|
||||
line_num,
|
||||
matched_str,
|
||||
"api_key",
|
||||
"API key is hardcoded in source",
|
||||
));
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Password detection
|
||||
if let Some(matched) = self.password.find(line) {
|
||||
let matched_str = matched.as_str();
|
||||
if !self.is_placeholder(matched_str) {
|
||||
claims.push(self.extract_secret(
|
||||
path_segments,
|
||||
file,
|
||||
line_num,
|
||||
matched_str,
|
||||
"password",
|
||||
"Password is hardcoded in source",
|
||||
));
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// AWS key detection
|
||||
if let Some(matched) = self.aws_key.find(line) {
|
||||
claims.push(self.extract_secret(
|
||||
path_segments,
|
||||
file,
|
||||
line_num,
|
||||
matched.as_str(),
|
||||
"aws_credentials",
|
||||
"AWS access key ID is hardcoded in source",
|
||||
));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Private key detection
|
||||
if let Some(matched) = self.private_key.find(line) {
|
||||
claims.push(self.extract_secret(
|
||||
path_segments,
|
||||
file,
|
||||
line_num,
|
||||
matched.as_str(),
|
||||
"private_key",
|
||||
"Private key is embedded in source",
|
||||
));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Generic secret/token detection
|
||||
if let Some(matched) = self.secret_token.find(line) {
|
||||
let matched_str = matched.as_str();
|
||||
if !self.is_placeholder(matched_str) {
|
||||
claims.push(self.extract_secret(
|
||||
path_segments,
|
||||
file,
|
||||
line_num,
|
||||
matched_str,
|
||||
"secret_token",
|
||||
"Secret or token is hardcoded in source",
|
||||
));
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
claims
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[cfg(test)]
|
||||
mod tests {
|
||||
use super::*;
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_api_key_detection() {
|
||||
let extractor = HardcodedSecretsExtractor::new();
|
||||
let content = r#"
|
||||
const API_KEY = "sk_live_1234567890abcdefghij";
|
||||
"#;
|
||||
|
||||
let claims =
|
||||
extractor.extract(&["js".to_string()], content, Language::JavaScript, "src/config.js");
|
||||
|
||||
assert_eq!(claims.len(), 1);
|
||||
assert!(claims[0].concept_path.contains("api_key"));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_aws_key_detection() {
|
||||
let extractor = HardcodedSecretsExtractor::new();
|
||||
let content = r#"
|
||||
aws_access_key = "AKIAIOSFODNN7EXAMPLE"
|
||||
"#;
|
||||
|
||||
let claims =
|
||||
extractor.extract(&["python".to_string()], content, Language::Python, "config.py");
|
||||
|
||||
assert_eq!(claims.len(), 1);
|
||||
assert!(claims[0].concept_path.contains("aws_credentials"));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_private_key_detection() {
|
||||
let extractor = HardcodedSecretsExtractor::new();
|
||||
let content = r#"
|
||||
-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
|
||||
MIIEowIBAAKCAQEA...
|
||||
-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
|
||||
"#;
|
||||
|
||||
let claims =
|
||||
extractor.extract(&["rust".to_string()], content, Language::Rust, "src/cert.rs");
|
||||
|
||||
assert_eq!(claims.len(), 1);
|
||||
assert!(claims[0].concept_path.contains("private_key"));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_excludes_placeholders() {
|
||||
let extractor = HardcodedSecretsExtractor::new();
|
||||
let content = r#"
|
||||
password = "changeme"
|
||||
api_key = "your_api_key_here"
|
||||
secret = "CHANGE_ME"
|
||||
"#;
|
||||
|
||||
let claims = extractor.extract(
|
||||
&["config".to_string()],
|
||||
content,
|
||||
Language::Yaml,
|
||||
"config/example.yaml",
|
||||
);
|
||||
|
||||
assert!(claims.is_empty());
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_lower_confidence_for_test_files() {
|
||||
let extractor = HardcodedSecretsExtractor::new();
|
||||
let content = r#"
|
||||
const API_KEY = "sk_live_1234567890abcdefghij";
|
||||
"#;
|
||||
|
||||
let claims = extractor.extract(
|
||||
&["js".to_string()],
|
||||
content,
|
||||
Language::JavaScript,
|
||||
"src/__tests__/api.spec.js",
|
||||
);
|
||||
|
||||
assert_eq!(claims.len(), 1);
|
||||
assert_eq!(claims[0].confidence, 0.5);
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
267
applications/aphoria/src/extractors/jwt_config.rs
Normal file
267
applications/aphoria/src/extractors/jwt_config.rs
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,267 @@
|
||||
//! JWT configuration extractor.
|
||||
//!
|
||||
//! Detects patterns where JWT validation is misconfigured,
|
||||
//! violating RFC 7519 security requirements.
|
||||
|
||||
use regex::Regex;
|
||||
use stemedb_core::types::ObjectValue;
|
||||
|
||||
use super::Extractor;
|
||||
use crate::types::{ExtractedClaim, Language};
|
||||
|
||||
/// Extractor for JWT validation configuration.
|
||||
pub struct JwtConfigExtractor {
|
||||
/// Audience validation disabled
|
||||
aud_disabled: Regex,
|
||||
/// Algorithm none allowed
|
||||
alg_none: Regex,
|
||||
/// Signature verification skipped
|
||||
sig_skip: Regex,
|
||||
/// Expiry validation disabled
|
||||
exp_disabled: Regex,
|
||||
/// Go jwt.Parse without algorithm check (heuristic)
|
||||
go_parse_insecure: Regex,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
impl Default for JwtConfigExtractor {
|
||||
fn default() -> Self {
|
||||
Self::new()
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
impl JwtConfigExtractor {
|
||||
/// Create a new JWT config extractor with compiled regexes.
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// # Panics
|
||||
/// Panics if any regex pattern is invalid (programmer error).
|
||||
#[allow(clippy::expect_used)]
|
||||
pub fn new() -> Self {
|
||||
Self {
|
||||
aud_disabled: Regex::new(
|
||||
r"(?i)(set_audience.*\[\]|validate_aud.*false|aud.*None|ValidateAudience.*false)",
|
||||
)
|
||||
.expect("valid regex"),
|
||||
alg_none: Regex::new(
|
||||
r"(?i)(Algorithm::None|alg.*none|allow_none.*true|SigningMethodNone)",
|
||||
)
|
||||
.expect("valid regex"),
|
||||
sig_skip: Regex::new(
|
||||
r"(?i)(dangerous_insecure|skip_signature|verify.*false|RequireSignedTokens.*false)",
|
||||
)
|
||||
.expect("valid regex"),
|
||||
exp_disabled: Regex::new(
|
||||
r"(?i)(validate_exp.*false|RequireExpirationTime.*false|IgnoreExpiration)",
|
||||
)
|
||||
.expect("valid regex"),
|
||||
go_parse_insecure: Regex::new(
|
||||
r"jwt\.Parse\([^,]+,\s*func\s*\([^)]*\*jwt\.Token\)\s*\([^)]*,\s*error\)\s*\{[^}]*return\s+[^,]+,\s*nil",
|
||||
)
|
||||
.expect("valid regex"),
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[allow(clippy::too_many_arguments)]
|
||||
fn extract_claim(
|
||||
&self,
|
||||
path_segments: &[String],
|
||||
file: &str,
|
||||
line: usize,
|
||||
matched_text: &str,
|
||||
leaf: &str,
|
||||
predicate: &str,
|
||||
value: ObjectValue,
|
||||
description: &str,
|
||||
confidence: f32,
|
||||
) -> ExtractedClaim {
|
||||
let mut concept_path = path_segments.to_vec();
|
||||
concept_path.push("jwt".to_string());
|
||||
concept_path.push(leaf.to_string());
|
||||
|
||||
ExtractedClaim {
|
||||
concept_path: format!("code://{}", concept_path.join("/")),
|
||||
predicate: predicate.to_string(),
|
||||
value,
|
||||
file: file.to_string(),
|
||||
line,
|
||||
matched_text: matched_text.to_string(),
|
||||
confidence,
|
||||
description: description.to_string(),
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
impl Extractor for JwtConfigExtractor {
|
||||
fn name(&self) -> &str {
|
||||
"jwt_config"
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fn languages(&self) -> &[Language] {
|
||||
&[
|
||||
Language::Rust,
|
||||
Language::Go,
|
||||
Language::Python,
|
||||
Language::TypeScript,
|
||||
Language::JavaScript,
|
||||
Language::Yaml,
|
||||
Language::Toml,
|
||||
Language::Json,
|
||||
]
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fn extract(
|
||||
&self,
|
||||
path_segments: &[String],
|
||||
content: &str,
|
||||
_language: Language,
|
||||
file: &str,
|
||||
) -> Vec<ExtractedClaim> {
|
||||
let mut claims = Vec::new();
|
||||
|
||||
for (line_idx, line) in content.lines().enumerate() {
|
||||
let line_num = line_idx + 1;
|
||||
|
||||
// Audience validation disabled
|
||||
if let Some(matched) = self.aud_disabled.find(line) {
|
||||
claims.push(self.extract_claim(
|
||||
path_segments,
|
||||
file,
|
||||
line_num,
|
||||
matched.as_str(),
|
||||
"audience_validation",
|
||||
"enabled",
|
||||
ObjectValue::Boolean(false),
|
||||
"JWT audience validation is disabled",
|
||||
1.0,
|
||||
));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Algorithm none allowed
|
||||
if let Some(matched) = self.alg_none.find(line) {
|
||||
claims.push(self.extract_claim(
|
||||
path_segments,
|
||||
file,
|
||||
line_num,
|
||||
matched.as_str(),
|
||||
"algorithm_restriction",
|
||||
"config_value",
|
||||
ObjectValue::Text("none_allowed".to_string()),
|
||||
"JWT allows 'none' algorithm (signature bypass)",
|
||||
1.0,
|
||||
));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Signature verification skipped
|
||||
if let Some(matched) = self.sig_skip.find(line) {
|
||||
claims.push(self.extract_claim(
|
||||
path_segments,
|
||||
file,
|
||||
line_num,
|
||||
matched.as_str(),
|
||||
"signature_verification",
|
||||
"enabled",
|
||||
ObjectValue::Boolean(false),
|
||||
"JWT signature verification is disabled",
|
||||
1.0,
|
||||
));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Expiry validation disabled
|
||||
if let Some(matched) = self.exp_disabled.find(line) {
|
||||
claims.push(self.extract_claim(
|
||||
path_segments,
|
||||
file,
|
||||
line_num,
|
||||
matched.as_str(),
|
||||
"expiry_validation",
|
||||
"enabled",
|
||||
ObjectValue::Boolean(false),
|
||||
"JWT expiry validation is disabled",
|
||||
1.0,
|
||||
));
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Check for Go insecure parse pattern (multi-line, lower confidence)
|
||||
if let Some(matched) = self.go_parse_insecure.find(content) {
|
||||
// Find line number for start of match
|
||||
let line_num = content[..matched.start()].lines().count() + 1;
|
||||
claims.push(self.extract_claim(
|
||||
path_segments,
|
||||
file,
|
||||
line_num,
|
||||
&matched.as_str()[..matched.as_str().len().min(50)],
|
||||
"signature_verification",
|
||||
"enabled",
|
||||
ObjectValue::Boolean(false),
|
||||
"JWT parsed without algorithm verification (heuristic)",
|
||||
0.7, // Lower confidence - heuristic match
|
||||
));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
claims
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[cfg(test)]
|
||||
mod tests {
|
||||
use super::*;
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_audience_disabled() {
|
||||
let extractor = JwtConfigExtractor::new();
|
||||
let content = r#"
|
||||
let validation = Validation::new(Algorithm::HS256);
|
||||
validation.validate_aud = false;
|
||||
"#;
|
||||
|
||||
let claims =
|
||||
extractor.extract(&["rust".to_string()], content, Language::Rust, "src/auth.rs");
|
||||
|
||||
assert_eq!(claims.len(), 1);
|
||||
assert!(claims[0].concept_path.contains("audience_validation"));
|
||||
assert_eq!(claims[0].value, ObjectValue::Boolean(false));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_algorithm_none() {
|
||||
let extractor = JwtConfigExtractor::new();
|
||||
let content = r#"
|
||||
// Dangerous: allows unsigned tokens
|
||||
Algorithm::None
|
||||
"#;
|
||||
|
||||
let claims =
|
||||
extractor.extract(&["rust".to_string()], content, Language::Rust, "src/auth.rs");
|
||||
|
||||
assert_eq!(claims.len(), 1);
|
||||
assert!(claims[0].concept_path.contains("algorithm_restriction"));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_signature_skip() {
|
||||
let extractor = JwtConfigExtractor::new();
|
||||
let content = r#"
|
||||
let claims = dangerous_insecure_decode(&token)?;
|
||||
"#;
|
||||
|
||||
let claims =
|
||||
extractor.extract(&["rust".to_string()], content, Language::Rust, "src/auth.rs");
|
||||
|
||||
assert_eq!(claims.len(), 1);
|
||||
assert!(claims[0].concept_path.contains("signature_verification"));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_multiple_issues() {
|
||||
let extractor = JwtConfigExtractor::new();
|
||||
let content = r#"
|
||||
validation.validate_aud = false;
|
||||
validation.validate_exp = false;
|
||||
"#;
|
||||
|
||||
let claims =
|
||||
extractor.extract(&["rust".to_string()], content, Language::Rust, "src/auth.rs");
|
||||
|
||||
assert_eq!(claims.len(), 2);
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
@ -1,16 +1,33 @@
|
||||
//! Claim extractors for finding implicit decisions in source code.
|
||||
// Skeleton phase: allow unused until extractors are implemented
|
||||
#![allow(dead_code)]
|
||||
//!
|
||||
//! Each extractor looks for specific patterns that represent implicit claims:
|
||||
//! - `tls_verify`: TLS certificate verification settings
|
||||
//! - `jwt_config`: JWT validation configuration
|
||||
//! - `hardcoded_secrets`: Credentials in source code
|
||||
//! - `timeout_config`: HTTP/DB/Redis timeout values
|
||||
//! - `dep_versions`: Vulnerable dependency versions
|
||||
//! - `dep_versions`: Dependency versions for advisory lookup
|
||||
//! - `cors_config`: CORS allow-origin settings
|
||||
//! - `rate_limit`: Rate limiting configuration
|
||||
|
||||
mod cors_config;
|
||||
mod dep_versions;
|
||||
mod hardcoded_secrets;
|
||||
mod jwt_config;
|
||||
mod rate_limit;
|
||||
mod timeout_config;
|
||||
mod tls_verify;
|
||||
|
||||
pub use cors_config::CorsConfigExtractor;
|
||||
pub use dep_versions::DepVersionsExtractor;
|
||||
pub use hardcoded_secrets::HardcodedSecretsExtractor;
|
||||
pub use jwt_config::JwtConfigExtractor;
|
||||
pub use rate_limit::{RateLimitExtractor, RateLimitThresholds};
|
||||
pub use timeout_config::{TimeoutConfigExtractor, TimeoutThresholds};
|
||||
pub use tls_verify::TlsVerifyExtractor;
|
||||
|
||||
use tracing::instrument;
|
||||
|
||||
use crate::config::AphoriaConfig;
|
||||
use crate::types::{ExtractedClaim, Language};
|
||||
|
||||
/// Trait for claim extractors.
|
||||
@ -30,6 +47,7 @@ pub trait Extractor: Send + Sync {
|
||||
/// * `path_segments` - ConceptPath segments derived from the file's location
|
||||
/// * `content` - The file content as a string
|
||||
/// * `language` - The detected language of the file
|
||||
/// * `file` - The relative file path
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// # Returns
|
||||
///
|
||||
@ -39,6 +57,7 @@ pub trait Extractor: Send + Sync {
|
||||
path_segments: &[String],
|
||||
content: &str,
|
||||
language: Language,
|
||||
file: &str,
|
||||
) -> Vec<ExtractedClaim>;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@ -49,15 +68,59 @@ pub struct ExtractorRegistry {
|
||||
|
||||
impl Default for ExtractorRegistry {
|
||||
fn default() -> Self {
|
||||
Self::new()
|
||||
Self::new(&AphoriaConfig::default())
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
impl ExtractorRegistry {
|
||||
/// Create a new registry with all built-in extractors.
|
||||
pub fn new() -> Self {
|
||||
// TODO: Register built-in extractors
|
||||
Self { extractors: Vec::new() }
|
||||
pub fn new(config: &AphoriaConfig) -> Self {
|
||||
let mut extractors: Vec<Box<dyn Extractor>> = Vec::new();
|
||||
|
||||
// Build set of enabled extractors
|
||||
let enabled: std::collections::HashSet<&str> =
|
||||
config.extractors.enabled.iter().map(|s| s.as_str()).collect();
|
||||
let disabled: std::collections::HashSet<&str> =
|
||||
config.extractors.disabled.iter().map(|s| s.as_str()).collect();
|
||||
|
||||
let is_enabled = |name: &str| -> bool {
|
||||
if !disabled.is_empty() {
|
||||
!disabled.contains(name)
|
||||
} else if !enabled.is_empty() {
|
||||
enabled.contains(name)
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
true
|
||||
}
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
// Register extractors based on configuration
|
||||
if is_enabled("tls_verify") {
|
||||
extractors.push(Box::new(TlsVerifyExtractor::new()));
|
||||
}
|
||||
if is_enabled("jwt_config") {
|
||||
extractors.push(Box::new(JwtConfigExtractor::new()));
|
||||
}
|
||||
if is_enabled("hardcoded_secrets") {
|
||||
extractors.push(Box::new(HardcodedSecretsExtractor::new()));
|
||||
}
|
||||
if is_enabled("timeout_config") {
|
||||
let thresholds = TimeoutThresholds {
|
||||
min_reasonable_ms: config.extractors.timeout_config.min_reasonable_ms,
|
||||
max_reasonable_ms: config.extractors.timeout_config.max_reasonable_ms,
|
||||
};
|
||||
extractors.push(Box::new(TimeoutConfigExtractor::new(thresholds)));
|
||||
}
|
||||
if is_enabled("dep_versions") {
|
||||
extractors.push(Box::new(DepVersionsExtractor::new()));
|
||||
}
|
||||
if is_enabled("cors_config") {
|
||||
extractors.push(Box::new(CorsConfigExtractor::new()));
|
||||
}
|
||||
if is_enabled("rate_limit") {
|
||||
extractors.push(Box::new(RateLimitExtractor::default()));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
Self { extractors }
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Get extractors applicable to a given language.
|
||||
@ -70,17 +133,24 @@ impl ExtractorRegistry {
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Extract claims from content using all applicable extractors.
|
||||
#[instrument(skip(self, path_segments, content), fields(file = %file, language = ?language))]
|
||||
pub fn extract_all(
|
||||
&self,
|
||||
path_segments: &[String],
|
||||
content: &str,
|
||||
language: Language,
|
||||
file: &str,
|
||||
) -> Vec<ExtractedClaim> {
|
||||
self.for_language(language)
|
||||
.iter()
|
||||
.flat_map(|e| e.extract(path_segments, content, language))
|
||||
.flat_map(|e| e.extract(path_segments, content, language, file))
|
||||
.collect()
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Get the names of all registered extractors.
|
||||
pub fn extractor_names(&self) -> Vec<&str> {
|
||||
self.extractors.iter().map(|e| e.name()).collect()
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[cfg(test)]
|
||||
@ -89,15 +159,53 @@ mod tests {
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_registry_creation() {
|
||||
let registry = ExtractorRegistry::new();
|
||||
// Currently empty, will be populated when extractors are implemented
|
||||
assert!(registry.for_language(Language::Rust).is_empty());
|
||||
let config = AphoriaConfig::default();
|
||||
let registry = ExtractorRegistry::new(&config);
|
||||
|
||||
// Should have all 7 extractors enabled by default
|
||||
assert_eq!(registry.extractor_names().len(), 7);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_extract_all_empty() {
|
||||
let registry = ExtractorRegistry::new();
|
||||
let claims = registry.extract_all(&["rust".to_string()], "fn main() {}", Language::Rust);
|
||||
assert!(claims.is_empty());
|
||||
fn test_registry_disabled_extractor() {
|
||||
let mut config = AphoriaConfig::default();
|
||||
config.extractors.disabled = vec!["tls_verify".to_string()];
|
||||
|
||||
let registry = ExtractorRegistry::new(&config);
|
||||
|
||||
assert!(!registry.extractor_names().contains(&"tls_verify"));
|
||||
assert_eq!(registry.extractor_names().len(), 6);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_registry_for_language() {
|
||||
let config = AphoriaConfig::default();
|
||||
let registry = ExtractorRegistry::new(&config);
|
||||
|
||||
let rust_extractors = registry.for_language(Language::Rust);
|
||||
// TLS, JWT, secrets, timeout, CORS, rate_limit work on Rust
|
||||
assert!(!rust_extractors.is_empty());
|
||||
|
||||
let cargo_extractors = registry.for_language(Language::CargoManifest);
|
||||
// Only dep_versions works on Cargo.toml
|
||||
assert!(cargo_extractors.iter().any(|e| e.name() == "dep_versions"));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_extract_all() {
|
||||
let config = AphoriaConfig::default();
|
||||
let registry = ExtractorRegistry::new(&config);
|
||||
|
||||
let content = r#"
|
||||
let client = reqwest::Client::builder()
|
||||
.danger_accept_invalid_certs(true)
|
||||
.build()?;
|
||||
"#;
|
||||
|
||||
let claims =
|
||||
registry.extract_all(&["rust".to_string()], content, Language::Rust, "src/client.rs");
|
||||
|
||||
assert!(!claims.is_empty());
|
||||
assert!(claims.iter().any(|c| c.concept_path.contains("tls")));
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
229
applications/aphoria/src/extractors/rate_limit.rs
Normal file
229
applications/aphoria/src/extractors/rate_limit.rs
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,229 @@
|
||||
//! Rate limiting configuration extractor.
|
||||
//!
|
||||
//! Detects rate limiting that is disabled or set unreasonably high,
|
||||
//! which can lead to availability and security issues.
|
||||
|
||||
use regex::Regex;
|
||||
use stemedb_core::types::ObjectValue;
|
||||
|
||||
use super::Extractor;
|
||||
use crate::types::{ExtractedClaim, Language};
|
||||
|
||||
/// Configuration for rate limit thresholds.
|
||||
#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
|
||||
pub struct RateLimitThresholds {
|
||||
/// Maximum reasonable requests per minute.
|
||||
pub max_requests_per_minute: u64,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
impl Default for RateLimitThresholds {
|
||||
fn default() -> Self {
|
||||
Self { max_requests_per_minute: 10_000 }
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Extractor for rate limiting configuration.
|
||||
pub struct RateLimitExtractor {
|
||||
/// Rate limiting disabled patterns
|
||||
disabled: Regex,
|
||||
/// Numeric rate limit patterns
|
||||
numeric_limit: Regex,
|
||||
/// Thresholds for flagging
|
||||
thresholds: RateLimitThresholds,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
impl Default for RateLimitExtractor {
|
||||
fn default() -> Self {
|
||||
Self::new(RateLimitThresholds::default())
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
impl RateLimitExtractor {
|
||||
/// Create a new rate limit extractor with the given thresholds.
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// # Panics
|
||||
/// Panics if any regex pattern is invalid (programmer error).
|
||||
#[allow(clippy::expect_used)]
|
||||
pub fn new(thresholds: RateLimitThresholds) -> Self {
|
||||
Self {
|
||||
disabled: Regex::new(
|
||||
r"(?i)(rate_?limit|ratelimit).*(?:disabled|off|false|0|none|skip)",
|
||||
)
|
||||
.expect("valid regex"),
|
||||
numeric_limit: Regex::new(
|
||||
r"(?i)(rate_?limit|ratelimit|max_?requests|requests_?per_?(?:second|minute|hour))\s*[:=]\s*(\d+)",
|
||||
)
|
||||
.expect("valid regex"),
|
||||
thresholds,
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fn normalize_to_per_minute(&self, value: u64, line: &str) -> u64 {
|
||||
let lower = line.to_lowercase();
|
||||
|
||||
if lower.contains("per_second") || lower.contains("persecond") || lower.contains("/s") {
|
||||
value * 60
|
||||
} else if lower.contains("per_hour") || lower.contains("perhour") || lower.contains("/h") {
|
||||
value / 60
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
// Default: assume per minute
|
||||
value
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
impl Extractor for RateLimitExtractor {
|
||||
fn name(&self) -> &str {
|
||||
"rate_limit"
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fn languages(&self) -> &[Language] {
|
||||
&[
|
||||
Language::Rust,
|
||||
Language::Go,
|
||||
Language::Python,
|
||||
Language::TypeScript,
|
||||
Language::JavaScript,
|
||||
Language::Yaml,
|
||||
Language::Toml,
|
||||
Language::Json,
|
||||
]
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fn extract(
|
||||
&self,
|
||||
path_segments: &[String],
|
||||
content: &str,
|
||||
_language: Language,
|
||||
file: &str,
|
||||
) -> Vec<ExtractedClaim> {
|
||||
let mut claims = Vec::new();
|
||||
|
||||
for (line_idx, line) in content.lines().enumerate() {
|
||||
let line_num = line_idx + 1;
|
||||
|
||||
// Rate limiting disabled
|
||||
if let Some(matched) = self.disabled.find(line) {
|
||||
let mut concept_path = path_segments.to_vec();
|
||||
concept_path.push("rate_limit".to_string());
|
||||
concept_path.push("enabled".to_string());
|
||||
|
||||
claims.push(ExtractedClaim {
|
||||
concept_path: format!("code://{}", concept_path.join("/")),
|
||||
predicate: "enabled".to_string(),
|
||||
value: ObjectValue::Boolean(false),
|
||||
file: file.to_string(),
|
||||
line: line_num,
|
||||
matched_text: matched.as_str().to_string(),
|
||||
confidence: 1.0,
|
||||
description: "Rate limiting is disabled".to_string(),
|
||||
});
|
||||
continue;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Numeric rate limit check
|
||||
if let Some(captures) = self.numeric_limit.captures(line) {
|
||||
if let Some(value_match) = captures.get(2) {
|
||||
if let Ok(value) = value_match.as_str().parse::<u64>() {
|
||||
let per_minute = self.normalize_to_per_minute(value, line);
|
||||
|
||||
if per_minute > self.thresholds.max_requests_per_minute {
|
||||
let mut concept_path = path_segments.to_vec();
|
||||
concept_path.push("rate_limit".to_string());
|
||||
concept_path.push("max_requests".to_string());
|
||||
|
||||
claims.push(ExtractedClaim {
|
||||
concept_path: format!("code://{}", concept_path.join("/")),
|
||||
predicate: "config_value".to_string(),
|
||||
value: ObjectValue::Number(per_minute as f64),
|
||||
file: file.to_string(),
|
||||
line: line_num,
|
||||
matched_text: captures
|
||||
.get(0)
|
||||
.map(|m| m.as_str())
|
||||
.unwrap_or("")
|
||||
.to_string(),
|
||||
confidence: 1.0,
|
||||
description: format!(
|
||||
"Rate limit {} req/min exceeds recommended maximum {} req/min",
|
||||
per_minute, self.thresholds.max_requests_per_minute
|
||||
),
|
||||
});
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
claims
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[cfg(test)]
|
||||
mod tests {
|
||||
use super::*;
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_rate_limit_disabled() {
|
||||
let extractor = RateLimitExtractor::default();
|
||||
let content = r#"
|
||||
rate_limit: disabled
|
||||
"#;
|
||||
|
||||
let claims =
|
||||
extractor.extract(&["config".to_string()], content, Language::Yaml, "config/api.yaml");
|
||||
|
||||
assert_eq!(claims.len(), 1);
|
||||
assert_eq!(claims[0].value, ObjectValue::Boolean(false));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_rate_limit_false() {
|
||||
let extractor = RateLimitExtractor::default();
|
||||
let content = r#"
|
||||
ratelimit_enabled = false
|
||||
"#;
|
||||
|
||||
let claims = extractor.extract(&["rust".to_string()], content, Language::Rust, "config.rs");
|
||||
|
||||
assert_eq!(claims.len(), 1);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_unreasonably_high_limit() {
|
||||
let extractor = RateLimitExtractor::default();
|
||||
let content = r#"
|
||||
max_requests = 100000 // 100k per minute
|
||||
"#;
|
||||
|
||||
let claims = extractor.extract(&["rust".to_string()], content, Language::Rust, "config.rs");
|
||||
|
||||
assert_eq!(claims.len(), 1);
|
||||
assert!(claims[0].description.contains("exceeds"));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_reasonable_limit_no_claims() {
|
||||
let extractor = RateLimitExtractor::default();
|
||||
let content = r#"
|
||||
max_requests = 1000
|
||||
"#;
|
||||
|
||||
let claims = extractor.extract(&["rust".to_string()], content, Language::Rust, "config.rs");
|
||||
|
||||
assert!(claims.is_empty());
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_per_second_normalization() {
|
||||
let extractor = RateLimitExtractor::default();
|
||||
let content = r#"
|
||||
requests_per_second = 500 // 30k per minute
|
||||
"#;
|
||||
|
||||
let claims = extractor.extract(&["rust".to_string()], content, Language::Rust, "config.rs");
|
||||
|
||||
assert_eq!(claims.len(), 1);
|
||||
// 500 * 60 = 30000 > 10000
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
315
applications/aphoria/src/extractors/timeout_config.rs
Normal file
315
applications/aphoria/src/extractors/timeout_config.rs
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,315 @@
|
||||
//! Timeout configuration extractor.
|
||||
//!
|
||||
//! Detects timeout values that are misconfigured (zero/infinite,
|
||||
//! too low, or too high) which can cause availability issues.
|
||||
|
||||
use regex::Regex;
|
||||
use stemedb_core::types::ObjectValue;
|
||||
|
||||
use super::Extractor;
|
||||
use crate::types::{ExtractedClaim, Language};
|
||||
|
||||
/// Configuration for timeout extraction thresholds.
|
||||
#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
|
||||
pub struct TimeoutThresholds {
|
||||
/// Minimum reasonable timeout in milliseconds.
|
||||
pub min_reasonable_ms: u64,
|
||||
/// Maximum reasonable timeout in milliseconds.
|
||||
pub max_reasonable_ms: u64,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
impl Default for TimeoutThresholds {
|
||||
fn default() -> Self {
|
||||
Self { min_reasonable_ms: 1000, max_reasonable_ms: 300_000 }
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Extractor for timeout configuration values.
|
||||
pub struct TimeoutConfigExtractor {
|
||||
/// Zero/infinite timeout patterns
|
||||
zero_timeout: Regex,
|
||||
/// Numeric timeout patterns (captures the value)
|
||||
numeric_timeout: Regex,
|
||||
/// Duration patterns (Rust/Go style, reserved for future use)
|
||||
#[allow(dead_code)]
|
||||
duration_timeout: Regex,
|
||||
/// Configuration thresholds
|
||||
thresholds: TimeoutThresholds,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
impl Default for TimeoutConfigExtractor {
|
||||
fn default() -> Self {
|
||||
Self::new(TimeoutThresholds::default())
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
impl TimeoutConfigExtractor {
|
||||
/// Create a new timeout extractor with the given thresholds.
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// # Panics
|
||||
/// Panics if any regex pattern is invalid (programmer error).
|
||||
#[allow(clippy::expect_used)]
|
||||
pub fn new(thresholds: TimeoutThresholds) -> Self {
|
||||
Self {
|
||||
zero_timeout: Regex::new(
|
||||
r"(?i)timeout\s*[:=]\s*(0|None|null|nil|infinity|Inf|never|\-1)",
|
||||
)
|
||||
.expect("valid regex"),
|
||||
numeric_timeout: Regex::new(r"(?i)timeout\s*[:=]\s*(\d+)").expect("valid regex"),
|
||||
duration_timeout: Regex::new(
|
||||
r"(?i)(?:Duration::from_(?:secs|millis|nanos)|time\.(?:Second|Millisecond)|timeout)\s*[:=\(]\s*(\d+)",
|
||||
)
|
||||
.expect("valid regex"),
|
||||
thresholds,
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[allow(clippy::too_many_arguments)]
|
||||
fn extract_claim(
|
||||
&self,
|
||||
path_segments: &[String],
|
||||
file: &str,
|
||||
line: usize,
|
||||
matched_text: &str,
|
||||
context: &str,
|
||||
value: f64,
|
||||
description: &str,
|
||||
) -> ExtractedClaim {
|
||||
let mut concept_path = path_segments.to_vec();
|
||||
concept_path.push(context.to_string());
|
||||
concept_path.push("timeout".to_string());
|
||||
|
||||
ExtractedClaim {
|
||||
concept_path: format!("code://{}", concept_path.join("/")),
|
||||
predicate: "config_value".to_string(),
|
||||
value: ObjectValue::Number(value),
|
||||
file: file.to_string(),
|
||||
line,
|
||||
matched_text: matched_text.to_string(),
|
||||
confidence: 1.0,
|
||||
description: description.to_string(),
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fn detect_context(&self, line: &str) -> &str {
|
||||
let lower = line.to_lowercase();
|
||||
if lower.contains("http") || lower.contains("client") || lower.contains("request") {
|
||||
"http"
|
||||
} else if lower.contains("db") || lower.contains("database") || lower.contains("sql") {
|
||||
"database"
|
||||
} else if lower.contains("redis") || lower.contains("cache") || lower.contains("memcache") {
|
||||
"cache"
|
||||
} else if lower.contains("grpc") || lower.contains("rpc") {
|
||||
"rpc"
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
"general"
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fn estimate_milliseconds(&self, value: u64, line: &str) -> u64 {
|
||||
// Strip comments before analyzing
|
||||
let code_part = line.split("//").next().unwrap_or(line);
|
||||
let code_part = code_part.split('#').next().unwrap_or(code_part);
|
||||
let lower = code_part.to_lowercase();
|
||||
|
||||
// Explicit unit markers in code (not comments)
|
||||
if lower.contains("from_secs") || lower.contains("_secs") {
|
||||
return value * 1000;
|
||||
}
|
||||
if lower.contains("from_millis") || lower.contains("millisecond") || lower.contains("_ms") {
|
||||
return value;
|
||||
}
|
||||
if lower.contains("from_nanos") || lower.contains("nanosecond") {
|
||||
return value / 1_000_000;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Heuristics based on magnitude
|
||||
if value > 1_000_000 {
|
||||
// Likely nanoseconds
|
||||
value / 1_000_000
|
||||
} else if value > 1000 && value < 1_000_000 {
|
||||
// Likely milliseconds
|
||||
value
|
||||
} else if value < 100 {
|
||||
// Likely seconds
|
||||
value * 1000
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
// Default: assume milliseconds
|
||||
value
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
impl Extractor for TimeoutConfigExtractor {
|
||||
fn name(&self) -> &str {
|
||||
"timeout_config"
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fn languages(&self) -> &[Language] {
|
||||
&[
|
||||
Language::Rust,
|
||||
Language::Go,
|
||||
Language::Python,
|
||||
Language::TypeScript,
|
||||
Language::JavaScript,
|
||||
Language::Yaml,
|
||||
Language::Toml,
|
||||
Language::Json,
|
||||
]
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fn extract(
|
||||
&self,
|
||||
path_segments: &[String],
|
||||
content: &str,
|
||||
_language: Language,
|
||||
file: &str,
|
||||
) -> Vec<ExtractedClaim> {
|
||||
let mut claims = Vec::new();
|
||||
|
||||
for (line_idx, line) in content.lines().enumerate() {
|
||||
let line_num = line_idx + 1;
|
||||
let context = self.detect_context(line);
|
||||
|
||||
// Zero/infinite timeout detection
|
||||
if let Some(matched) = self.zero_timeout.find(line) {
|
||||
claims.push(self.extract_claim(
|
||||
path_segments,
|
||||
file,
|
||||
line_num,
|
||||
matched.as_str(),
|
||||
context,
|
||||
0.0,
|
||||
"Timeout is disabled (infinite wait)",
|
||||
));
|
||||
continue;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Numeric timeout detection
|
||||
if let Some(captures) = self.numeric_timeout.captures(line) {
|
||||
if let Some(value_match) = captures.get(1) {
|
||||
if let Ok(value) = value_match.as_str().parse::<u64>() {
|
||||
let ms = self.estimate_milliseconds(value, line);
|
||||
|
||||
if ms > 0 && ms < self.thresholds.min_reasonable_ms {
|
||||
claims.push(self.extract_claim(
|
||||
path_segments,
|
||||
file,
|
||||
line_num,
|
||||
captures.get(0).map(|m| m.as_str()).unwrap_or(""),
|
||||
context,
|
||||
ms as f64,
|
||||
&format!(
|
||||
"Timeout {}ms is below minimum reasonable {}ms",
|
||||
ms, self.thresholds.min_reasonable_ms
|
||||
),
|
||||
));
|
||||
} else if ms > self.thresholds.max_reasonable_ms {
|
||||
claims.push(self.extract_claim(
|
||||
path_segments,
|
||||
file,
|
||||
line_num,
|
||||
captures.get(0).map(|m| m.as_str()).unwrap_or(""),
|
||||
context,
|
||||
ms as f64,
|
||||
&format!(
|
||||
"Timeout {}ms exceeds maximum reasonable {}ms",
|
||||
ms, self.thresholds.max_reasonable_ms
|
||||
),
|
||||
));
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
claims
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[cfg(test)]
|
||||
mod tests {
|
||||
use super::*;
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_zero_timeout_detection() {
|
||||
let extractor = TimeoutConfigExtractor::default();
|
||||
let content = r#"
|
||||
client.timeout = 0
|
||||
"#;
|
||||
|
||||
let claims =
|
||||
extractor.extract(&["rust".to_string()], content, Language::Rust, "src/http.rs");
|
||||
|
||||
assert_eq!(claims.len(), 1);
|
||||
assert!(claims[0].description.contains("disabled"));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_nil_timeout_detection() {
|
||||
let extractor = TimeoutConfigExtractor::default();
|
||||
let content = r#"
|
||||
timeout: nil
|
||||
"#;
|
||||
|
||||
let claims = extractor.extract(&["go".to_string()], content, Language::Go, "config.go");
|
||||
|
||||
assert_eq!(claims.len(), 1);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_unreasonably_low_timeout() {
|
||||
let extractor = TimeoutConfigExtractor::default();
|
||||
let content = r#"
|
||||
http_client.timeout = 100 // 100ms
|
||||
"#;
|
||||
|
||||
let claims =
|
||||
extractor.extract(&["rust".to_string()], content, Language::Rust, "src/http.rs");
|
||||
|
||||
assert_eq!(claims.len(), 1);
|
||||
assert!(claims[0].description.contains("below minimum"));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_unreasonably_high_timeout() {
|
||||
let extractor = TimeoutConfigExtractor::default();
|
||||
let content = r#"
|
||||
db_timeout = 600000 // 10 minutes
|
||||
"#;
|
||||
|
||||
let claims =
|
||||
extractor.extract(&["python".to_string()], content, Language::Python, "config.py");
|
||||
|
||||
assert_eq!(claims.len(), 1);
|
||||
assert!(claims[0].description.contains("exceeds maximum"));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_reasonable_timeout_no_claims() {
|
||||
let extractor = TimeoutConfigExtractor::default();
|
||||
let content = r#"
|
||||
timeout = 30000 // 30 seconds
|
||||
"#;
|
||||
|
||||
let claims =
|
||||
extractor.extract(&["rust".to_string()], content, Language::Rust, "src/http.rs");
|
||||
|
||||
assert!(claims.is_empty(), "Expected no claims for reasonable 30000ms timeout");
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_context_detection() {
|
||||
let extractor = TimeoutConfigExtractor::default();
|
||||
|
||||
let content_http = "http_client.timeout = 0";
|
||||
let claims =
|
||||
extractor.extract(&["rust".to_string()], content_http, Language::Rust, "src/http.rs");
|
||||
assert!(claims[0].concept_path.contains("http"));
|
||||
|
||||
let content_db = "database_timeout = 0";
|
||||
let claims =
|
||||
extractor.extract(&["rust".to_string()], content_db, Language::Rust, "src/db.rs");
|
||||
assert!(claims[0].concept_path.contains("database"));
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
259
applications/aphoria/src/extractors/tls_verify.rs
Normal file
259
applications/aphoria/src/extractors/tls_verify.rs
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,259 @@
|
||||
//! TLS certificate verification extractor.
|
||||
//!
|
||||
//! Detects patterns where TLS certificate verification is disabled,
|
||||
//! which violates OWASP security guidelines.
|
||||
|
||||
use regex::Regex;
|
||||
use stemedb_core::types::ObjectValue;
|
||||
|
||||
use super::Extractor;
|
||||
use crate::types::{ExtractedClaim, Language};
|
||||
|
||||
/// Extractor for TLS certificate verification settings.
|
||||
pub struct TlsVerifyExtractor {
|
||||
/// Rust: reqwest danger_accept_invalid_certs
|
||||
rust_reqwest: Regex,
|
||||
/// Rust: native-tls accept_invalid_certs
|
||||
rust_native_tls: Regex,
|
||||
/// Go: InsecureSkipVerify
|
||||
go_skip_verify: Regex,
|
||||
/// Python: requests verify=False
|
||||
python_verify: Regex,
|
||||
/// Node.js: rejectUnauthorized: false
|
||||
node_reject_unauthorized: Regex,
|
||||
/// Node.js: NODE_TLS_REJECT_UNAUTHORIZED=0
|
||||
node_env_reject: Regex,
|
||||
/// Generic YAML/TOML/JSON config
|
||||
config_verify: Regex,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
impl Default for TlsVerifyExtractor {
|
||||
fn default() -> Self {
|
||||
Self::new()
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
impl TlsVerifyExtractor {
|
||||
/// Create a new TLS verify extractor with compiled regexes.
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// # Panics
|
||||
/// Panics if any regex pattern is invalid (programmer error).
|
||||
#[allow(clippy::expect_used)]
|
||||
pub fn new() -> Self {
|
||||
Self {
|
||||
rust_reqwest: Regex::new(r"danger_accept_invalid_certs\s*\(\s*true\s*\)")
|
||||
.expect("valid regex"),
|
||||
// Use TlsConnector or native-tls specific patterns (avoid matching reqwest's danger_ version)
|
||||
rust_native_tls: Regex::new(r"\.accept_invalid_certs\s*\(\s*true\s*\)")
|
||||
.expect("valid regex"),
|
||||
go_skip_verify: Regex::new(r"InsecureSkipVerify\s*:\s*true").expect("valid regex"),
|
||||
python_verify: Regex::new(r"verify\s*=\s*False").expect("valid regex"),
|
||||
node_reject_unauthorized: Regex::new(r"rejectUnauthorized\s*:\s*false")
|
||||
.expect("valid regex"),
|
||||
node_env_reject: Regex::new(r#"NODE_TLS_REJECT_UNAUTHORIZED.*['"]0['"]"#)
|
||||
.expect("valid regex"),
|
||||
config_verify: Regex::new(
|
||||
r"(?i)(tls_verify|ssl_verify|verify_ssl|verify_tls)\s*[:=]\s*(false|no|0|off)",
|
||||
)
|
||||
.expect("valid regex"),
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fn check_pattern(
|
||||
&self,
|
||||
content: &str,
|
||||
pattern: &Regex,
|
||||
path_segments: &[String],
|
||||
file: &str,
|
||||
) -> Vec<ExtractedClaim> {
|
||||
let mut claims = Vec::new();
|
||||
|
||||
for (line_idx, line) in content.lines().enumerate() {
|
||||
if let Some(matched) = pattern.find(line) {
|
||||
let mut concept_path = path_segments.to_vec();
|
||||
concept_path.push("tls".to_string());
|
||||
concept_path.push("cert_verification".to_string());
|
||||
|
||||
claims.push(ExtractedClaim {
|
||||
concept_path: format!("code://{}", concept_path.join("/")),
|
||||
predicate: "enabled".to_string(),
|
||||
value: ObjectValue::Boolean(false),
|
||||
file: file.to_string(),
|
||||
line: line_idx + 1,
|
||||
matched_text: matched.as_str().to_string(),
|
||||
confidence: 1.0,
|
||||
description: "TLS certificate verification is disabled".to_string(),
|
||||
});
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
claims
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
impl Extractor for TlsVerifyExtractor {
|
||||
fn name(&self) -> &str {
|
||||
"tls_verify"
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fn languages(&self) -> &[Language] {
|
||||
&[
|
||||
Language::Rust,
|
||||
Language::Go,
|
||||
Language::Python,
|
||||
Language::TypeScript,
|
||||
Language::JavaScript,
|
||||
Language::Yaml,
|
||||
Language::Toml,
|
||||
Language::Json,
|
||||
]
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fn extract(
|
||||
&self,
|
||||
path_segments: &[String],
|
||||
content: &str,
|
||||
language: Language,
|
||||
file: &str,
|
||||
) -> Vec<ExtractedClaim> {
|
||||
let mut claims = Vec::new();
|
||||
|
||||
match language {
|
||||
Language::Rust => {
|
||||
claims.extend(self.check_pattern(content, &self.rust_reqwest, path_segments, file));
|
||||
claims.extend(self.check_pattern(
|
||||
content,
|
||||
&self.rust_native_tls,
|
||||
path_segments,
|
||||
file,
|
||||
));
|
||||
}
|
||||
Language::Go => {
|
||||
claims.extend(self.check_pattern(
|
||||
content,
|
||||
&self.go_skip_verify,
|
||||
path_segments,
|
||||
file,
|
||||
));
|
||||
}
|
||||
Language::Python => {
|
||||
claims.extend(self.check_pattern(
|
||||
content,
|
||||
&self.python_verify,
|
||||
path_segments,
|
||||
file,
|
||||
));
|
||||
}
|
||||
Language::TypeScript | Language::JavaScript => {
|
||||
claims.extend(self.check_pattern(
|
||||
content,
|
||||
&self.node_reject_unauthorized,
|
||||
path_segments,
|
||||
file,
|
||||
));
|
||||
claims.extend(self.check_pattern(
|
||||
content,
|
||||
&self.node_env_reject,
|
||||
path_segments,
|
||||
file,
|
||||
));
|
||||
}
|
||||
Language::Yaml | Language::Toml | Language::Json => {
|
||||
claims.extend(self.check_pattern(
|
||||
content,
|
||||
&self.config_verify,
|
||||
path_segments,
|
||||
file,
|
||||
));
|
||||
}
|
||||
_ => {}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
claims
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[cfg(test)]
|
||||
mod tests {
|
||||
use super::*;
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_rust_reqwest_detection() {
|
||||
let extractor = TlsVerifyExtractor::new();
|
||||
let content = r#"
|
||||
let client = reqwest::Client::builder()
|
||||
.danger_accept_invalid_certs(true)
|
||||
.build()?;
|
||||
"#;
|
||||
|
||||
let claims =
|
||||
extractor.extract(&["rust".to_string()], content, Language::Rust, "src/client.rs");
|
||||
|
||||
assert_eq!(claims.len(), 1);
|
||||
assert_eq!(claims[0].predicate, "enabled");
|
||||
assert_eq!(claims[0].value, ObjectValue::Boolean(false));
|
||||
assert_eq!(claims[0].line, 3);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_go_insecure_skip_verify() {
|
||||
let extractor = TlsVerifyExtractor::new();
|
||||
let content = r#"
|
||||
tr := &http.Transport{
|
||||
TLSClientConfig: &tls.Config{InsecureSkipVerify: true},
|
||||
}
|
||||
"#;
|
||||
|
||||
let claims =
|
||||
extractor.extract(&["go".to_string()], content, Language::Go, "internal/http.go");
|
||||
|
||||
assert_eq!(claims.len(), 1);
|
||||
assert!(claims[0].matched_text.contains("InsecureSkipVerify"));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_python_verify_false() {
|
||||
let extractor = TlsVerifyExtractor::new();
|
||||
let content = r#"
|
||||
response = requests.get(url, verify=False)
|
||||
"#;
|
||||
|
||||
let claims =
|
||||
extractor.extract(&["python".to_string()], content, Language::Python, "client.py");
|
||||
|
||||
assert_eq!(claims.len(), 1);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_yaml_config() {
|
||||
let extractor = TlsVerifyExtractor::new();
|
||||
let content = r#"
|
||||
http:
|
||||
tls_verify: false
|
||||
"#;
|
||||
|
||||
let claims = extractor.extract(
|
||||
&["config".to_string()],
|
||||
content,
|
||||
Language::Yaml,
|
||||
"config/production.yaml",
|
||||
);
|
||||
|
||||
assert_eq!(claims.len(), 1);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_no_false_positives() {
|
||||
let extractor = TlsVerifyExtractor::new();
|
||||
let content = r#"
|
||||
let client = reqwest::Client::builder()
|
||||
.danger_accept_invalid_certs(false)
|
||||
.build()?;
|
||||
"#;
|
||||
|
||||
let claims =
|
||||
extractor.extract(&["rust".to_string()], content, Language::Rust, "src/client.rs");
|
||||
|
||||
assert!(claims.is_empty());
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
@ -1,8 +1,5 @@
|
||||
//! Aphoria - A code-level truth linter powered by Episteme
|
||||
//!
|
||||
// Skeleton phase: allow unused code until extractors are implemented
|
||||
#![allow(dead_code, unused_imports, unused_variables)]
|
||||
//!
|
||||
//! Aphoria scans a codebase, extracts the decisions embedded in config and code,
|
||||
//! and checks them against authoritative sources. It finds the places where what
|
||||
//! your code *does* contradicts what the specs *say*.
|
||||
@ -42,18 +39,28 @@
|
||||
//! ```
|
||||
|
||||
// Module declarations
|
||||
mod bridge;
|
||||
mod config;
|
||||
pub mod corpus;
|
||||
mod episteme;
|
||||
mod error;
|
||||
mod extractors;
|
||||
mod report;
|
||||
pub mod extractors;
|
||||
pub mod report;
|
||||
mod types;
|
||||
mod walker;
|
||||
|
||||
// Public re-exports
|
||||
pub use config::AphoriaConfig;
|
||||
pub use config::{AphoriaConfig, CorpusConfig};
|
||||
pub use corpus::{CorpusBuildResult, CorpusBuilderInfo, CorpusRegistry};
|
||||
pub use error::AphoriaError;
|
||||
pub use types::{AcknowledgeArgs, ConflictResult, ExtractedClaim, ScanArgs, ScanResult, Verdict};
|
||||
|
||||
use extractors::ExtractorRegistry;
|
||||
use tracing::{info, instrument};
|
||||
use walker::walk_project;
|
||||
|
||||
use crate::episteme::{create_authoritative_corpus, ConceptIndex, LocalEpisteme};
|
||||
|
||||
/// Run a scan on the specified project.
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// This is the main entry point for scanning a codebase. It:
|
||||
@ -62,56 +69,183 @@ pub use types::{AcknowledgeArgs, ConflictResult, ExtractedClaim, ScanArgs, ScanR
|
||||
/// 3. Ingests claims into the local Episteme instance
|
||||
/// 4. Queries for conflicts against authoritative sources
|
||||
/// 5. Returns a formatted report
|
||||
#[instrument(skip(config), fields(path = %args.path.display(), format = %args.format))]
|
||||
pub async fn run_scan(args: ScanArgs, config: &AphoriaConfig) -> Result<ScanResult, AphoriaError> {
|
||||
tracing::info!(path = %args.path.display(), format = %args.format, "Starting scan");
|
||||
info!("Starting scan");
|
||||
|
||||
// TODO: Implement full scan pipeline
|
||||
// For now, return a stub result to validate the CLI works
|
||||
Ok(ScanResult::stub(&args.path, &args.format))
|
||||
let project_root = args.path.canonicalize().unwrap_or_else(|_| args.path.clone());
|
||||
|
||||
// 1. Walk the project to find files
|
||||
let files = walk_project(&project_root, config)?;
|
||||
info!(files_found = files.len(), "Project walk complete");
|
||||
|
||||
// 2. Extract claims from files
|
||||
let registry = ExtractorRegistry::new(config);
|
||||
let mut all_claims = Vec::new();
|
||||
|
||||
for file in &files {
|
||||
let content = match std::fs::read_to_string(&file.path) {
|
||||
Ok(c) => c,
|
||||
Err(e) => {
|
||||
tracing::warn!(file = %file.relative_path, error = %e, "Failed to read file");
|
||||
continue;
|
||||
}
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
let claims =
|
||||
registry.extract_all(&file.path_segments, &content, file.language, &file.relative_path);
|
||||
|
||||
all_claims.extend(claims);
|
||||
}
|
||||
info!(claims_extracted = all_claims.len(), "Extraction complete");
|
||||
|
||||
// 3. Open local Episteme and ingest claims
|
||||
let mut episteme = LocalEpisteme::open(config, &project_root).await?;
|
||||
|
||||
if !all_claims.is_empty() {
|
||||
episteme.ingest_claims(&all_claims).await?;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// 4. Build authoritative corpus and check for conflicts
|
||||
// This uses in-memory concept matching, so scan works without `aphoria init`
|
||||
let signing_key = bridge::load_or_generate_key(&project_root)?;
|
||||
let corpus = create_authoritative_corpus(&signing_key);
|
||||
let index = ConceptIndex::build(&corpus);
|
||||
let conflicts = episteme.check_conflicts(&all_claims, config, &index).await?;
|
||||
|
||||
// 5. Shut down Episteme
|
||||
episteme.shutdown().await;
|
||||
|
||||
// 6. Build result
|
||||
let project_name =
|
||||
project_root.file_name().and_then(|s| s.to_str()).unwrap_or("unknown").to_string();
|
||||
|
||||
Ok(ScanResult {
|
||||
project: project_name,
|
||||
scan_id: generate_scan_id(),
|
||||
files_scanned: files.len(),
|
||||
claims_extracted: all_claims.len(),
|
||||
conflicts,
|
||||
format: args.format,
|
||||
})
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Acknowledge a conflict as intentional.
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// Creates an assertion in Episteme recording that this conflict has been
|
||||
/// reviewed and accepted. The conflict still appears in reports but marked as ACK.
|
||||
#[instrument(skip(config), fields(concept_path = %args.concept_path))]
|
||||
pub async fn acknowledge(
|
||||
args: AcknowledgeArgs,
|
||||
_config: &AphoriaConfig,
|
||||
config: &AphoriaConfig,
|
||||
) -> Result<(), AphoriaError> {
|
||||
tracing::info!(
|
||||
concept_path = %args.concept_path,
|
||||
reason = %args.reason,
|
||||
"Acknowledging conflict"
|
||||
);
|
||||
info!("Acknowledging conflict");
|
||||
|
||||
let project_root = std::env::current_dir()?;
|
||||
let mut episteme = LocalEpisteme::open(config, &project_root).await?;
|
||||
|
||||
// Create acknowledgment assertion
|
||||
let claim = ExtractedClaim {
|
||||
concept_path: args.concept_path.clone(),
|
||||
predicate: "acknowledged".to_string(),
|
||||
value: stemedb_core::types::ObjectValue::Text(args.reason.clone()),
|
||||
file: "aphoria_ack".to_string(),
|
||||
line: 0,
|
||||
matched_text: format!("Acknowledged: {}", args.reason),
|
||||
confidence: 1.0,
|
||||
description: format!("Conflict acknowledged: {}", args.reason),
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
episteme.ingest_claims(&[claim]).await?;
|
||||
episteme.shutdown().await;
|
||||
|
||||
// TODO: Create acknowledgment assertion in Episteme
|
||||
Ok(())
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Set the current scan as the baseline.
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// Future `aphoria diff` commands will compare against this baseline.
|
||||
#[instrument(skip(_config))]
|
||||
pub async fn set_baseline(_config: &AphoriaConfig) -> Result<(), AphoriaError> {
|
||||
tracing::info!("Setting baseline");
|
||||
info!("Setting baseline");
|
||||
|
||||
// TODO: Record baseline scan ID
|
||||
let project_root = std::env::current_dir()?;
|
||||
let aphoria_dir = project_root.join(".aphoria");
|
||||
std::fs::create_dir_all(&aphoria_dir)?;
|
||||
|
||||
// Record the current scan ID as baseline
|
||||
let scan_id = generate_scan_id();
|
||||
std::fs::write(aphoria_dir.join("baseline"), &scan_id)?;
|
||||
|
||||
info!(scan_id, "Baseline set");
|
||||
Ok(())
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Show changes since the last baseline.
|
||||
pub async fn show_diff(_config: &AphoriaConfig) -> Result<String, AphoriaError> {
|
||||
tracing::info!("Showing diff");
|
||||
#[instrument(skip(config))]
|
||||
pub async fn show_diff(config: &AphoriaConfig) -> Result<String, AphoriaError> {
|
||||
info!("Showing diff");
|
||||
|
||||
// TODO: Compare current scan against baseline
|
||||
Ok("No baseline set. Run `aphoria baseline` first.".to_string())
|
||||
let project_root = std::env::current_dir()?;
|
||||
let baseline_path = project_root.join(".aphoria").join("baseline");
|
||||
|
||||
if !baseline_path.exists() {
|
||||
return Err(AphoriaError::NoBaseline);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// For now, just run a scan and compare against baseline
|
||||
// Full diff implementation would track assertion hashes
|
||||
let args =
|
||||
ScanArgs { path: project_root, format: "table".to_string(), exit_code_enabled: false };
|
||||
|
||||
let result = run_scan(args, config).await?;
|
||||
|
||||
let mut output = String::new();
|
||||
output.push_str("Changes since baseline:\n\n");
|
||||
output.push_str(&format!(
|
||||
" {} conflicts ({} BLOCK, {} FLAG)\n",
|
||||
result.conflicts.len(),
|
||||
result.count_by_verdict(Verdict::Block),
|
||||
result.count_by_verdict(Verdict::Flag),
|
||||
));
|
||||
|
||||
Ok(output)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Show current scan status.
|
||||
pub async fn show_status(_config: &AphoriaConfig) -> Result<String, AphoriaError> {
|
||||
tracing::info!("Showing status");
|
||||
#[instrument(skip(config))]
|
||||
pub async fn show_status(config: &AphoriaConfig) -> Result<String, AphoriaError> {
|
||||
info!("Showing status");
|
||||
|
||||
// TODO: Show summary of local Episteme instance
|
||||
Ok("Aphoria status: Not initialized. Run `aphoria init` first.".to_string())
|
||||
let project_root = std::env::current_dir()?;
|
||||
let aphoria_dir = project_root.join(".aphoria");
|
||||
let data_dir = &config.episteme.data_dir;
|
||||
|
||||
let mut output = String::new();
|
||||
|
||||
if !data_dir.exists() {
|
||||
output.push_str("Aphoria status: Not initialized. Run `aphoria init` first.\n");
|
||||
return Ok(output);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
output.push_str("Aphoria status:\n");
|
||||
output.push_str(&format!(" Data directory: {}\n", data_dir.display()));
|
||||
output.push_str(&format!(" Project root: {}\n", project_root.display()));
|
||||
|
||||
if aphoria_dir.join("baseline").exists() {
|
||||
let baseline = std::fs::read_to_string(aphoria_dir.join("baseline"))?;
|
||||
output.push_str(&format!(" Baseline: {}\n", baseline.trim()));
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
output.push_str(" Baseline: none\n");
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if aphoria_dir.join("agent.key").exists() {
|
||||
output.push_str(" Agent key: present\n");
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
output.push_str(" Agent key: not generated\n");
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
Ok(output)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Initialize Aphoria with the authoritative corpus.
|
||||
@ -119,52 +253,118 @@ pub async fn show_status(_config: &AphoriaConfig) -> Result<String, AphoriaError
|
||||
/// Downloads and ingests:
|
||||
/// - RFC corpus (auth, crypto, TLS)
|
||||
/// - OWASP cheat sheets
|
||||
pub async fn initialize(_config: &AphoriaConfig) -> Result<(), AphoriaError> {
|
||||
tracing::info!("Initializing Aphoria");
|
||||
#[instrument(skip(config))]
|
||||
pub async fn initialize(config: &AphoriaConfig) -> Result<(), AphoriaError> {
|
||||
info!("Initializing Aphoria");
|
||||
|
||||
// TODO: Download and ingest authoritative corpus
|
||||
let project_root = std::env::current_dir()?;
|
||||
|
||||
// Create .aphoria directory
|
||||
let aphoria_dir = project_root.join(".aphoria");
|
||||
std::fs::create_dir_all(&aphoria_dir)?;
|
||||
|
||||
// Open Episteme (this will create the data directory)
|
||||
let mut episteme = LocalEpisteme::open(config, &project_root).await?;
|
||||
|
||||
// Generate signing key for authoritative corpus
|
||||
let signing_key = bridge::load_or_generate_key(&project_root)?;
|
||||
|
||||
// Create and ingest authoritative corpus
|
||||
let corpus = create_authoritative_corpus(&signing_key);
|
||||
let ingested = episteme.ingest_authoritative(&corpus).await?;
|
||||
|
||||
episteme.shutdown().await;
|
||||
|
||||
info!(assertions = ingested, "Authoritative corpus ingested");
|
||||
Ok(())
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Generate a unique scan ID.
|
||||
fn generate_scan_id() -> String {
|
||||
use std::time::{SystemTime, UNIX_EPOCH};
|
||||
|
||||
let timestamp =
|
||||
SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).map(|d| d.as_millis()).unwrap_or(0);
|
||||
|
||||
format!("scan-{}", timestamp)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Arguments for corpus build command.
|
||||
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Default)]
|
||||
pub struct CorpusBuildArgs {
|
||||
/// Only include specific corpus sources (comma-separated: rfc,owasp,vendor,hardcoded).
|
||||
pub only: Option<Vec<String>>,
|
||||
/// Run in offline mode (skip sources requiring network).
|
||||
pub offline: bool,
|
||||
/// Clear cache before building.
|
||||
pub clear_cache: bool,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Build the authoritative corpus from configured sources.
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// This command:
|
||||
/// 1. Fetches RFCs, OWASP cheat sheets, and vendor documentation
|
||||
/// 2. Parses normative statements and recommendations
|
||||
/// 3. Ingests them as assertions into the local Episteme instance
|
||||
#[instrument(skip(config), fields(offline = args.offline, clear_cache = args.clear_cache))]
|
||||
pub async fn build_corpus(
|
||||
args: CorpusBuildArgs,
|
||||
config: &AphoriaConfig,
|
||||
) -> Result<CorpusBuildResult, AphoriaError> {
|
||||
use std::time::{SystemTime, UNIX_EPOCH};
|
||||
|
||||
info!("Building authoritative corpus");
|
||||
|
||||
let project_root = std::env::current_dir()?;
|
||||
|
||||
// Clear cache if requested
|
||||
if args.clear_cache {
|
||||
let cache_dir = &config.corpus.cache_dir;
|
||||
if cache_dir.exists() {
|
||||
info!(cache_dir = %cache_dir.display(), "Clearing corpus cache");
|
||||
std::fs::remove_dir_all(cache_dir)?;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Build corpus config based on --only flag
|
||||
let mut corpus_config = config.corpus.clone();
|
||||
if let Some(only) = &args.only {
|
||||
corpus_config.include_hardcoded = only.iter().any(|s| s == "hardcoded");
|
||||
corpus_config.include_rfc = only.iter().any(|s| s == "rfc");
|
||||
corpus_config.include_owasp = only.iter().any(|s| s == "owasp");
|
||||
corpus_config.include_vendor = only.iter().any(|s| s == "vendor");
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Create registry with configured builders
|
||||
let registry = CorpusRegistry::with_defaults(&corpus_config);
|
||||
|
||||
// Load signing key
|
||||
let signing_key = bridge::load_or_generate_key(&project_root)?;
|
||||
|
||||
// Build corpus
|
||||
let timestamp = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).map(|d| d.as_secs()).unwrap_or(0);
|
||||
|
||||
let result = registry.build_all(&signing_key, timestamp, &corpus_config, args.offline)?;
|
||||
|
||||
// Ingest into Episteme
|
||||
if !result.assertions.is_empty() {
|
||||
let mut episteme = episteme::LocalEpisteme::open(config, &project_root).await?;
|
||||
let ingested = episteme.ingest_authoritative(&result.assertions).await?;
|
||||
episteme.shutdown().await;
|
||||
info!(ingested, "Corpus ingested into Episteme");
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
Ok(result)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// List available corpus sources.
|
||||
#[instrument(skip(config))]
|
||||
pub fn list_corpus_sources(config: &AphoriaConfig) -> Vec<CorpusBuilderInfo> {
|
||||
info!("Listing corpus sources");
|
||||
|
||||
let registry = CorpusRegistry::with_defaults(&config.corpus);
|
||||
registry.list_builders()
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[cfg(test)]
|
||||
mod tests {
|
||||
use super::*;
|
||||
use std::path::PathBuf;
|
||||
|
||||
#[tokio::test]
|
||||
async fn test_scan_returns_stub_result() {
|
||||
let args = ScanArgs {
|
||||
path: PathBuf::from("."),
|
||||
format: "table".to_string(),
|
||||
exit_code_enabled: false,
|
||||
};
|
||||
let config = AphoriaConfig::default();
|
||||
|
||||
let result = run_scan(args, &config).await;
|
||||
assert!(result.is_ok());
|
||||
|
||||
let scan_result = result.expect("should have result");
|
||||
assert!(!scan_result.has_blocks());
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[tokio::test]
|
||||
async fn test_acknowledge_succeeds() {
|
||||
let args = AcknowledgeArgs {
|
||||
concept_path: "code://rust/test/jwt/audience_validation".to_string(),
|
||||
reason: "Internal service".to_string(),
|
||||
};
|
||||
let config = AphoriaConfig::default();
|
||||
|
||||
let result = acknowledge(args, &config).await;
|
||||
assert!(result.is_ok());
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[tokio::test]
|
||||
async fn test_status_before_init() {
|
||||
let config = AphoriaConfig::default();
|
||||
let result = show_status(&config).await;
|
||||
|
||||
assert!(result.is_ok());
|
||||
assert!(result.expect("should have status").contains("Not initialized"));
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
mod tests;
|
||||
|
||||
@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ use std::process::ExitCode;
|
||||
|
||||
use clap::{Parser, Subcommand};
|
||||
|
||||
use aphoria::{run_scan, AcknowledgeArgs, AphoriaConfig, ScanArgs};
|
||||
use aphoria::{report, run_scan, AcknowledgeArgs, AphoriaConfig, CorpusBuildArgs, ScanArgs};
|
||||
|
||||
/// A code-level truth linter powered by Episteme.
|
||||
///
|
||||
@ -42,6 +42,10 @@ enum Commands {
|
||||
/// Exit with non-zero code if conflicts found
|
||||
#[arg(long)]
|
||||
exit_code: bool,
|
||||
|
||||
/// Use stricter thresholds (FLAG at 0.3, BLOCK at 0.5)
|
||||
#[arg(long)]
|
||||
strict: bool,
|
||||
},
|
||||
|
||||
/// Acknowledge a conflict (mark as intentional)
|
||||
@ -65,6 +69,33 @@ enum Commands {
|
||||
|
||||
/// Initialize Aphoria with authoritative corpus
|
||||
Init,
|
||||
|
||||
/// Manage the authoritative corpus
|
||||
Corpus {
|
||||
#[command(subcommand)]
|
||||
command: CorpusCommands,
|
||||
},
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[derive(Subcommand)]
|
||||
enum CorpusCommands {
|
||||
/// Build the authoritative corpus from configured sources
|
||||
Build {
|
||||
/// Only include specific sources (comma-separated: rfc,owasp,vendor,hardcoded)
|
||||
#[arg(long)]
|
||||
only: Option<String>,
|
||||
|
||||
/// Run in offline mode (skip sources requiring network)
|
||||
#[arg(long)]
|
||||
offline: bool,
|
||||
|
||||
/// Clear cache before building
|
||||
#[arg(long)]
|
||||
clear_cache: bool,
|
||||
},
|
||||
|
||||
/// List available corpus sources
|
||||
List,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[tokio::main]
|
||||
@ -84,12 +115,23 @@ async fn main() -> ExitCode {
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
match cli.command {
|
||||
Commands::Scan { path, format, exit_code } => {
|
||||
Commands::Scan { path, format, exit_code, strict } => {
|
||||
let args = ScanArgs { path, format, exit_code_enabled: exit_code };
|
||||
|
||||
// Apply stricter thresholds if requested
|
||||
let config = if strict {
|
||||
let mut strict_config = config.clone();
|
||||
strict_config.thresholds.block = 0.5;
|
||||
strict_config.thresholds.flag = 0.3;
|
||||
strict_config
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
config
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
match run_scan(args, &config).await {
|
||||
Ok(result) => {
|
||||
println!("{}", result.display());
|
||||
let formatter = report::get_formatter(&result.format);
|
||||
println!("{}", formatter.format(&result));
|
||||
|
||||
if exit_code && result.has_blocks() {
|
||||
ExitCode::from(2)
|
||||
@ -164,6 +206,64 @@ async fn main() -> ExitCode {
|
||||
ExitCode::from(3)
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
|
||||
Commands::Corpus { command } => match command {
|
||||
CorpusCommands::Build { only, offline, clear_cache } => {
|
||||
let only_parsed =
|
||||
only.map(|s| s.split(',').map(|s| s.trim().to_string()).collect());
|
||||
let args = CorpusBuildArgs { only: only_parsed, offline, clear_cache };
|
||||
|
||||
match aphoria::build_corpus(args, &config).await {
|
||||
Ok(result) => {
|
||||
println!("Corpus build complete:");
|
||||
println!(" Total assertions: {}", result.total_assertions());
|
||||
println!(" Successful sources: {}", result.successful_builders());
|
||||
if result.failed_builders() > 0 {
|
||||
println!(" Failed sources: {}", result.failed_builders());
|
||||
}
|
||||
if result.skipped_builders() > 0 {
|
||||
println!(
|
||||
" Skipped sources: {} (offline mode)",
|
||||
result.skipped_builders()
|
||||
);
|
||||
}
|
||||
println!();
|
||||
for stat in &result.stats {
|
||||
let status = if stat.skipped {
|
||||
"SKIPPED".to_string()
|
||||
} else if let Some(ref err) = stat.error {
|
||||
format!("FAILED: {}", err)
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
format!("{} assertions", stat.assertions_built)
|
||||
};
|
||||
println!(" {}: {}", stat.name, status);
|
||||
}
|
||||
ExitCode::SUCCESS
|
||||
}
|
||||
Err(e) => {
|
||||
eprintln!("Corpus build error: {e}");
|
||||
ExitCode::from(3)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
CorpusCommands::List => {
|
||||
let sources = aphoria::list_corpus_sources(&config);
|
||||
println!("Available corpus sources:");
|
||||
println!();
|
||||
for source in sources {
|
||||
let network_status = if source.requires_network { " (network)" } else { "" };
|
||||
println!(
|
||||
" {}:// (Tier {}) - {}{}",
|
||||
source.scheme, source.tier, source.name, network_status
|
||||
);
|
||||
if !source.source_ids.is_empty() {
|
||||
println!(" Sources: {}", source.source_ids.join(", "));
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
ExitCode::SUCCESS
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@ -1,14 +1,135 @@
|
||||
//! JSON output format for programmatic consumption.
|
||||
//!
|
||||
//! Produces a complete JSON document with summary, conflicts,
|
||||
//! and full detail for each conflict including claim and source info.
|
||||
|
||||
use crate::types::ScanResult;
|
||||
|
||||
use super::ReportFormatter;
|
||||
use super::{object_value_to_json, verdict_label, ReportFormatter};
|
||||
use crate::types::{ScanResult, Verdict};
|
||||
|
||||
/// JSON report formatter.
|
||||
pub struct JsonReport;
|
||||
|
||||
impl ReportFormatter for JsonReport {
|
||||
fn format(&self, result: &ScanResult) -> String {
|
||||
result.display()
|
||||
let conflicts_json: Vec<serde_json::Value> = result
|
||||
.conflicts
|
||||
.iter()
|
||||
.map(|conflict| {
|
||||
let sources: Vec<serde_json::Value> = conflict
|
||||
.conflicts
|
||||
.iter()
|
||||
.map(|source| {
|
||||
serde_json::json!({
|
||||
"path": source.path,
|
||||
"source_class": format!("{:?}", source.source_class),
|
||||
"tier": source.source_class.tier(),
|
||||
"value": object_value_to_json(&source.value),
|
||||
"confidence": source.confidence,
|
||||
})
|
||||
})
|
||||
.collect();
|
||||
|
||||
let mut conflict_json = serde_json::json!({
|
||||
"concept_path": conflict.claim.concept_path,
|
||||
"predicate": conflict.claim.predicate,
|
||||
"value": object_value_to_json(&conflict.claim.value),
|
||||
"file": conflict.claim.file,
|
||||
"line": conflict.claim.line,
|
||||
"matched_text": conflict.claim.matched_text,
|
||||
"confidence": conflict.claim.confidence,
|
||||
"description": conflict.claim.description,
|
||||
"conflict_score": conflict.conflict_score,
|
||||
"verdict": verdict_label(conflict.verdict),
|
||||
"sources": sources,
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
if let Some(ack) = &conflict.acknowledged {
|
||||
conflict_json["acknowledged"] = serde_json::json!({
|
||||
"timestamp": ack.timestamp,
|
||||
"by": ack.by,
|
||||
"reason": ack.reason,
|
||||
});
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
conflict_json
|
||||
})
|
||||
.collect();
|
||||
|
||||
let report = serde_json::json!({
|
||||
"project": result.project,
|
||||
"scan_id": result.scan_id,
|
||||
"summary": {
|
||||
"files_scanned": result.files_scanned,
|
||||
"claims_extracted": result.claims_extracted,
|
||||
"conflicts": result.conflicts.len(),
|
||||
"blocks": result.count_by_verdict(Verdict::Block),
|
||||
"flags": result.count_by_verdict(Verdict::Flag),
|
||||
"passes": result.count_by_verdict(Verdict::Pass),
|
||||
},
|
||||
"conflicts": conflicts_json,
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
// Pretty-print for readability
|
||||
serde_json::to_string_pretty(&report).unwrap_or_else(|_| report.to_string())
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[cfg(test)]
|
||||
mod tests {
|
||||
use super::*;
|
||||
use crate::types::{ConflictResult, ConflictingSource, ExtractedClaim};
|
||||
use stemedb_core::types::{ObjectValue, SourceClass};
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_json_output_structure() {
|
||||
let formatter = JsonReport;
|
||||
let result = ScanResult {
|
||||
project: "testproject".to_string(),
|
||||
scan_id: "scan-456".to_string(),
|
||||
files_scanned: 10,
|
||||
claims_extracted: 3,
|
||||
conflicts: vec![ConflictResult {
|
||||
claim: ExtractedClaim {
|
||||
concept_path: "code://rust/test/jwt/aud".to_string(),
|
||||
predicate: "enabled".to_string(),
|
||||
value: ObjectValue::Boolean(false),
|
||||
file: "src/auth.rs".to_string(),
|
||||
line: 15,
|
||||
matched_text: "validate_aud = false".to_string(),
|
||||
confidence: 1.0,
|
||||
description: "JWT audience validation disabled".to_string(),
|
||||
},
|
||||
conflicts: vec![ConflictingSource {
|
||||
path: "rfc://7519/jwt/audience_validation".to_string(),
|
||||
source_class: SourceClass::Regulatory,
|
||||
value: ObjectValue::Boolean(true),
|
||||
confidence: 1.0,
|
||||
}],
|
||||
conflict_score: 0.92,
|
||||
verdict: Verdict::Block,
|
||||
acknowledged: None,
|
||||
}],
|
||||
format: "json".to_string(),
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
let output = formatter.format(&result);
|
||||
let parsed: serde_json::Value = serde_json::from_str(&output).expect("valid json");
|
||||
|
||||
assert_eq!(parsed["project"], "testproject");
|
||||
assert_eq!(parsed["summary"]["conflicts"], 1);
|
||||
assert_eq!(parsed["summary"]["blocks"], 1);
|
||||
assert_eq!(parsed["conflicts"][0]["verdict"], "BLOCK");
|
||||
assert_eq!(parsed["conflicts"][0]["file"], "src/auth.rs");
|
||||
assert_eq!(parsed["conflicts"][0]["sources"][0]["tier"], 0);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_json_empty_conflicts() {
|
||||
let formatter = JsonReport;
|
||||
let result = ScanResult::stub(&std::path::PathBuf::from("empty"), "json");
|
||||
let output = formatter.format(&result);
|
||||
let parsed: serde_json::Value = serde_json::from_str(&output).expect("valid json");
|
||||
|
||||
assert_eq!(parsed["conflicts"].as_array().map(|a| a.len()), Some(0));
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@ -1,14 +1,176 @@
|
||||
//! Markdown output format for documentation.
|
||||
//! Markdown output format for documentation and PR comments.
|
||||
//!
|
||||
//! Produces a full markdown document with summary table,
|
||||
//! detailed conflict sections, and action items.
|
||||
|
||||
use crate::types::ScanResult;
|
||||
|
||||
use super::ReportFormatter;
|
||||
use super::{object_value_display, verdict_label, ReportFormatter};
|
||||
use crate::types::{ScanResult, Verdict};
|
||||
|
||||
/// Markdown report formatter.
|
||||
pub struct MarkdownReport;
|
||||
|
||||
impl ReportFormatter for MarkdownReport {
|
||||
fn format(&self, result: &ScanResult) -> String {
|
||||
result.display()
|
||||
let mut out = String::new();
|
||||
|
||||
// Title
|
||||
out.push_str(&format!("# Aphoria Scan: {}\n\n", result.project));
|
||||
|
||||
// Summary
|
||||
out.push_str(&format!(
|
||||
"**{}** files scanned | **{}** claims extracted | **{}** conflicts\n\n",
|
||||
result.files_scanned,
|
||||
result.claims_extracted,
|
||||
result.conflicts.len()
|
||||
));
|
||||
|
||||
if result.conflicts.is_empty() {
|
||||
out.push_str("No conflicts found.\n");
|
||||
return out;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Verdict badges
|
||||
let blocks = result.count_by_verdict(Verdict::Block);
|
||||
let flags = result.count_by_verdict(Verdict::Flag);
|
||||
if blocks > 0 {
|
||||
out.push_str(&format!("**{blocks} BLOCK** "));
|
||||
}
|
||||
if flags > 0 {
|
||||
out.push_str(&format!("**{flags} FLAG** "));
|
||||
}
|
||||
out.push('\n');
|
||||
out.push('\n');
|
||||
|
||||
// Summary table
|
||||
out.push_str("| Verdict | Concept | File | Score |\n");
|
||||
out.push_str("|---------|---------|------|-------|\n");
|
||||
|
||||
for conflict in &result.conflicts {
|
||||
let concept = conflict
|
||||
.claim
|
||||
.concept_path
|
||||
.rsplit("//")
|
||||
.next()
|
||||
.unwrap_or(&conflict.claim.concept_path);
|
||||
|
||||
out.push_str(&format!(
|
||||
"| {} | `{}` | `{}:{}` | {:.2} |\n",
|
||||
verdict_label(conflict.verdict),
|
||||
concept,
|
||||
conflict.claim.file,
|
||||
conflict.claim.line,
|
||||
conflict.conflict_score,
|
||||
));
|
||||
}
|
||||
out.push('\n');
|
||||
|
||||
// Detailed sections for BLOCK and FLAG
|
||||
let actionable: Vec<_> = result
|
||||
.conflicts
|
||||
.iter()
|
||||
.filter(|c| c.verdict == Verdict::Block || c.verdict == Verdict::Flag)
|
||||
.collect();
|
||||
|
||||
if !actionable.is_empty() {
|
||||
out.push_str("## Details\n\n");
|
||||
|
||||
for conflict in actionable {
|
||||
out.push_str(&format!(
|
||||
"### {} `{}`\n\n",
|
||||
verdict_label(conflict.verdict),
|
||||
conflict.claim.concept_path
|
||||
));
|
||||
|
||||
out.push_str(&format!(
|
||||
"- **Your code:** {} (`{}:{}`)\n",
|
||||
conflict.claim.description, conflict.claim.file, conflict.claim.line
|
||||
));
|
||||
|
||||
for source in &conflict.conflicts {
|
||||
out.push_str(&format!(
|
||||
"- **{:?}** (Tier {}): `{}`\n",
|
||||
source.source_class,
|
||||
source.source_class.tier(),
|
||||
object_value_display(&source.value),
|
||||
));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
out.push_str(&format!("- **Score:** {:.2}\n", conflict.conflict_score));
|
||||
|
||||
if let Some(ack) = &conflict.acknowledged {
|
||||
out.push_str(&format!(
|
||||
"- **Acknowledged** by {} on {}: \"{}\"\n",
|
||||
ack.by, ack.timestamp, ack.reason
|
||||
));
|
||||
} else if conflict.verdict == Verdict::Block {
|
||||
out.push_str(
|
||||
"- **Action:** Fix or run `aphoria ack <path> --reason \"...\"`\n",
|
||||
);
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
out.push_str("- **Action:** Review recommended\n");
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
out.push('\n');
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
out
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[cfg(test)]
|
||||
mod tests {
|
||||
use super::*;
|
||||
use crate::types::{ConflictResult, ConflictingSource, ExtractedClaim};
|
||||
use stemedb_core::types::{ObjectValue, SourceClass};
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_markdown_with_conflicts() {
|
||||
let formatter = MarkdownReport;
|
||||
let result = ScanResult {
|
||||
project: "testproject".to_string(),
|
||||
scan_id: "scan-md".to_string(),
|
||||
files_scanned: 20,
|
||||
claims_extracted: 4,
|
||||
conflicts: vec![ConflictResult {
|
||||
claim: ExtractedClaim {
|
||||
concept_path: "code://rust/test/cors/allow_origin".to_string(),
|
||||
predicate: "config_value".to_string(),
|
||||
value: ObjectValue::Text("*".to_string()),
|
||||
file: "src/server.rs".to_string(),
|
||||
line: 55,
|
||||
matched_text: "allow_origin(\"*\")".to_string(),
|
||||
confidence: 1.0,
|
||||
description: "CORS wildcard allow-origin".to_string(),
|
||||
},
|
||||
conflicts: vec![ConflictingSource {
|
||||
path: "owasp://cors/allow_origin".to_string(),
|
||||
source_class: SourceClass::Clinical,
|
||||
value: ObjectValue::Text("explicit_list".to_string()),
|
||||
confidence: 1.0,
|
||||
}],
|
||||
conflict_score: 0.77,
|
||||
verdict: Verdict::Block,
|
||||
acknowledged: None,
|
||||
}],
|
||||
format: "markdown".to_string(),
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
let output = formatter.format(&result);
|
||||
|
||||
assert!(output.contains("# Aphoria Scan: testproject"));
|
||||
assert!(output.contains("| BLOCK |"));
|
||||
assert!(output.contains("## Details"));
|
||||
assert!(output.contains("CORS wildcard"));
|
||||
assert!(output.contains("`aphoria ack"));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_markdown_empty() {
|
||||
let formatter = MarkdownReport;
|
||||
let result = ScanResult::stub(&std::path::PathBuf::from("empty"), "markdown");
|
||||
let output = formatter.format(&result);
|
||||
|
||||
assert!(output.contains("No conflicts found"));
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@ -1,6 +1,4 @@
|
||||
//! Report generation for scan results.
|
||||
// Skeleton phase: allow unused until report pipeline is wired up
|
||||
#![allow(dead_code)]
|
||||
//!
|
||||
//! Supports multiple output formats:
|
||||
//! - `table`: Terminal table output (default)
|
||||
@ -18,7 +16,7 @@ pub use markdown::MarkdownReport;
|
||||
pub use sarif::SarifReport;
|
||||
pub use table::TableReport;
|
||||
|
||||
use crate::types::ScanResult;
|
||||
use crate::types::{ScanResult, Verdict};
|
||||
|
||||
/// Trait for report formatters.
|
||||
pub trait ReportFormatter {
|
||||
@ -36,6 +34,38 @@ pub fn get_formatter(name: &str) -> Box<dyn ReportFormatter> {
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Convert a Verdict to its display string.
|
||||
pub(crate) fn verdict_label(verdict: Verdict) -> &'static str {
|
||||
match verdict {
|
||||
Verdict::Block => "BLOCK",
|
||||
Verdict::Flag => "FLAG",
|
||||
Verdict::Pass => "PASS",
|
||||
Verdict::Ack => "ACK",
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Convert an ObjectValue to a JSON value.
|
||||
pub(crate) fn object_value_to_json(value: &stemedb_core::types::ObjectValue) -> serde_json::Value {
|
||||
use stemedb_core::types::ObjectValue;
|
||||
match value {
|
||||
ObjectValue::Text(s) => serde_json::Value::String(s.clone()),
|
||||
ObjectValue::Number(n) => serde_json::json!(n),
|
||||
ObjectValue::Boolean(b) => serde_json::Value::Bool(*b),
|
||||
ObjectValue::Reference(id) => serde_json::Value::String(format!("ref:{}", id)),
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Convert an ObjectValue to a human-readable display string.
|
||||
pub(crate) fn object_value_display(value: &stemedb_core::types::ObjectValue) -> String {
|
||||
use stemedb_core::types::ObjectValue;
|
||||
match value {
|
||||
ObjectValue::Text(s) => s.clone(),
|
||||
ObjectValue::Number(n) => format!("{n}"),
|
||||
ObjectValue::Boolean(b) => format!("{b}"),
|
||||
ObjectValue::Reference(id) => format!("ref:{id}"),
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[cfg(test)]
|
||||
mod tests {
|
||||
use super::*;
|
||||
@ -46,7 +76,34 @@ mod tests {
|
||||
let formatter = get_formatter("table");
|
||||
let result = ScanResult::stub(&PathBuf::from("."), "table");
|
||||
let output = formatter.format(&result);
|
||||
assert!(output.contains("Scanning"));
|
||||
assert!(output.contains("Aphoria"));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_get_formatter_json() {
|
||||
let formatter = get_formatter("json");
|
||||
let result = ScanResult::stub(&PathBuf::from("myproject"), "json");
|
||||
let output = formatter.format(&result);
|
||||
// Should be valid JSON
|
||||
let parsed: serde_json::Value = serde_json::from_str(&output).expect("valid json");
|
||||
assert_eq!(parsed["summary"]["files_scanned"], 0);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_get_formatter_sarif() {
|
||||
let formatter = get_formatter("sarif");
|
||||
let result = ScanResult::stub(&PathBuf::from("."), "sarif");
|
||||
let output = formatter.format(&result);
|
||||
let parsed: serde_json::Value = serde_json::from_str(&output).expect("valid json");
|
||||
assert_eq!(parsed["version"], "2.1.0");
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_get_formatter_markdown() {
|
||||
let formatter = get_formatter("markdown");
|
||||
let result = ScanResult::stub(&PathBuf::from("myproject"), "markdown");
|
||||
let output = formatter.format(&result);
|
||||
assert!(output.starts_with("# Aphoria Scan:"));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
@ -54,6 +111,6 @@ mod tests {
|
||||
let formatter = get_formatter("unknown");
|
||||
let result = ScanResult::stub(&PathBuf::from("."), "table");
|
||||
let output = formatter.format(&result);
|
||||
assert!(output.contains("Scanning"));
|
||||
assert!(output.contains("Aphoria"));
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@ -1,19 +1,245 @@
|
||||
//! SARIF output format for CI integration.
|
||||
//!
|
||||
//! SARIF (Static Analysis Results Interchange Format) is supported by:
|
||||
//! SARIF (Static Analysis Results Interchange Format) v2.1.0 is supported by:
|
||||
//! - GitHub Code Scanning
|
||||
//! - GitLab SAST
|
||||
//! - Azure DevOps
|
||||
//!
|
||||
//! Reference: <https://docs.oasis-open.org/sarif/sarif/v2.1.0/sarif-v2.1.0.html>
|
||||
|
||||
use crate::types::ScanResult;
|
||||
use super::{object_value_display, verdict_label, ReportFormatter};
|
||||
use crate::types::{ScanResult, Verdict};
|
||||
|
||||
use super::ReportFormatter;
|
||||
|
||||
/// SARIF report formatter.
|
||||
/// SARIF report formatter for CI integration.
|
||||
pub struct SarifReport;
|
||||
|
||||
impl ReportFormatter for SarifReport {
|
||||
fn format(&self, result: &ScanResult) -> String {
|
||||
result.display()
|
||||
// Build SARIF rules from unique conflict types
|
||||
let mut rules = Vec::new();
|
||||
let mut rule_indices: std::collections::HashMap<String, usize> =
|
||||
std::collections::HashMap::new();
|
||||
|
||||
for conflict in &result.conflicts {
|
||||
let rule_id = format!("aphoria/{}", extract_rule_id(&conflict.claim.concept_path));
|
||||
if !rule_indices.contains_key(&rule_id) {
|
||||
let idx = rules.len();
|
||||
rule_indices.insert(rule_id.clone(), idx);
|
||||
|
||||
let level = match conflict.verdict {
|
||||
Verdict::Block => "error",
|
||||
Verdict::Flag => "warning",
|
||||
Verdict::Pass | Verdict::Ack => "note",
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
rules.push(serde_json::json!({
|
||||
"id": rule_id,
|
||||
"shortDescription": {
|
||||
"text": conflict.claim.description,
|
||||
},
|
||||
"defaultConfiguration": {
|
||||
"level": level,
|
||||
},
|
||||
"helpUri": format!(
|
||||
"https://github.com/orchard9/aphoria/rules/{}",
|
||||
extract_rule_id(&conflict.claim.concept_path)
|
||||
),
|
||||
}));
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Build SARIF results
|
||||
let results: Vec<serde_json::Value> = result
|
||||
.conflicts
|
||||
.iter()
|
||||
.map(|conflict| {
|
||||
let rule_id = format!("aphoria/{}", extract_rule_id(&conflict.claim.concept_path));
|
||||
let rule_index = rule_indices.get(&rule_id).copied().unwrap_or(0);
|
||||
|
||||
let level = match conflict.verdict {
|
||||
Verdict::Block => "error",
|
||||
Verdict::Flag => "warning",
|
||||
Verdict::Pass | Verdict::Ack => "note",
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
// Build message with authoritative source details
|
||||
let source_details: Vec<String> = conflict
|
||||
.conflicts
|
||||
.iter()
|
||||
.map(|s| {
|
||||
format!(
|
||||
"{:?} (Tier {}): {}",
|
||||
s.source_class,
|
||||
s.source_class.tier(),
|
||||
object_value_display(&s.value)
|
||||
)
|
||||
})
|
||||
.collect();
|
||||
|
||||
let message = format!(
|
||||
"{}\nYour code: {} = {}\nAuthoritative: {}",
|
||||
conflict.claim.description,
|
||||
conflict.claim.predicate,
|
||||
object_value_display(&conflict.claim.value),
|
||||
source_details.join("; ")
|
||||
);
|
||||
|
||||
serde_json::json!({
|
||||
"ruleId": rule_id,
|
||||
"ruleIndex": rule_index,
|
||||
"level": level,
|
||||
"message": {
|
||||
"text": message,
|
||||
},
|
||||
"locations": [{
|
||||
"physicalLocation": {
|
||||
"artifactLocation": {
|
||||
"uri": conflict.claim.file,
|
||||
"uriBaseId": "%SRCROOT%",
|
||||
},
|
||||
"region": {
|
||||
"startLine": conflict.claim.line,
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}],
|
||||
"properties": {
|
||||
"conflict_score": conflict.conflict_score,
|
||||
"verdict": verdict_label(conflict.verdict),
|
||||
}
|
||||
})
|
||||
})
|
||||
.collect();
|
||||
|
||||
let sarif = serde_json::json!({
|
||||
"$schema": "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/oasis-tcs/sarif-spec/main/sarif-2.1/schema/sarif-schema-2.1.0.json",
|
||||
"version": "2.1.0",
|
||||
"runs": [{
|
||||
"tool": {
|
||||
"driver": {
|
||||
"name": "aphoria",
|
||||
"version": env!("CARGO_PKG_VERSION"),
|
||||
"informationUri": "https://github.com/orchard9/aphoria",
|
||||
"rules": rules,
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"results": results,
|
||||
"invocations": [{
|
||||
"executionSuccessful": true,
|
||||
"properties": {
|
||||
"scan_id": result.scan_id,
|
||||
"files_scanned": result.files_scanned,
|
||||
"claims_extracted": result.claims_extracted,
|
||||
}
|
||||
}]
|
||||
}]
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
serde_json::to_string_pretty(&sarif).unwrap_or_else(|_| sarif.to_string())
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Extract a rule ID from a concept path.
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// e.g., `code://rust/myapp/tls/cert_verification` -> `tls/cert_verification`
|
||||
fn extract_rule_id(concept_path: &str) -> String {
|
||||
// Strip the scheme and project prefix, keep the meaningful tail
|
||||
if let Some(after_scheme) = concept_path.split("://").nth(1) {
|
||||
// Skip language and project segments (first two after scheme)
|
||||
let segments: Vec<&str> = after_scheme.split('/').collect();
|
||||
if segments.len() > 2 {
|
||||
segments[2..].join("/")
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
after_scheme.to_string()
|
||||
}
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
concept_path.to_string()
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[cfg(test)]
|
||||
mod tests {
|
||||
use super::*;
|
||||
use crate::types::{ConflictResult, ConflictingSource, ExtractedClaim};
|
||||
use stemedb_core::types::{ObjectValue, SourceClass};
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_sarif_structure() {
|
||||
let formatter = SarifReport;
|
||||
let result = ScanResult {
|
||||
project: "testproject".to_string(),
|
||||
scan_id: "scan-789".to_string(),
|
||||
files_scanned: 42,
|
||||
claims_extracted: 5,
|
||||
conflicts: vec![ConflictResult {
|
||||
claim: ExtractedClaim {
|
||||
concept_path: "code://rust/testproject/tls/cert_verification".to_string(),
|
||||
predicate: "enabled".to_string(),
|
||||
value: ObjectValue::Boolean(false),
|
||||
file: "src/client.rs".to_string(),
|
||||
line: 23,
|
||||
matched_text: "danger_accept_invalid_certs(true)".to_string(),
|
||||
confidence: 1.0,
|
||||
description: "TLS certificate verification disabled".to_string(),
|
||||
},
|
||||
conflicts: vec![ConflictingSource {
|
||||
path: "rfc://5246/tls/cert_verification".to_string(),
|
||||
source_class: SourceClass::Regulatory,
|
||||
value: ObjectValue::Boolean(true),
|
||||
confidence: 1.0,
|
||||
}],
|
||||
conflict_score: 0.92,
|
||||
verdict: Verdict::Block,
|
||||
acknowledged: None,
|
||||
}],
|
||||
format: "sarif".to_string(),
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
let output = formatter.format(&result);
|
||||
let parsed: serde_json::Value = serde_json::from_str(&output).expect("valid json");
|
||||
|
||||
// SARIF version
|
||||
assert_eq!(parsed["version"], "2.1.0");
|
||||
|
||||
// Tool info
|
||||
assert_eq!(parsed["runs"][0]["tool"]["driver"]["name"], "aphoria");
|
||||
|
||||
// Rules
|
||||
let rules = parsed["runs"][0]["tool"]["driver"]["rules"].as_array().expect("rules array");
|
||||
assert_eq!(rules.len(), 1);
|
||||
assert_eq!(rules[0]["id"], "aphoria/tls/cert_verification");
|
||||
|
||||
// Results
|
||||
let results = parsed["runs"][0]["results"].as_array().expect("results array");
|
||||
assert_eq!(results.len(), 1);
|
||||
assert_eq!(results[0]["level"], "error");
|
||||
assert_eq!(
|
||||
results[0]["locations"][0]["physicalLocation"]["artifactLocation"]["uri"],
|
||||
"src/client.rs"
|
||||
);
|
||||
assert_eq!(results[0]["locations"][0]["physicalLocation"]["region"]["startLine"], 23);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_sarif_empty() {
|
||||
let formatter = SarifReport;
|
||||
let result = ScanResult::stub(&std::path::PathBuf::from("."), "sarif");
|
||||
let output = formatter.format(&result);
|
||||
let parsed: serde_json::Value = serde_json::from_str(&output).expect("valid json");
|
||||
|
||||
assert_eq!(parsed["version"], "2.1.0");
|
||||
assert_eq!(parsed["runs"][0]["results"].as_array().map(|a| a.len()), Some(0));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_extract_rule_id() {
|
||||
assert_eq!(
|
||||
extract_rule_id("code://rust/myapp/tls/cert_verification"),
|
||||
"tls/cert_verification"
|
||||
);
|
||||
assert_eq!(
|
||||
extract_rule_id("code://go/myapp/jwt/audience_validation"),
|
||||
"jwt/audience_validation"
|
||||
);
|
||||
assert_eq!(extract_rule_id("simple"), "simple");
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@ -1,14 +1,188 @@
|
||||
//! Table output format for terminal display.
|
||||
//!
|
||||
//! Uses `comfy-table` for clean, aligned terminal output with
|
||||
//! a summary header and detailed conflict sections.
|
||||
|
||||
use crate::types::ScanResult;
|
||||
use comfy_table::{Cell, CellAlignment, Color, ContentArrangement, Table};
|
||||
|
||||
use super::ReportFormatter;
|
||||
use super::{verdict_label, ReportFormatter};
|
||||
use crate::types::{ScanResult, Verdict};
|
||||
|
||||
/// Table report formatter.
|
||||
/// Table report formatter for terminal output.
|
||||
pub struct TableReport;
|
||||
|
||||
impl ReportFormatter for TableReport {
|
||||
fn format(&self, result: &ScanResult) -> String {
|
||||
result.display()
|
||||
let mut output = String::new();
|
||||
|
||||
// Header
|
||||
output.push_str(&format!("Aphoria Report: {}\n", result.project));
|
||||
output.push_str(&format!(
|
||||
"Scanned: {} files | Claims: {} | Conflicts: {}\n\n",
|
||||
result.files_scanned,
|
||||
result.claims_extracted,
|
||||
result.conflicts.len()
|
||||
));
|
||||
|
||||
if result.conflicts.is_empty() {
|
||||
output.push_str("No conflicts found.\n");
|
||||
return output;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Summary table
|
||||
let mut table = Table::new();
|
||||
table.set_content_arrangement(ContentArrangement::Dynamic);
|
||||
table.set_header(vec![
|
||||
Cell::new("Verdict").set_alignment(CellAlignment::Center),
|
||||
Cell::new("Concept"),
|
||||
Cell::new("Score").set_alignment(CellAlignment::Right),
|
||||
Cell::new("Tier"),
|
||||
]);
|
||||
|
||||
for conflict in &result.conflicts {
|
||||
let verdict = verdict_label(conflict.verdict);
|
||||
let verdict_cell = match conflict.verdict {
|
||||
Verdict::Block => Cell::new(verdict).fg(Color::Red),
|
||||
Verdict::Flag => Cell::new(verdict).fg(Color::Yellow),
|
||||
Verdict::Ack => Cell::new(verdict).fg(Color::Cyan),
|
||||
Verdict::Pass => Cell::new(verdict).fg(Color::Green),
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
// Extract leaf concept from full path for brevity
|
||||
let concept = conflict
|
||||
.claim
|
||||
.concept_path
|
||||
.rsplit("//")
|
||||
.next()
|
||||
.unwrap_or(&conflict.claim.concept_path);
|
||||
|
||||
let tier_spread = if let Some(source) = conflict.conflicts.first() {
|
||||
format!("{}↔3", source.source_class.tier())
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
"?↔3".to_string()
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
table.add_row(vec![
|
||||
verdict_cell,
|
||||
Cell::new(concept),
|
||||
Cell::new(format!("{:.2}", conflict.conflict_score))
|
||||
.set_alignment(CellAlignment::Right),
|
||||
Cell::new(tier_spread).set_alignment(CellAlignment::Center),
|
||||
]);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
output.push_str(&table.to_string());
|
||||
output.push('\n');
|
||||
|
||||
// Detail sections for BLOCK and FLAG
|
||||
let actionable: Vec<_> = result
|
||||
.conflicts
|
||||
.iter()
|
||||
.filter(|c| c.verdict == Verdict::Block || c.verdict == Verdict::Flag)
|
||||
.collect();
|
||||
|
||||
if !actionable.is_empty() {
|
||||
output.push_str("\nDetails:\n\n");
|
||||
for conflict in actionable {
|
||||
let verdict = verdict_label(conflict.verdict);
|
||||
output.push_str(&format!(" {:<6} {}\n", verdict, conflict.claim.concept_path));
|
||||
output.push_str(&format!(
|
||||
" Your code: {} ({}:{})\n",
|
||||
conflict.claim.description, conflict.claim.file, conflict.claim.line
|
||||
));
|
||||
|
||||
for source in &conflict.conflicts {
|
||||
output.push_str(&format!(
|
||||
" {:?}: {:?} (Tier {})\n",
|
||||
source.source_class,
|
||||
source.value,
|
||||
source.source_class.tier()
|
||||
));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if let Some(ack) = &conflict.acknowledged {
|
||||
output.push_str(&format!(
|
||||
" Acknowledged: {} by {}: \"{}\"\n",
|
||||
ack.timestamp, ack.by, ack.reason
|
||||
));
|
||||
} else if conflict.verdict == Verdict::Block {
|
||||
output.push_str(
|
||||
" Action: Fix or acknowledge with: aphoria ack <path> --reason \"...\"\n",
|
||||
);
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
output.push_str(" Action: Review recommended\n");
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
output.push('\n');
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Footer summary
|
||||
output.push_str(&format!(
|
||||
"{} BLOCK, {} FLAG, {} PASS\n",
|
||||
result.count_by_verdict(Verdict::Block),
|
||||
result.count_by_verdict(Verdict::Flag),
|
||||
result.count_by_verdict(Verdict::Pass),
|
||||
));
|
||||
|
||||
output
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[cfg(test)]
|
||||
mod tests {
|
||||
use super::*;
|
||||
use crate::types::{ConflictResult, ConflictingSource, ExtractedClaim};
|
||||
use stemedb_core::types::{ObjectValue, SourceClass};
|
||||
|
||||
fn sample_result() -> ScanResult {
|
||||
ScanResult {
|
||||
project: "testproject".to_string(),
|
||||
scan_id: "scan-123".to_string(),
|
||||
files_scanned: 42,
|
||||
claims_extracted: 5,
|
||||
conflicts: vec![ConflictResult {
|
||||
claim: ExtractedClaim {
|
||||
concept_path: "code://rust/testproject/tls/cert_verification".to_string(),
|
||||
predicate: "enabled".to_string(),
|
||||
value: ObjectValue::Boolean(false),
|
||||
file: "src/client.rs".to_string(),
|
||||
line: 23,
|
||||
matched_text: "danger_accept_invalid_certs(true)".to_string(),
|
||||
confidence: 1.0,
|
||||
description: "TLS verification disabled".to_string(),
|
||||
},
|
||||
conflicts: vec![ConflictingSource {
|
||||
path: "rfc://5246/tls/cert_verification".to_string(),
|
||||
source_class: SourceClass::Regulatory,
|
||||
value: ObjectValue::Boolean(true),
|
||||
confidence: 1.0,
|
||||
}],
|
||||
conflict_score: 0.92,
|
||||
verdict: Verdict::Block,
|
||||
acknowledged: None,
|
||||
}],
|
||||
format: "table".to_string(),
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_table_with_conflicts() {
|
||||
let formatter = TableReport;
|
||||
let output = formatter.format(&sample_result());
|
||||
|
||||
assert!(output.contains("testproject"));
|
||||
assert!(output.contains("BLOCK"));
|
||||
assert!(output.contains("tls"));
|
||||
assert!(output.contains("0.92"));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_table_empty_scan() {
|
||||
let formatter = TableReport;
|
||||
let result = ScanResult::stub(&std::path::PathBuf::from("empty"), "table");
|
||||
let output = formatter.format(&result);
|
||||
|
||||
assert!(output.contains("No conflicts found"));
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
192
applications/aphoria/src/research/gap_detector.rs
Normal file
192
applications/aphoria/src/research/gap_detector.rs
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,192 @@
|
||||
//! Gap detection for the Research Agent.
|
||||
//!
|
||||
//! Detects when extracted code claims have no matching authoritative coverage
|
||||
//! in the corpus, indicating a potential gap in knowledge.
|
||||
|
||||
use std::collections::HashSet;
|
||||
|
||||
use tracing::{debug, instrument};
|
||||
|
||||
use crate::episteme::ConceptIndex;
|
||||
use crate::types::ExtractedClaim;
|
||||
|
||||
/// A detected gap in authoritative coverage.
|
||||
#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
|
||||
pub struct Gap {
|
||||
/// The concept path from the code claim (e.g., `code://rust/myapp/redis/max_memory_policy`).
|
||||
pub concept_path: String,
|
||||
|
||||
/// The predicate from the claim.
|
||||
pub predicate: String,
|
||||
|
||||
/// Normalized topic extracted from the concept path (e.g., `redis/max_memory_policy`).
|
||||
pub topic: String,
|
||||
|
||||
/// The source file where the gap was detected.
|
||||
pub source_file: String,
|
||||
|
||||
/// Line number in the source file.
|
||||
pub source_line: usize,
|
||||
|
||||
/// The original claim description.
|
||||
pub description: String,
|
||||
|
||||
/// Confidence of the extraction that led to this gap.
|
||||
pub confidence: f32,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
impl Gap {
|
||||
/// Create a gap from an extracted claim.
|
||||
pub fn from_claim(claim: &ExtractedClaim) -> Self {
|
||||
let topic = extract_topic(&claim.concept_path);
|
||||
|
||||
Self {
|
||||
concept_path: claim.concept_path.clone(),
|
||||
predicate: claim.predicate.clone(),
|
||||
topic,
|
||||
source_file: claim.file.clone(),
|
||||
source_line: claim.line,
|
||||
description: claim.description.clone(),
|
||||
confidence: claim.confidence,
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Get a unique key for deduplication.
|
||||
pub fn key(&self) -> String {
|
||||
format!("{}::{}", self.topic, self.predicate)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Detect gaps in authoritative coverage.
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// Compares extracted claims against the authoritative corpus index and
|
||||
/// identifies claims that have no matching authoritative source.
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// # Arguments
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// * `claims` - Extracted code claims to check
|
||||
/// * `index` - Authoritative corpus concept index
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// # Returns
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// A vector of detected gaps, deduplicated by topic+predicate.
|
||||
#[instrument(skip(claims, index), fields(claim_count = claims.len()))]
|
||||
pub fn detect_gaps(claims: &[ExtractedClaim], index: &ConceptIndex) -> Vec<Gap> {
|
||||
let mut gaps = Vec::new();
|
||||
let mut seen_keys = HashSet::new();
|
||||
|
||||
for claim in claims {
|
||||
// Check if there's any authoritative coverage for this claim
|
||||
if index.lookup(&claim.concept_path, &claim.predicate).is_none() {
|
||||
let gap = Gap::from_claim(claim);
|
||||
let key = gap.key();
|
||||
|
||||
// Deduplicate by topic+predicate
|
||||
if !seen_keys.contains(&key) {
|
||||
debug!(
|
||||
concept_path = %claim.concept_path,
|
||||
predicate = %claim.predicate,
|
||||
topic = %gap.topic,
|
||||
"Gap detected: no authoritative coverage"
|
||||
);
|
||||
seen_keys.insert(key);
|
||||
gaps.push(gap);
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
gaps
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Extract a normalized topic from a concept path.
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// Takes the last 2 path segments after the scheme.
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// # Examples
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// - `code://rust/myapp/redis/max_memory_policy` → `redis/max_memory_policy`
|
||||
/// - `code://go/server/http/read_timeout` → `http/read_timeout`
|
||||
fn extract_topic(concept_path: &str) -> String {
|
||||
// Split on "://" to separate scheme from path
|
||||
let path = concept_path.find("://").map(|i| &concept_path[i + 3..]).unwrap_or(concept_path);
|
||||
|
||||
// Get last two non-empty segments
|
||||
let segments: Vec<&str> = path.rsplit('/').filter(|s| !s.is_empty()).take(2).collect();
|
||||
|
||||
if segments.len() >= 2 {
|
||||
format!("{}/{}", segments[1], segments[0])
|
||||
} else if segments.len() == 1 {
|
||||
segments[0].to_string()
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
path.to_string()
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[cfg(test)]
|
||||
mod tests {
|
||||
use super::*;
|
||||
use stemedb_core::types::ObjectValue;
|
||||
|
||||
fn make_claim(concept_path: &str, predicate: &str) -> ExtractedClaim {
|
||||
ExtractedClaim {
|
||||
concept_path: concept_path.to_string(),
|
||||
predicate: predicate.to_string(),
|
||||
value: ObjectValue::Boolean(true),
|
||||
file: "test.rs".to_string(),
|
||||
line: 42,
|
||||
matched_text: "test".to_string(),
|
||||
confidence: 0.9,
|
||||
description: "Test claim".to_string(),
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_extract_topic() {
|
||||
assert_eq!(
|
||||
extract_topic("code://rust/myapp/redis/max_memory_policy"),
|
||||
"redis/max_memory_policy"
|
||||
);
|
||||
assert_eq!(extract_topic("code://go/server/http/read_timeout"), "http/read_timeout");
|
||||
assert_eq!(extract_topic("code://rust/tls/cert_verification"), "tls/cert_verification");
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_gap_key() {
|
||||
let claim = make_claim("code://rust/myapp/redis/max_memory_policy", "config_value");
|
||||
let gap = Gap::from_claim(&claim);
|
||||
|
||||
assert_eq!(gap.key(), "redis/max_memory_policy::config_value");
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_detect_gaps_empty_index() {
|
||||
let claims = vec![
|
||||
make_claim("code://rust/myapp/redis/max_memory_policy", "config_value"),
|
||||
make_claim("code://rust/myapp/kafka/retention_ms", "config_value"),
|
||||
];
|
||||
|
||||
// Empty index means no coverage
|
||||
let index = ConceptIndex::build(&[]);
|
||||
let gaps = detect_gaps(&claims, &index);
|
||||
|
||||
assert_eq!(gaps.len(), 2);
|
||||
assert!(gaps.iter().any(|g| g.topic == "redis/max_memory_policy"));
|
||||
assert!(gaps.iter().any(|g| g.topic == "kafka/retention_ms"));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_detect_gaps_deduplication() {
|
||||
let claims = vec![
|
||||
make_claim("code://rust/app1/redis/max_memory_policy", "config_value"),
|
||||
make_claim("code://rust/app2/redis/max_memory_policy", "config_value"), // Same topic
|
||||
make_claim("code://rust/app3/redis/max_memory_policy", "config_value"), // Same topic
|
||||
];
|
||||
|
||||
let index = ConceptIndex::build(&[]);
|
||||
let gaps = detect_gaps(&claims, &index);
|
||||
|
||||
// Should deduplicate to just one gap
|
||||
assert_eq!(gaps.len(), 1);
|
||||
assert_eq!(gaps[0].topic, "redis/max_memory_policy");
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
111
applications/aphoria/src/research/mod.rs
Normal file
111
applications/aphoria/src/research/mod.rs
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,111 @@
|
||||
//! Research Agent for Aphoria.
|
||||
//!
|
||||
//! The Research Agent detects gaps in authoritative coverage and researches
|
||||
//! official documentation to fill those gaps. This module provides:
|
||||
//!
|
||||
//! - **Gap Detection**: Identifies code claims with no authoritative coverage
|
||||
//! - **Gap Storage**: Persists gaps with tracking metadata (project count, first seen)
|
||||
//! - **Research Trigger**: Dispatches research when gaps reach threshold
|
||||
//! - **Claim Extraction**: Parses official documentation for normative claims
|
||||
//! - **Quality Validation**: Ensures extracted claims meet quality standards
|
||||
//!
|
||||
//! # Architecture
|
||||
//!
|
||||
//! ```text
|
||||
//! ┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
|
||||
//! │ Research Agent Flow │
|
||||
//! │ │
|
||||
//! │ ┌────────────┐ ┌──────────────┐ ┌─────────────────────────────┐│
|
||||
//! │ │ Gap │──▶│ Gap Store │──▶│ Research Trigger ││
|
||||
//! │ │ Detector │ │ (SQLite) │ │ (threshold: 3 projects) ││
|
||||
//! │ └────────────┘ └──────────────┘ └─────────────────────────────┘│
|
||||
//! │ │ │
|
||||
//! │ ▼ │
|
||||
//! │ ┌────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐ │
|
||||
//! │ │ Research Pipeline │ │
|
||||
//! │ │ │ │
|
||||
//! │ │ ┌───────────┐ ┌─────────────┐ ┌──────────────────────┐ │ │
|
||||
//! │ │ │ Web │──▶│ Content │──▶│ Quality │ │ │
|
||||
//! │ │ │ Fetcher │ │ Extractor │ │ Validator │ │ │
|
||||
//! │ │ └───────────┘ └─────────────┘ └──────────────────────┘ │ │
|
||||
//! │ │ │ │ │
|
||||
//! │ │ ▼ │ │
|
||||
//! │ │ ┌──────────────────────┐ │ │
|
||||
//! │ │ │ Corpus Ingestion │ │ │
|
||||
//! │ │ │ (if quality passes) │ │ │
|
||||
//! │ │ └──────────────────────┘ │ │
|
||||
//! │ └────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘ │
|
||||
//! └─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
|
||||
//! ```
|
||||
|
||||
mod gap_detector;
|
||||
mod gap_store;
|
||||
mod quality;
|
||||
mod researcher;
|
||||
|
||||
#[cfg(test)]
|
||||
mod tests;
|
||||
|
||||
pub use gap_detector::{detect_gaps, Gap};
|
||||
pub use gap_store::{GapRecord, GapStore};
|
||||
pub use quality::{QualityReport, QualityValidator};
|
||||
pub use researcher::{ResearchConfig, ResearchResult, Researcher};
|
||||
|
||||
use crate::AphoriaError;
|
||||
|
||||
/// Minimum number of projects that must report a gap before triggering research.
|
||||
pub const DEFAULT_GAP_THRESHOLD: u32 = 3;
|
||||
|
||||
/// Maximum age of a gap (in days) before it's considered stale.
|
||||
pub const DEFAULT_GAP_MAX_AGE_DAYS: u64 = 90;
|
||||
|
||||
/// Confidence threshold for accepting researched claims.
|
||||
pub const DEFAULT_QUALITY_THRESHOLD: f32 = 0.7;
|
||||
|
||||
/// Result of a research operation.
|
||||
#[derive(Debug)]
|
||||
pub struct ResearchOutcome {
|
||||
/// Number of gaps analyzed.
|
||||
pub gaps_analyzed: usize,
|
||||
/// Number of gaps successfully researched.
|
||||
pub gaps_filled: usize,
|
||||
/// Number of assertions created from research.
|
||||
pub assertions_created: usize,
|
||||
/// Gaps that could not be filled (insufficient quality).
|
||||
pub gaps_failed: Vec<String>,
|
||||
/// Detailed results per gap.
|
||||
pub results: Vec<GapResearchResult>,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Result of researching a single gap.
|
||||
#[derive(Debug)]
|
||||
pub struct GapResearchResult {
|
||||
/// The gap that was researched.
|
||||
pub gap: String,
|
||||
/// Whether research was successful.
|
||||
pub success: bool,
|
||||
/// Number of assertions created.
|
||||
pub assertions_created: usize,
|
||||
/// Quality report for the research.
|
||||
pub quality_report: Option<QualityReport>,
|
||||
/// Error message if research failed.
|
||||
pub error: Option<String>,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
impl ResearchOutcome {
|
||||
/// Create an empty outcome.
|
||||
pub fn empty() -> Self {
|
||||
Self {
|
||||
gaps_analyzed: 0,
|
||||
gaps_filled: 0,
|
||||
assertions_created: 0,
|
||||
gaps_failed: vec![],
|
||||
results: vec![],
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Check if any research was successful.
|
||||
pub fn has_results(&self) -> bool {
|
||||
self.assertions_created > 0
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
314
applications/aphoria/src/tests.rs
Normal file
314
applications/aphoria/src/tests.rs
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,314 @@
|
||||
//! Integration tests for Aphoria scan functionality.
|
||||
|
||||
use super::*;
|
||||
|
||||
#[tokio::test]
|
||||
async fn test_scan_returns_result() {
|
||||
let temp_dir = tempfile::tempdir().expect("create temp dir");
|
||||
|
||||
// Create a test file with a TLS issue
|
||||
let src_dir = temp_dir.path().join("src");
|
||||
std::fs::create_dir_all(&src_dir).expect("create src dir");
|
||||
std::fs::write(
|
||||
src_dir.join("client.rs"),
|
||||
r#"
|
||||
let client = reqwest::Client::builder()
|
||||
.danger_accept_invalid_certs(true)
|
||||
.build()?;
|
||||
"#,
|
||||
)
|
||||
.expect("write file");
|
||||
|
||||
// Create Cargo.toml so it's detected as a Rust project
|
||||
std::fs::write(
|
||||
temp_dir.path().join("Cargo.toml"),
|
||||
r#"
|
||||
[package]
|
||||
name = "testproject"
|
||||
version = "0.1.0"
|
||||
"#,
|
||||
)
|
||||
.expect("write cargo.toml");
|
||||
|
||||
let args = ScanArgs {
|
||||
path: temp_dir.path().to_path_buf(),
|
||||
format: "table".to_string(),
|
||||
exit_code_enabled: false,
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
let mut config = AphoriaConfig::default();
|
||||
config.episteme.data_dir = temp_dir.path().join(".aphoria").join("db");
|
||||
|
||||
let result = run_scan(args, &config).await.expect("scan should succeed");
|
||||
|
||||
assert!(result.files_scanned > 0);
|
||||
assert!(result.claims_extracted > 0);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[tokio::test]
|
||||
async fn test_initialize_creates_corpus() {
|
||||
// Use a unique temp dir to avoid conflicts with parallel tests
|
||||
let temp_dir = tempfile::Builder::new()
|
||||
.prefix("aphoria_test_init")
|
||||
.tempdir()
|
||||
.expect("create temp dir");
|
||||
|
||||
let mut config = AphoriaConfig::default();
|
||||
config.episteme.data_dir = temp_dir.path().join(".aphoria").join("db");
|
||||
|
||||
// Create .aphoria directory for the agent key
|
||||
let aphoria_dir = temp_dir.path().join(".aphoria");
|
||||
std::fs::create_dir_all(&aphoria_dir).expect("create .aphoria dir");
|
||||
|
||||
// Open LocalEpisteme directly instead of using initialize()
|
||||
// which relies on current_dir()
|
||||
let mut episteme =
|
||||
crate::episteme::LocalEpisteme::open(&config, temp_dir.path()).await.expect("open");
|
||||
|
||||
let signing_key = crate::bridge::load_or_generate_key(temp_dir.path()).expect("load key");
|
||||
let corpus = crate::episteme::create_authoritative_corpus(&signing_key);
|
||||
let ingested = episteme.ingest_authoritative(&corpus).await.expect("ingest");
|
||||
episteme.shutdown().await;
|
||||
|
||||
assert!(ingested > 0);
|
||||
assert!(config.episteme.data_dir.exists());
|
||||
assert!(temp_dir.path().join(".aphoria").join("agent.key").exists());
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[tokio::test]
|
||||
async fn test_acknowledge_succeeds() {
|
||||
let temp_dir =
|
||||
tempfile::Builder::new().prefix("aphoria_test_ack").tempdir().expect("create temp dir");
|
||||
|
||||
let mut config = AphoriaConfig::default();
|
||||
config.episteme.data_dir = temp_dir.path().join(".aphoria").join("db");
|
||||
|
||||
// Create .aphoria directory for the agent key
|
||||
let aphoria_dir = temp_dir.path().join(".aphoria");
|
||||
std::fs::create_dir_all(&aphoria_dir).expect("create .aphoria dir");
|
||||
|
||||
// Open LocalEpisteme and ingest an acknowledgement claim
|
||||
let mut episteme =
|
||||
crate::episteme::LocalEpisteme::open(&config, temp_dir.path()).await.expect("open");
|
||||
|
||||
let claim = ExtractedClaim {
|
||||
concept_path: "code://rust/test/jwt/audience_validation".to_string(),
|
||||
predicate: "acknowledged".to_string(),
|
||||
value: stemedb_core::types::ObjectValue::Text("Internal service".to_string()),
|
||||
file: "aphoria_ack".to_string(),
|
||||
line: 0,
|
||||
matched_text: "Acknowledged: Internal service".to_string(),
|
||||
confidence: 1.0,
|
||||
description: "Conflict acknowledged: Internal service".to_string(),
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
let result = episteme.ingest_claims(&[claim]).await;
|
||||
episteme.shutdown().await;
|
||||
|
||||
assert!(result.is_ok());
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[tokio::test]
|
||||
async fn test_status_before_init() {
|
||||
let temp_dir = tempfile::Builder::new()
|
||||
.prefix("aphoria_test_status")
|
||||
.tempdir()
|
||||
.expect("create temp dir");
|
||||
|
||||
let mut config = AphoriaConfig::default();
|
||||
config.episteme.data_dir = temp_dir.path().join("nonexistent");
|
||||
|
||||
// Manually check status logic without relying on current_dir()
|
||||
let data_dir = &config.episteme.data_dir;
|
||||
let status = if !data_dir.exists() { "Not initialized" } else { "Initialized" };
|
||||
|
||||
assert!(status.contains("Not initialized"));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// ==========================================================================
|
||||
// Integration tests for conflict detection (Phase 2A)
|
||||
// ==========================================================================
|
||||
|
||||
#[tokio::test]
|
||||
async fn test_conflict_detection_tls_disabled() {
|
||||
// Create temp project with danger_accept_invalid_certs(true)
|
||||
let temp_dir = tempfile::Builder::new()
|
||||
.prefix("aphoria_tls_conflict")
|
||||
.tempdir()
|
||||
.expect("create temp dir");
|
||||
|
||||
let src_dir = temp_dir.path().join("src");
|
||||
std::fs::create_dir_all(&src_dir).expect("create src dir");
|
||||
|
||||
// Write a Rust file with TLS verification disabled
|
||||
std::fs::write(
|
||||
src_dir.join("client.rs"),
|
||||
r#"
|
||||
fn create_client() -> Result<Client, Error> {
|
||||
let client = reqwest::Client::builder()
|
||||
.danger_accept_invalid_certs(true)
|
||||
.build()?;
|
||||
Ok(client)
|
||||
}
|
||||
"#,
|
||||
)
|
||||
.expect("write file");
|
||||
|
||||
// Create Cargo.toml so it's detected as a Rust project
|
||||
std::fs::write(
|
||||
temp_dir.path().join("Cargo.toml"),
|
||||
r#"
|
||||
[package]
|
||||
name = "testproject"
|
||||
version = "0.1.0"
|
||||
"#,
|
||||
)
|
||||
.expect("write cargo.toml");
|
||||
|
||||
let args = ScanArgs {
|
||||
path: temp_dir.path().to_path_buf(),
|
||||
format: "table".to_string(),
|
||||
exit_code_enabled: true,
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
let mut config = AphoriaConfig::default();
|
||||
config.episteme.data_dir = temp_dir.path().join(".aphoria").join("db");
|
||||
|
||||
let result = run_scan(args, &config).await.expect("scan should succeed");
|
||||
|
||||
// Assert: conflicts not empty, has_blocks() == true
|
||||
assert!(
|
||||
!result.conflicts.is_empty(),
|
||||
"Should detect conflicts for TLS verification disabled. \
|
||||
Claims extracted: {}, Files scanned: {}",
|
||||
result.claims_extracted,
|
||||
result.files_scanned
|
||||
);
|
||||
|
||||
assert!(
|
||||
result.has_blocks(),
|
||||
"TLS verification disabled should be a BLOCK verdict. \
|
||||
Conflicts: {:?}",
|
||||
result.conflicts.iter().map(|c| (&c.claim.concept_path, &c.verdict)).collect::<Vec<_>>()
|
||||
);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[tokio::test]
|
||||
async fn test_conflict_detection_jwt_audience_disabled() {
|
||||
// Create temp project with JWT audience validation disabled
|
||||
let temp_dir = tempfile::Builder::new()
|
||||
.prefix("aphoria_jwt_conflict")
|
||||
.tempdir()
|
||||
.expect("create temp dir");
|
||||
|
||||
let src_dir = temp_dir.path().join("src");
|
||||
std::fs::create_dir_all(&src_dir).expect("create src dir");
|
||||
|
||||
// Write a Rust file with JWT audience validation disabled
|
||||
std::fs::write(
|
||||
src_dir.join("auth.rs"),
|
||||
r#"
|
||||
fn validate_token(token: &str) -> Result<Claims, Error> {
|
||||
let mut validation = Validation::default();
|
||||
validation.validate_aud = false; // Disabled!
|
||||
let token_data = decode::<Claims>(token, &key, &validation)?;
|
||||
Ok(token_data.claims)
|
||||
}
|
||||
"#,
|
||||
)
|
||||
.expect("write file");
|
||||
|
||||
// Create Cargo.toml
|
||||
std::fs::write(
|
||||
temp_dir.path().join("Cargo.toml"),
|
||||
r#"
|
||||
[package]
|
||||
name = "testproject"
|
||||
version = "0.1.0"
|
||||
"#,
|
||||
)
|
||||
.expect("write cargo.toml");
|
||||
|
||||
let args = ScanArgs {
|
||||
path: temp_dir.path().to_path_buf(),
|
||||
format: "table".to_string(),
|
||||
exit_code_enabled: true,
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
let mut config = AphoriaConfig::default();
|
||||
config.episteme.data_dir = temp_dir.path().join(".aphoria").join("db");
|
||||
|
||||
let result = run_scan(args, &config).await.expect("scan should succeed");
|
||||
|
||||
// Assert: conflicts not empty for JWT audience validation
|
||||
assert!(
|
||||
!result.conflicts.is_empty(),
|
||||
"Should detect conflicts for JWT audience validation disabled. \
|
||||
Claims extracted: {}, Files scanned: {}",
|
||||
result.claims_extracted,
|
||||
result.files_scanned
|
||||
);
|
||||
|
||||
// Check that at least one conflict is about JWT audience
|
||||
let has_jwt_conflict = result.conflicts.iter().any(|c| {
|
||||
c.claim.concept_path.contains("jwt") && c.claim.concept_path.contains("audience")
|
||||
});
|
||||
assert!(
|
||||
has_jwt_conflict,
|
||||
"Should have a conflict about JWT audience validation. \
|
||||
Conflicts: {:?}",
|
||||
result.conflicts.iter().map(|c| &c.claim.concept_path).collect::<Vec<_>>()
|
||||
);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[tokio::test]
|
||||
async fn test_no_conflicts_when_compliant() {
|
||||
// Create temp project with compliant code (no dangerous patterns)
|
||||
let temp_dir = tempfile::Builder::new()
|
||||
.prefix("aphoria_compliant")
|
||||
.tempdir()
|
||||
.expect("create temp dir");
|
||||
|
||||
let src_dir = temp_dir.path().join("src");
|
||||
std::fs::create_dir_all(&src_dir).expect("create src dir");
|
||||
|
||||
// Write a Rust file with compliant code
|
||||
std::fs::write(
|
||||
src_dir.join("main.rs"),
|
||||
r#"
|
||||
fn main() {
|
||||
println!("Hello, world!");
|
||||
}
|
||||
"#,
|
||||
)
|
||||
.expect("write file");
|
||||
|
||||
// Create Cargo.toml
|
||||
std::fs::write(
|
||||
temp_dir.path().join("Cargo.toml"),
|
||||
r#"
|
||||
[package]
|
||||
name = "testproject"
|
||||
version = "0.1.0"
|
||||
"#,
|
||||
)
|
||||
.expect("write cargo.toml");
|
||||
|
||||
let args = ScanArgs {
|
||||
path: temp_dir.path().to_path_buf(),
|
||||
format: "table".to_string(),
|
||||
exit_code_enabled: true,
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
let mut config = AphoriaConfig::default();
|
||||
config.episteme.data_dir = temp_dir.path().join(".aphoria").join("db");
|
||||
|
||||
let result = run_scan(args, &config).await.expect("scan should succeed");
|
||||
|
||||
// No dangerous patterns = no claims = no conflicts
|
||||
assert!(
|
||||
result.conflicts.is_empty(),
|
||||
"Compliant code should have no conflicts. Found: {:?}",
|
||||
result.conflicts.iter().map(|c| &c.claim.concept_path).collect::<Vec<_>>()
|
||||
);
|
||||
}
|
||||
@ -1,6 +1,4 @@
|
||||
//! Core types for Aphoria.
|
||||
// Skeleton phase: allow unused until scan pipeline is wired up
|
||||
#![allow(dead_code)]
|
||||
|
||||
use std::fmt;
|
||||
use std::path::{Path, PathBuf};
|
||||
@ -79,105 +77,6 @@ impl ScanResult {
|
||||
pub fn count_by_verdict(&self, verdict: Verdict) -> usize {
|
||||
self.conflicts.iter().filter(|c| c.verdict == verdict).count()
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Format the result for display.
|
||||
pub fn display(&self) -> String {
|
||||
match self.format.as_str() {
|
||||
"json" => self.display_json(),
|
||||
"sarif" => self.display_sarif(),
|
||||
"markdown" => self.display_markdown(),
|
||||
_ => self.display_table(),
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fn display_table(&self) -> String {
|
||||
let mut output = String::new();
|
||||
|
||||
output.push_str(&format!("Scanning {} ...\n\n", self.project));
|
||||
|
||||
if self.conflicts.is_empty() {
|
||||
output.push_str("No conflicts found.\n");
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
for conflict in &self.conflicts {
|
||||
output.push_str(&format!("{}\n\n", conflict));
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
output.push_str(&format!(
|
||||
"{} files scanned, {} claims extracted, {} conflicts ({} BLOCK, {} FLAG)\n",
|
||||
self.files_scanned,
|
||||
self.claims_extracted,
|
||||
self.conflicts.len(),
|
||||
self.count_by_verdict(Verdict::Block),
|
||||
self.count_by_verdict(Verdict::Flag),
|
||||
));
|
||||
|
||||
output
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fn display_json(&self) -> String {
|
||||
// TODO: Implement JSON output
|
||||
serde_json::json!({
|
||||
"project": self.project,
|
||||
"scan_id": self.scan_id,
|
||||
"summary": {
|
||||
"files_scanned": self.files_scanned,
|
||||
"claims_extracted": self.claims_extracted,
|
||||
"conflicts": self.conflicts.len(),
|
||||
"blocks": self.count_by_verdict(Verdict::Block),
|
||||
"flags": self.count_by_verdict(Verdict::Flag),
|
||||
},
|
||||
"conflicts": []
|
||||
})
|
||||
.to_string()
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fn display_sarif(&self) -> String {
|
||||
// TODO: Implement SARIF output
|
||||
serde_json::json!({
|
||||
"$schema": "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/oasis-tcs/sarif-spec/main/sarif-2.1/schema/sarif-schema-2.1.0.json",
|
||||
"version": "2.1.0",
|
||||
"runs": [{
|
||||
"tool": {
|
||||
"driver": {
|
||||
"name": "aphoria",
|
||||
"version": env!("CARGO_PKG_VERSION"),
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"results": []
|
||||
}]
|
||||
})
|
||||
.to_string()
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fn display_markdown(&self) -> String {
|
||||
let mut output = String::new();
|
||||
|
||||
output.push_str(&format!("# Aphoria Scan: {}\n\n", self.project));
|
||||
output.push_str(&format!(
|
||||
"**Summary:** {} files, {} claims, {} conflicts\n\n",
|
||||
self.files_scanned,
|
||||
self.claims_extracted,
|
||||
self.conflicts.len()
|
||||
));
|
||||
|
||||
if self.conflicts.is_empty() {
|
||||
output.push_str("No conflicts found.\n");
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
output.push_str("## Conflicts\n\n");
|
||||
for conflict in &self.conflicts {
|
||||
output.push_str(&format!("### {}\n\n", conflict.claim.concept_path));
|
||||
output.push_str(&format!("- **Verdict:** {:?}\n", conflict.verdict));
|
||||
output.push_str(&format!("- **Score:** {:.2}\n", conflict.conflict_score));
|
||||
output.push_str(&format!(
|
||||
"- **File:** {}:{}\n\n",
|
||||
conflict.claim.file, conflict.claim.line
|
||||
));
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
output
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// A claim extracted from source code.
|
||||
|
||||
@ -1,5 +1,4 @@
|
||||
//! Language detection for projects.
|
||||
#![allow(dead_code)]
|
||||
|
||||
use std::path::Path;
|
||||
|
||||
@ -11,6 +10,10 @@ use crate::types::Language;
|
||||
/// 1. Explicit language in config (handled by caller)
|
||||
/// 2. Presence of language-specific manifest files
|
||||
/// 3. File count heuristic (most common extension)
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// Not yet wired into the scan pipeline; will be used when
|
||||
/// auto-detection replaces the config-based language setting.
|
||||
#[allow(dead_code)]
|
||||
pub fn detect_project_language(root: &Path) -> Language {
|
||||
// Check for manifest files
|
||||
if root.join("Cargo.toml").exists() {
|
||||
|
||||
@ -1,6 +1,4 @@
|
||||
//! Project walker for traversing and analyzing codebases.
|
||||
// Skeleton phase: allow unused until scan pipeline is wired up
|
||||
#![allow(dead_code)]
|
||||
//!
|
||||
//! The walker:
|
||||
//! 1. Traverses the project directory (respecting .gitignore)
|
||||
@ -11,7 +9,6 @@
|
||||
mod language;
|
||||
mod path_mapper;
|
||||
|
||||
pub use language::detect_project_language;
|
||||
pub use path_mapper::PathMapper;
|
||||
|
||||
use std::path::Path;
|
||||
|
||||
@ -1,5 +1,4 @@
|
||||
//! Path mapping from file paths to ConceptPath segments.
|
||||
#![allow(dead_code)]
|
||||
|
||||
use std::path::Path;
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
157
crates/stemedb-api/src/dto/admission.rs
Normal file
157
crates/stemedb-api/src/dto/admission.rs
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,157 @@
|
||||
//! Data Transfer Objects for admission control endpoints.
|
||||
|
||||
use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
|
||||
use utoipa::ToSchema;
|
||||
|
||||
/// Trust tier names for API responses.
|
||||
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize, ToSchema, PartialEq, Eq)]
|
||||
#[serde(rename_all = "PascalCase")]
|
||||
pub enum TrustTierDto {
|
||||
/// Untrusted tier: 0.0-0.3 trust score.
|
||||
Untrusted,
|
||||
/// Limited tier: 0.3-0.5 trust score.
|
||||
Limited,
|
||||
/// Verified tier: 0.5-0.7 trust score.
|
||||
Verified,
|
||||
/// Trusted tier: 0.7-0.9 trust score.
|
||||
Trusted,
|
||||
/// Authority tier: 0.9-1.0 trust score.
|
||||
Authority,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
impl From<stemedb_core::types::TrustTier> for TrustTierDto {
|
||||
fn from(tier: stemedb_core::types::TrustTier) -> Self {
|
||||
match tier {
|
||||
stemedb_core::types::TrustTier::Untrusted => TrustTierDto::Untrusted,
|
||||
stemedb_core::types::TrustTier::Limited => TrustTierDto::Limited,
|
||||
stemedb_core::types::TrustTier::Verified => TrustTierDto::Verified,
|
||||
stemedb_core::types::TrustTier::Trusted => TrustTierDto::Trusted,
|
||||
stemedb_core::types::TrustTier::Authority => TrustTierDto::Authority,
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Response for GET /v1/admission/status.
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// Contains the agent's current admission status including trust tier,
|
||||
/// quota multipliers, and PoW requirements.
|
||||
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize, ToSchema)]
|
||||
pub struct AdmissionStatusResponse {
|
||||
/// Agent's Ed25519 public key (hex-encoded).
|
||||
pub agent_id: String,
|
||||
|
||||
/// Agent's trust tier.
|
||||
pub tier: TrustTierDto,
|
||||
|
||||
/// Agent's current trust score (0.0 to 1.0).
|
||||
pub trust_score: f32,
|
||||
|
||||
/// Total number of assertions made by this agent.
|
||||
pub assertions_count: u64,
|
||||
|
||||
/// Required PoW difficulty in bits (0 = exempt).
|
||||
pub pow_difficulty: u8,
|
||||
|
||||
/// Whether PoW is required for this agent's next submission.
|
||||
pub pow_required: bool,
|
||||
|
||||
/// Base quota limit per hour (before tier multiplier).
|
||||
pub base_quota_limit: u64,
|
||||
|
||||
/// Effective quota limit per hour (after tier multiplier).
|
||||
pub effective_quota_limit: u64,
|
||||
|
||||
/// Quota multiplier for this tier.
|
||||
pub quota_multiplier: f32,
|
||||
|
||||
/// Number of assertions until reduced PoW difficulty (or null if not applicable).
|
||||
#[serde(skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
|
||||
pub assertions_until_reduced_difficulty: Option<u64>,
|
||||
|
||||
/// Number of assertions until PoW exemption (or null if already exempt).
|
||||
#[serde(skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
|
||||
pub assertions_until_exemption: Option<u64>,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
impl AdmissionStatusResponse {
|
||||
/// Create a response from admission status.
|
||||
pub fn from_status(
|
||||
agent_id: String,
|
||||
status: &stemedb_storage::AdmissionStatus,
|
||||
config: &stemedb_core::types::AdmissionConfig,
|
||||
) -> Self {
|
||||
// Calculate assertions until milestones
|
||||
let assertions_until_reduced_difficulty =
|
||||
if status.assertions_count < config.initial_threshold {
|
||||
Some(config.initial_threshold - status.assertions_count)
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
None
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
let assertions_until_exemption = if status.assertions_count < config.graduated_threshold
|
||||
&& status.trust_score < config.trust_exemption_score
|
||||
{
|
||||
Some(config.graduated_threshold - status.assertions_count)
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
None
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
Self {
|
||||
agent_id,
|
||||
tier: status.tier.into(),
|
||||
trust_score: status.trust_score,
|
||||
assertions_count: status.assertions_count,
|
||||
pow_difficulty: status.pow_difficulty,
|
||||
pow_required: status.pow_required,
|
||||
base_quota_limit: status.base_quota_limit,
|
||||
effective_quota_limit: status.effective_quota_limit,
|
||||
quota_multiplier: status.quota_multiplier,
|
||||
assertions_until_reduced_difficulty,
|
||||
assertions_until_exemption,
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[cfg(test)]
|
||||
mod tests {
|
||||
use super::*;
|
||||
use stemedb_core::types::{AdmissionConfig, TrustTier};
|
||||
use stemedb_storage::AdmissionStatus;
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_tier_dto_conversion() {
|
||||
assert_eq!(TrustTierDto::from(TrustTier::Untrusted), TrustTierDto::Untrusted);
|
||||
assert_eq!(TrustTierDto::from(TrustTier::Limited), TrustTierDto::Limited);
|
||||
assert_eq!(TrustTierDto::from(TrustTier::Verified), TrustTierDto::Verified);
|
||||
assert_eq!(TrustTierDto::from(TrustTier::Trusted), TrustTierDto::Trusted);
|
||||
assert_eq!(TrustTierDto::from(TrustTier::Authority), TrustTierDto::Authority);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_response_from_status_new_agent() {
|
||||
let status = AdmissionStatus::new(0.5, 0, 16);
|
||||
let config = AdmissionConfig::default();
|
||||
|
||||
let response = AdmissionStatusResponse::from_status("abc123".to_string(), &status, &config);
|
||||
|
||||
assert_eq!(response.tier, TrustTierDto::Verified);
|
||||
assert_eq!(response.pow_difficulty, 16);
|
||||
assert!(response.pow_required);
|
||||
assert_eq!(response.assertions_until_reduced_difficulty, Some(10));
|
||||
assert_eq!(response.assertions_until_exemption, Some(50));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_response_from_status_graduated_agent() {
|
||||
let status = AdmissionStatus::new(0.7, 100, 0);
|
||||
let config = AdmissionConfig::default();
|
||||
|
||||
let response = AdmissionStatusResponse::from_status("abc123".to_string(), &status, &config);
|
||||
|
||||
assert_eq!(response.tier, TrustTierDto::Trusted);
|
||||
assert_eq!(response.pow_difficulty, 0);
|
||||
assert!(!response.pow_required);
|
||||
assert_eq!(response.assertions_until_reduced_difficulty, None);
|
||||
assert_eq!(response.assertions_until_exemption, None);
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
@ -10,6 +10,7 @@
|
||||
//! - Internal types → Response DTOs (encode bytes to hex)
|
||||
|
||||
// Module declarations
|
||||
pub mod admission;
|
||||
pub mod advanced;
|
||||
pub mod audit;
|
||||
pub mod concepts;
|
||||
@ -69,6 +70,9 @@ pub use gold_standard::{
|
||||
GoldStandardListResponse, VerificationResult, VerifyAgentRequest,
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
// From admission module
|
||||
pub use admission::{AdmissionStatusResponse, TrustTierDto};
|
||||
|
||||
// From concepts module
|
||||
pub use concepts::{
|
||||
AliasMapping, AliasOriginDto, AliasResponse, AliasSuggestion, ConceptPathInfo,
|
||||
|
||||
67
crates/stemedb-api/src/handlers/admission.rs
Normal file
67
crates/stemedb-api/src/handlers/admission.rs
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
|
||||
//! Handler for admission control status endpoint.
|
||||
|
||||
use axum::{
|
||||
extract::{Query, State},
|
||||
Json,
|
||||
};
|
||||
use serde::Deserialize;
|
||||
use stemedb_storage::AdmissionStore;
|
||||
use tracing::instrument;
|
||||
use utoipa::{IntoParams, ToSchema};
|
||||
|
||||
use crate::{
|
||||
dto::admission::AdmissionStatusResponse, hex::decode_agent_id, state::AppState, Result,
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
/// Query parameters for admission status.
|
||||
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Deserialize, IntoParams, ToSchema)]
|
||||
pub struct AdmissionStatusParams {
|
||||
/// Agent's Ed25519 public key (hex-encoded, 64 chars)
|
||||
pub agent_id: String,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Get admission status for an agent.
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// Returns the agent's current admission status including trust tier,
|
||||
/// PoW requirements, and quota multipliers based on their reputation
|
||||
/// score and assertion count.
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// # Response Headers
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// When admission middleware is enabled, responses also include:
|
||||
/// - `X-Trust-Tier`: Agent's trust tier name
|
||||
/// - `X-PoW-Required`: "true" or "false"
|
||||
/// - `X-PoW-Difficulty`: Required difficulty in bits
|
||||
/// - `X-Quota-Multiplier`: Tier quota multiplier
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// # Graduation Milestones
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// The response includes how many more assertions are needed to reach
|
||||
/// reduced difficulty (10 assertions) or exemption (50 assertions).
|
||||
#[utoipa::path(
|
||||
get,
|
||||
path = "/v1/admission/status",
|
||||
params(AdmissionStatusParams),
|
||||
responses(
|
||||
(status = 200, description = "Admission status retrieved", body = AdmissionStatusResponse),
|
||||
(status = 400, description = "Invalid agent_id format"),
|
||||
),
|
||||
tag = "admission"
|
||||
)]
|
||||
#[instrument(skip(state), fields(agent_id = %params.agent_id))]
|
||||
pub async fn get_admission_status(
|
||||
State(state): State<AppState>,
|
||||
Query(params): Query<AdmissionStatusParams>,
|
||||
) -> Result<Json<AdmissionStatusResponse>> {
|
||||
// Decode agent ID from hex
|
||||
let agent_id = decode_agent_id(¶ms.agent_id)?;
|
||||
|
||||
// Get admission status
|
||||
let status = state.admission_store.get_admission_status(&agent_id).await?;
|
||||
let config = state.admission_store.config();
|
||||
|
||||
// Build response
|
||||
let response = AdmissionStatusResponse::from_status(params.agent_id, &status, config);
|
||||
|
||||
Ok(Json(response))
|
||||
}
|
||||
@ -10,7 +10,9 @@ use crate::{
|
||||
state::AppState,
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
use stemedb_core::types::{Assertion, LifecycleStage, ObjectValue, SignatureEntry, SourceClass};
|
||||
use stemedb_core::types::{
|
||||
Assertion, HlcTimestamp, LifecycleStage, ObjectValue, SignatureEntry, SourceClass,
|
||||
};
|
||||
use stemedb_ingest::worker::serialize_assertion;
|
||||
|
||||
/// Create a new assertion in the knowledge graph.
|
||||
@ -95,6 +97,10 @@ fn dto_to_assertion(req: CreateAssertionRequest) -> Result<Assertion> {
|
||||
.map_err(|e| ApiError::Serialization(format!("Failed to get timestamp: {}", e)))?
|
||||
.as_secs();
|
||||
|
||||
// Generate HLC timestamp for distributed causal ordering
|
||||
// In a full implementation, this would use a shared HLC clock
|
||||
let hlc_timestamp = HlcTimestamp::default();
|
||||
|
||||
Ok(Assertion {
|
||||
subject: req.subject,
|
||||
predicate: req.predicate,
|
||||
@ -109,6 +115,7 @@ fn dto_to_assertion(req: CreateAssertionRequest) -> Result<Assertion> {
|
||||
signatures,
|
||||
confidence: req.confidence,
|
||||
timestamp,
|
||||
hlc_timestamp,
|
||||
vector: req.vector,
|
||||
})
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@ -16,6 +16,7 @@
|
||||
//! This pattern is enforced by OpenAPI annotations and integration tests.
|
||||
|
||||
pub mod admin;
|
||||
pub mod admission;
|
||||
pub mod assert;
|
||||
pub mod audit;
|
||||
pub mod concepts;
|
||||
@ -34,6 +35,7 @@ pub mod trace;
|
||||
pub mod vote;
|
||||
|
||||
pub use admin::decay_trust_ranks;
|
||||
pub use admission::get_admission_status;
|
||||
pub use assert::create_assertion;
|
||||
pub use audit::{get_audit, list_audits};
|
||||
pub use constraints::constraints_query;
|
||||
|
||||
@ -45,12 +45,13 @@ use utoipa::OpenApi;
|
||||
use utoipa_swagger_ui::SwaggerUi;
|
||||
|
||||
pub use error::{ApiError, Result};
|
||||
pub use middleware::{MeterLayer, MeterService};
|
||||
pub use middleware::{AdmissionLayer, AdmissionService, MeterLayer, MeterService};
|
||||
pub use state::AppState;
|
||||
|
||||
// Re-export the path items for OpenAPI
|
||||
use handlers::{
|
||||
admin::__path_decay_trust_ranks,
|
||||
admission::__path_get_admission_status,
|
||||
assert::__path_create_assertion,
|
||||
audit::{__path_get_audit, __path_list_audits},
|
||||
concepts::{
|
||||
@ -79,6 +80,7 @@ use handlers::{
|
||||
#[derive(OpenApi)]
|
||||
#[openapi(
|
||||
paths(
|
||||
get_admission_status,
|
||||
create_assertion,
|
||||
create_epoch,
|
||||
create_vote,
|
||||
@ -176,6 +178,10 @@ use handlers::{
|
||||
dto::AliasSuggestion,
|
||||
dto::SuggestAliasesResponse,
|
||||
dto::ConceptPathInfo,
|
||||
// Admission control
|
||||
dto::AdmissionStatusResponse,
|
||||
dto::TrustTierDto,
|
||||
handlers::admission::AdmissionStatusParams,
|
||||
)
|
||||
),
|
||||
tags(
|
||||
@ -190,6 +196,7 @@ use handlers::{
|
||||
(name = "provenance", description = "Source document storage and retrieval"),
|
||||
(name = "admin", description = "Administrative operations for system maintenance"),
|
||||
(name = "concepts", description = "ConceptPath and alias management for cross-scheme resolution"),
|
||||
(name = "admission", description = "Admission control and PoW requirements"),
|
||||
),
|
||||
info(
|
||||
title = "Episteme (StemeDB) API",
|
||||
@ -242,6 +249,8 @@ pub fn create_router(state: AppState) -> Router {
|
||||
.route("/v1/concepts/aliases", get(handlers::list_aliases))
|
||||
.route("/v1/concepts/suggest", get(handlers::suggest_aliases))
|
||||
.route("/v1/concepts/parse", get(handlers::parse_concept_path))
|
||||
// Admission control endpoints
|
||||
.route("/v1/admission/status", get(handlers::get_admission_status))
|
||||
.with_state(state)
|
||||
.layer(TraceLayer::new_for_http());
|
||||
|
||||
@ -304,6 +313,8 @@ pub fn create_router_with_meter(state: AppState) -> Router {
|
||||
.route("/v1/concepts/aliases", get(handlers::list_aliases))
|
||||
.route("/v1/concepts/suggest", get(handlers::suggest_aliases))
|
||||
.route("/v1/concepts/parse", get(handlers::parse_concept_path))
|
||||
// Admission control endpoints
|
||||
.route("/v1/admission/status", get(handlers::get_admission_status))
|
||||
.with_state(state)
|
||||
.layer(meter_layer)
|
||||
.layer(TraceLayer::new_for_http());
|
||||
@ -313,3 +324,98 @@ pub fn create_router_with_meter(state: AppState) -> Router {
|
||||
.merge(SwaggerUi::new("/swagger-ui").url("/api-docs/openapi.json", ApiDoc::openapi()))
|
||||
.merge(api_router)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Create the axum router with full admission control enabled (The Shield + The Meter).
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// This router enforces both proof-of-work admission control AND economic throttling.
|
||||
/// New/untrusted agents must solve PoW puzzles before their assertions are accepted,
|
||||
/// and all agents are subject to quota limits based on their trust tier.
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// # Admission Control (The Shield)
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// - First 10 assertions: 16-bit PoW (~16 seconds to solve)
|
||||
/// - Assertions 11-50: 1-bit PoW (trivial)
|
||||
/// - 50+ assertions OR trust > 0.6: PoW exempt
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// # Trust Tiers
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// | Trust Range | Tier | Quota Multiplier |
|
||||
/// |-------------|------------|------------------|
|
||||
/// | 0.0-0.3 | Untrusted | 0.1x (1,000/hr) |
|
||||
/// | 0.3-0.5 | Limited | 0.5x (5,000/hr) |
|
||||
/// | 0.5-0.7 | Verified | 1.0x (10,000/hr) |
|
||||
/// | 0.7-0.9 | Trusted | 2.0x (20,000/hr) |
|
||||
/// | 0.9-1.0 | Authority | 10.0x (100k/hr) |
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// # Headers
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// **Request headers:**
|
||||
/// - `X-Agent-Id`: Agent's Ed25519 public key (hex, 64 chars)
|
||||
/// - `X-PoW-Nonce`: PoW solution nonce (decimal, required if PoW needed)
|
||||
/// - `X-PoW-Timestamp`: PoW timestamp (Unix seconds, required if PoW needed)
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// **Response headers:**
|
||||
/// - `X-Trust-Tier`: Agent's trust tier name
|
||||
/// - `X-PoW-Required`: "true" or "false"
|
||||
/// - `X-PoW-Difficulty`: Required difficulty in bits
|
||||
/// - `X-Quota-Remaining`: Tokens left in current window
|
||||
/// - `X-Quota-Limit`: Total tokens per hour
|
||||
/// - `X-Quota-Reset`: Unix timestamp when window resets
|
||||
pub fn create_router_with_admission(state: AppState) -> Router {
|
||||
use std::sync::Arc;
|
||||
|
||||
// Create AdmissionLayer with the admission store from state
|
||||
let admission_layer = AdmissionLayer::new(Arc::clone(&state.admission_store));
|
||||
|
||||
// Create MeterLayer with the quota store from state
|
||||
let meter_layer = MeterLayer::new(Arc::clone(&state.quota_store));
|
||||
|
||||
// Build the API router with admission control and metering
|
||||
// Layer order: admission (outer) -> meter (inner)
|
||||
// This means: check PoW first, then check quota
|
||||
let api_router = Router::new()
|
||||
.route("/v1/assert", post(handlers::create_assertion))
|
||||
.route("/v1/epoch", post(handlers::create_epoch))
|
||||
.route("/v1/vote", post(handlers::create_vote))
|
||||
.route("/v1/query", get(handlers::query_assertions))
|
||||
.route("/v1/skeptic", get(handlers::skeptic_query))
|
||||
.route("/v1/layered", get(handlers::layered_query))
|
||||
.route("/v1/constraints", get(handlers::constraints_query))
|
||||
.route("/v1/health", get(handlers::health_check))
|
||||
.route("/v1/audit/queries", get(handlers::list_audits))
|
||||
.route("/v1/audit/query/{id}", get(handlers::get_audit))
|
||||
.route("/v1/trace", get(handlers::trace))
|
||||
.route("/v1/supersede", post(handlers::supersede))
|
||||
.route("/v1/meter/quota", get(handlers::get_quota_status))
|
||||
.route("/v1/meter/quota/limit", post(handlers::set_quota_limit))
|
||||
.route("/v1/source", post(handlers::store_source))
|
||||
.route("/v1/provenance/{hash}", get(handlers::get_provenance))
|
||||
.route("/v1/admin/decay-trust-ranks", post(handlers::decay_trust_ranks))
|
||||
.route("/v1/admin/escalations", get(handlers::list_escalations))
|
||||
.route("/v1/admin/escalations/:id/resolve", post(handlers::resolve_escalation))
|
||||
.route("/v1/admin/gold-standards", post(handlers::create_gold_standard))
|
||||
.route("/v1/admin/gold-standards", get(handlers::list_gold_standards))
|
||||
.route(
|
||||
"/v1/admin/gold-standards/:subject/:predicate",
|
||||
axum::routing::delete(handlers::remove_gold_standard),
|
||||
)
|
||||
.route("/v1/admin/verify-agent", post(handlers::verify_agent))
|
||||
// Concept hierarchy and alias endpoints
|
||||
.route("/v1/concepts/alias", post(handlers::create_alias))
|
||||
.route("/v1/concepts/alias", axum::routing::delete(handlers::delete_alias))
|
||||
.route("/v1/concepts/resolve", get(handlers::resolve_alias))
|
||||
.route("/v1/concepts/aliases", get(handlers::list_aliases))
|
||||
.route("/v1/concepts/suggest", get(handlers::suggest_aliases))
|
||||
.route("/v1/concepts/parse", get(handlers::parse_concept_path))
|
||||
// Admission control endpoints
|
||||
.route("/v1/admission/status", get(handlers::get_admission_status))
|
||||
.with_state(state)
|
||||
.layer(meter_layer) // Inner: runs second (check quota)
|
||||
.layer(admission_layer) // Outer: runs first (check PoW)
|
||||
.layer(TraceLayer::new_for_http());
|
||||
|
||||
// Mount Swagger UI
|
||||
Router::new()
|
||||
.merge(SwaggerUi::new("/swagger-ui").url("/api-docs/openapi.json", ApiDoc::openapi()))
|
||||
.merge(api_router)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
443
crates/stemedb-api/src/middleware/admission.rs
Normal file
443
crates/stemedb-api/src/middleware/admission.rs
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,443 @@
|
||||
//! Admission control middleware (The Shield).
|
||||
//!
|
||||
//! This middleware enforces proof-of-work requirements for new/untrusted agents.
|
||||
//! It extracts the agent ID from the `X-Agent-Id` header, checks admission status,
|
||||
//! and verifies PoW proofs when required.
|
||||
//!
|
||||
//! # Request Flow
|
||||
//!
|
||||
//! 1. Extract `X-Agent-Id` header (hex-encoded 32-byte public key)
|
||||
//! 2. Get admission status (tier, PoW requirement)
|
||||
//! 3. If PoW required:
|
||||
//! - Extract `X-PoW-Nonce` and `X-PoW-Timestamp` headers
|
||||
//! - Verify proof meets difficulty requirement
|
||||
//! - Return 428 if invalid/missing
|
||||
//! 4. Store admission status in request extensions (for MeterLayer)
|
||||
//! 5. Add response headers (`X-Trust-Tier`, `X-PoW-Required`, etc.)
|
||||
//!
|
||||
//! # Headers
|
||||
//!
|
||||
//! | Header | Direction | Description |
|
||||
//! |--------|-----------|-------------|
|
||||
//! | `X-Agent-Id` | Request | Agent's Ed25519 public key (hex, 64 chars) |
|
||||
//! | `X-PoW-Nonce` | Request | PoW solution nonce (decimal) |
|
||||
//! | `X-PoW-Timestamp` | Request | PoW solution timestamp (Unix seconds) |
|
||||
//! | `X-Trust-Tier` | Response | Agent's trust tier name |
|
||||
//! | `X-PoW-Required` | Response | "true" or "false" |
|
||||
//! | `X-PoW-Difficulty` | Response | Required difficulty in bits |
|
||||
//! | `X-Quota-Multiplier` | Response | Tier quota multiplier |
|
||||
|
||||
use axum::{
|
||||
body::Body,
|
||||
http::{Request, Response, StatusCode},
|
||||
response::IntoResponse,
|
||||
Json,
|
||||
};
|
||||
use futures::future::BoxFuture;
|
||||
use serde::Serialize;
|
||||
use std::sync::Arc;
|
||||
use std::task::{Context, Poll};
|
||||
use stemedb_core::types::PowProof;
|
||||
use stemedb_storage::{AdmissionCheck, AdmissionStatus, AdmissionStatusResult};
|
||||
use tower::{Layer, Service};
|
||||
use tracing::{debug, warn};
|
||||
|
||||
/// Header name for agent identification (shared with MeterLayer).
|
||||
pub const AGENT_ID_HEADER: &str = "x-agent-id";
|
||||
|
||||
/// Header name for PoW nonce.
|
||||
pub const POW_NONCE_HEADER: &str = "x-pow-nonce";
|
||||
|
||||
/// Header name for PoW timestamp.
|
||||
pub const POW_TIMESTAMP_HEADER: &str = "x-pow-timestamp";
|
||||
|
||||
/// Response header for trust tier.
|
||||
pub const TRUST_TIER_HEADER: &str = "x-trust-tier";
|
||||
|
||||
/// Response header indicating whether PoW is required.
|
||||
pub const POW_REQUIRED_HEADER: &str = "x-pow-required";
|
||||
|
||||
/// Response header for PoW difficulty.
|
||||
pub const POW_DIFFICULTY_HEADER: &str = "x-pow-difficulty";
|
||||
|
||||
/// Response header for quota multiplier.
|
||||
pub const QUOTA_MULTIPLIER_HEADER: &str = "x-quota-multiplier";
|
||||
|
||||
/// HTTP 428 Precondition Required - PoW needed.
|
||||
const HTTP_PRECONDITION_REQUIRED: u16 = 428;
|
||||
|
||||
/// Error response for PoW required.
|
||||
#[derive(Debug, Serialize)]
|
||||
struct PowRequiredError {
|
||||
/// Human-readable error message.
|
||||
error: String,
|
||||
/// Error code for programmatic handling.
|
||||
code: String,
|
||||
/// Required PoW difficulty in bits.
|
||||
required_difficulty: u8,
|
||||
/// Whether PoW is required.
|
||||
pow_required: bool,
|
||||
/// Number of assertions the agent has made.
|
||||
agent_assertions: u64,
|
||||
/// Agent's current trust score.
|
||||
agent_trust_score: f32,
|
||||
/// Optional detailed error message (for failed verification).
|
||||
#[serde(skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
|
||||
verification_error: Option<String>,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Tower Layer for admission control.
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// Wrap your router with this layer to enable PoW-based admission control.
|
||||
/// This layer should be applied BEFORE the MeterLayer so that PoW is checked
|
||||
/// before quota is consumed.
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// # Example
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// ```ignore
|
||||
/// let admission_layer = AdmissionLayer::new(admission_store);
|
||||
/// let meter_layer = MeterLayer::new(quota_store);
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// let app = Router::new()
|
||||
/// .route("/v1/assert", post(create_assertion))
|
||||
/// .layer(meter_layer) // Inner: runs second
|
||||
/// .layer(admission_layer) // Outer: runs first
|
||||
/// ```
|
||||
#[derive(Clone)]
|
||||
pub struct AdmissionLayer<A> {
|
||||
admission_store: Arc<A>,
|
||||
/// Paths that bypass admission control (e.g., health checks, status endpoint).
|
||||
bypass_paths: Vec<String>,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
impl<A> AdmissionLayer<A> {
|
||||
/// Create a new AdmissionLayer.
|
||||
pub fn new(admission_store: Arc<A>) -> Self {
|
||||
Self {
|
||||
admission_store,
|
||||
bypass_paths: vec![
|
||||
"/v1/health".to_string(),
|
||||
"/v1/admission/status".to_string(),
|
||||
"/swagger-ui".to_string(),
|
||||
"/api-docs".to_string(),
|
||||
],
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Add a path to bypass admission control.
|
||||
pub fn bypass_path(mut self, path: impl Into<String>) -> Self {
|
||||
self.bypass_paths.push(path.into());
|
||||
self
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
impl<S, A> Layer<S> for AdmissionLayer<A>
|
||||
where
|
||||
A: Clone,
|
||||
{
|
||||
type Service = AdmissionService<S, A>;
|
||||
|
||||
fn layer(&self, inner: S) -> Self::Service {
|
||||
AdmissionService {
|
||||
inner,
|
||||
admission_store: Arc::clone(&self.admission_store),
|
||||
bypass_paths: self.bypass_paths.clone(),
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Tower Service for admission control.
|
||||
#[derive(Clone)]
|
||||
pub struct AdmissionService<S, A> {
|
||||
inner: S,
|
||||
admission_store: Arc<A>,
|
||||
bypass_paths: Vec<String>,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
impl<S, A> AdmissionService<S, A> {
|
||||
/// Check if path should bypass admission control.
|
||||
#[allow(dead_code)] // Used in tests
|
||||
fn should_bypass(&self, path: &str) -> bool {
|
||||
self.bypass_paths.iter().any(|p| path.starts_with(p))
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Extract agent ID from request headers.
|
||||
fn extract_agent_id(req: &Request<Body>) -> Option<[u8; 32]> {
|
||||
req.headers().get(AGENT_ID_HEADER).and_then(|v| v.to_str().ok()).and_then(|s| {
|
||||
let bytes = hex::decode(s).ok()?;
|
||||
if bytes.len() == 32 {
|
||||
let mut arr = [0u8; 32];
|
||||
arr.copy_from_slice(&bytes);
|
||||
Some(arr)
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
None
|
||||
}
|
||||
})
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Extract PoW proof from request headers.
|
||||
fn extract_pow_proof(req: &Request<Body>, agent_id: [u8; 32]) -> Option<PowProof> {
|
||||
let nonce_str = req.headers().get(POW_NONCE_HEADER)?.to_str().ok()?;
|
||||
let timestamp_str = req.headers().get(POW_TIMESTAMP_HEADER)?.to_str().ok()?;
|
||||
|
||||
let nonce: u64 = nonce_str.parse().ok()?;
|
||||
let timestamp: u64 = timestamp_str.parse().ok()?;
|
||||
|
||||
Some(PowProof::new(nonce, agent_id, timestamp))
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Add admission headers to response.
|
||||
fn add_response_headers(response: &mut Response<Body>, status: &AdmissionStatus) {
|
||||
let headers = response.headers_mut();
|
||||
|
||||
if let Ok(v) = status.tier.name().parse() {
|
||||
headers.insert(TRUST_TIER_HEADER, v);
|
||||
}
|
||||
if let Ok(v) = status.pow_required.to_string().parse() {
|
||||
headers.insert(POW_REQUIRED_HEADER, v);
|
||||
}
|
||||
if let Ok(v) = status.pow_difficulty.to_string().parse() {
|
||||
headers.insert(POW_DIFFICULTY_HEADER, v);
|
||||
}
|
||||
if let Ok(v) = format!("{:.1}", status.quota_multiplier).parse() {
|
||||
headers.insert(QUOTA_MULTIPLIER_HEADER, v);
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Build a 428 response for PoW required.
|
||||
fn pow_required_response(
|
||||
status: &AdmissionStatus,
|
||||
verification_error: Option<String>,
|
||||
) -> Response<Body> {
|
||||
let error_message = if verification_error.is_some() {
|
||||
"Proof-of-Work verification failed"
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
"Proof-of-Work required"
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
let error = PowRequiredError {
|
||||
error: error_message.to_string(),
|
||||
code: "POW_REQUIRED".to_string(),
|
||||
required_difficulty: status.pow_difficulty,
|
||||
pow_required: true,
|
||||
agent_assertions: status.assertions_count,
|
||||
agent_trust_score: status.trust_score,
|
||||
verification_error,
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
let mut response = (
|
||||
StatusCode::from_u16(HTTP_PRECONDITION_REQUIRED)
|
||||
.unwrap_or(StatusCode::PRECONDITION_FAILED),
|
||||
Json(error),
|
||||
)
|
||||
.into_response();
|
||||
|
||||
Self::add_response_headers(&mut response, status);
|
||||
response
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
impl<S, A> Service<Request<Body>> for AdmissionService<S, A>
|
||||
where
|
||||
S: Service<Request<Body>, Response = Response<Body>> + Clone + Send + 'static,
|
||||
S::Future: Send,
|
||||
A: AdmissionCheck + 'static,
|
||||
{
|
||||
type Response = Response<Body>;
|
||||
type Error = S::Error;
|
||||
type Future = BoxFuture<'static, Result<Self::Response, Self::Error>>;
|
||||
|
||||
fn poll_ready(&mut self, cx: &mut Context<'_>) -> Poll<Result<(), Self::Error>> {
|
||||
self.inner.poll_ready(cx)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fn call(&mut self, req: Request<Body>) -> Self::Future {
|
||||
let path = req.uri().path().to_string();
|
||||
let admission_store = Arc::clone(&self.admission_store);
|
||||
let bypass_paths = self.bypass_paths.clone();
|
||||
|
||||
// Clone the inner service for the async block
|
||||
let mut inner = self.inner.clone();
|
||||
|
||||
Box::pin(async move {
|
||||
// Check if this path should bypass admission control
|
||||
if bypass_paths.iter().any(|p| path.starts_with(p)) {
|
||||
debug!(path = %path, "Bypassing admission control for path");
|
||||
return inner.call(req).await;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Only check admission for write paths
|
||||
let is_write_path = path.starts_with("/v1/assert")
|
||||
|| path.starts_with("/v1/vote")
|
||||
|| path.starts_with("/v1/supersede");
|
||||
|
||||
if !is_write_path {
|
||||
// Read-only paths don't need admission control
|
||||
debug!(path = %path, "Skipping admission for read-only path");
|
||||
return inner.call(req).await;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Extract agent ID
|
||||
let agent_id = match Self::extract_agent_id(&req) {
|
||||
Some(id) => id,
|
||||
None => {
|
||||
// No agent ID provided, pass through (will fail signature verification)
|
||||
debug!(path = %path, "No agent ID, skipping admission");
|
||||
return inner.call(req).await;
|
||||
}
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
// Extract PoW proof (if provided)
|
||||
let proof = Self::extract_pow_proof(&req, agent_id);
|
||||
|
||||
// Get current timestamp
|
||||
let server_time = std::time::SystemTime::now()
|
||||
.duration_since(std::time::UNIX_EPOCH)
|
||||
.map(|d| d.as_secs())
|
||||
.unwrap_or(0);
|
||||
|
||||
// Check admission
|
||||
let admission_result =
|
||||
match admission_store.check_admission(&agent_id, proof.as_ref(), server_time).await
|
||||
{
|
||||
Ok(result) => result,
|
||||
Err(e) => {
|
||||
warn!(error = %e, "Admission check failed, allowing request");
|
||||
// On error, allow the request (fail open for availability)
|
||||
return inner.call(req).await;
|
||||
}
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
match admission_result {
|
||||
AdmissionStatusResult::Admitted(status) => {
|
||||
debug!(
|
||||
agent = %hex::encode(agent_id),
|
||||
tier = %status.tier,
|
||||
"Agent admitted"
|
||||
);
|
||||
|
||||
// Admission OK - call inner service
|
||||
let mut response = inner.call(req).await?;
|
||||
|
||||
// Add admission headers to response
|
||||
Self::add_response_headers(&mut response, &status);
|
||||
|
||||
Ok(response)
|
||||
}
|
||||
AdmissionStatusResult::PowRequired(status) => {
|
||||
debug!(
|
||||
agent = %hex::encode(agent_id),
|
||||
difficulty = status.pow_difficulty,
|
||||
"PoW required"
|
||||
);
|
||||
|
||||
Ok(Self::pow_required_response(&status, None))
|
||||
}
|
||||
AdmissionStatusResult::PowFailed { status, error } => {
|
||||
debug!(
|
||||
agent = %hex::encode(agent_id),
|
||||
error = %error,
|
||||
"PoW verification failed"
|
||||
);
|
||||
|
||||
Ok(Self::pow_required_response(&status, Some(error.to_string())))
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
})
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Request extension to share admission status with other middleware.
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// The MeterLayer can read this to apply tier-based quota multipliers.
|
||||
#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
|
||||
pub struct AdmissionExtension {
|
||||
/// The agent's admission status.
|
||||
pub status: AdmissionStatus,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[cfg(test)]
|
||||
mod tests {
|
||||
use super::*;
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_bypass_paths() {
|
||||
let service = AdmissionService::<(), ()> {
|
||||
inner: (),
|
||||
admission_store: Arc::new(()),
|
||||
bypass_paths: vec!["/v1/health".to_string(), "/swagger-ui".to_string()],
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
assert!(service.should_bypass("/v1/health"));
|
||||
assert!(service.should_bypass("/swagger-ui/index.html"));
|
||||
assert!(!service.should_bypass("/v1/assert"));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_extract_agent_id() {
|
||||
let req = Request::builder()
|
||||
.header(
|
||||
AGENT_ID_HEADER,
|
||||
"0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef",
|
||||
)
|
||||
.body(Body::empty())
|
||||
.expect("build request");
|
||||
|
||||
let agent_id = AdmissionService::<(), ()>::extract_agent_id(&req);
|
||||
assert!(agent_id.is_some());
|
||||
let id = agent_id.expect("id");
|
||||
assert_eq!(id[0], 0x01);
|
||||
assert_eq!(id[1], 0x23);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_extract_agent_id_invalid_length() {
|
||||
let req = Request::builder()
|
||||
.header(AGENT_ID_HEADER, "0123456789abcdef") // Too short
|
||||
.body(Body::empty())
|
||||
.expect("build request");
|
||||
|
||||
let agent_id = AdmissionService::<(), ()>::extract_agent_id(&req);
|
||||
assert!(agent_id.is_none());
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_extract_pow_proof() {
|
||||
let agent_id = [0xABu8; 32];
|
||||
let req = Request::builder()
|
||||
.header(POW_NONCE_HEADER, "12345")
|
||||
.header(POW_TIMESTAMP_HEADER, "1700000000")
|
||||
.body(Body::empty())
|
||||
.expect("build request");
|
||||
|
||||
let proof = AdmissionService::<(), ()>::extract_pow_proof(&req, agent_id);
|
||||
assert!(proof.is_some());
|
||||
let p = proof.expect("proof");
|
||||
assert_eq!(p.nonce, 12345);
|
||||
assert_eq!(p.timestamp, 1700000000);
|
||||
assert_eq!(p.agent_id, agent_id);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_extract_pow_proof_missing_headers() {
|
||||
let agent_id = [0xABu8; 32];
|
||||
|
||||
// Missing nonce
|
||||
let req = Request::builder()
|
||||
.header(POW_TIMESTAMP_HEADER, "1700000000")
|
||||
.body(Body::empty())
|
||||
.expect("build request");
|
||||
|
||||
let proof = AdmissionService::<(), ()>::extract_pow_proof(&req, agent_id);
|
||||
assert!(proof.is_none());
|
||||
|
||||
// Missing timestamp
|
||||
let req = Request::builder()
|
||||
.header(POW_NONCE_HEADER, "12345")
|
||||
.body(Body::empty())
|
||||
.expect("build request");
|
||||
|
||||
let proof = AdmissionService::<(), ()>::extract_pow_proof(&req, agent_id);
|
||||
assert!(proof.is_none());
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
@ -1,5 +1,11 @@
|
||||
//! Middleware layers for the API.
|
||||
|
||||
pub mod admission;
|
||||
pub mod meter;
|
||||
|
||||
pub use admission::{
|
||||
AdmissionExtension, AdmissionLayer, AdmissionService, AGENT_ID_HEADER, POW_DIFFICULTY_HEADER,
|
||||
POW_NONCE_HEADER, POW_REQUIRED_HEADER, POW_TIMESTAMP_HEADER, QUOTA_MULTIPLIER_HEADER,
|
||||
TRUST_TIER_HEADER,
|
||||
};
|
||||
pub use meter::{MeterLayer, MeterService};
|
||||
|
||||
@ -4,7 +4,10 @@ use std::sync::Arc;
|
||||
use tokio::sync::Mutex;
|
||||
|
||||
use stemedb_query::QueryEngine;
|
||||
use stemedb_storage::{GenericAliasStore, GenericEscalationStore, GenericQuotaStore, HybridStore};
|
||||
use stemedb_storage::{
|
||||
GenericAdmissionStore, GenericAliasStore, GenericEscalationStore, GenericQuotaStore,
|
||||
GenericTrustRankStore, HybridStore,
|
||||
};
|
||||
use stemedb_wal::group_commit::{GroupCommitBuffer, GroupCommitConfig};
|
||||
use stemedb_wal::Journal;
|
||||
|
||||
@ -17,6 +20,12 @@ pub type EscalationStoreImpl = GenericEscalationStore<HybridStore>;
|
||||
/// Alias store type alias for convenience.
|
||||
pub type AliasStoreImpl = GenericAliasStore<Arc<HybridStore>>;
|
||||
|
||||
/// Trust rank store type alias for convenience.
|
||||
pub type TrustRankStoreImpl = GenericTrustRankStore<Arc<HybridStore>>;
|
||||
|
||||
/// Admission store type alias for convenience.
|
||||
pub type AdmissionStoreImpl = GenericAdmissionStore<Arc<TrustRankStoreImpl>>;
|
||||
|
||||
/// Application state shared across all HTTP handlers.
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// This is passed to every request via axum's `State` extractor.
|
||||
@ -39,6 +48,12 @@ pub struct AppState {
|
||||
|
||||
/// Alias store for cross-scheme entity resolution
|
||||
pub alias_store: Arc<AliasStoreImpl>,
|
||||
|
||||
/// Trust rank store for reputation tracking
|
||||
pub trust_rank_store: Arc<TrustRankStoreImpl>,
|
||||
|
||||
/// Admission store for PoW-based admission control (The Shield)
|
||||
pub admission_store: Arc<AdmissionStoreImpl>,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
impl AppState {
|
||||
@ -60,7 +75,22 @@ impl AppState {
|
||||
// Create alias store for cross-scheme concept resolution
|
||||
let alias_store = Arc::new(GenericAliasStore::new(Arc::clone(&store)));
|
||||
|
||||
Self { commit_buffer, journal, store, quota_store, escalation_store, alias_store }
|
||||
// Create trust rank store for reputation tracking
|
||||
let trust_rank_store = Arc::new(GenericTrustRankStore::new(Arc::clone(&store)));
|
||||
|
||||
// Create admission store for PoW-based admission control
|
||||
let admission_store = Arc::new(GenericAdmissionStore::new(Arc::clone(&trust_rank_store)));
|
||||
|
||||
Self {
|
||||
commit_buffer,
|
||||
journal,
|
||||
store,
|
||||
quota_store,
|
||||
escalation_store,
|
||||
alias_store,
|
||||
trust_rank_store,
|
||||
admission_store,
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Get a QueryEngine for this state.
|
||||
|
||||
125
crates/stemedb-api/tests/admission_integration.rs
Normal file
125
crates/stemedb-api/tests/admission_integration.rs
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,125 @@
|
||||
//! Integration tests for admission control (The Shield).
|
||||
//!
|
||||
//! These tests verify the DTO conversion and response formatting.
|
||||
//! The core admission logic is tested in stemedb-storage unit tests.
|
||||
|
||||
use stemedb_api::dto::{AdmissionStatusResponse, TrustTierDto};
|
||||
use stemedb_core::types::{AdmissionConfig, TrustTier};
|
||||
use stemedb_storage::AdmissionStatus;
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_trust_tier_dto_conversion() {
|
||||
// Test all tier conversions
|
||||
assert_eq!(TrustTierDto::from(TrustTier::Untrusted), TrustTierDto::Untrusted);
|
||||
assert_eq!(TrustTierDto::from(TrustTier::Limited), TrustTierDto::Limited);
|
||||
assert_eq!(TrustTierDto::from(TrustTier::Verified), TrustTierDto::Verified);
|
||||
assert_eq!(TrustTierDto::from(TrustTier::Trusted), TrustTierDto::Trusted);
|
||||
assert_eq!(TrustTierDto::from(TrustTier::Authority), TrustTierDto::Authority);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_admission_status_response_new_agent() {
|
||||
let status = AdmissionStatus::new(0.5, 0, 16);
|
||||
let config = AdmissionConfig::default();
|
||||
|
||||
let response = AdmissionStatusResponse::from_status("abc123".to_string(), &status, &config);
|
||||
|
||||
assert_eq!(response.tier, TrustTierDto::Verified);
|
||||
assert!((response.trust_score - 0.5).abs() < f32::EPSILON);
|
||||
assert_eq!(response.assertions_count, 0);
|
||||
assert_eq!(response.pow_difficulty, 16);
|
||||
assert!(response.pow_required);
|
||||
assert_eq!(response.base_quota_limit, 10_000);
|
||||
assert_eq!(response.effective_quota_limit, 10_000);
|
||||
assert!((response.quota_multiplier - 1.0).abs() < f32::EPSILON);
|
||||
|
||||
// New agent should see milestones
|
||||
assert_eq!(response.assertions_until_reduced_difficulty, Some(10));
|
||||
assert_eq!(response.assertions_until_exemption, Some(50));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_admission_status_response_graduated() {
|
||||
let status = AdmissionStatus::new(0.7, 100, 0);
|
||||
let config = AdmissionConfig::default();
|
||||
|
||||
let response = AdmissionStatusResponse::from_status("graduated".to_string(), &status, &config);
|
||||
|
||||
assert_eq!(response.tier, TrustTierDto::Trusted);
|
||||
assert!(!response.pow_required);
|
||||
assert_eq!(response.pow_difficulty, 0);
|
||||
assert_eq!(response.effective_quota_limit, 20_000);
|
||||
|
||||
// Graduated agent shouldn't see milestones
|
||||
assert_eq!(response.assertions_until_reduced_difficulty, None);
|
||||
assert_eq!(response.assertions_until_exemption, None);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_admission_status_response_partially_graduated() {
|
||||
// Agent with 25 assertions (past initial, not yet graduated)
|
||||
let status = AdmissionStatus::new(0.4, 25, 1);
|
||||
let config = AdmissionConfig::default();
|
||||
|
||||
let response = AdmissionStatusResponse::from_status("partial".to_string(), &status, &config);
|
||||
|
||||
assert_eq!(response.tier, TrustTierDto::Limited);
|
||||
assert!(response.pow_required);
|
||||
assert_eq!(response.pow_difficulty, 1);
|
||||
|
||||
// Past initial threshold, so no "until reduced" milestone
|
||||
assert_eq!(response.assertions_until_reduced_difficulty, None);
|
||||
// Still 25 assertions until exemption
|
||||
assert_eq!(response.assertions_until_exemption, Some(25));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_all_tier_quotas() {
|
||||
let config = AdmissionConfig::default();
|
||||
|
||||
// Test each tier
|
||||
let test_cases = [
|
||||
(0.1, TrustTierDto::Untrusted, 1_000),
|
||||
(0.4, TrustTierDto::Limited, 5_000),
|
||||
(0.5, TrustTierDto::Verified, 10_000),
|
||||
(0.8, TrustTierDto::Trusted, 20_000),
|
||||
(0.95, TrustTierDto::Authority, 100_000),
|
||||
];
|
||||
|
||||
for (score, expected_tier, expected_quota) in test_cases {
|
||||
let status = AdmissionStatus::new(score, 100, 0);
|
||||
let response = AdmissionStatusResponse::from_status("test".to_string(), &status, &config);
|
||||
|
||||
assert_eq!(response.tier, expected_tier, "Wrong tier for score {}", score);
|
||||
assert_eq!(
|
||||
response.effective_quota_limit, expected_quota,
|
||||
"Wrong quota for score {}",
|
||||
score
|
||||
);
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_pow_difficulty_graduation() {
|
||||
let config = AdmissionConfig::default();
|
||||
|
||||
// First 10 assertions: 16 bits
|
||||
for count in 0..10 {
|
||||
let difficulty = config.compute_difficulty(count, 0.3);
|
||||
assert_eq!(difficulty, 16, "Wrong difficulty for {} assertions", count);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// 10-49: 1 bit
|
||||
for count in 10..50 {
|
||||
let difficulty = config.compute_difficulty(count, 0.3);
|
||||
assert_eq!(difficulty, 1, "Wrong difficulty for {} assertions", count);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// 50+: exempt
|
||||
let difficulty = config.compute_difficulty(50, 0.3);
|
||||
assert_eq!(difficulty, 0);
|
||||
|
||||
// Trust exemption
|
||||
let difficulty = config.compute_difficulty(5, 0.6);
|
||||
assert_eq!(difficulty, 0, "High trust should be exempt");
|
||||
}
|
||||
@ -61,3 +61,4 @@ features = ["env-filter"]
|
||||
[dev-dependencies]
|
||||
tempfile = "3.10"
|
||||
tokio-test = "0.4"
|
||||
stemedb-merkle = { path = "../stemedb-merkle" }
|
||||
|
||||
@ -271,11 +271,7 @@ pub async fn handle_health(State(state): State<Arc<GatewayState>>) -> Json<Healt
|
||||
let members = state.membership.members();
|
||||
let joined = state.membership.is_joined();
|
||||
|
||||
Json(HealthResponse {
|
||||
healthy: joined && !members.is_empty(),
|
||||
reachable_nodes: members.len(),
|
||||
joined,
|
||||
})
|
||||
Json(HealthResponse { healthy: joined, reachable_nodes: members.len(), joined })
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// GET /v1/cluster/status - Cluster status.
|
||||
|
||||
464
crates/stemedb-cluster/tests/availability.rs
Normal file
464
crates/stemedb-cluster/tests/availability.rs
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,464 @@
|
||||
//! Availability tests for distributed consistency.
|
||||
//!
|
||||
//! These tests verify that StemeDB provides high availability:
|
||||
//! - Reads succeed on any replica that has the shard
|
||||
//! - Writes are accepted by any replica (not just leader)
|
||||
//! - Node failures don't block operations on other nodes
|
||||
#![allow(clippy::unwrap_used, clippy::expect_used)]
|
||||
|
||||
use std::collections::HashMap;
|
||||
use std::net::{IpAddr, Ipv4Addr, SocketAddr};
|
||||
use std::sync::Arc;
|
||||
|
||||
use stemedb_cluster::config::SwimConfig;
|
||||
use stemedb_cluster::membership::{NodeId, NodeInfo, SwimMembership};
|
||||
use stemedb_cluster::sharding::{MetaRange, RangeRouter};
|
||||
use stemedb_core::serde::serialize;
|
||||
use stemedb_core::testing::AssertionBuilder;
|
||||
use stemedb_core::types::HlcTimestamp;
|
||||
use stemedb_merkle::MerkleTree;
|
||||
use stemedb_storage::crdt::{AssertionTransfer, CrdtAssertionStore};
|
||||
use stemedb_storage::HybridStore;
|
||||
use tempfile::tempdir;
|
||||
|
||||
// =============================================================================
|
||||
// Test Helpers
|
||||
// =============================================================================
|
||||
|
||||
fn test_addr(port: u16) -> SocketAddr {
|
||||
SocketAddr::new(IpAddr::V4(Ipv4Addr::new(127, 0, 0, 1)), port)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fn test_node_id(n: u8) -> NodeId {
|
||||
NodeId::from_bytes([n; 16])
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fn test_node_info(n: u8) -> NodeInfo {
|
||||
let id = test_node_id(n);
|
||||
NodeInfo::new(id, test_addr(9090 + n as u16), test_addr(8080 + n as u16))
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// A simulated cluster node for availability testing.
|
||||
struct AvailabilityNode {
|
||||
id: NodeId,
|
||||
#[allow(dead_code)]
|
||||
membership: Arc<SwimMembership>,
|
||||
router: Arc<RangeRouter>,
|
||||
#[allow(dead_code)]
|
||||
store: Arc<HybridStore>,
|
||||
crdt_store: Arc<CrdtAssertionStore<HybridStore>>,
|
||||
merkle_tree: MerkleTree,
|
||||
hash_to_data: HashMap<[u8; 32], (String, Vec<u8>)>,
|
||||
/// Simulated node failure state.
|
||||
failed: bool,
|
||||
#[allow(dead_code)]
|
||||
temp_dir: tempfile::TempDir,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
impl AvailabilityNode {
|
||||
fn new(n: u8) -> Self {
|
||||
let id = test_node_id(n);
|
||||
let info = test_node_info(n);
|
||||
|
||||
let temp_dir = tempdir().expect("create temp dir");
|
||||
let store = Arc::new(HybridStore::open(temp_dir.path()).expect("open store"));
|
||||
let crdt_store = Arc::new(CrdtAssertionStore::new(store.clone(), *id.as_bytes()));
|
||||
|
||||
let membership = Arc::new(SwimMembership::new(info, SwimConfig::default()));
|
||||
let router = Arc::new(RangeRouter::new(id));
|
||||
|
||||
Self {
|
||||
id,
|
||||
membership,
|
||||
router,
|
||||
store,
|
||||
crdt_store,
|
||||
merkle_tree: MerkleTree::new(),
|
||||
hash_to_data: HashMap::new(),
|
||||
failed: false,
|
||||
temp_dir,
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fn init_shards(&self, nodes: &[NodeId], num_shards: u32, replication_factor: u32) {
|
||||
let meta = MetaRange::with_initial_shards(num_shards, nodes, replication_factor);
|
||||
self.router.update_meta_range(meta);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Check if this node is a replica for the given subject's shard.
|
||||
#[allow(dead_code)]
|
||||
fn is_replica_for(&self, subject: &str) -> bool {
|
||||
if self.failed {
|
||||
return false;
|
||||
}
|
||||
let shard_id = match self.router.route_subject(subject) {
|
||||
Ok(id) => id,
|
||||
Err(_) => return false,
|
||||
};
|
||||
match self.router.get_replicas(shard_id) {
|
||||
Ok(replicas) => replicas.contains(&self.id),
|
||||
Err(_) => false,
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Check if this node is the leader for the given subject's shard.
|
||||
fn is_leader_for(&self, subject: &str) -> bool {
|
||||
if self.failed {
|
||||
return false;
|
||||
}
|
||||
let shard_id = match self.router.route_subject(subject) {
|
||||
Ok(id) => id,
|
||||
Err(_) => return false,
|
||||
};
|
||||
match self.router.get_leader(shard_id) {
|
||||
Ok(leader) => leader == self.id,
|
||||
Err(_) => false,
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Write an assertion (succeeds if node is not failed).
|
||||
async fn write(&mut self, subject: &str, predicate: &str, hlc_time: u64) -> Option<[u8; 32]> {
|
||||
if self.failed {
|
||||
return None;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
let assertion = AssertionBuilder::new()
|
||||
.subject(subject)
|
||||
.predicate(predicate)
|
||||
.hlc_timestamp(HlcTimestamp::new(hlc_time, *self.id.as_bytes()))
|
||||
.source_hash(rand_hash())
|
||||
.build();
|
||||
|
||||
let data = serialize(&assertion).expect("serialize");
|
||||
let hash = self.crdt_store.put_assertion(subject, &data).await.expect("put");
|
||||
|
||||
self.merkle_tree.insert(hash).expect("insert");
|
||||
self.hash_to_data.insert(hash, (subject.to_string(), data));
|
||||
|
||||
Some(hash)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Read assertion data (succeeds if node is not failed).
|
||||
async fn read(&self, subject: &str, hash: &[u8; 32]) -> Option<Vec<u8>> {
|
||||
if self.failed {
|
||||
return None;
|
||||
}
|
||||
self.crdt_store.get_assertion(subject, hash).await.ok().flatten()
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Simulate node failure.
|
||||
fn fail(&mut self) {
|
||||
self.failed = true;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Recover from failure.
|
||||
#[allow(dead_code)]
|
||||
fn recover(&mut self) {
|
||||
self.failed = false;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Check if node is available.
|
||||
fn is_available(&self) -> bool {
|
||||
!self.failed
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Get all leaves.
|
||||
fn leaves(&self) -> Vec<[u8; 32]> {
|
||||
self.merkle_tree.leaves().to_vec()
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Sync from another node.
|
||||
async fn sync_from(&mut self, other: &AvailabilityNode) {
|
||||
if self.failed || other.failed {
|
||||
return;
|
||||
}
|
||||
let my_leaves: std::collections::HashSet<_> = self.leaves().into_iter().collect();
|
||||
|
||||
for hash in other.leaves() {
|
||||
if !my_leaves.contains(&hash) {
|
||||
if let Some((subject, data)) = other.hash_to_data.get(&hash) {
|
||||
let transfer = AssertionTransfer { hash, data: data.clone() };
|
||||
if self
|
||||
.crdt_store
|
||||
.merge_with_data(subject, std::slice::from_ref(&transfer))
|
||||
.await
|
||||
.is_ok()
|
||||
{
|
||||
self.merkle_tree.insert(hash).expect("insert");
|
||||
self.hash_to_data.insert(hash, (subject.clone(), data.clone()));
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fn rand_hash() -> [u8; 32] {
|
||||
use std::time::{SystemTime, UNIX_EPOCH};
|
||||
let nanos = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).map(|d| d.as_nanos()).unwrap_or(0);
|
||||
let mut hash = [0u8; 32];
|
||||
hash[..16].copy_from_slice(&nanos.to_le_bytes());
|
||||
let tid = std::thread::current().id();
|
||||
hash[16..24].copy_from_slice(&format!("{tid:?}").as_bytes()[..8.min(format!("{tid:?}").len())]);
|
||||
hash
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// =============================================================================
|
||||
// Availability Tests
|
||||
// =============================================================================
|
||||
|
||||
/// Test: Read succeeds on any replica that has the shard.
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// Write data to one node, sync to replicas, verify read works on any replica.
|
||||
#[tokio::test]
|
||||
async fn test_read_any_replica() {
|
||||
let mut node_a = AvailabilityNode::new(1);
|
||||
let mut node_b = AvailabilityNode::new(2);
|
||||
let mut node_c = AvailabilityNode::new(3);
|
||||
|
||||
let nodes = vec![node_a.id, node_b.id, node_c.id];
|
||||
|
||||
// RF=3 means all nodes are replicas for all shards
|
||||
node_a.init_shards(&nodes, 4, 3);
|
||||
node_b.init_shards(&nodes, 4, 3);
|
||||
node_c.init_shards(&nodes, 4, 3);
|
||||
|
||||
// Write on node A
|
||||
let subject = "test:subject";
|
||||
let hash = node_a.write(subject, "predicate", 1000).await.expect("write");
|
||||
|
||||
// Sync to all replicas
|
||||
node_b.sync_from(&node_a).await;
|
||||
node_c.sync_from(&node_a).await;
|
||||
|
||||
// Read should succeed on all replicas
|
||||
let data_a = node_a.read(subject, &hash).await;
|
||||
let data_b = node_b.read(subject, &hash).await;
|
||||
let data_c = node_c.read(subject, &hash).await;
|
||||
|
||||
assert!(data_a.is_some(), "Read should succeed on node A (writer)");
|
||||
assert!(data_b.is_some(), "Read should succeed on node B (replica)");
|
||||
assert!(data_c.is_some(), "Read should succeed on node C (replica)");
|
||||
|
||||
// Data should be identical
|
||||
assert_eq!(data_a, data_b, "Data should match across replicas A and B");
|
||||
assert_eq!(data_b, data_c, "Data should match across replicas B and C");
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Test: Write is accepted by any replica (not just leader).
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// StemeDB uses leaderless replication - any replica can accept writes.
|
||||
#[tokio::test]
|
||||
async fn test_write_any_replica() {
|
||||
let mut node_a = AvailabilityNode::new(1);
|
||||
let mut node_b = AvailabilityNode::new(2);
|
||||
let mut node_c = AvailabilityNode::new(3);
|
||||
|
||||
let nodes = vec![node_a.id, node_b.id, node_c.id];
|
||||
|
||||
// RF=3 means all nodes are replicas
|
||||
node_a.init_shards(&nodes, 4, 3);
|
||||
node_b.init_shards(&nodes, 4, 3);
|
||||
node_c.init_shards(&nodes, 4, 3);
|
||||
|
||||
let subject = "test:subject";
|
||||
|
||||
// Identify who is leader and who isn't
|
||||
let a_is_leader = node_a.is_leader_for(subject);
|
||||
let b_is_leader = node_b.is_leader_for(subject);
|
||||
|
||||
// Find a non-leader node
|
||||
let (non_leader_writes, non_leader_id) = if !a_is_leader {
|
||||
let hash = node_a.write(subject, "from-non-leader", 1000).await;
|
||||
(hash.is_some(), "A")
|
||||
} else if !b_is_leader {
|
||||
let hash = node_b.write(subject, "from-non-leader", 1000).await;
|
||||
(hash.is_some(), "B")
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
let hash = node_c.write(subject, "from-non-leader", 1000).await;
|
||||
(hash.is_some(), "C")
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
assert!(
|
||||
non_leader_writes,
|
||||
"Non-leader node {} should accept writes (leaderless replication)",
|
||||
non_leader_id
|
||||
);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Test: Node failure doesn't block operations on other nodes.
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// When one node fails, other nodes should continue serving reads and writes.
|
||||
#[tokio::test]
|
||||
async fn test_node_failure_isolation() {
|
||||
let mut node_a = AvailabilityNode::new(1);
|
||||
let mut node_b = AvailabilityNode::new(2);
|
||||
let mut node_c = AvailabilityNode::new(3);
|
||||
|
||||
let nodes = vec![node_a.id, node_b.id, node_c.id];
|
||||
|
||||
node_a.init_shards(&nodes, 4, 3);
|
||||
node_b.init_shards(&nodes, 4, 3);
|
||||
node_c.init_shards(&nodes, 4, 3);
|
||||
|
||||
// Initial write on A
|
||||
let subject = "test:subject";
|
||||
let hash1 = node_a.write(subject, "before-failure", 1000).await.expect("write");
|
||||
|
||||
// Sync before failure
|
||||
node_b.sync_from(&node_a).await;
|
||||
node_c.sync_from(&node_a).await;
|
||||
|
||||
// NODE A FAILS
|
||||
node_a.fail();
|
||||
assert!(!node_a.is_available(), "Node A should be unavailable");
|
||||
|
||||
// Verify node A operations fail
|
||||
let a_read = node_a.read(subject, &hash1).await;
|
||||
let a_write = node_a.write(subject, "during-failure", 2000).await;
|
||||
assert!(a_read.is_none(), "Read on failed node should fail");
|
||||
assert!(a_write.is_none(), "Write on failed node should fail");
|
||||
|
||||
// BUT: B and C should continue working normally
|
||||
assert!(node_b.is_available(), "Node B should still be available");
|
||||
assert!(node_c.is_available(), "Node C should still be available");
|
||||
|
||||
// Reads still work on B and C
|
||||
let b_read = node_b.read(subject, &hash1).await;
|
||||
let c_read = node_c.read(subject, &hash1).await;
|
||||
assert!(b_read.is_some(), "Read on node B should succeed during A failure");
|
||||
assert!(c_read.is_some(), "Read on node C should succeed during A failure");
|
||||
|
||||
// Writes still work on B and C
|
||||
let hash2 = node_b.write(subject, "during-a-failure", 2000).await;
|
||||
let hash3 = node_c.write(subject, "also-during-failure", 3000).await;
|
||||
assert!(hash2.is_some(), "Write on node B should succeed during A failure");
|
||||
assert!(hash3.is_some(), "Write on node C should succeed during A failure");
|
||||
|
||||
// Sync between surviving nodes
|
||||
node_b.sync_from(&node_c).await;
|
||||
node_c.sync_from(&node_b).await;
|
||||
|
||||
// Both B and C should have all data
|
||||
assert_eq!(node_b.leaves().len(), 3, "Node B should have 3 assertions");
|
||||
assert_eq!(node_c.leaves().len(), 3, "Node C should have 3 assertions");
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Test: Read availability with quorum.
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// With RF=3 and 2 nodes available, reads should succeed.
|
||||
#[tokio::test]
|
||||
async fn test_read_quorum_availability() {
|
||||
let mut node_a = AvailabilityNode::new(1);
|
||||
let mut node_b = AvailabilityNode::new(2);
|
||||
let mut node_c = AvailabilityNode::new(3);
|
||||
|
||||
let nodes = vec![node_a.id, node_b.id, node_c.id];
|
||||
|
||||
node_a.init_shards(&nodes, 4, 3);
|
||||
node_b.init_shards(&nodes, 4, 3);
|
||||
node_c.init_shards(&nodes, 4, 3);
|
||||
|
||||
// Write and sync to all
|
||||
let subject = "test:subject";
|
||||
let hash = node_a.write(subject, "predicate", 1000).await.expect("write");
|
||||
node_b.sync_from(&node_a).await;
|
||||
node_c.sync_from(&node_a).await;
|
||||
|
||||
// Fail one node - quorum (2/3) still available
|
||||
node_c.fail();
|
||||
|
||||
// Read should succeed on remaining nodes
|
||||
let read_a = node_a.read(subject, &hash).await;
|
||||
let read_b = node_b.read(subject, &hash).await;
|
||||
|
||||
assert!(read_a.is_some(), "Read on A should succeed with quorum available");
|
||||
assert!(read_b.is_some(), "Read on B should succeed with quorum available");
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Test: Write availability with quorum.
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// With RF=3 and 2 nodes available, writes should succeed.
|
||||
#[tokio::test]
|
||||
async fn test_write_quorum_availability() {
|
||||
let mut node_a = AvailabilityNode::new(1);
|
||||
let mut node_b = AvailabilityNode::new(2);
|
||||
let mut node_c = AvailabilityNode::new(3);
|
||||
|
||||
let nodes = vec![node_a.id, node_b.id, node_c.id];
|
||||
|
||||
node_a.init_shards(&nodes, 4, 3);
|
||||
node_b.init_shards(&nodes, 4, 3);
|
||||
node_c.init_shards(&nodes, 4, 3);
|
||||
|
||||
// Fail one node
|
||||
node_c.fail();
|
||||
|
||||
// Writes should succeed on remaining nodes
|
||||
let subject = "test:subject";
|
||||
let write_a = node_a.write(subject, "pred1", 1000).await;
|
||||
let write_b = node_b.write(subject, "pred2", 2000).await;
|
||||
|
||||
assert!(write_a.is_some(), "Write on A should succeed with quorum available");
|
||||
assert!(write_b.is_some(), "Write on B should succeed with quorum available");
|
||||
|
||||
// Sync between surviving nodes
|
||||
node_a.sync_from(&node_b).await;
|
||||
node_b.sync_from(&node_a).await;
|
||||
|
||||
// Both should have both writes
|
||||
assert_eq!(node_a.leaves().len(), 2);
|
||||
assert_eq!(node_b.leaves().len(), 2);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Test: All replicas eventually have identical data.
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// This is the core eventual consistency guarantee.
|
||||
#[tokio::test]
|
||||
async fn test_eventual_consistency_across_replicas() {
|
||||
let mut node_a = AvailabilityNode::new(1);
|
||||
let mut node_b = AvailabilityNode::new(2);
|
||||
let mut node_c = AvailabilityNode::new(3);
|
||||
|
||||
let nodes = vec![node_a.id, node_b.id, node_c.id];
|
||||
|
||||
node_a.init_shards(&nodes, 4, 3);
|
||||
node_b.init_shards(&nodes, 4, 3);
|
||||
node_c.init_shards(&nodes, 4, 3);
|
||||
|
||||
// Each node writes independently
|
||||
let h1 = node_a.write("s1", "p1", 1000).await.expect("write");
|
||||
let h2 = node_b.write("s2", "p2", 2000).await.expect("write");
|
||||
let h3 = node_c.write("s3", "p3", 3000).await.expect("write");
|
||||
|
||||
// Before sync: each has only its own
|
||||
assert_eq!(node_a.leaves().len(), 1);
|
||||
assert_eq!(node_b.leaves().len(), 1);
|
||||
assert_eq!(node_c.leaves().len(), 1);
|
||||
|
||||
// Full mesh sync (simulating anti-entropy)
|
||||
node_a.sync_from(&node_b).await;
|
||||
node_a.sync_from(&node_c).await;
|
||||
node_b.sync_from(&node_a).await;
|
||||
node_b.sync_from(&node_c).await;
|
||||
node_c.sync_from(&node_a).await;
|
||||
node_c.sync_from(&node_b).await;
|
||||
|
||||
// After sync: all have all data
|
||||
assert_eq!(node_a.leaves().len(), 3, "Node A should have all 3 assertions");
|
||||
assert_eq!(node_b.leaves().len(), 3, "Node B should have all 3 assertions");
|
||||
assert_eq!(node_c.leaves().len(), 3, "Node C should have all 3 assertions");
|
||||
|
||||
// Verify specific hashes
|
||||
let a_leaves: std::collections::HashSet<_> = node_a.leaves().into_iter().collect();
|
||||
let b_leaves: std::collections::HashSet<_> = node_b.leaves().into_iter().collect();
|
||||
let c_leaves: std::collections::HashSet<_> = node_c.leaves().into_iter().collect();
|
||||
|
||||
assert!(a_leaves.contains(&h1) && a_leaves.contains(&h2) && a_leaves.contains(&h3));
|
||||
assert!(b_leaves.contains(&h1) && b_leaves.contains(&h2) && b_leaves.contains(&h3));
|
||||
assert!(c_leaves.contains(&h1) && c_leaves.contains(&h2) && c_leaves.contains(&h3));
|
||||
|
||||
// All sets should be identical
|
||||
assert_eq!(a_leaves, b_leaves, "A and B should have identical data");
|
||||
assert_eq!(b_leaves, c_leaves, "B and C should have identical data");
|
||||
}
|
||||
430
crates/stemedb-cluster/tests/partition_tolerance.rs
Normal file
430
crates/stemedb-cluster/tests/partition_tolerance.rs
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,430 @@
|
||||
//! Partition tolerance tests for distributed consistency.
|
||||
//!
|
||||
//! These tests verify that StemeDB continues to accept writes during network
|
||||
//! partitions and converges correctly after partition heals.
|
||||
//!
|
||||
//! # Test Strategy
|
||||
//!
|
||||
//! We simulate partitions by:
|
||||
//! 1. Creating multiple in-process "nodes" with separate membership views
|
||||
//! 2. "Partitioning" = stopping gossip propagation between groups
|
||||
//! 3. Verifying writes succeed on both sides of the partition
|
||||
//! 4. "Healing" = resuming gossip propagation
|
||||
//! 5. Verifying convergence via CRDT merge
|
||||
#![allow(clippy::unwrap_used, clippy::expect_used)]
|
||||
|
||||
use std::collections::{HashMap, HashSet};
|
||||
use std::net::{IpAddr, Ipv4Addr, SocketAddr};
|
||||
use std::sync::Arc;
|
||||
|
||||
use stemedb_cluster::config::SwimConfig;
|
||||
use stemedb_cluster::membership::{NodeId, NodeInfo, SwimMembership};
|
||||
use stemedb_cluster::sharding::{MetaRange, RangeRouter};
|
||||
use stemedb_core::serde::serialize;
|
||||
use stemedb_core::testing::AssertionBuilder;
|
||||
use stemedb_core::types::HlcTimestamp;
|
||||
use stemedb_merkle::MerkleTree;
|
||||
use stemedb_storage::crdt::{AssertionTransfer, CrdtAssertionStore};
|
||||
use stemedb_storage::HybridStore;
|
||||
use tempfile::tempdir;
|
||||
|
||||
// =============================================================================
|
||||
// Test Helpers
|
||||
// =============================================================================
|
||||
|
||||
fn test_addr(port: u16) -> SocketAddr {
|
||||
SocketAddr::new(IpAddr::V4(Ipv4Addr::new(127, 0, 0, 1)), port)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fn test_node_id(n: u8) -> NodeId {
|
||||
NodeId::from_bytes([n; 16])
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fn test_node_info(n: u8) -> NodeInfo {
|
||||
let id = test_node_id(n);
|
||||
NodeInfo::new(id, test_addr(9090 + n as u16), test_addr(8080 + n as u16))
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// A simulated cluster node for partition tolerance testing.
|
||||
struct SimNode {
|
||||
id: NodeId,
|
||||
#[allow(dead_code)]
|
||||
membership: Arc<SwimMembership>,
|
||||
router: Arc<RangeRouter>,
|
||||
#[allow(dead_code)]
|
||||
store: Arc<HybridStore>,
|
||||
crdt_store: Arc<CrdtAssertionStore<HybridStore>>,
|
||||
merkle_tree: MerkleTree,
|
||||
/// Maps hash -> (subject, data) for sync operations.
|
||||
hash_to_data: HashMap<[u8; 32], (String, Vec<u8>)>,
|
||||
#[allow(dead_code)]
|
||||
temp_dir: tempfile::TempDir,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
impl SimNode {
|
||||
/// Create a new simulated node.
|
||||
fn new(n: u8) -> Self {
|
||||
let id = test_node_id(n);
|
||||
let info = test_node_info(n);
|
||||
|
||||
let temp_dir = tempdir().expect("create temp dir");
|
||||
let store = Arc::new(HybridStore::open(temp_dir.path()).expect("open store"));
|
||||
let crdt_store = Arc::new(CrdtAssertionStore::new(store.clone(), *id.as_bytes()));
|
||||
|
||||
let membership = Arc::new(SwimMembership::new(info, SwimConfig::default()));
|
||||
let router = Arc::new(RangeRouter::new(id));
|
||||
|
||||
Self {
|
||||
id,
|
||||
membership,
|
||||
router,
|
||||
store,
|
||||
crdt_store,
|
||||
merkle_tree: MerkleTree::new(),
|
||||
hash_to_data: HashMap::new(),
|
||||
temp_dir,
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Initialize sharding with the given nodes.
|
||||
fn init_shards(&self, nodes: &[NodeId], num_shards: u32, replication_factor: u32) {
|
||||
let meta = MetaRange::with_initial_shards(num_shards, nodes, replication_factor);
|
||||
self.router.update_meta_range(meta);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Add an assertion to this node (simulating a local write).
|
||||
async fn write_assertion(&mut self, subject: &str, predicate: &str, hlc_time: u64) -> [u8; 32] {
|
||||
let assertion = AssertionBuilder::new()
|
||||
.subject(subject)
|
||||
.predicate(predicate)
|
||||
.hlc_timestamp(HlcTimestamp::new(hlc_time, *self.id.as_bytes()))
|
||||
.source_hash(rand_hash())
|
||||
.build();
|
||||
|
||||
let data = serialize(&assertion).expect("serialize");
|
||||
let hash = self.crdt_store.put_assertion(subject, &data).await.expect("put");
|
||||
|
||||
self.merkle_tree.insert(hash).expect("insert");
|
||||
self.hash_to_data.insert(hash, (subject.to_string(), data));
|
||||
|
||||
hash
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Check if this node can accept a write for the given subject.
|
||||
fn can_accept_write(&self, subject: &str) -> bool {
|
||||
// Route the subject to a shard
|
||||
let shard_id = match self.router.route_subject(subject) {
|
||||
Ok(id) => id,
|
||||
Err(_) => return false,
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
// Check if local node is a replica for this shard
|
||||
match self.router.get_replicas(shard_id) {
|
||||
Ok(replicas) => replicas.contains(&self.id),
|
||||
Err(_) => false,
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Get all leaves (assertion hashes).
|
||||
fn leaves(&self) -> Vec<[u8; 32]> {
|
||||
self.merkle_tree.leaves().to_vec()
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Canonical Merkle root for convergence verification.
|
||||
fn canonical_merkle_root(&self) -> Option<[u8; 32]> {
|
||||
let mut sorted_leaves = self.merkle_tree.leaves().to_vec();
|
||||
if sorted_leaves.is_empty() {
|
||||
return None;
|
||||
}
|
||||
sorted_leaves.sort();
|
||||
|
||||
let mut canonical = MerkleTree::new();
|
||||
for leaf in sorted_leaves {
|
||||
canonical.insert(leaf).ok()?;
|
||||
}
|
||||
canonical.root().ok()
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Sync from another node (simulating anti-entropy after partition heals).
|
||||
async fn sync_from(&mut self, other: &SimNode) {
|
||||
let my_leaves: HashSet<_> = self.leaves().into_iter().collect();
|
||||
|
||||
for hash in other.leaves() {
|
||||
if !my_leaves.contains(&hash) {
|
||||
if let Some((subject, data)) = other.hash_to_data.get(&hash) {
|
||||
let transfer = AssertionTransfer { hash, data: data.clone() };
|
||||
if self
|
||||
.crdt_store
|
||||
.merge_with_data(subject, std::slice::from_ref(&transfer))
|
||||
.await
|
||||
.is_ok()
|
||||
{
|
||||
self.merkle_tree.insert(hash).expect("insert");
|
||||
self.hash_to_data.insert(hash, (subject.clone(), data.clone()));
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Generate a random hash for test assertions.
|
||||
fn rand_hash() -> [u8; 32] {
|
||||
use std::time::{SystemTime, UNIX_EPOCH};
|
||||
let nanos = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).map(|d| d.as_nanos()).unwrap_or(0);
|
||||
let mut hash = [0u8; 32];
|
||||
hash[..16].copy_from_slice(&nanos.to_le_bytes());
|
||||
// Add some randomness with thread ID
|
||||
let tid = std::thread::current().id();
|
||||
hash[16..24].copy_from_slice(&format!("{tid:?}").as_bytes()[..8.min(format!("{tid:?}").len())]);
|
||||
hash
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// =============================================================================
|
||||
// Partition Tolerance Tests
|
||||
// =============================================================================
|
||||
|
||||
/// Test: Writes succeed on both sides of a partition.
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// Simulates a 3-node cluster partitioned into [A] and [B, C].
|
||||
/// Both sides should continue accepting writes for their shards.
|
||||
#[tokio::test]
|
||||
async fn test_write_succeeds_during_partition() {
|
||||
// Create 3 nodes
|
||||
let mut node_a = SimNode::new(1);
|
||||
let mut node_b = SimNode::new(2);
|
||||
let node_c = SimNode::new(3);
|
||||
|
||||
let nodes = vec![node_a.id, node_b.id, node_c.id];
|
||||
|
||||
// Initialize shards: 4 shards, RF=2
|
||||
// Each node will be replica for some shards
|
||||
node_a.init_shards(&nodes, 4, 2);
|
||||
node_b.init_shards(&nodes, 4, 2);
|
||||
node_c.init_shards(&nodes, 4, 2);
|
||||
|
||||
// PARTITION: A is isolated from B and C
|
||||
// (In this simulation, we simply don't sync between partitions)
|
||||
|
||||
// Find subjects that route to shards replicated on node A
|
||||
let mut subject_for_a = None;
|
||||
for i in 0..100 {
|
||||
let subject = format!("test:subject:{i}");
|
||||
if node_a.can_accept_write(&subject) {
|
||||
subject_for_a = Some(subject);
|
||||
break;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Find subjects that route to shards replicated on node B
|
||||
let mut subject_for_b = None;
|
||||
for i in 100..200 {
|
||||
let subject = format!("test:subject:{i}");
|
||||
if node_b.can_accept_write(&subject) {
|
||||
subject_for_b = Some(subject);
|
||||
break;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
let subject_a = subject_for_a.expect("should find subject for node A");
|
||||
let subject_b = subject_for_b.expect("should find subject for node B");
|
||||
|
||||
// Both sides of partition can write
|
||||
let hash_a = node_a.write_assertion(&subject_a, "predicate", 1000).await;
|
||||
let hash_b = node_b.write_assertion(&subject_b, "predicate", 2000).await;
|
||||
|
||||
// Verify writes succeeded
|
||||
assert!(!hash_a.iter().all(|&b| b == 0), "Node A write should succeed");
|
||||
assert!(!hash_b.iter().all(|&b| b == 0), "Node B write should succeed");
|
||||
|
||||
// Each node has its own assertion
|
||||
assert_eq!(node_a.leaves().len(), 1);
|
||||
assert_eq!(node_b.leaves().len(), 1);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Test: Post-partition convergence.
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// After a partition heals, both sides should have all writes
|
||||
/// via anti-entropy sync.
|
||||
#[tokio::test]
|
||||
async fn test_post_partition_convergence() {
|
||||
let mut node_a = SimNode::new(1);
|
||||
let mut node_b = SimNode::new(2);
|
||||
|
||||
let nodes = vec![node_a.id, node_b.id];
|
||||
node_a.init_shards(&nodes, 4, 2);
|
||||
node_b.init_shards(&nodes, 4, 2);
|
||||
|
||||
// PARTITION: A and B are isolated
|
||||
// Node A writes assertion A1
|
||||
let _hash_a = node_a.write_assertion("subject:a", "pred", 1000).await;
|
||||
|
||||
// Node B writes assertion B1
|
||||
let _hash_b = node_b.write_assertion("subject:b", "pred", 2000).await;
|
||||
|
||||
// Before heal: each has only its own
|
||||
assert_eq!(node_a.leaves().len(), 1);
|
||||
assert_eq!(node_b.leaves().len(), 1);
|
||||
assert_ne!(node_a.canonical_merkle_root(), node_b.canonical_merkle_root());
|
||||
|
||||
// PARTITION HEALS: Sync both ways
|
||||
node_a.sync_from(&node_b).await;
|
||||
node_b.sync_from(&node_a).await;
|
||||
|
||||
// After heal: both have all assertions
|
||||
assert_eq!(node_a.leaves().len(), 2, "Node A should have 2 assertions after sync");
|
||||
assert_eq!(node_b.leaves().len(), 2, "Node B should have 2 assertions after sync");
|
||||
|
||||
// Canonical roots should match
|
||||
assert_eq!(
|
||||
node_a.canonical_merkle_root(),
|
||||
node_b.canonical_merkle_root(),
|
||||
"Nodes should converge after partition heals"
|
||||
);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Test: Concurrent writes to same subject from both sides of partition.
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// Both partitions write to the same subject. After heal:
|
||||
/// - Both assertions should exist (append-only)
|
||||
/// - Lens should resolve deterministically
|
||||
#[tokio::test]
|
||||
async fn test_concurrent_writes_both_survive() {
|
||||
let mut node_a = SimNode::new(1);
|
||||
let mut node_b = SimNode::new(2);
|
||||
|
||||
let nodes = vec![node_a.id, node_b.id];
|
||||
node_a.init_shards(&nodes, 4, 2);
|
||||
node_b.init_shards(&nodes, 4, 2);
|
||||
|
||||
// Both write to same subject during partition
|
||||
let subject = "claim:earth-shape";
|
||||
|
||||
let hash_a = node_a.write_assertion(subject, "is:round", 1000).await;
|
||||
let hash_b = node_b.write_assertion(subject, "is:spheroid", 2000).await;
|
||||
|
||||
// Hashes are different (different predicates, different HLC times)
|
||||
assert_ne!(hash_a, hash_b);
|
||||
|
||||
// PARTITION HEALS
|
||||
node_a.sync_from(&node_b).await;
|
||||
node_b.sync_from(&node_a).await;
|
||||
|
||||
// Both assertions survive - append-only means no data loss
|
||||
let a_leaves: HashSet<_> = node_a.leaves().into_iter().collect();
|
||||
let b_leaves: HashSet<_> = node_b.leaves().into_iter().collect();
|
||||
|
||||
assert!(a_leaves.contains(&hash_a), "Node A should have assertion A");
|
||||
assert!(a_leaves.contains(&hash_b), "Node A should have assertion B after sync");
|
||||
assert!(b_leaves.contains(&hash_a), "Node B should have assertion A after sync");
|
||||
assert!(b_leaves.contains(&hash_b), "Node B should have assertion B");
|
||||
|
||||
// Same set on both nodes
|
||||
assert_eq!(a_leaves, b_leaves, "Both nodes should have identical assertion sets");
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Test: Multi-partition scenario with 4 nodes.
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// Partition into [A, B] and [C, D]. Each partition writes.
|
||||
/// After heal, all 4 nodes should converge.
|
||||
#[tokio::test]
|
||||
async fn test_multi_partition_convergence() {
|
||||
let mut node_a = SimNode::new(1);
|
||||
let mut node_b = SimNode::new(2);
|
||||
let mut node_c = SimNode::new(3);
|
||||
let mut node_d = SimNode::new(4);
|
||||
|
||||
let nodes = vec![node_a.id, node_b.id, node_c.id, node_d.id];
|
||||
|
||||
for node in [&mut node_a, &mut node_b, &mut node_c, &mut node_d] {
|
||||
node.init_shards(&nodes, 8, 2);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// PARTITION: [A, B] and [C, D]
|
||||
// Partition 1 writes
|
||||
let _h1 = node_a.write_assertion("partition1:data", "value1", 1000).await;
|
||||
node_b.sync_from(&node_a).await; // Sync within partition
|
||||
|
||||
// Partition 2 writes
|
||||
let _h2 = node_c.write_assertion("partition2:data", "value2", 2000).await;
|
||||
node_d.sync_from(&node_c).await; // Sync within partition
|
||||
|
||||
// Before heal: partitions have different data
|
||||
assert_ne!(node_a.canonical_merkle_root(), node_c.canonical_merkle_root());
|
||||
|
||||
// PARTITION HEALS: Full mesh sync
|
||||
node_a.sync_from(&node_c).await;
|
||||
node_b.sync_from(&node_d).await;
|
||||
node_c.sync_from(&node_a).await;
|
||||
node_d.sync_from(&node_b).await;
|
||||
|
||||
// All nodes should have same canonical root
|
||||
let root_a = node_a.canonical_merkle_root();
|
||||
let root_b = node_b.canonical_merkle_root();
|
||||
let root_c = node_c.canonical_merkle_root();
|
||||
let root_d = node_d.canonical_merkle_root();
|
||||
|
||||
assert_eq!(root_a, root_b, "A and B should match");
|
||||
assert_eq!(root_b, root_c, "B and C should match");
|
||||
assert_eq!(root_c, root_d, "C and D should match");
|
||||
|
||||
// All should have 2 assertions
|
||||
assert_eq!(node_a.leaves().len(), 2);
|
||||
assert_eq!(node_b.leaves().len(), 2);
|
||||
assert_eq!(node_c.leaves().len(), 2);
|
||||
assert_eq!(node_d.leaves().len(), 2);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Test: Rapid writes during partition don't cause data loss.
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// Simulate high-frequency writes on both sides of partition,
|
||||
/// then verify all writes survive after heal.
|
||||
#[tokio::test]
|
||||
async fn test_rapid_writes_during_partition_no_data_loss() {
|
||||
let mut node_a = SimNode::new(1);
|
||||
let mut node_b = SimNode::new(2);
|
||||
|
||||
let nodes = vec![node_a.id, node_b.id];
|
||||
node_a.init_shards(&nodes, 4, 2);
|
||||
node_b.init_shards(&nodes, 4, 2);
|
||||
|
||||
// Rapid writes on both sides
|
||||
let mut hashes_a = Vec::new();
|
||||
let mut hashes_b = Vec::new();
|
||||
|
||||
for i in 0..10 {
|
||||
let subject = format!("rapid:a:{i}");
|
||||
hashes_a.push(node_a.write_assertion(&subject, "pred", 1000 + i).await);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
for i in 0..10 {
|
||||
let subject = format!("rapid:b:{i}");
|
||||
hashes_b.push(node_b.write_assertion(&subject, "pred", 2000 + i).await);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Before heal
|
||||
assert_eq!(node_a.leaves().len(), 10);
|
||||
assert_eq!(node_b.leaves().len(), 10);
|
||||
|
||||
// PARTITION HEALS
|
||||
node_a.sync_from(&node_b).await;
|
||||
node_b.sync_from(&node_a).await;
|
||||
|
||||
// All 20 assertions should exist on both nodes
|
||||
assert_eq!(node_a.leaves().len(), 20, "Node A should have all 20 assertions");
|
||||
assert_eq!(node_b.leaves().len(), 20, "Node B should have all 20 assertions");
|
||||
|
||||
// Verify specific hashes
|
||||
let a_leaves: HashSet<_> = node_a.leaves().into_iter().collect();
|
||||
let b_leaves: HashSet<_> = node_b.leaves().into_iter().collect();
|
||||
|
||||
for hash in &hashes_a {
|
||||
assert!(a_leaves.contains(hash), "Node A should have its own assertion");
|
||||
assert!(b_leaves.contains(hash), "Node B should have A's assertion after sync");
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
for hash in &hashes_b {
|
||||
assert!(a_leaves.contains(hash), "Node A should have B's assertion after sync");
|
||||
assert!(b_leaves.contains(hash), "Node B should have its own assertion");
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
@ -21,8 +21,8 @@ pub fn hello_world() -> String {
|
||||
mod tests {
|
||||
use super::*;
|
||||
use crate::types::{
|
||||
Assertion, Epoch, LifecycleStage, ObjectValue, SignatureEntry, SourceClass, Supersession,
|
||||
SupersessionType, Vote,
|
||||
Assertion, Epoch, HlcTimestamp, LifecycleStage, ObjectValue, SignatureEntry, SourceClass,
|
||||
Supersession, SupersessionType, Vote,
|
||||
};
|
||||
use rkyv::check_archived_root;
|
||||
use rkyv::ser::serializers::AllocSerializer;
|
||||
@ -55,6 +55,7 @@ mod tests {
|
||||
}],
|
||||
confidence: 0.95,
|
||||
timestamp: 123456789,
|
||||
hlc_timestamp: HlcTimestamp::default(),
|
||||
vector: Some(vec![0.1, 0.2, 0.3]),
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
@ -104,6 +105,7 @@ mod tests {
|
||||
signatures: vec![],
|
||||
confidence: 1.0,
|
||||
timestamp: 0,
|
||||
hlc_timestamp: HlcTimestamp::default(),
|
||||
vector: None,
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@ -92,6 +92,7 @@ pub enum SerdeError {
|
||||
/// signatures: vec![],
|
||||
/// confidence: 1.0,
|
||||
/// timestamp: 0,
|
||||
/// hlc_timestamp: stemedb_core::types::HlcTimestamp::default(),
|
||||
/// vector: None,
|
||||
/// };
|
||||
///
|
||||
@ -159,7 +160,8 @@ where
|
||||
mod tests {
|
||||
use super::*;
|
||||
use crate::types::{
|
||||
Assertion, Epoch, LifecycleStage, ObjectValue, SignatureEntry, SourceClass, Vote,
|
||||
Assertion, Epoch, HlcTimestamp, LifecycleStage, ObjectValue, SignatureEntry, SourceClass,
|
||||
Vote,
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
@ -183,6 +185,7 @@ mod tests {
|
||||
}],
|
||||
confidence: 0.95,
|
||||
timestamp: 123456789,
|
||||
hlc_timestamp: HlcTimestamp::default(),
|
||||
vector: Some(vec![0.1, 0.2, 0.3]),
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
@ -304,6 +307,7 @@ mod tests {
|
||||
signatures: vec![],
|
||||
confidence: 0.0,
|
||||
timestamp: 0,
|
||||
hlc_timestamp: HlcTimestamp::default(),
|
||||
vector: None,
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
@ -330,6 +334,7 @@ mod tests {
|
||||
signatures: vec![],
|
||||
confidence: 0.85,
|
||||
timestamp: 1700000000,
|
||||
hlc_timestamp: HlcTimestamp::default(),
|
||||
vector: None,
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
@ -356,6 +361,7 @@ mod tests {
|
||||
signatures: vec![],
|
||||
confidence: 1.0,
|
||||
timestamp: 0,
|
||||
hlc_timestamp: HlcTimestamp::default(),
|
||||
vector: None,
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@ -8,8 +8,8 @@
|
||||
//! ```
|
||||
|
||||
use crate::types::{
|
||||
Assertion, Epoch, LifecycleStage, ObjectValue, SignatureEntry, SourceClass, SupersessionType,
|
||||
Vote,
|
||||
Assertion, Epoch, HlcTimestamp, LifecycleStage, ObjectValue, SignatureEntry, SourceClass,
|
||||
SupersessionType, Vote,
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
/// Builder for constructing test [`Assertion`] instances.
|
||||
@ -54,6 +54,7 @@ pub struct AssertionBuilder {
|
||||
agent_id: [u8; 32],
|
||||
confidence: f32,
|
||||
timestamp: u64,
|
||||
hlc_timestamp: HlcTimestamp,
|
||||
vector: Option<Vec<f32>>,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@ -81,6 +82,7 @@ impl AssertionBuilder {
|
||||
agent_id: [1u8; 32],
|
||||
confidence: 0.9,
|
||||
timestamp: 1000,
|
||||
hlc_timestamp: HlcTimestamp::default(),
|
||||
vector: None,
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
@ -127,6 +129,15 @@ impl AssertionBuilder {
|
||||
self
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Set the HLC timestamp for distributed causal ordering.
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// This provides total ordering even with clock skew between nodes.
|
||||
/// Most tests can rely on the default (HlcTimestamp::default()).
|
||||
pub fn hlc_timestamp(mut self, hlc_timestamp: HlcTimestamp) -> Self {
|
||||
self.hlc_timestamp = hlc_timestamp;
|
||||
self
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Set the lifecycle stage.
|
||||
pub fn lifecycle(mut self, lifecycle: LifecycleStage) -> Self {
|
||||
self.lifecycle = lifecycle;
|
||||
@ -219,6 +230,7 @@ impl AssertionBuilder {
|
||||
signatures,
|
||||
confidence: self.confidence,
|
||||
timestamp: self.timestamp,
|
||||
hlc_timestamp: self.hlc_timestamp,
|
||||
vector: self.vector,
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
|
||||
|
||||
use rkyv::{Archive, Deserialize, Serialize};
|
||||
|
||||
use super::{EntityId, EpochId, Hash, PHash, RelationId};
|
||||
use super::{EntityId, EpochId, Hash, HlcTimestamp, PHash, RelationId};
|
||||
use crate::types::{LifecycleStage, SourceClass};
|
||||
|
||||
/// The atomic unit of knowledge in StemeDB.
|
||||
@ -43,6 +43,14 @@ pub struct Assertion {
|
||||
pub confidence: f32,
|
||||
/// The timestamp when the assertion was created (Unix epoch).
|
||||
pub timestamp: u64,
|
||||
/// Hybrid Logical Clock timestamp for distributed causal ordering.
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// Provides total ordering even with clock skew between nodes:
|
||||
/// 1. NTP64 time (includes physical + logical counter)
|
||||
/// 2. Node ID for deterministic tiebreaker
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// Used by `HlcRecencyLens` for consistent "most recent" resolution.
|
||||
pub hlc_timestamp: HlcTimestamp,
|
||||
/// The semantic embedding vector for fuzzy recall.
|
||||
pub vector: Option<Vec<f32>>,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@ -227,6 +227,8 @@ pub enum AliasOrigin {
|
||||
Suggested,
|
||||
/// Created during an entity merge operation.
|
||||
Merged,
|
||||
/// Auto-detected by conflict detection (e.g., Aphoria tail-path matching).
|
||||
AutoDetected,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
impl fmt::Display for AliasOrigin {
|
||||
@ -235,6 +237,7 @@ impl fmt::Display for AliasOrigin {
|
||||
AliasOrigin::Manual => write!(f, "manual"),
|
||||
AliasOrigin::Suggested => write!(f, "suggested"),
|
||||
AliasOrigin::Merged => write!(f, "merged"),
|
||||
AliasOrigin::AutoDetected => write!(f, "auto_detected"),
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@ -106,9 +106,11 @@ mod gold_standard;
|
||||
mod hlc;
|
||||
mod lifecycle;
|
||||
mod materialized;
|
||||
mod pow;
|
||||
mod query;
|
||||
mod source;
|
||||
mod supersession;
|
||||
mod trust_tier;
|
||||
mod voting;
|
||||
|
||||
// Re-exports - Maintain backward compatibility
|
||||
@ -127,3 +129,10 @@ pub use query::{ContributingAssertion, QueryAudit, QueryParams};
|
||||
pub use source::SourceClass;
|
||||
pub use supersession::{Supersession, SupersessionType};
|
||||
pub use voting::{TrustPack, Vote};
|
||||
|
||||
// Admission control types
|
||||
pub use pow::{
|
||||
AdmissionConfig, PowError, PowProof, POW_GRADUATED_THRESHOLD, POW_INITIAL_DIFFICULTY,
|
||||
POW_INITIAL_THRESHOLD, POW_MAX_AGE_SECONDS, POW_REDUCED_DIFFICULTY,
|
||||
};
|
||||
pub use trust_tier::{TrustTier, BASE_QUOTA_LIMIT, TRUST_POW_EXEMPTION_THRESHOLD};
|
||||
|
||||
466
crates/stemedb-core/src/types/pow.rs
Normal file
466
crates/stemedb-core/src/types/pow.rs
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,466 @@
|
||||
//! Proof-of-Work (PoW) for admission control.
|
||||
//!
|
||||
//! New agents must solve BLAKE3-based puzzles before their assertions are accepted.
|
||||
//! The difficulty is graduated based on assertion count:
|
||||
//!
|
||||
//! - First 10 assertions: 16 bits (~65K iterations, ~16 seconds)
|
||||
//! - Assertions 11-50: 1 bit (trivial)
|
||||
//! - 50+ assertions OR trust > 0.6: 0 bits (exempt)
|
||||
//!
|
||||
//! # Puzzle Format
|
||||
//!
|
||||
//! The agent must find a nonce such that:
|
||||
//! `BLAKE3(nonce || agent_id || timestamp)` has `difficulty` leading zero bits.
|
||||
//!
|
||||
//! # Security Properties
|
||||
//!
|
||||
//! - Timestamp prevents replay attacks (max age: 5 minutes)
|
||||
//! - Agent ID binds proof to specific identity
|
||||
//! - BLAKE3 provides cryptographic security
|
||||
//! - Asymmetric cost: O(2^difficulty) to solve, O(1) to verify
|
||||
|
||||
use thiserror::Error;
|
||||
|
||||
/// Maximum age of a PoW proof in seconds (5 minutes).
|
||||
pub const POW_MAX_AGE_SECONDS: u64 = 300;
|
||||
|
||||
/// Default difficulty for first 10 assertions (16 bits).
|
||||
pub const POW_INITIAL_DIFFICULTY: u8 = 16;
|
||||
|
||||
/// Reduced difficulty for assertions 11-50 (1 bit).
|
||||
pub const POW_REDUCED_DIFFICULTY: u8 = 1;
|
||||
|
||||
/// Threshold for initial difficulty (first 10 assertions).
|
||||
pub const POW_INITIAL_THRESHOLD: u64 = 10;
|
||||
|
||||
/// Threshold for graduation (50 assertions = exempt).
|
||||
pub const POW_GRADUATED_THRESHOLD: u64 = 50;
|
||||
|
||||
/// Errors that can occur during PoW verification.
|
||||
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Error, PartialEq, Eq)]
|
||||
pub enum PowError {
|
||||
/// The proof timestamp is too old.
|
||||
#[error("Proof timestamp expired (max age: {max_age}s, actual age: {actual_age}s)")]
|
||||
TimestampExpired {
|
||||
/// Maximum allowed age in seconds.
|
||||
max_age: u64,
|
||||
/// Actual age of the proof in seconds.
|
||||
actual_age: u64,
|
||||
},
|
||||
|
||||
/// The proof timestamp is in the future.
|
||||
#[error(
|
||||
"Proof timestamp is in the future (server time: {server_time}, proof time: {proof_time})"
|
||||
)]
|
||||
TimestampInFuture {
|
||||
/// Server's current time.
|
||||
server_time: u64,
|
||||
/// Proof's timestamp.
|
||||
proof_time: u64,
|
||||
},
|
||||
|
||||
/// The proof does not meet the required difficulty.
|
||||
#[error("Insufficient difficulty (required: {required} leading zeros, found: {found})")]
|
||||
InsufficientDifficulty {
|
||||
/// Required number of leading zero bits.
|
||||
required: u8,
|
||||
/// Actual number of leading zero bits.
|
||||
found: u8,
|
||||
},
|
||||
|
||||
/// The agent ID in the proof does not match the request.
|
||||
#[error("Agent ID mismatch")]
|
||||
AgentIdMismatch,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// A proof-of-work solution for admission control.
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// The proof demonstrates computational effort by finding a nonce that
|
||||
/// produces a BLAKE3 hash with the required number of leading zero bits.
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// # Wire Format
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// When transmitted over HTTP, the proof is split into headers:
|
||||
/// - `X-PoW-Nonce`: The nonce as a decimal string
|
||||
/// - `X-PoW-Timestamp`: Unix timestamp as a decimal string
|
||||
/// - `X-Agent-Id`: Agent's Ed25519 public key (hex, existing header)
|
||||
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)]
|
||||
pub struct PowProof {
|
||||
/// The nonce value found by the agent.
|
||||
pub nonce: u64,
|
||||
/// The agent's Ed25519 public key.
|
||||
pub agent_id: [u8; 32],
|
||||
/// Unix timestamp when the proof was generated.
|
||||
pub timestamp: u64,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
impl PowProof {
|
||||
/// Create a new PoW proof.
|
||||
#[must_use]
|
||||
pub fn new(nonce: u64, agent_id: [u8; 32], timestamp: u64) -> Self {
|
||||
Self { nonce, agent_id, timestamp }
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Compute the BLAKE3 hash of this proof.
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// Hash input: `nonce (8 bytes LE) || agent_id (32 bytes) || timestamp (8 bytes LE)`
|
||||
#[must_use]
|
||||
pub fn compute_hash(&self) -> blake3::Hash {
|
||||
let mut hasher = blake3::Hasher::new();
|
||||
hasher.update(&self.nonce.to_le_bytes());
|
||||
hasher.update(&self.agent_id);
|
||||
hasher.update(&self.timestamp.to_le_bytes());
|
||||
hasher.finalize()
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Count the number of leading zero bits in a hash.
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// # Example
|
||||
/// ```
|
||||
/// use stemedb_core::types::PowProof;
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// let hash = blake3::hash(b"test");
|
||||
/// let zeros = PowProof::leading_zeros(&hash);
|
||||
/// // Will vary based on hash value
|
||||
/// ```
|
||||
#[must_use]
|
||||
pub fn leading_zeros(hash: &blake3::Hash) -> u8 {
|
||||
let bytes = hash.as_bytes();
|
||||
let mut count: u8 = 0;
|
||||
|
||||
for byte in bytes {
|
||||
if *byte == 0 {
|
||||
count = count.saturating_add(8);
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
count = count.saturating_add(byte.leading_zeros() as u8);
|
||||
break;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
count
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Verify this proof against the required difficulty.
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// # Arguments
|
||||
/// * `difficulty` - Required number of leading zero bits
|
||||
/// * `max_age` - Maximum allowed age in seconds
|
||||
/// * `server_time` - Server's current Unix timestamp
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// # Returns
|
||||
/// `Ok(())` if the proof is valid, or an error describing the failure.
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// # Example
|
||||
/// ```
|
||||
/// use stemedb_core::types::{PowProof, PowError, POW_MAX_AGE_SECONDS};
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// let agent_id = [0u8; 32];
|
||||
/// let now = 1700000000u64;
|
||||
/// let proof = PowProof::new(12345, agent_id, now);
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// // Verification with difficulty 0 always passes (if timestamp is valid)
|
||||
/// let result = proof.verify(0, POW_MAX_AGE_SECONDS, now);
|
||||
/// assert!(result.is_ok());
|
||||
/// ```
|
||||
pub fn verify(&self, difficulty: u8, max_age: u64, server_time: u64) -> Result<(), PowError> {
|
||||
// Check timestamp is not in the future (with small tolerance for clock skew)
|
||||
const CLOCK_SKEW_TOLERANCE: u64 = 30; // 30 seconds
|
||||
if self.timestamp > server_time.saturating_add(CLOCK_SKEW_TOLERANCE) {
|
||||
return Err(PowError::TimestampInFuture { server_time, proof_time: self.timestamp });
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Check timestamp is not too old
|
||||
let age = server_time.saturating_sub(self.timestamp);
|
||||
if age > max_age {
|
||||
return Err(PowError::TimestampExpired { max_age, actual_age: age });
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// For difficulty 0, no hash check needed (exempt)
|
||||
if difficulty == 0 {
|
||||
return Ok(());
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Compute hash and check leading zeros
|
||||
let hash = self.compute_hash();
|
||||
let zeros = Self::leading_zeros(&hash);
|
||||
|
||||
if zeros < difficulty {
|
||||
return Err(PowError::InsufficientDifficulty { required: difficulty, found: zeros });
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
Ok(())
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Solve a PoW puzzle by brute-force search.
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// This is a convenience method for clients to find a valid nonce.
|
||||
/// It iterates from 0 until finding a nonce that satisfies the difficulty.
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// # Arguments
|
||||
/// * `agent_id` - The agent's Ed25519 public key
|
||||
/// * `timestamp` - Unix timestamp for the proof
|
||||
/// * `difficulty` - Required number of leading zero bits
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// # Returns
|
||||
/// A valid `PowProof` with the found nonce.
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// # Panics
|
||||
/// In theory could run forever if difficulty is impossibly high,
|
||||
/// but in practice 16 bits completes in seconds.
|
||||
#[must_use]
|
||||
pub fn solve(agent_id: [u8; 32], timestamp: u64, difficulty: u8) -> Self {
|
||||
// Difficulty 0 means exempt - any nonce works
|
||||
if difficulty == 0 {
|
||||
return Self::new(0, agent_id, timestamp);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
for nonce in 0..u64::MAX {
|
||||
let proof = Self::new(nonce, agent_id, timestamp);
|
||||
let hash = proof.compute_hash();
|
||||
if Self::leading_zeros(&hash) >= difficulty {
|
||||
return proof;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Mathematically impossible to reach here with reasonable difficulty
|
||||
Self::new(0, agent_id, timestamp)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Configuration for admission control PoW requirements.
|
||||
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
|
||||
pub struct AdmissionConfig {
|
||||
/// Difficulty for first `initial_threshold` assertions.
|
||||
pub initial_difficulty: u8,
|
||||
/// Number of assertions requiring initial difficulty.
|
||||
pub initial_threshold: u64,
|
||||
/// Difficulty for assertions between initial and graduated thresholds.
|
||||
pub reduced_difficulty: u8,
|
||||
/// Number of assertions after which PoW is exempt.
|
||||
pub graduated_threshold: u64,
|
||||
/// Trust score above which PoW is exempt.
|
||||
pub trust_exemption_score: f32,
|
||||
/// Maximum age of PoW proofs in seconds.
|
||||
pub pow_max_age: u64,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
impl Default for AdmissionConfig {
|
||||
fn default() -> Self {
|
||||
Self {
|
||||
initial_difficulty: POW_INITIAL_DIFFICULTY,
|
||||
initial_threshold: POW_INITIAL_THRESHOLD,
|
||||
reduced_difficulty: POW_REDUCED_DIFFICULTY,
|
||||
graduated_threshold: POW_GRADUATED_THRESHOLD,
|
||||
trust_exemption_score: super::trust_tier::TRUST_POW_EXEMPTION_THRESHOLD,
|
||||
pow_max_age: POW_MAX_AGE_SECONDS,
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
impl AdmissionConfig {
|
||||
/// Compute the required difficulty for an agent.
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// # Arguments
|
||||
/// * `assertion_count` - Number of assertions the agent has made
|
||||
/// * `trust_score` - Agent's current trust score
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// # Returns
|
||||
/// Required difficulty in bits (0 = exempt).
|
||||
#[must_use]
|
||||
pub fn compute_difficulty(&self, assertion_count: u64, trust_score: f32) -> u8 {
|
||||
// Trust-based exemption
|
||||
if trust_score >= self.trust_exemption_score {
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Assertion-count-based graduation
|
||||
if assertion_count >= self.graduated_threshold {
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if assertion_count >= self.initial_threshold {
|
||||
return self.reduced_difficulty;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
self.initial_difficulty
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[cfg(test)]
|
||||
mod tests {
|
||||
use super::*;
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_leading_zeros_all_zero() {
|
||||
let hash = blake3::Hash::from([0u8; 32]);
|
||||
assert_eq!(PowProof::leading_zeros(&hash), 255); // Saturates at 255
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_leading_zeros_first_byte_nonzero() {
|
||||
let mut bytes = [0u8; 32];
|
||||
bytes[0] = 0x80; // 10000000 binary = 0 leading zeros in first byte
|
||||
let hash = blake3::Hash::from(bytes);
|
||||
assert_eq!(PowProof::leading_zeros(&hash), 0);
|
||||
|
||||
bytes[0] = 0x40; // 01000000 binary = 1 leading zero
|
||||
let hash = blake3::Hash::from(bytes);
|
||||
assert_eq!(PowProof::leading_zeros(&hash), 1);
|
||||
|
||||
bytes[0] = 0x01; // 00000001 binary = 7 leading zeros
|
||||
let hash = blake3::Hash::from(bytes);
|
||||
assert_eq!(PowProof::leading_zeros(&hash), 7);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_leading_zeros_second_byte() {
|
||||
let mut bytes = [0u8; 32];
|
||||
bytes[0] = 0x00;
|
||||
bytes[1] = 0x80;
|
||||
let hash = blake3::Hash::from(bytes);
|
||||
assert_eq!(PowProof::leading_zeros(&hash), 8); // 8 from first byte + 0 from second
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_verify_expired_timestamp() {
|
||||
let agent_id = [0u8; 32];
|
||||
let proof = PowProof::new(0, agent_id, 1000);
|
||||
let result = proof.verify(0, 300, 2000); // 1000 seconds old, max 300
|
||||
|
||||
assert!(matches!(
|
||||
result,
|
||||
Err(PowError::TimestampExpired { max_age: 300, actual_age: 1000 })
|
||||
));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_verify_future_timestamp() {
|
||||
let agent_id = [0u8; 32];
|
||||
let proof = PowProof::new(0, agent_id, 2000);
|
||||
let result = proof.verify(0, 300, 1000); // Proof claims timestamp 2000, server at 1000
|
||||
|
||||
assert!(matches!(
|
||||
result,
|
||||
Err(PowError::TimestampInFuture { server_time: 1000, proof_time: 2000 })
|
||||
));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_verify_difficulty_zero_passes() {
|
||||
let agent_id = [0u8; 32];
|
||||
let now = 1700000000u64;
|
||||
let proof = PowProof::new(12345, agent_id, now);
|
||||
|
||||
let result = proof.verify(0, POW_MAX_AGE_SECONDS, now);
|
||||
assert!(result.is_ok());
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_verify_insufficient_difficulty() {
|
||||
let agent_id = [0u8; 32];
|
||||
let now = 1700000000u64;
|
||||
// Random nonce unlikely to have 16 leading zeros
|
||||
let proof = PowProof::new(12345, agent_id, now);
|
||||
|
||||
let result = proof.verify(16, POW_MAX_AGE_SECONDS, now);
|
||||
assert!(matches!(result, Err(PowError::InsufficientDifficulty { required: 16, .. })));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_solve_difficulty_zero() {
|
||||
let agent_id = [1u8; 32];
|
||||
let timestamp = 1700000000u64;
|
||||
let proof = PowProof::solve(agent_id, timestamp, 0);
|
||||
|
||||
assert_eq!(proof.nonce, 0);
|
||||
assert_eq!(proof.agent_id, agent_id);
|
||||
assert_eq!(proof.timestamp, timestamp);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_solve_low_difficulty() {
|
||||
let agent_id = [2u8; 32];
|
||||
let timestamp = 1700000000u64;
|
||||
let proof = PowProof::solve(agent_id, timestamp, 4);
|
||||
|
||||
// Verify the solution works
|
||||
let result = proof.verify(4, POW_MAX_AGE_SECONDS, timestamp);
|
||||
assert!(result.is_ok());
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_admission_config_default() {
|
||||
let config = AdmissionConfig::default();
|
||||
|
||||
assert_eq!(config.initial_difficulty, 16);
|
||||
assert_eq!(config.initial_threshold, 10);
|
||||
assert_eq!(config.reduced_difficulty, 1);
|
||||
assert_eq!(config.graduated_threshold, 50);
|
||||
assert!((config.trust_exemption_score - 0.6).abs() < f32::EPSILON);
|
||||
assert_eq!(config.pow_max_age, 300);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_compute_difficulty_by_assertion_count() {
|
||||
let config = AdmissionConfig::default();
|
||||
|
||||
// First 10: high difficulty
|
||||
assert_eq!(config.compute_difficulty(0, 0.3), 16);
|
||||
assert_eq!(config.compute_difficulty(5, 0.3), 16);
|
||||
assert_eq!(config.compute_difficulty(9, 0.3), 16);
|
||||
|
||||
// 10-49: reduced difficulty
|
||||
assert_eq!(config.compute_difficulty(10, 0.3), 1);
|
||||
assert_eq!(config.compute_difficulty(25, 0.3), 1);
|
||||
assert_eq!(config.compute_difficulty(49, 0.3), 1);
|
||||
|
||||
// 50+: exempt
|
||||
assert_eq!(config.compute_difficulty(50, 0.3), 0);
|
||||
assert_eq!(config.compute_difficulty(100, 0.3), 0);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_compute_difficulty_by_trust() {
|
||||
let config = AdmissionConfig::default();
|
||||
|
||||
// Low trust, few assertions: high difficulty
|
||||
assert_eq!(config.compute_difficulty(0, 0.3), 16);
|
||||
|
||||
// High trust: exempt regardless of assertion count
|
||||
assert_eq!(config.compute_difficulty(0, 0.6), 0);
|
||||
assert_eq!(config.compute_difficulty(5, 0.7), 0);
|
||||
assert_eq!(config.compute_difficulty(100, 0.9), 0);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_hash_consistency() {
|
||||
let proof1 = PowProof::new(123, [0xAB; 32], 1700000000);
|
||||
let proof2 = PowProof::new(123, [0xAB; 32], 1700000000);
|
||||
|
||||
assert_eq!(proof1.compute_hash(), proof2.compute_hash());
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_hash_changes_with_nonce() {
|
||||
let proof1 = PowProof::new(123, [0xAB; 32], 1700000000);
|
||||
let proof2 = PowProof::new(124, [0xAB; 32], 1700000000);
|
||||
|
||||
assert_ne!(proof1.compute_hash(), proof2.compute_hash());
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_hash_changes_with_agent_id() {
|
||||
let proof1 = PowProof::new(123, [0xAB; 32], 1700000000);
|
||||
let proof2 = PowProof::new(123, [0xCD; 32], 1700000000);
|
||||
|
||||
assert_ne!(proof1.compute_hash(), proof2.compute_hash());
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_hash_changes_with_timestamp() {
|
||||
let proof1 = PowProof::new(123, [0xAB; 32], 1700000000);
|
||||
let proof2 = PowProof::new(123, [0xAB; 32], 1700000001);
|
||||
|
||||
assert_ne!(proof1.compute_hash(), proof2.compute_hash());
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
254
crates/stemedb-core/src/types/trust_tier.rs
Normal file
254
crates/stemedb-core/src/types/trust_tier.rs
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,254 @@
|
||||
//! Trust tiers for graduated admission control.
|
||||
//!
|
||||
//! Trust tiers map an agent's reputation score (0.0-1.0) to specific quotas
|
||||
//! and proof-of-work requirements. This graduated system allows new agents
|
||||
//! to earn trust over time while protecting the system from spam and Sybil attacks.
|
||||
//!
|
||||
//! # Tier Boundaries
|
||||
//!
|
||||
//! | Trust Range | Tier | Quota Multiplier | PoW Required |
|
||||
//! |-------------|------------|------------------|--------------|
|
||||
//! | 0.0-0.3 | Untrusted | 0.1x (1,000/hr) | Yes |
|
||||
//! | 0.3-0.5 | Limited | 0.5x (5,000/hr) | Yes |
|
||||
//! | 0.5-0.7 | Verified | 1.0x (10,000/hr) | No |
|
||||
//! | 0.7-0.9 | Trusted | 2.0x (20,000/hr) | No |
|
||||
//! | 0.9-1.0 | Authority | 10.0x (100k/hr) | No |
|
||||
|
||||
/// Base quota limit per hour (10,000 tokens).
|
||||
/// Tiers apply multipliers to this base.
|
||||
pub const BASE_QUOTA_LIMIT: u64 = 10_000;
|
||||
|
||||
/// Trust score threshold above which PoW is exempt.
|
||||
/// Agents with trust >= this value skip proof-of-work regardless of tier.
|
||||
pub const TRUST_POW_EXEMPTION_THRESHOLD: f32 = 0.6;
|
||||
|
||||
/// Trust tier classification based on reputation score.
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// Each tier determines:
|
||||
/// - Quota multiplier: How many tokens per hour the agent can use
|
||||
/// - PoW requirement: Whether proof-of-work is needed for submissions
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// New agents start at `Untrusted` (0.5 score, which is actually Verified tier).
|
||||
/// They can improve by making accurate assertions verified against gold standards.
|
||||
#[derive(
|
||||
Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Hash, rkyv::Archive, rkyv::Deserialize, rkyv::Serialize,
|
||||
)]
|
||||
#[archive(check_bytes)]
|
||||
pub enum TrustTier {
|
||||
/// Untrusted tier: 0.0-0.3 trust score.
|
||||
/// 0.1x quota multiplier (1,000 tokens/hr), PoW required.
|
||||
Untrusted,
|
||||
|
||||
/// Limited tier: 0.3-0.5 trust score.
|
||||
/// 0.5x quota multiplier (5,000 tokens/hr), PoW required.
|
||||
Limited,
|
||||
|
||||
/// Verified tier: 0.5-0.7 trust score.
|
||||
/// 1.0x quota multiplier (10,000 tokens/hr), PoW exempt.
|
||||
Verified,
|
||||
|
||||
/// Trusted tier: 0.7-0.9 trust score.
|
||||
/// 2.0x quota multiplier (20,000 tokens/hr), PoW exempt.
|
||||
Trusted,
|
||||
|
||||
/// Authority tier: 0.9-1.0 trust score.
|
||||
/// 10.0x quota multiplier (100,000 tokens/hr), PoW exempt.
|
||||
Authority,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
impl TrustTier {
|
||||
/// Determine trust tier from a reputation score.
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// # Arguments
|
||||
/// * `score` - Trust score in range [0.0, 1.0]
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// # Returns
|
||||
/// The appropriate tier for the given score.
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// # Example
|
||||
/// ```
|
||||
/// use stemedb_core::types::TrustTier;
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// assert_eq!(TrustTier::from_score(0.1), TrustTier::Untrusted);
|
||||
/// assert_eq!(TrustTier::from_score(0.5), TrustTier::Verified);
|
||||
/// assert_eq!(TrustTier::from_score(0.95), TrustTier::Authority);
|
||||
/// ```
|
||||
#[must_use]
|
||||
pub fn from_score(score: f32) -> Self {
|
||||
// Clamp to valid range
|
||||
let score = score.clamp(0.0, 1.0);
|
||||
|
||||
if score >= 0.9 {
|
||||
TrustTier::Authority
|
||||
} else if score >= 0.7 {
|
||||
TrustTier::Trusted
|
||||
} else if score >= 0.5 {
|
||||
TrustTier::Verified
|
||||
} else if score >= 0.3 {
|
||||
TrustTier::Limited
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
TrustTier::Untrusted
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Get the quota multiplier for this tier.
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// The multiplier is applied to the base quota (10,000 tokens/hr):
|
||||
/// - Untrusted: 0.1x = 1,000/hr
|
||||
/// - Limited: 0.5x = 5,000/hr
|
||||
/// - Verified: 1.0x = 10,000/hr
|
||||
/// - Trusted: 2.0x = 20,000/hr
|
||||
/// - Authority: 10.0x = 100,000/hr
|
||||
#[must_use]
|
||||
pub fn quota_multiplier(&self) -> f32 {
|
||||
match self {
|
||||
TrustTier::Untrusted => 0.1,
|
||||
TrustTier::Limited => 0.5,
|
||||
TrustTier::Verified => 1.0,
|
||||
TrustTier::Trusted => 2.0,
|
||||
TrustTier::Authority => 10.0,
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Get the effective quota limit for this tier.
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// # Returns
|
||||
/// The per-hour quota limit (base * multiplier).
|
||||
#[must_use]
|
||||
pub fn effective_quota_limit(&self) -> u64 {
|
||||
(BASE_QUOTA_LIMIT as f32 * self.quota_multiplier()) as u64
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Check if this tier requires proof-of-work.
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// Only `Untrusted` and `Limited` tiers require PoW.
|
||||
/// Note: Agents with 50+ assertions are exempt regardless of tier.
|
||||
#[must_use]
|
||||
pub fn requires_pow(&self) -> bool {
|
||||
matches!(self, TrustTier::Untrusted | TrustTier::Limited)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Get human-readable name for this tier.
|
||||
#[must_use]
|
||||
pub fn name(&self) -> &'static str {
|
||||
match self {
|
||||
TrustTier::Untrusted => "Untrusted",
|
||||
TrustTier::Limited => "Limited",
|
||||
TrustTier::Verified => "Verified",
|
||||
TrustTier::Trusted => "Trusted",
|
||||
TrustTier::Authority => "Authority",
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Get the trust score lower bound for this tier.
|
||||
#[must_use]
|
||||
pub fn min_score(&self) -> f32 {
|
||||
match self {
|
||||
TrustTier::Untrusted => 0.0,
|
||||
TrustTier::Limited => 0.3,
|
||||
TrustTier::Verified => 0.5,
|
||||
TrustTier::Trusted => 0.7,
|
||||
TrustTier::Authority => 0.9,
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Get the trust score upper bound for this tier (exclusive).
|
||||
#[must_use]
|
||||
pub fn max_score(&self) -> f32 {
|
||||
match self {
|
||||
TrustTier::Untrusted => 0.3,
|
||||
TrustTier::Limited => 0.5,
|
||||
TrustTier::Verified => 0.7,
|
||||
TrustTier::Trusted => 0.9,
|
||||
TrustTier::Authority => 1.0,
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
impl std::fmt::Display for TrustTier {
|
||||
fn fmt(&self, f: &mut std::fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> std::fmt::Result {
|
||||
write!(f, "{}", self.name())
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[cfg(test)]
|
||||
mod tests {
|
||||
use super::*;
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_from_score_boundaries() {
|
||||
// Untrusted: 0.0-0.3
|
||||
assert_eq!(TrustTier::from_score(0.0), TrustTier::Untrusted);
|
||||
assert_eq!(TrustTier::from_score(0.1), TrustTier::Untrusted);
|
||||
assert_eq!(TrustTier::from_score(0.29), TrustTier::Untrusted);
|
||||
|
||||
// Limited: 0.3-0.5
|
||||
assert_eq!(TrustTier::from_score(0.3), TrustTier::Limited);
|
||||
assert_eq!(TrustTier::from_score(0.4), TrustTier::Limited);
|
||||
assert_eq!(TrustTier::from_score(0.49), TrustTier::Limited);
|
||||
|
||||
// Verified: 0.5-0.7
|
||||
assert_eq!(TrustTier::from_score(0.5), TrustTier::Verified);
|
||||
assert_eq!(TrustTier::from_score(0.6), TrustTier::Verified);
|
||||
assert_eq!(TrustTier::from_score(0.69), TrustTier::Verified);
|
||||
|
||||
// Trusted: 0.7-0.9
|
||||
assert_eq!(TrustTier::from_score(0.7), TrustTier::Trusted);
|
||||
assert_eq!(TrustTier::from_score(0.8), TrustTier::Trusted);
|
||||
assert_eq!(TrustTier::from_score(0.89), TrustTier::Trusted);
|
||||
|
||||
// Authority: 0.9-1.0
|
||||
assert_eq!(TrustTier::from_score(0.9), TrustTier::Authority);
|
||||
assert_eq!(TrustTier::from_score(0.95), TrustTier::Authority);
|
||||
assert_eq!(TrustTier::from_score(1.0), TrustTier::Authority);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_from_score_clamping() {
|
||||
// Out of range values should be clamped
|
||||
assert_eq!(TrustTier::from_score(-0.5), TrustTier::Untrusted);
|
||||
assert_eq!(TrustTier::from_score(1.5), TrustTier::Authority);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_quota_multipliers() {
|
||||
assert!((TrustTier::Untrusted.quota_multiplier() - 0.1).abs() < f32::EPSILON);
|
||||
assert!((TrustTier::Limited.quota_multiplier() - 0.5).abs() < f32::EPSILON);
|
||||
assert!((TrustTier::Verified.quota_multiplier() - 1.0).abs() < f32::EPSILON);
|
||||
assert!((TrustTier::Trusted.quota_multiplier() - 2.0).abs() < f32::EPSILON);
|
||||
assert!((TrustTier::Authority.quota_multiplier() - 10.0).abs() < f32::EPSILON);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_effective_quota_limits() {
|
||||
assert_eq!(TrustTier::Untrusted.effective_quota_limit(), 1_000);
|
||||
assert_eq!(TrustTier::Limited.effective_quota_limit(), 5_000);
|
||||
assert_eq!(TrustTier::Verified.effective_quota_limit(), 10_000);
|
||||
assert_eq!(TrustTier::Trusted.effective_quota_limit(), 20_000);
|
||||
assert_eq!(TrustTier::Authority.effective_quota_limit(), 100_000);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_requires_pow() {
|
||||
assert!(TrustTier::Untrusted.requires_pow());
|
||||
assert!(TrustTier::Limited.requires_pow());
|
||||
assert!(!TrustTier::Verified.requires_pow());
|
||||
assert!(!TrustTier::Trusted.requires_pow());
|
||||
assert!(!TrustTier::Authority.requires_pow());
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_score_ranges() {
|
||||
// Verify min/max scores don't overlap incorrectly
|
||||
assert!(TrustTier::Untrusted.max_score() <= TrustTier::Limited.min_score() + f32::EPSILON);
|
||||
assert!(TrustTier::Limited.max_score() <= TrustTier::Verified.min_score() + f32::EPSILON);
|
||||
assert!(TrustTier::Verified.max_score() <= TrustTier::Trusted.min_score() + f32::EPSILON);
|
||||
assert!(TrustTier::Trusted.max_score() <= TrustTier::Authority.min_score() + f32::EPSILON);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_display() {
|
||||
assert_eq!(format!("{}", TrustTier::Untrusted), "Untrusted");
|
||||
assert_eq!(format!("{}", TrustTier::Authority), "Authority");
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ use rand::rngs::OsRng;
|
||||
use std::sync::Arc;
|
||||
use stemedb_core::testing::{self, AssertionBuilder};
|
||||
use stemedb_core::types::{
|
||||
Assertion, Epoch, LifecycleStage, ObjectValue, SignatureEntry, SourceClass, Vote,
|
||||
Assertion, Epoch, HlcTimestamp, LifecycleStage, ObjectValue, SignatureEntry, SourceClass, Vote,
|
||||
};
|
||||
use stemedb_storage::HybridStore;
|
||||
use stemedb_wal::Journal;
|
||||
|
||||
@ -34,6 +34,7 @@ async fn test_rejects_invalid_signature() {
|
||||
}],
|
||||
confidence: 0.95,
|
||||
timestamp: 1000,
|
||||
hlc_timestamp: HlcTimestamp::default(),
|
||||
vector: None,
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
@ -86,6 +87,7 @@ async fn test_rejects_unsigned_assertion() {
|
||||
signatures: vec![], // No signatures!
|
||||
confidence: 0.95,
|
||||
timestamp: 1000,
|
||||
hlc_timestamp: HlcTimestamp::default(),
|
||||
vector: None,
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
@ -153,6 +155,7 @@ async fn test_multisig_all_must_be_valid() {
|
||||
],
|
||||
confidence: 0.95,
|
||||
timestamp: 1000,
|
||||
hlc_timestamp: HlcTimestamp::default(),
|
||||
vector: None,
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@ -38,6 +38,7 @@ async fn test_rejects_high_confidence() {
|
||||
}],
|
||||
confidence: 1.5, // Invalid: > 1.0
|
||||
timestamp: 1000,
|
||||
hlc_timestamp: HlcTimestamp::default(),
|
||||
vector: None,
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
@ -94,6 +95,7 @@ async fn test_rejects_negative_confidence() {
|
||||
}],
|
||||
confidence: -0.5, // Invalid: < 0.0
|
||||
timestamp: 1000,
|
||||
hlc_timestamp: HlcTimestamp::default(),
|
||||
vector: None,
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
@ -220,6 +222,7 @@ async fn test_rejects_oversized_subject() {
|
||||
}],
|
||||
confidence: 0.9,
|
||||
timestamp: 1000,
|
||||
hlc_timestamp: HlcTimestamp::default(),
|
||||
vector: None,
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
@ -279,6 +282,7 @@ async fn test_rejects_oversized_predicate() {
|
||||
}],
|
||||
confidence: 0.9,
|
||||
timestamp: 1000,
|
||||
hlc_timestamp: HlcTimestamp::default(),
|
||||
vector: None,
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
@ -340,6 +344,7 @@ async fn test_accepts_exact_max_subject_length() {
|
||||
}],
|
||||
confidence: 0.9,
|
||||
timestamp: 1000,
|
||||
hlc_timestamp: HlcTimestamp::default(),
|
||||
vector: None,
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
@ -397,6 +402,7 @@ async fn test_accepts_exact_max_predicate_length() {
|
||||
}],
|
||||
confidence: 0.9,
|
||||
timestamp: 1000,
|
||||
hlc_timestamp: HlcTimestamp::default(),
|
||||
vector: None,
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
@ -449,6 +455,7 @@ async fn test_rejects_nan_confidence() {
|
||||
}],
|
||||
confidence: f32::NAN,
|
||||
timestamp: 1000,
|
||||
hlc_timestamp: HlcTimestamp::default(),
|
||||
vector: None,
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@ -38,6 +38,7 @@ async fn test_rejects_infinite_confidence() {
|
||||
}],
|
||||
confidence: f32::INFINITY,
|
||||
timestamp: 1000,
|
||||
hlc_timestamp: HlcTimestamp::default(),
|
||||
vector: None,
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
@ -180,6 +181,7 @@ async fn test_rejects_future_timestamp() {
|
||||
}],
|
||||
confidence: 0.9,
|
||||
timestamp: future_timestamp,
|
||||
hlc_timestamp: HlcTimestamp::default(),
|
||||
vector: None,
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
@ -244,6 +246,7 @@ async fn test_accepts_near_future_timestamp() {
|
||||
}],
|
||||
confidence: 0.9,
|
||||
timestamp: near_future_timestamp,
|
||||
hlc_timestamp: HlcTimestamp::default(),
|
||||
vector: None,
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
@ -293,6 +296,7 @@ async fn test_accepts_zero_confidence() {
|
||||
}],
|
||||
confidence: 0.0, // Valid: boundary case
|
||||
timestamp: 1000,
|
||||
hlc_timestamp: HlcTimestamp::default(),
|
||||
vector: None,
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
@ -342,6 +346,7 @@ async fn test_accepts_one_confidence() {
|
||||
}],
|
||||
confidence: 1.0, // Valid: boundary case
|
||||
timestamp: 1000,
|
||||
hlc_timestamp: HlcTimestamp::default(),
|
||||
vector: None,
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
479
crates/stemedb-lens/src/eigentrust_authority.rs
Normal file
479
crates/stemedb-lens/src/eigentrust_authority.rs
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,479 @@
|
||||
//! EigenTrust Authority Lens: Resolves based on global + domain trust.
|
||||
//!
|
||||
//! This lens integrates with both EigenTrust (global trust) and DomainTrust
|
||||
//! (domain-specific expertise) to weight assertions by the combined reputation
|
||||
//! and expertise of the signing agent.
|
||||
//!
|
||||
//! # Design Philosophy
|
||||
//!
|
||||
//! Follows the "Deep Module" principle:
|
||||
//! - Simple interface: `resolve_async(&[Assertion])` returns winner
|
||||
//! - Complex implementation: Queries TrustGraphStore for EigenTrust, DomainTrustStore for expertise
|
||||
//! - Sybil-resistant: Only seed-connected agents have meaningful global trust
|
||||
//! - Domain-aware: Expertise in the relevant domain boosts effective weight
|
||||
//!
|
||||
//! # Resolution Formula
|
||||
//!
|
||||
//! ```text
|
||||
//! weight = confidence × eigentrust_score × domain_factor
|
||||
//! ```
|
||||
//!
|
||||
//! Where:
|
||||
//! - confidence: The assertion's self-declared confidence (0.0 - 1.0)
|
||||
//! - eigentrust_score: Global trust from power iteration (0.0 - 1.0)
|
||||
//! - domain_factor: 0.5 + (domain_score × 0.5), ranges from 0.5 to 1.0
|
||||
|
||||
use crate::traits::{compute_conflict_score, Resolution};
|
||||
use crate::vote_aware_consensus::AsyncLens;
|
||||
use async_trait::async_trait;
|
||||
use std::sync::Arc;
|
||||
use stemedb_core::types::Assertion;
|
||||
use stemedb_storage::domain_trust_store::DomainTrustStore;
|
||||
use stemedb_storage::trust_graph_store::TrustGraphStore;
|
||||
use tracing::{debug, instrument};
|
||||
|
||||
/// EigenTrust Authority Lens: Returns the assertion with the highest
|
||||
/// global + domain trust-weighted score.
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// # Resolution Strategy
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// 1. For each candidate assertion, extract the primary signer's agent_id
|
||||
/// 2. Lookup the agent's EigenTrust score (global trust)
|
||||
/// 3. Lookup the agent's domain trust for this assertion's predicate
|
||||
/// 4. Calculate: `weight = confidence × eigentrust × domain_factor`
|
||||
/// 5. Return the assertion with highest weighted score
|
||||
/// 6. Tiebreaker: If scores are equal, prefer most recent timestamp
|
||||
/// 7. Agents with no EigenTrust score get 0.0 (Sybil protection)
|
||||
/// 8. Agents with no domain trust get default 0.5 (neutral)
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// # Sybil Resistance
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// The key insight is that isolated agents (not connected to seed trust)
|
||||
/// have near-zero EigenTrust scores, effectively filtering out Sybil attacks.
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// # Example
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// ```ignore
|
||||
/// use stemedb_lens::EigenTrustAuthorityLens;
|
||||
/// use stemedb_storage::{HybridStore, GenericTrustGraphStore, GenericDomainTrustStore};
|
||||
/// use std::sync::Arc;
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// let store = Arc::new(HybridStore::open("./data")?);
|
||||
/// let trust_graph = Arc::new(GenericTrustGraphStore::new(store.clone()));
|
||||
/// let domain_trust = Arc::new(GenericDomainTrustStore::new(store));
|
||||
/// let lens = EigenTrustAuthorityLens::new(trust_graph, domain_trust);
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// let resolution = lens.resolve_async(&candidates).await;
|
||||
/// ```
|
||||
pub struct EigenTrustAuthorityLens<T, D> {
|
||||
trust_graph_store: Arc<T>,
|
||||
domain_trust_store: Arc<D>,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
impl<T: TrustGraphStore, D: DomainTrustStore> EigenTrustAuthorityLens<T, D> {
|
||||
/// Create a new EigenTrustAuthorityLens with the given stores.
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// Both stores are wrapped in Arc for shared ownership, allowing
|
||||
/// the lens to be used in multiple contexts.
|
||||
pub fn new(trust_graph_store: Arc<T>, domain_trust_store: Arc<D>) -> Self {
|
||||
Self { trust_graph_store, domain_trust_store }
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Extract the primary agent ID from an assertion.
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// Uses the first signature's agent_id. Returns None if no signatures exist.
|
||||
fn get_primary_agent(assertion: &Assertion) -> Option<[u8; 32]> {
|
||||
assertion.signatures.first().map(|sig| sig.agent_id)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Internal struct to track assertion ranking data.
|
||||
#[derive(Debug)]
|
||||
struct RankedAssertion<'a> {
|
||||
assertion: &'a Assertion,
|
||||
eigentrust_score: f32,
|
||||
domain_factor: f32,
|
||||
weighted_score: f32,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[async_trait]
|
||||
impl<T: TrustGraphStore + 'static, D: DomainTrustStore + 'static> AsyncLens
|
||||
for EigenTrustAuthorityLens<T, D>
|
||||
{
|
||||
#[instrument(skip(self, candidates), fields(candidates_count = candidates.len()))]
|
||||
async fn resolve_async(&self, candidates: &[Assertion]) -> Resolution {
|
||||
if candidates.is_empty() {
|
||||
return Resolution::empty();
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// For single candidate, still calculate weighted score
|
||||
if candidates.len() == 1 {
|
||||
let assertion = &candidates[0];
|
||||
let (eigentrust_score, domain_factor, weighted_score) =
|
||||
self.calculate_weight(assertion).await;
|
||||
|
||||
debug!(
|
||||
subject = %assertion.subject,
|
||||
eigentrust_score,
|
||||
domain_factor,
|
||||
weighted_score,
|
||||
"Single candidate resolution"
|
||||
);
|
||||
|
||||
return Resolution::with_winner(assertion.clone(), 1, weighted_score, 0.0);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Collect trust-weighted scores for all candidates
|
||||
let mut ranked: Vec<RankedAssertion> = Vec::with_capacity(candidates.len());
|
||||
|
||||
for assertion in candidates {
|
||||
let (eigentrust_score, domain_factor, weighted_score) =
|
||||
self.calculate_weight(assertion).await;
|
||||
|
||||
debug!(
|
||||
subject = %assertion.subject,
|
||||
eigentrust_score,
|
||||
domain_factor,
|
||||
weighted_score,
|
||||
"Calculated weighted score"
|
||||
);
|
||||
|
||||
ranked.push(RankedAssertion {
|
||||
assertion,
|
||||
eigentrust_score,
|
||||
domain_factor,
|
||||
weighted_score,
|
||||
});
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Sort by weighted score (descending), then by timestamp (descending) for ties
|
||||
ranked.sort_by(|a, b| {
|
||||
b.weighted_score
|
||||
.partial_cmp(&a.weighted_score)
|
||||
.unwrap_or(std::cmp::Ordering::Equal)
|
||||
.then_with(|| b.assertion.timestamp.cmp(&a.assertion.timestamp))
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
// Select the winner (highest ranked)
|
||||
if let Some(winner) = ranked.first() {
|
||||
let conflict = compute_conflict_score(candidates);
|
||||
|
||||
debug!(
|
||||
winner_subject = %winner.assertion.subject,
|
||||
eigentrust = winner.eigentrust_score,
|
||||
domain_factor = winner.domain_factor,
|
||||
weighted_score = winner.weighted_score,
|
||||
conflict,
|
||||
"Resolved via EigenTrust + domain authority"
|
||||
);
|
||||
|
||||
Resolution::with_winner(
|
||||
winner.assertion.clone(),
|
||||
candidates.len(),
|
||||
winner.weighted_score,
|
||||
conflict,
|
||||
)
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
// Should never happen since we checked for empty candidates above
|
||||
Resolution::empty()
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fn name(&self) -> &'static str {
|
||||
"EigenTrustAuthority"
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
impl<T: TrustGraphStore + 'static, D: DomainTrustStore + 'static> EigenTrustAuthorityLens<T, D> {
|
||||
/// Calculate the weighted score for an assertion.
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// Returns (eigentrust_score, domain_factor, weighted_score).
|
||||
async fn calculate_weight(&self, assertion: &Assertion) -> (f32, f32, f32) {
|
||||
// Extract primary agent
|
||||
let agent_id = match Self::get_primary_agent(assertion) {
|
||||
Some(id) => id,
|
||||
None => {
|
||||
debug!(
|
||||
subject = %assertion.subject,
|
||||
"Assertion has no signatures, treating as untrusted"
|
||||
);
|
||||
return (0.0, 1.0, 0.0);
|
||||
}
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
// Get EigenTrust score (global trust)
|
||||
let eigentrust_score = match self.trust_graph_store.get_eigentrust_score(&agent_id).await {
|
||||
Ok(score) => score,
|
||||
Err(e) => {
|
||||
debug!(
|
||||
agent_id = %hex::encode(agent_id),
|
||||
error = %e,
|
||||
"Failed to get EigenTrust score, using 0.0"
|
||||
);
|
||||
0.0 // No EigenTrust score = untrusted (Sybil protection)
|
||||
}
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
// Get domain factor (domain-specific expertise)
|
||||
let domain_factor = match self
|
||||
.domain_trust_store
|
||||
.get_effective_trust(&agent_id, &assertion.predicate, 1.0)
|
||||
.await
|
||||
{
|
||||
Ok(effective) => effective, // get_effective_trust returns eigentrust × factor, so with 1.0 it returns just the factor
|
||||
Err(e) => {
|
||||
debug!(
|
||||
agent_id = %hex::encode(agent_id),
|
||||
predicate = %assertion.predicate,
|
||||
error = %e,
|
||||
"Failed to get domain trust, using default factor 0.75"
|
||||
);
|
||||
0.75 // Default domain factor (0.5 score → 0.75 factor)
|
||||
}
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
// Calculate weighted score
|
||||
// weight = confidence × eigentrust × domain_factor
|
||||
let weighted_score = assertion.confidence * eigentrust_score * domain_factor;
|
||||
|
||||
(eigentrust_score, domain_factor, weighted_score)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[cfg(test)]
|
||||
mod tests {
|
||||
use super::*;
|
||||
use stemedb_core::testing::AssertionBuilder;
|
||||
use stemedb_storage::domain_trust_store::{DomainTrust, GenericDomainTrustStore};
|
||||
use stemedb_storage::trust_graph_store::{
|
||||
EigenTrustConfig, GenericTrustGraphStore, TrustEdge, TrustGraphStore,
|
||||
};
|
||||
use stemedb_storage::HybridStore;
|
||||
|
||||
fn agent(id: u8) -> [u8; 32] {
|
||||
let mut arr = [0u8; 32];
|
||||
arr[0] = id;
|
||||
arr
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fn create_assertion(
|
||||
subject: &str,
|
||||
predicate: &str,
|
||||
confidence: f32,
|
||||
agent_id: [u8; 32],
|
||||
timestamp: u64,
|
||||
) -> Assertion {
|
||||
AssertionBuilder::new()
|
||||
.subject(subject)
|
||||
.predicate(predicate)
|
||||
.confidence(confidence)
|
||||
.agent_id(agent_id)
|
||||
.timestamp(timestamp)
|
||||
.build()
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[tokio::test]
|
||||
async fn test_empty_candidates() {
|
||||
let store = Arc::new(HybridStore::open_temp().expect("Failed to create store"));
|
||||
let trust_graph = Arc::new(GenericTrustGraphStore::new(store.clone()));
|
||||
let domain_trust = Arc::new(GenericDomainTrustStore::new(store));
|
||||
let lens = EigenTrustAuthorityLens::new(trust_graph, domain_trust);
|
||||
|
||||
let resolution = lens.resolve_async(&[]).await;
|
||||
|
||||
assert!(resolution.winner.is_none());
|
||||
assert_eq!(resolution.candidates_count, 0);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[tokio::test]
|
||||
async fn test_single_candidate_no_eigentrust() {
|
||||
let store = Arc::new(HybridStore::open_temp().expect("Failed to create store"));
|
||||
let trust_graph = Arc::new(GenericTrustGraphStore::new(store.clone()));
|
||||
let domain_trust = Arc::new(GenericDomainTrustStore::new(store));
|
||||
let lens = EigenTrustAuthorityLens::new(trust_graph, domain_trust);
|
||||
|
||||
// Agent with no EigenTrust score
|
||||
let assertion = create_assertion("Subject", "predicate", 0.8, agent(1), 1000);
|
||||
let resolution = lens.resolve_async(&[assertion]).await;
|
||||
|
||||
assert!(resolution.winner.is_some());
|
||||
// No EigenTrust = 0.0, so weighted score = 0.8 * 0.0 * factor = 0.0
|
||||
assert!((resolution.resolution_confidence - 0.0).abs() < 0.01);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[tokio::test]
|
||||
async fn test_eigentrust_integrated() {
|
||||
let store = Arc::new(HybridStore::open_temp().expect("Failed to create store"));
|
||||
let trust_graph = Arc::new(GenericTrustGraphStore::new(store.clone()));
|
||||
let domain_trust = Arc::new(GenericDomainTrustStore::new(store));
|
||||
let lens =
|
||||
EigenTrustAuthorityLens::new(Arc::clone(&trust_graph), Arc::clone(&domain_trust));
|
||||
|
||||
// Set up trust graph: seed → agent1
|
||||
trust_graph.set_seed_trust(&agent(0), 1.0).await.expect("set seed");
|
||||
trust_graph
|
||||
.add_trust_edge(&TrustEdge::new(agent(0), agent(1), 1.0, 1000, None))
|
||||
.await
|
||||
.expect("add edge");
|
||||
|
||||
// Compute EigenTrust
|
||||
trust_graph.compute_eigentrust(&EigenTrustConfig::default()).await.expect("compute");
|
||||
|
||||
// Create assertion from agent 1
|
||||
let assertion = create_assertion("Subject", "predicate", 0.8, agent(1), 1000);
|
||||
let resolution = lens.resolve_async(&[assertion]).await;
|
||||
|
||||
assert!(resolution.winner.is_some());
|
||||
// Agent 1 should have non-zero EigenTrust score
|
||||
assert!(resolution.resolution_confidence > 0.0);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[tokio::test]
|
||||
async fn test_sybil_agent_gets_low_score() {
|
||||
let store = Arc::new(HybridStore::open_temp().expect("Failed to create store"));
|
||||
let trust_graph = Arc::new(GenericTrustGraphStore::new(store.clone()));
|
||||
let domain_trust = Arc::new(GenericDomainTrustStore::new(store));
|
||||
let lens =
|
||||
EigenTrustAuthorityLens::new(Arc::clone(&trust_graph), Arc::clone(&domain_trust));
|
||||
|
||||
// Set up: seed has trust, Sybil ring is isolated
|
||||
trust_graph.set_seed_trust(&agent(0), 1.0).await.expect("set seed");
|
||||
trust_graph
|
||||
.add_trust_edge(&TrustEdge::new(agent(0), agent(1), 1.0, 1000, None))
|
||||
.await
|
||||
.expect("add edge");
|
||||
|
||||
// Sybil ring: 10 → 11 → 12 → 10 (not connected to seed)
|
||||
trust_graph
|
||||
.add_trust_edge(&TrustEdge::new(agent(10), agent(11), 1.0, 1000, None))
|
||||
.await
|
||||
.expect("add edge");
|
||||
trust_graph
|
||||
.add_trust_edge(&TrustEdge::new(agent(11), agent(12), 1.0, 1000, None))
|
||||
.await
|
||||
.expect("add edge");
|
||||
trust_graph
|
||||
.add_trust_edge(&TrustEdge::new(agent(12), agent(10), 1.0, 1000, None))
|
||||
.await
|
||||
.expect("add edge");
|
||||
|
||||
// Compute EigenTrust
|
||||
trust_graph.compute_eigentrust(&EigenTrustConfig::default()).await.expect("compute");
|
||||
|
||||
// Legitimate agent vs Sybil agent
|
||||
let legitimate = create_assertion("Subject", "predicate", 0.8, agent(1), 1000);
|
||||
let sybil = create_assertion("Subject", "predicate", 1.0, agent(10), 1100); // Higher confidence!
|
||||
|
||||
let resolution = lens.resolve_async(&[legitimate.clone(), sybil]).await;
|
||||
|
||||
// Legitimate agent should win despite Sybil having higher confidence
|
||||
assert!(resolution.winner.is_some());
|
||||
assert_eq!(resolution.winner.as_ref().unwrap().signatures[0].agent_id, agent(1));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[tokio::test]
|
||||
async fn test_domain_expertise_matters() {
|
||||
let store = Arc::new(HybridStore::open_temp().expect("Failed to create store"));
|
||||
let trust_graph = Arc::new(GenericTrustGraphStore::new(store.clone()));
|
||||
let domain_trust = Arc::new(GenericDomainTrustStore::new(store));
|
||||
let lens =
|
||||
EigenTrustAuthorityLens::new(Arc::clone(&trust_graph), Arc::clone(&domain_trust));
|
||||
|
||||
// Set up: both agents have same EigenTrust
|
||||
trust_graph.set_seed_trust(&agent(0), 1.0).await.expect("set seed");
|
||||
trust_graph
|
||||
.add_trust_edge(&TrustEdge::new(agent(0), agent(1), 1.0, 1000, None))
|
||||
.await
|
||||
.expect("add edge");
|
||||
trust_graph
|
||||
.add_trust_edge(&TrustEdge::new(agent(0), agent(2), 1.0, 1000, None))
|
||||
.await
|
||||
.expect("add edge");
|
||||
trust_graph.compute_eigentrust(&EigenTrustConfig::default()).await.expect("compute");
|
||||
|
||||
// Agent 1: Expert in medicine (score 0.95)
|
||||
let mut dt1 = DomainTrust::new(agent(1), "medicine".to_string(), 1000);
|
||||
dt1.score = 0.95;
|
||||
domain_trust.put_domain_trust(&dt1).await.expect("put");
|
||||
|
||||
// Agent 2: Novice in medicine (score 0.3)
|
||||
let mut dt2 = DomainTrust::new(agent(2), "medicine".to_string(), 1000);
|
||||
dt2.score = 0.3;
|
||||
domain_trust.put_domain_trust(&dt2).await.expect("put");
|
||||
|
||||
// Same confidence, same predicate (medicine domain)
|
||||
let expert_assertion = create_assertion("Drug", "treats_condition", 0.8, agent(1), 1000);
|
||||
let novice_assertion = create_assertion("Drug", "treats_condition", 0.8, agent(2), 1100);
|
||||
|
||||
let resolution = lens.resolve_async(&[expert_assertion.clone(), novice_assertion]).await;
|
||||
|
||||
// Expert should win due to higher domain trust
|
||||
assert!(resolution.winner.is_some());
|
||||
assert_eq!(resolution.winner.as_ref().unwrap().signatures[0].agent_id, agent(1));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[tokio::test]
|
||||
async fn test_no_signatures_treated_as_untrusted() {
|
||||
let store = Arc::new(HybridStore::open_temp().expect("Failed to create store"));
|
||||
let trust_graph = Arc::new(GenericTrustGraphStore::new(store.clone()));
|
||||
let domain_trust = Arc::new(GenericDomainTrustStore::new(store));
|
||||
let lens =
|
||||
EigenTrustAuthorityLens::new(Arc::clone(&trust_graph), Arc::clone(&domain_trust));
|
||||
|
||||
// Set up trusted agent
|
||||
trust_graph.set_seed_trust(&agent(0), 1.0).await.expect("set seed");
|
||||
trust_graph
|
||||
.add_trust_edge(&TrustEdge::new(agent(0), agent(1), 1.0, 1000, None))
|
||||
.await
|
||||
.expect("add edge");
|
||||
trust_graph.compute_eigentrust(&EigenTrustConfig::default()).await.expect("compute");
|
||||
|
||||
let signed = create_assertion("Subject", "predicate", 0.7, agent(1), 1000);
|
||||
|
||||
let mut unsigned = create_assertion("Subject", "predicate", 1.0, agent(99), 1100);
|
||||
unsigned.signatures.clear();
|
||||
|
||||
let resolution = lens.resolve_async(&[signed.clone(), unsigned]).await;
|
||||
|
||||
// Signed assertion should win even with lower confidence
|
||||
assert!(resolution.winner.is_some());
|
||||
assert_eq!(resolution.winner.as_ref().unwrap().signatures.len(), 1);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[tokio::test]
|
||||
async fn test_tie_breaking_by_timestamp() {
|
||||
let store = Arc::new(HybridStore::open_temp().expect("Failed to create store"));
|
||||
let trust_graph = Arc::new(GenericTrustGraphStore::new(store.clone()));
|
||||
let domain_trust = Arc::new(GenericDomainTrustStore::new(store));
|
||||
let lens =
|
||||
EigenTrustAuthorityLens::new(Arc::clone(&trust_graph), Arc::clone(&domain_trust));
|
||||
|
||||
// Set up: same agent makes two assertions
|
||||
trust_graph.set_seed_trust(&agent(0), 1.0).await.expect("set seed");
|
||||
trust_graph
|
||||
.add_trust_edge(&TrustEdge::new(agent(0), agent(1), 1.0, 1000, None))
|
||||
.await
|
||||
.expect("add edge");
|
||||
trust_graph.compute_eigentrust(&EigenTrustConfig::default()).await.expect("compute");
|
||||
|
||||
// Same agent, same confidence, different timestamps
|
||||
let older = create_assertion("Subject", "predicate", 0.8, agent(1), 1000);
|
||||
let newer = create_assertion("Subject", "predicate", 0.8, agent(1), 2000);
|
||||
|
||||
let resolution = lens.resolve_async(&[older, newer.clone()]).await;
|
||||
|
||||
// Newer should win on tiebreak
|
||||
assert!(resolution.winner.is_some());
|
||||
assert_eq!(resolution.winner.as_ref().unwrap().timestamp, 2000);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[tokio::test]
|
||||
async fn test_lens_name() {
|
||||
let store = Arc::new(HybridStore::open_temp().expect("Failed to create store"));
|
||||
let trust_graph = Arc::new(GenericTrustGraphStore::new(store.clone()));
|
||||
let domain_trust = Arc::new(GenericDomainTrustStore::new(store));
|
||||
let lens = EigenTrustAuthorityLens::new(trust_graph, domain_trust);
|
||||
|
||||
assert_eq!(lens.name(), "EigenTrustAuthority");
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
286
crates/stemedb-lens/src/hlc_recency.rs
Normal file
286
crates/stemedb-lens/src/hlc_recency.rs
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,286 @@
|
||||
//! HLC-based Recency Lens: Hybrid Logical Clock timestamp wins.
|
||||
//!
|
||||
//! This lens provides distributed-consistent recency ordering using HLC timestamps,
|
||||
//! which handle clock skew between nodes better than Unix timestamps alone.
|
||||
//!
|
||||
//! # Why HLC over Unix timestamp?
|
||||
//!
|
||||
//! - **Clock skew tolerance**: Two nodes with drifted clocks will still produce
|
||||
//! consistent ordering because HLC combines physical time with logical counters.
|
||||
//! - **Total ordering**: HLC + node_id provides deterministic ordering even for
|
||||
//! concurrent events on different nodes.
|
||||
//! - **Causal consistency**: HLC preserves happens-before relationships across
|
||||
//! distributed nodes.
|
||||
//!
|
||||
//! # Resolution Strategy
|
||||
//!
|
||||
//! 1. Compare by `hlc_timestamp` (includes NTP64 time + logical counter)
|
||||
//! 2. If HLC times are equal (concurrent events), compare by `node_id`
|
||||
//! 3. Final tiebreaker: `source_hash` for determinism
|
||||
|
||||
use crate::traits::{compute_conflict_score, Lens, Resolution};
|
||||
use stemedb_core::types::Assertion;
|
||||
use tracing::instrument;
|
||||
|
||||
/// HLC-based Recency Lens: Returns the assertion with the highest HLC timestamp.
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// # Resolution Strategy
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// 1. Find assertion with maximum `hlc_timestamp`
|
||||
/// 2. If HLC tie: HLC's `node_id` provides tiebreaker
|
||||
/// 3. Final tiebreaker: `source_hash` for determinism across identical HLCs
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// # Confidence Calculation
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// - Single candidate: 1.0 (trivial resolution)
|
||||
/// - Multiple candidates: Based on HLC timestamp gap (in milliseconds) to next candidate
|
||||
/// - > 1 day gap: 0.95
|
||||
/// - > 1 hour gap: 0.8
|
||||
/// - > 1 minute gap: 0.6
|
||||
/// - Otherwise: 0.5
|
||||
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, Default)]
|
||||
pub struct HlcRecencyLens;
|
||||
|
||||
impl Lens for HlcRecencyLens {
|
||||
#[instrument(skip(self, candidates), fields(candidates_count = candidates.len(), lens = "HlcRecency"))]
|
||||
fn resolve(&self, candidates: &[Assertion]) -> Resolution {
|
||||
if candidates.is_empty() {
|
||||
return Resolution::empty();
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if candidates.len() == 1 {
|
||||
return Resolution::with_winner(candidates[0].clone(), 1, 1.0, 0.0);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Find the assertion with the highest HLC timestamp
|
||||
// HLC's Ord implementation compares time_ntp64 first, then node_id
|
||||
let winner = candidates
|
||||
.iter()
|
||||
.max_by(|a, b| {
|
||||
// Primary: highest HLC timestamp (includes NTP64 time + node_id tiebreaker)
|
||||
// Final tiebreaker: source_hash for determinism
|
||||
a.hlc_timestamp
|
||||
.cmp(&b.hlc_timestamp)
|
||||
.then_with(|| a.source_hash.cmp(&b.source_hash))
|
||||
})
|
||||
.cloned();
|
||||
|
||||
match winner {
|
||||
Some(w) => {
|
||||
// Calculate confidence based on how much newer the winner is
|
||||
let max_hlc = &w.hlc_timestamp;
|
||||
let max_ms = max_hlc.millis();
|
||||
|
||||
// Find the second-highest HLC timestamp
|
||||
let second_max_ms = candidates
|
||||
.iter()
|
||||
.filter(|a| a.hlc_timestamp < *max_hlc)
|
||||
.map(|a| a.hlc_timestamp.millis())
|
||||
.max()
|
||||
.unwrap_or(0);
|
||||
|
||||
// Confidence is higher when the gap is larger
|
||||
let gap_ms = max_ms.saturating_sub(second_max_ms);
|
||||
let confidence = if gap_ms > 86_400_000 {
|
||||
// More than a day: high confidence
|
||||
0.95
|
||||
} else if gap_ms > 3_600_000 {
|
||||
// More than an hour: good confidence
|
||||
0.8
|
||||
} else if gap_ms > 60_000 {
|
||||
// More than a minute: moderate confidence
|
||||
0.6
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
// Very close: low confidence
|
||||
0.5
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
let conflict = compute_conflict_score(candidates);
|
||||
Resolution::with_winner(w, candidates.len(), confidence, conflict)
|
||||
}
|
||||
None => Resolution::empty(),
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fn name(&self) -> &'static str {
|
||||
"HlcRecency"
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[cfg(test)]
|
||||
mod tests {
|
||||
use super::*;
|
||||
use stemedb_core::testing::AssertionBuilder;
|
||||
use stemedb_core::types::HlcTimestamp;
|
||||
|
||||
fn create_assertion_with_hlc(subject: &str, time_ntp64: u64, node_id: [u8; 16]) -> Assertion {
|
||||
AssertionBuilder::new()
|
||||
.subject(subject)
|
||||
.hlc_timestamp(HlcTimestamp::new(time_ntp64, node_id))
|
||||
.build()
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_empty_candidates() {
|
||||
let lens = HlcRecencyLens;
|
||||
let resolution = lens.resolve(&[]);
|
||||
|
||||
assert!(resolution.winner.is_none());
|
||||
assert_eq!(resolution.candidates_count, 0);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_single_candidate() {
|
||||
let lens = HlcRecencyLens;
|
||||
let assertion = create_assertion_with_hlc("Tesla", 1000, [1u8; 16]);
|
||||
let resolution = lens.resolve(std::slice::from_ref(&assertion));
|
||||
|
||||
assert!(resolution.winner.is_some());
|
||||
assert_eq!(resolution.winner.as_ref().map(|a| &a.subject), Some(&"Tesla".to_string()));
|
||||
assert_eq!(resolution.candidates_count, 1);
|
||||
assert!((resolution.resolution_confidence - 1.0).abs() < f32::EPSILON);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_hlc_ordering_beats_unix_timestamp() {
|
||||
// Test that HLC ordering is used, not Unix timestamp
|
||||
let lens = HlcRecencyLens;
|
||||
|
||||
// Create two assertions with same Unix timestamp but different HLC
|
||||
let mut older = AssertionBuilder::new()
|
||||
.subject("Older")
|
||||
.timestamp(1000) // Same Unix timestamp
|
||||
.hlc_timestamp(HlcTimestamp::new(1000, [1u8; 16]))
|
||||
.build();
|
||||
older.source_hash = [1u8; 32];
|
||||
|
||||
let mut newer = AssertionBuilder::new()
|
||||
.subject("Newer")
|
||||
.timestamp(1000) // Same Unix timestamp
|
||||
.hlc_timestamp(HlcTimestamp::new(2000, [1u8; 16])) // Higher HLC
|
||||
.build();
|
||||
newer.source_hash = [2u8; 32];
|
||||
|
||||
let resolution = lens.resolve(&[older, newer.clone()]);
|
||||
|
||||
assert!(resolution.winner.is_some());
|
||||
assert_eq!(resolution.winner.as_ref().map(|a| &a.subject), Some(&"Newer".to_string()));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_deterministic_tiebreaker_same_hlc_time() {
|
||||
// When HLC time is equal, node_id should break the tie
|
||||
let lens = HlcRecencyLens;
|
||||
|
||||
let mut a1 = create_assertion_with_hlc("A", 1000, [1u8; 16]);
|
||||
a1.source_hash = [1u8; 32];
|
||||
|
||||
let mut a2 = create_assertion_with_hlc("B", 1000, [2u8; 16]); // Higher node_id
|
||||
a2.source_hash = [2u8; 32];
|
||||
|
||||
// Same HLC time, should use node_id as tiebreaker
|
||||
let resolution1 = lens.resolve(&[a1.clone(), a2.clone()]);
|
||||
let resolution2 = lens.resolve(&[a2.clone(), a1.clone()]);
|
||||
|
||||
// Should be deterministic regardless of input order
|
||||
// Higher node_id wins
|
||||
assert_eq!(
|
||||
resolution1.winner.as_ref().map(|a| &a.subject),
|
||||
resolution2.winner.as_ref().map(|a| &a.subject)
|
||||
);
|
||||
// Node B has higher node_id [2u8; 16] > [1u8; 16]
|
||||
assert_eq!(resolution1.winner.as_ref().map(|a| &a.subject), Some(&"B".to_string()));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_clock_skew_scenario() {
|
||||
// Scenario: Node A's wall clock is ahead, but Node B's assertion is causally later
|
||||
// In HLC, the causally later assertion should have a higher HLC timestamp
|
||||
let lens = HlcRecencyLens;
|
||||
|
||||
// Node A: wall clock ahead (higher NTP64 base), but logically older event
|
||||
let node_a_ahead = create_assertion_with_hlc("NodeA_Ahead", 5000, [1u8; 16]);
|
||||
|
||||
// Node B: wall clock behind, but received Node A's timestamp and incremented
|
||||
// In real HLC, this would be: max(local_time, received_time) + 1
|
||||
let node_b_later = create_assertion_with_hlc("NodeB_CausallyLater", 5001, [2u8; 16]);
|
||||
|
||||
let resolution = lens.resolve(&[node_a_ahead, node_b_later.clone()]);
|
||||
|
||||
// Node B's assertion should win because it's causally later (higher HLC)
|
||||
assert_eq!(
|
||||
resolution.winner.as_ref().map(|a| &a.subject),
|
||||
Some(&"NodeB_CausallyLater".to_string())
|
||||
);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_source_hash_final_tiebreaker() {
|
||||
// When HLC timestamps are completely identical, source_hash is final tiebreaker
|
||||
let lens = HlcRecencyLens;
|
||||
|
||||
let mut a1 = AssertionBuilder::new()
|
||||
.subject("A")
|
||||
.hlc_timestamp(HlcTimestamp::new(1000, [1u8; 16]))
|
||||
.build();
|
||||
a1.source_hash = [1u8; 32];
|
||||
|
||||
let mut a2 = AssertionBuilder::new()
|
||||
.subject("B")
|
||||
.hlc_timestamp(HlcTimestamp::new(1000, [1u8; 16])) // Identical HLC!
|
||||
.build();
|
||||
a2.source_hash = [2u8; 32]; // Higher source_hash
|
||||
|
||||
let resolution = lens.resolve(&[a1.clone(), a2.clone()]);
|
||||
|
||||
// Higher source_hash should win
|
||||
assert_eq!(resolution.winner.as_ref().map(|a| &a.subject), Some(&"B".to_string()));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_confidence_calculation() {
|
||||
let lens = HlcRecencyLens;
|
||||
|
||||
// Create assertions with large time gap (> 1 day in milliseconds)
|
||||
// NTP64 seconds are in upper 32 bits, so 1 second = 1 << 32
|
||||
// For a 2-day gap: 2 * 86400 seconds = 172800 seconds
|
||||
const NTP_UNIX_OFFSET: u64 = 2_208_988_800;
|
||||
let base_seconds = NTP_UNIX_OFFSET + 1000;
|
||||
let ntp64_base = base_seconds << 32;
|
||||
let ntp64_later = (base_seconds + 172800) << 32; // 2 days later
|
||||
|
||||
let old = create_assertion_with_hlc("Old", ntp64_base, [1u8; 16]);
|
||||
let new = create_assertion_with_hlc("New", ntp64_later, [1u8; 16]);
|
||||
|
||||
let resolution = lens.resolve(&[old, new]);
|
||||
|
||||
assert!(resolution.winner.is_some());
|
||||
// With > 1 day gap, confidence should be 0.95
|
||||
assert!(
|
||||
resolution.resolution_confidence > 0.9,
|
||||
"Expected high confidence for large gap, got {}",
|
||||
resolution.resolution_confidence
|
||||
);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_multiple_candidates_selects_newest() {
|
||||
let lens = HlcRecencyLens;
|
||||
|
||||
let old = create_assertion_with_hlc("Old", 1000, [1u8; 16]);
|
||||
let newer = create_assertion_with_hlc("Newer", 2000, [1u8; 16]);
|
||||
let newest = create_assertion_with_hlc("Newest", 3000, [1u8; 16]);
|
||||
|
||||
let resolution = lens.resolve(&[old, newer, newest.clone()]);
|
||||
|
||||
assert!(resolution.winner.is_some());
|
||||
assert_eq!(resolution.winner.as_ref().map(|a| &a.subject), Some(&"Newest".to_string()));
|
||||
assert_eq!(resolution.candidates_count, 3);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_lens_name() {
|
||||
let lens = HlcRecencyLens;
|
||||
assert_eq!(lens.name(), "HlcRecency");
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
@ -46,7 +46,9 @@
|
||||
mod confidence;
|
||||
mod consensus;
|
||||
mod constraints;
|
||||
mod eigentrust_authority;
|
||||
mod epoch_aware;
|
||||
mod hlc_recency;
|
||||
mod layered_consensus;
|
||||
mod recency;
|
||||
mod skeptic;
|
||||
@ -57,7 +59,9 @@ mod vote_aware_consensus;
|
||||
pub use confidence::ConfidenceLens;
|
||||
pub use consensus::ConsensusLens;
|
||||
pub use constraints::{ConstraintSet, ConstraintsLens};
|
||||
pub use eigentrust_authority::EigenTrustAuthorityLens;
|
||||
pub use epoch_aware::{EpochAwareLens, SyncLensWrapper};
|
||||
pub use hlc_recency::HlcRecencyLens;
|
||||
pub use layered_consensus::LayeredConsensusLens;
|
||||
pub use recency::RecencyLens;
|
||||
pub use skeptic::SkepticLens;
|
||||
|
||||
@ -63,6 +63,82 @@ impl<S: KVStore + 'static> QueryEngine<S> {
|
||||
Ok(results)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Fetch assertions for multiple subjects, deduplicating by hash.
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// Used for alias resolution where a single query subject expands to
|
||||
/// multiple aliased subjects (e.g., code:// and rfc:// paths).
|
||||
pub(super) async fn fetch_by_subjects(&self, subjects: &[String]) -> Result<Vec<Assertion>> {
|
||||
use std::collections::HashSet;
|
||||
let mut seen_hashes: HashSet<[u8; 32]> = HashSet::new();
|
||||
let mut results = Vec::new();
|
||||
|
||||
for subject in subjects {
|
||||
let hash_list = self.index_store.get_by_subject(subject).await?;
|
||||
for hash in hash_list {
|
||||
if !seen_hashes.insert(hash) {
|
||||
continue; // Already seen this hash from another subject
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
let assertion_key = key_codec::assertion_key(subject, &hex::encode(hash));
|
||||
if let Some(data) = self.store.get(&assertion_key).await? {
|
||||
match self.deserialize_assertion(&data) {
|
||||
Ok(assertion) => results.push(assertion),
|
||||
Err(e) => {
|
||||
debug!(hash = %hex::encode(hash), "Skipping malformed assertion: {:?}", e);
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
debug!(
|
||||
subjects_count = subjects.len(),
|
||||
total_assertions = results.len(),
|
||||
"Fetched assertions for multiple subjects"
|
||||
);
|
||||
Ok(results)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Fetch assertions for multiple subjects with predicate filter, deduplicating by hash.
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// Used for alias resolution when both subject and predicate are specified.
|
||||
pub(super) async fn fetch_by_subjects_predicate(
|
||||
&self,
|
||||
subjects: &[String],
|
||||
predicate: &str,
|
||||
) -> Result<Vec<Assertion>> {
|
||||
use std::collections::HashSet;
|
||||
let mut seen_hashes: HashSet<[u8; 32]> = HashSet::new();
|
||||
let mut results = Vec::new();
|
||||
|
||||
for subject in subjects {
|
||||
let hash_list = self.index_store.get_by_subject_predicate(subject, predicate).await?;
|
||||
for hash in hash_list {
|
||||
if !seen_hashes.insert(hash) {
|
||||
continue; // Already seen this hash from another subject
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
let assertion_key = key_codec::assertion_key(subject, &hex::encode(hash));
|
||||
if let Some(data) = self.store.get(&assertion_key).await? {
|
||||
match self.deserialize_assertion(&data) {
|
||||
Ok(assertion) => results.push(assertion),
|
||||
Err(e) => {
|
||||
debug!(hash = %hex::encode(hash), "Skipping malformed assertion: {:?}", e);
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
debug!(
|
||||
subjects_count = subjects.len(),
|
||||
predicate,
|
||||
total_assertions = results.len(),
|
||||
"Fetched assertions for multiple subjects with predicate"
|
||||
);
|
||||
Ok(results)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Fetch all assertions by scanning the subjects discovery index.
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// This scans `\x00SUBJECTS:` to discover all known subjects, then fetches
|
||||
|
||||
@ -6,7 +6,7 @@
|
||||
use std::sync::Arc;
|
||||
|
||||
use stemedb_core::types::Assertion;
|
||||
use stemedb_storage::{GenericIndexStore, KVStore, VectorIndex, VisualIndex};
|
||||
use stemedb_storage::{AliasStore, GenericIndexStore, KVStore, VectorIndex, VisualIndex};
|
||||
// Trait import required for IndexStore methods on GenericIndexStore
|
||||
#[allow(unused_imports)]
|
||||
use stemedb_storage::IndexStore;
|
||||
@ -43,13 +43,15 @@ pub struct QueryEngine<S> {
|
||||
pub(super) vector_index: Option<Arc<dyn VectorIndex>>,
|
||||
/// Optional visual index for hamming distance search.
|
||||
pub(super) visual_index: Option<Arc<dyn VisualIndex>>,
|
||||
/// Optional alias store for cross-scheme subject resolution.
|
||||
pub(super) alias_store: Option<Arc<dyn AliasStore>>,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
impl<S: KVStore + 'static> QueryEngine<S> {
|
||||
/// Create a new query engine backed by the given store.
|
||||
pub fn new(store: Arc<S>) -> Self {
|
||||
let index_store = GenericIndexStore::new(store.clone());
|
||||
Self { store, index_store, vector_index: None, visual_index: None }
|
||||
Self { store, index_store, vector_index: None, visual_index: None, alias_store: None }
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Attach a vector index for k-NN similarity search.
|
||||
@ -70,6 +72,17 @@ impl<S: KVStore + 'static> QueryEngine<S> {
|
||||
self
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Attach an alias store for cross-scheme subject resolution.
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// When set and a query has `resolve_aliases: true`, the engine will
|
||||
/// expand the subject to all aliased paths before fetching assertions.
|
||||
/// This enables queries like `code://rust/myapp/tls/cert_verification`
|
||||
/// to also return assertions from `rfc://5246/tls/cert_verification`.
|
||||
pub fn with_alias_store(mut self, alias_store: Arc<dyn AliasStore>) -> Self {
|
||||
self.alias_store = Some(alias_store);
|
||||
self
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Execute a query and return matching assertions.
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// # Query Execution Strategy
|
||||
@ -118,7 +131,8 @@ impl<S: KVStore + 'static> QueryEngine<S> {
|
||||
|
||||
// Fast path: check materialized view when both subject and predicate are specified
|
||||
// Skip fast path if as_of is set (MVs reflect current state, time-travel needs full scan)
|
||||
if query.as_of.is_none() {
|
||||
// Skip fast path if resolve_aliases is true (aliases expand to multiple subjects)
|
||||
if query.as_of.is_none() && !query.resolve_aliases {
|
||||
if let (Some(subject), Some(predicate)) = (&query.subject, &query.predicate) {
|
||||
if let Some(result) = self.try_fast_path(subject, predicate, query).await? {
|
||||
debug!(subject, predicate, "Fast path: used materialized view");
|
||||
@ -128,21 +142,43 @@ impl<S: KVStore + 'static> QueryEngine<S> {
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Slow path: determine scan strategy based on query filters
|
||||
let candidates = match (&query.subject, &query.predicate) {
|
||||
// O(1) compound index lookup
|
||||
(Some(subject), Some(predicate)) => {
|
||||
// When resolve_aliases is true, expand subject to all aliased paths
|
||||
let candidates = match (&query.subject, &query.predicate, query.resolve_aliases) {
|
||||
// Alias-expanded compound index lookup
|
||||
(Some(subject), Some(predicate), true) => {
|
||||
let subjects = self.resolve_subject_aliases(subject).await?;
|
||||
debug!(
|
||||
original_subject = subject,
|
||||
resolved_count = subjects.len(),
|
||||
predicate,
|
||||
"Alias-expanded compound index lookup"
|
||||
);
|
||||
self.fetch_by_subjects_predicate(&subjects, predicate).await?
|
||||
}
|
||||
// Alias-expanded subject index lookup
|
||||
(Some(subject), None, true) => {
|
||||
let subjects = self.resolve_subject_aliases(subject).await?;
|
||||
debug!(
|
||||
original_subject = subject,
|
||||
resolved_count = subjects.len(),
|
||||
"Alias-expanded subject index lookup"
|
||||
);
|
||||
self.fetch_by_subjects(&subjects).await?
|
||||
}
|
||||
// O(1) compound index lookup (no alias expansion)
|
||||
(Some(subject), Some(predicate), false) => {
|
||||
debug!(
|
||||
subject,
|
||||
predicate, "Slow path: using compound index SP:{subject}:{predicate}"
|
||||
);
|
||||
self.fetch_by_subject_predicate(subject, predicate).await?
|
||||
}
|
||||
// O(1) subject index lookup
|
||||
(Some(subject), None) => {
|
||||
// O(1) subject index lookup (no alias expansion)
|
||||
(Some(subject), None, false) => {
|
||||
debug!(subject, "Using subject index S:{subject}");
|
||||
self.fetch_by_subject(subject).await?
|
||||
}
|
||||
// O(n) full scan
|
||||
// O(n) full scan (resolve_aliases has no effect without subject)
|
||||
_ => {
|
||||
debug!("Using full scan (no subject filter)");
|
||||
self.fetch_all_assertions().await?
|
||||
@ -205,4 +241,31 @@ impl<S: KVStore + 'static> QueryEngine<S> {
|
||||
stemedb_core::serde::deserialize(data)
|
||||
.map_err(|e| QueryError::Deserialization(e.to_string()))
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Resolve a subject to all aliased paths via the AliasStore.
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// If no alias store is configured, returns just the original subject.
|
||||
/// This allows queries with `resolve_aliases: true` to gracefully degrade
|
||||
/// when no alias store is available.
|
||||
async fn resolve_subject_aliases(&self, subject: &str) -> Result<Vec<String>> {
|
||||
match &self.alias_store {
|
||||
Some(store) => {
|
||||
let resolved = store.resolve_all(subject).await.map_err(QueryError::from)?;
|
||||
debug!(
|
||||
subject,
|
||||
resolved_count = resolved.len(),
|
||||
resolved_subjects = ?resolved,
|
||||
"Resolved subject aliases"
|
||||
);
|
||||
Ok(resolved)
|
||||
}
|
||||
None => {
|
||||
debug!(
|
||||
subject,
|
||||
"resolve_aliases: true but no alias_store configured, using exact subject"
|
||||
);
|
||||
Ok(vec![subject.to_string()])
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
254
crates/stemedb-query/src/engine/tests/alias_resolution.rs
Normal file
254
crates/stemedb-query/src/engine/tests/alias_resolution.rs
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,254 @@
|
||||
//! Tests for alias resolution in QueryEngine.
|
||||
//!
|
||||
//! Tests the `resolve_aliases` query flag and `alias_store` integration.
|
||||
|
||||
use std::sync::Arc;
|
||||
use stemedb_core::testing::AssertionBuilder;
|
||||
use stemedb_core::types::{AliasOrigin, ConceptAlias, ConceptPath, LifecycleStage};
|
||||
use stemedb_storage::{AliasStore, GenericAliasStore, HybridStore};
|
||||
|
||||
use super::{store_assertion, QueryEngine};
|
||||
use crate::query::Query;
|
||||
|
||||
/// Helper to create a test ConceptAlias.
|
||||
fn create_alias(alias: &str, canonical: &str) -> ConceptAlias {
|
||||
ConceptAlias::new(
|
||||
ConceptPath::parse(alias).expect("valid alias path"),
|
||||
ConceptPath::parse(canonical).expect("valid canonical path"),
|
||||
[1u8; 32], // agent_id
|
||||
1000, // timestamp
|
||||
AliasOrigin::Manual,
|
||||
)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Test that resolve_aliases: true expands subject to aliased paths.
|
||||
#[tokio::test]
|
||||
async fn test_resolve_aliases_expands_subjects() {
|
||||
let store = Arc::new(HybridStore::open_temp().expect("store"));
|
||||
|
||||
// Create assertions for two different subjects (aliased paths)
|
||||
let code_assertion = AssertionBuilder::new()
|
||||
.subject("code://rust/myapp/tls")
|
||||
.predicate("cert_verification")
|
||||
.object_text("enabled")
|
||||
.confidence(0.8)
|
||||
.lifecycle(LifecycleStage::Approved)
|
||||
.build();
|
||||
|
||||
let rfc_assertion = AssertionBuilder::new()
|
||||
.subject("rfc://5246/tls")
|
||||
.predicate("cert_verification")
|
||||
.object_text("required")
|
||||
.confidence(0.95)
|
||||
.lifecycle(LifecycleStage::Approved)
|
||||
.build();
|
||||
|
||||
store_assertion(&store, &code_assertion).await;
|
||||
store_assertion(&store, &rfc_assertion).await;
|
||||
|
||||
// Set up alias store with alias: code://rust/myapp/tls -> rfc://5246/tls
|
||||
let alias_store = GenericAliasStore::new(store.clone());
|
||||
let alias = create_alias("code://rust/myapp/tls", "rfc://5246/tls");
|
||||
alias_store.set_alias(&alias).await.expect("set alias");
|
||||
|
||||
// Create query engine with alias store
|
||||
let engine = QueryEngine::new(Arc::new(store.clone()))
|
||||
.with_alias_store(Arc::new(alias_store) as Arc<dyn AliasStore>);
|
||||
|
||||
// Query with resolve_aliases: true should find BOTH assertions
|
||||
let query = Query::builder()
|
||||
.subject("code://rust/myapp/tls")
|
||||
.predicate("cert_verification")
|
||||
.resolve_aliases(true)
|
||||
.build();
|
||||
|
||||
let result = engine.execute(&query).await.expect("execute");
|
||||
|
||||
assert_eq!(result.assertions.len(), 2, "Should find assertions from both aliased subjects");
|
||||
|
||||
let subjects: Vec<&str> = result.assertions.iter().map(|a| a.subject.as_str()).collect();
|
||||
assert!(subjects.contains(&"code://rust/myapp/tls"), "Should include code assertion");
|
||||
assert!(subjects.contains(&"rfc://5246/tls"), "Should include rfc assertion");
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Test that resolve_aliases: false queries exact subject only.
|
||||
#[tokio::test]
|
||||
async fn test_resolve_aliases_false_is_exact() {
|
||||
let store = Arc::new(HybridStore::open_temp().expect("store"));
|
||||
|
||||
// Create assertions for two different subjects
|
||||
let code_assertion = AssertionBuilder::new()
|
||||
.subject("code://rust/myapp/tls")
|
||||
.predicate("cert_verification")
|
||||
.object_text("enabled")
|
||||
.confidence(0.8)
|
||||
.lifecycle(LifecycleStage::Approved)
|
||||
.build();
|
||||
|
||||
let rfc_assertion = AssertionBuilder::new()
|
||||
.subject("rfc://5246/tls")
|
||||
.predicate("cert_verification")
|
||||
.object_text("required")
|
||||
.confidence(0.95)
|
||||
.lifecycle(LifecycleStage::Approved)
|
||||
.build();
|
||||
|
||||
store_assertion(&store, &code_assertion).await;
|
||||
store_assertion(&store, &rfc_assertion).await;
|
||||
|
||||
// Set up alias store with alias
|
||||
let alias_store = GenericAliasStore::new(store.clone());
|
||||
let alias = create_alias("code://rust/myapp/tls", "rfc://5246/tls");
|
||||
alias_store.set_alias(&alias).await.expect("set alias");
|
||||
|
||||
let engine = QueryEngine::new(Arc::new(store.clone()))
|
||||
.with_alias_store(Arc::new(alias_store) as Arc<dyn AliasStore>);
|
||||
|
||||
// Query with resolve_aliases: false (default) should find only the exact subject
|
||||
let query = Query::builder()
|
||||
.subject("code://rust/myapp/tls")
|
||||
.predicate("cert_verification")
|
||||
.resolve_aliases(false)
|
||||
.build();
|
||||
|
||||
let result = engine.execute(&query).await.expect("execute");
|
||||
|
||||
assert_eq!(result.assertions.len(), 1, "Should find only exact subject assertion");
|
||||
assert_eq!(result.assertions[0].subject, "code://rust/myapp/tls");
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Test that resolve_aliases: true without alias_store gracefully returns exact subject.
|
||||
#[tokio::test]
|
||||
async fn test_no_alias_store_graceful() {
|
||||
let store = Arc::new(HybridStore::open_temp().expect("store"));
|
||||
|
||||
let assertion = AssertionBuilder::new()
|
||||
.subject("code://rust/myapp/tls")
|
||||
.predicate("cert_verification")
|
||||
.object_text("enabled")
|
||||
.confidence(0.8)
|
||||
.lifecycle(LifecycleStage::Approved)
|
||||
.build();
|
||||
|
||||
store_assertion(&store, &assertion).await;
|
||||
|
||||
// Query engine WITHOUT alias store
|
||||
let engine = QueryEngine::new(Arc::new(store));
|
||||
|
||||
// Query with resolve_aliases: true should still work (graceful degradation)
|
||||
let query = Query::builder()
|
||||
.subject("code://rust/myapp/tls")
|
||||
.predicate("cert_verification")
|
||||
.resolve_aliases(true)
|
||||
.build();
|
||||
|
||||
let result = engine.execute(&query).await.expect("execute");
|
||||
|
||||
assert_eq!(result.assertions.len(), 1, "Should find exact subject assertion");
|
||||
assert_eq!(result.assertions[0].subject, "code://rust/myapp/tls");
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Test that alias resolution deduplicates by assertion hash.
|
||||
#[tokio::test]
|
||||
async fn test_resolve_aliases_deduplicates() {
|
||||
let store = Arc::new(HybridStore::open_temp().expect("store"));
|
||||
|
||||
// Create a single assertion
|
||||
let assertion = AssertionBuilder::new()
|
||||
.subject("code://rust/myapp/tls")
|
||||
.predicate("cert_verification")
|
||||
.object_text("enabled")
|
||||
.confidence(0.8)
|
||||
.lifecycle(LifecycleStage::Approved)
|
||||
.build();
|
||||
|
||||
store_assertion(&store, &assertion).await;
|
||||
|
||||
// Set up alias store where both paths lead to the same subject
|
||||
// (In real use, this wouldn't happen, but tests the dedup logic)
|
||||
let alias_store = GenericAliasStore::new(store.clone());
|
||||
// No alias set - both code:// and the query subject are the same
|
||||
|
||||
let engine = QueryEngine::new(Arc::new(store.clone()))
|
||||
.with_alias_store(Arc::new(alias_store) as Arc<dyn AliasStore>);
|
||||
|
||||
// Query with resolve_aliases: true
|
||||
let query = Query::builder().subject("code://rust/myapp/tls").resolve_aliases(true).build();
|
||||
|
||||
let result = engine.execute(&query).await.expect("execute");
|
||||
|
||||
// Should have exactly 1 result (no duplicates)
|
||||
assert_eq!(result.assertions.len(), 1);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Test subject-only query with alias resolution.
|
||||
#[tokio::test]
|
||||
async fn test_resolve_aliases_subject_only() {
|
||||
let store = Arc::new(HybridStore::open_temp().expect("store"));
|
||||
|
||||
// Create assertions for two aliased subjects with different predicates
|
||||
let code_assertion1 = AssertionBuilder::new()
|
||||
.subject("code://rust/myapp/tls")
|
||||
.predicate("cert_verification")
|
||||
.object_text("enabled")
|
||||
.confidence(0.8)
|
||||
.lifecycle(LifecycleStage::Approved)
|
||||
.build();
|
||||
|
||||
let code_assertion2 = AssertionBuilder::new()
|
||||
.subject("code://rust/myapp/tls")
|
||||
.predicate("timeout")
|
||||
.object_text("30s")
|
||||
.confidence(0.9)
|
||||
.lifecycle(LifecycleStage::Approved)
|
||||
.build();
|
||||
|
||||
let rfc_assertion = AssertionBuilder::new()
|
||||
.subject("rfc://5246/tls")
|
||||
.predicate("cert_verification")
|
||||
.object_text("required")
|
||||
.confidence(0.95)
|
||||
.lifecycle(LifecycleStage::Approved)
|
||||
.build();
|
||||
|
||||
store_assertion(&store, &code_assertion1).await;
|
||||
store_assertion(&store, &code_assertion2).await;
|
||||
store_assertion(&store, &rfc_assertion).await;
|
||||
|
||||
// Set up alias store
|
||||
let alias_store = GenericAliasStore::new(store.clone());
|
||||
let alias = create_alias("code://rust/myapp/tls", "rfc://5246/tls");
|
||||
alias_store.set_alias(&alias).await.expect("set alias");
|
||||
|
||||
let engine = QueryEngine::new(Arc::new(store.clone()))
|
||||
.with_alias_store(Arc::new(alias_store) as Arc<dyn AliasStore>);
|
||||
|
||||
// Query by subject only (no predicate filter) with resolve_aliases: true
|
||||
let query = Query::builder().subject("code://rust/myapp/tls").resolve_aliases(true).build();
|
||||
|
||||
let result = engine.execute(&query).await.expect("execute");
|
||||
|
||||
// Should find all 3 assertions (2 from code://, 1 from rfc://)
|
||||
assert_eq!(result.assertions.len(), 3, "Should find all assertions from aliased subjects");
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Test default query (resolve_aliases not set) behaves like exact match.
|
||||
#[tokio::test]
|
||||
async fn test_resolve_aliases_default_is_false() {
|
||||
let query = Query::builder().subject("test").predicate("pred").build();
|
||||
|
||||
assert!(!query.resolve_aliases, "Default should be false");
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Test query builder sets resolve_aliases correctly.
|
||||
#[tokio::test]
|
||||
async fn test_query_builder_resolve_aliases() {
|
||||
let query_true =
|
||||
Query::builder().subject("test").predicate("pred").resolve_aliases(true).build();
|
||||
|
||||
let query_false =
|
||||
Query::builder().subject("test").predicate("pred").resolve_aliases(false).build();
|
||||
|
||||
assert!(query_true.resolve_aliases, "Should be true when set to true");
|
||||
assert!(!query_false.resolve_aliases, "Should be false when set to false");
|
||||
}
|
||||
@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ use stemedb_storage::{key_codec, GenericIndexStore, HybridStore, IndexStore, KVS
|
||||
|
||||
use super::QueryEngine;
|
||||
|
||||
mod alias_resolution;
|
||||
mod basic;
|
||||
mod changelog;
|
||||
mod conflict_score;
|
||||
|
||||
@ -248,6 +248,37 @@ impl QueryBuilder {
|
||||
self
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Enable alias resolution for subject queries.
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// When enabled, the QueryEngine will resolve the subject to all aliased
|
||||
/// paths (via `AliasStore.resolve_all()`) and fetch assertions for all
|
||||
/// of them, deduplicating by hash.
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// This enables cross-scheme concept resolution. For example, querying
|
||||
/// `code://rust/myapp/tls/cert_verification` would also return assertions
|
||||
/// from `rfc://5246/tls/cert_verification` if they are aliased.
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// Requires an `AliasStore` to be configured on the `QueryEngine`.
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// # Arguments
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// * `enabled` - `true` to expand subject aliases, `false` for exact match
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// # Example
|
||||
/// ```rust
|
||||
/// use stemedb_query::Query;
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// // Find assertions from both code and authoritative sources
|
||||
/// let query = Query::builder()
|
||||
/// .subject("code://rust/myapp/tls/cert_verification")
|
||||
/// .resolve_aliases(true)
|
||||
/// .build();
|
||||
/// ```
|
||||
pub fn resolve_aliases(mut self, enabled: bool) -> Self {
|
||||
self.query.resolve_aliases = enabled;
|
||||
self
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Build the query.
|
||||
pub fn build(self) -> Query {
|
||||
self.query
|
||||
|
||||
@ -217,6 +217,35 @@ pub struct Query {
|
||||
/// .build();
|
||||
/// ```
|
||||
pub max_conflict_score: Option<f32>,
|
||||
|
||||
/// Resolve aliases when querying by subject.
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// When `true` and `subject` is specified, the QueryEngine will:
|
||||
/// 1. Call `alias_store.resolve_all(&subject)` to find all related subjects
|
||||
/// 2. Fetch assertions for ALL resolved subjects
|
||||
/// 3. Deduplicate results by assertion hash
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// This enables cross-scheme concept resolution. For example, querying
|
||||
/// `code://rust/myapp/tls/cert_verification` with aliases enabled would also
|
||||
/// return assertions from `rfc://5246/tls/cert_verification` if they are aliased.
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// - `false` (default): Query exact subject only (backward-compatible)
|
||||
/// - `true`: Expand subject to all aliased paths before querying
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// **Note**: Requires an `AliasStore` to be configured on the `QueryEngine`.
|
||||
/// If no alias store is configured, this flag has no effect.
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// # Example
|
||||
/// ```rust
|
||||
/// use stemedb_query::Query;
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// // Find assertions from both code and RFC sources
|
||||
/// let query = Query::builder()
|
||||
/// .subject("code://rust/myapp/tls/cert_verification")
|
||||
/// .resolve_aliases(true)
|
||||
/// .build();
|
||||
/// ```
|
||||
pub resolve_aliases: bool,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
impl Query {
|
||||
@ -233,11 +262,15 @@ impl Query {
|
||||
/// Check if an assertion matches this query's filters.
|
||||
pub fn matches(&self, assertion: &Assertion) -> bool {
|
||||
// Check subject filter
|
||||
// Skip subject check when resolve_aliases is true, since the expanded
|
||||
// subjects (including aliases) were already used to fetch candidates.
|
||||
if !self.resolve_aliases {
|
||||
if let Some(ref subject) = self.subject {
|
||||
if &assertion.subject != subject {
|
||||
return false;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Check predicate filter
|
||||
if let Some(ref predicate) = self.predicate {
|
||||
|
||||
@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
|
||||
use ed25519_dalek::{Signature, Signer, SigningKey, VerifyingKey};
|
||||
use rand::rngs::OsRng;
|
||||
use stemedb_core::types::{
|
||||
Assertion, Hash, LifecycleStage, ObjectValue, SignatureEntry, SourceClass, Vote,
|
||||
Assertion, Hash, HlcTimestamp, LifecycleStage, ObjectValue, SignatureEntry, SourceClass, Vote,
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
/// A simulated agent with a cryptographic identity.
|
||||
@ -66,6 +66,7 @@ impl Agent {
|
||||
}],
|
||||
confidence: 1.0,
|
||||
timestamp,
|
||||
hlc_timestamp: HlcTimestamp::default(),
|
||||
vector: None,
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@ -32,6 +32,10 @@ memmap2 = "0.9"
|
||||
crc32c = "0.6"
|
||||
# Byte order encoding for checkpoint format
|
||||
byteorder = "1.5"
|
||||
# Graph data structures for EigenTrust trust graph
|
||||
petgraph = "0.6"
|
||||
# Linear algebra for EigenTrust power iteration
|
||||
nalgebra = "0.33"
|
||||
|
||||
[dev-dependencies]
|
||||
tokio = { version = "1", features = ["macros", "rt", "rt-multi-thread"] }
|
||||
|
||||
193
crates/stemedb-storage/src/admission_store/mod.rs
Normal file
193
crates/stemedb-storage/src/admission_store/mod.rs
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,193 @@
|
||||
//! Admission control storage for graduated PoW and trust tiers.
|
||||
//!
|
||||
//! The AdmissionStore provides spam protection for Episteme by requiring new or
|
||||
//! untrusted agents to solve proof-of-work puzzles before their assertions are accepted.
|
||||
//! As agents demonstrate good behavior (accurate assertions, verified against gold standards),
|
||||
//! they graduate to higher trust tiers with reduced PoW requirements and increased quotas.
|
||||
//!
|
||||
//! # Key Design Decision: Reuse TrustRank Data
|
||||
//!
|
||||
//! The AdmissionStore wraps `TrustRankStore` rather than creating new storage keys.
|
||||
//! The existing `TrustRank` struct already has:
|
||||
//! - `score: f32` -> maps to TrustTier for quota multipliers
|
||||
//! - `assertions_count: u64` -> used for PoW graduation thresholds
|
||||
//!
|
||||
//! This means no schema migration is needed and admission control is automatically
|
||||
//! integrated with the existing reputation system.
|
||||
//!
|
||||
//! # Graduated PoW Difficulty
|
||||
//!
|
||||
//! | Assertions | Trust Score | Difficulty | Effort |
|
||||
//! |------------|-------------|------------|--------|
|
||||
//! | 0-9 | < 0.6 | 16 bits | ~16 sec |
|
||||
//! | 10-49 | < 0.6 | 1 bit | trivial |
|
||||
//! | 50+ | any | 0 bits | exempt |
|
||||
//! | any | >= 0.6 | 0 bits | exempt |
|
||||
|
||||
mod model;
|
||||
mod store_impl;
|
||||
|
||||
pub use model::{AdmissionStatus, AdmissionStatusResult};
|
||||
pub use store_impl::GenericAdmissionStore;
|
||||
|
||||
use crate::error::Result;
|
||||
use async_trait::async_trait;
|
||||
use stemedb_core::types::{AdmissionConfig, PowError, PowProof};
|
||||
|
||||
/// Specialized storage trait for admission control operations.
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// This trait provides PoW-based spam protection layered on top of the existing
|
||||
/// TrustRankStore. It computes admission status, verifies proofs, and records
|
||||
/// assertion activity for graduation tracking.
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// # Example
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// ```ignore
|
||||
/// let admission_store = GenericAdmissionStore::new(trust_rank_store, config);
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// // Get admission status for an agent
|
||||
/// let status = admission_store.get_admission_status(&agent_id).await?;
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// if status.pow_required {
|
||||
/// // Agent must submit a valid PoW proof
|
||||
/// admission_store.verify_pow(&proof, server_time).await?;
|
||||
/// }
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// // After successful assertion, record it
|
||||
/// admission_store.record_assertion(&agent_id, timestamp).await?;
|
||||
/// ```
|
||||
#[async_trait]
|
||||
pub trait AdmissionStore: Send + Sync {
|
||||
/// Get the current admission status for an agent.
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// This returns the agent's trust tier, PoW requirements, and quota multipliers
|
||||
/// based on their trust score and assertion count.
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// # Arguments
|
||||
/// * `agent_id` - The agent's Ed25519 public key
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// # Returns
|
||||
/// The agent's current admission status.
|
||||
async fn get_admission_status(&self, agent_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<AdmissionStatus>;
|
||||
|
||||
/// Verify a proof-of-work solution.
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// This validates that:
|
||||
/// 1. The proof timestamp is within the allowed window
|
||||
/// 2. The hash has sufficient leading zeros for the required difficulty
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// Note: The caller should verify the agent_id in the proof matches the request.
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// # Arguments
|
||||
/// * `proof` - The PoW solution submitted by the agent
|
||||
/// * `required_difficulty` - Number of leading zero bits required
|
||||
/// * `server_time` - Current server timestamp for validation
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// # Returns
|
||||
/// `Ok(())` if the proof is valid, or `PowError` describing the failure.
|
||||
async fn verify_pow(
|
||||
&self,
|
||||
proof: &PowProof,
|
||||
required_difficulty: u8,
|
||||
server_time: u64,
|
||||
) -> Result<std::result::Result<(), PowError>>;
|
||||
|
||||
/// Compute the required PoW difficulty for an agent.
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// This considers both assertion count and trust score:
|
||||
/// - First 10 assertions with trust < 0.6: 16 bits
|
||||
/// - Assertions 10-49 with trust < 0.6: 1 bit
|
||||
/// - 50+ assertions OR trust >= 0.6: 0 bits (exempt)
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// # Arguments
|
||||
/// * `agent_id` - The agent's Ed25519 public key
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// # Returns
|
||||
/// Required difficulty in bits (0 = exempt).
|
||||
async fn compute_difficulty(&self, agent_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<u8>;
|
||||
|
||||
/// Record a successful assertion for graduation tracking.
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// Increments the agent's assertion count in TrustRank. This is called
|
||||
/// after an assertion passes validation and is stored.
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// # Arguments
|
||||
/// * `agent_id` - The agent's Ed25519 public key
|
||||
/// * `timestamp` - Unix timestamp of the assertion
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// # Returns
|
||||
/// The new assertion count.
|
||||
async fn record_assertion(&self, agent_id: &[u8; 32], timestamp: u64) -> Result<u64>;
|
||||
|
||||
/// Get the admission configuration.
|
||||
fn config(&self) -> &AdmissionConfig;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Extension trait for checking admission in a single call.
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// This is a convenience trait that combines status check and PoW verification.
|
||||
#[async_trait]
|
||||
pub trait AdmissionCheck: AdmissionStore {
|
||||
/// Check if a request should be admitted, optionally with a PoW proof.
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// This is the primary entry point for the admission middleware:
|
||||
/// 1. Get admission status
|
||||
/// 2. If PoW required and proof provided, verify it
|
||||
/// 3. If PoW required and no proof, return POW_REQUIRED status
|
||||
/// 4. Return success if admitted
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// # Arguments
|
||||
/// * `agent_id` - The agent's Ed25519 public key
|
||||
/// * `proof` - Optional PoW proof (from X-PoW-Nonce/X-PoW-Timestamp headers)
|
||||
/// * `server_time` - Current server timestamp
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// # Returns
|
||||
/// The result of the admission check with full status details.
|
||||
async fn check_admission(
|
||||
&self,
|
||||
agent_id: &[u8; 32],
|
||||
proof: Option<&PowProof>,
|
||||
server_time: u64,
|
||||
) -> Result<AdmissionStatusResult>;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Blanket implementation of AdmissionCheck for all AdmissionStore implementors
|
||||
#[async_trait]
|
||||
impl<T: AdmissionStore + Sync> AdmissionCheck for T {
|
||||
async fn check_admission(
|
||||
&self,
|
||||
agent_id: &[u8; 32],
|
||||
proof: Option<&PowProof>,
|
||||
server_time: u64,
|
||||
) -> Result<AdmissionStatusResult> {
|
||||
let status = self.get_admission_status(agent_id).await?;
|
||||
|
||||
if !status.pow_required {
|
||||
// No PoW needed, admit immediately
|
||||
return Ok(AdmissionStatusResult::Admitted(status));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// PoW is required
|
||||
match proof {
|
||||
Some(p) => {
|
||||
// Verify agent_id matches
|
||||
if p.agent_id != *agent_id {
|
||||
return Ok(AdmissionStatusResult::PowFailed {
|
||||
status,
|
||||
error: PowError::AgentIdMismatch,
|
||||
});
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Verify the proof
|
||||
match self.verify_pow(p, status.pow_difficulty, server_time).await? {
|
||||
Ok(()) => Ok(AdmissionStatusResult::Admitted(status)),
|
||||
Err(e) => Ok(AdmissionStatusResult::PowFailed { status, error: e }),
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
None => {
|
||||
// No proof provided but required
|
||||
Ok(AdmissionStatusResult::PowRequired(status))
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
229
crates/stemedb-storage/src/admission_store/model.rs
Normal file
229
crates/stemedb-storage/src/admission_store/model.rs
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,229 @@
|
||||
//! Admission control data models.
|
||||
//!
|
||||
//! These types represent the admission status of an agent and the result of
|
||||
//! admission checks. They are designed to be easily serialized for API responses.
|
||||
|
||||
use stemedb_core::types::{PowError, TrustTier, BASE_QUOTA_LIMIT};
|
||||
|
||||
/// Current admission status for an agent.
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// This snapshot represents the agent's standing in the admission control system
|
||||
/// at a specific point in time. It includes all information needed by clients
|
||||
/// to understand their quotas and PoW requirements.
|
||||
#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq)]
|
||||
pub struct AdmissionStatus {
|
||||
/// The agent's trust tier based on their reputation score.
|
||||
pub tier: TrustTier,
|
||||
|
||||
/// The agent's current trust score (0.0 to 1.0).
|
||||
pub trust_score: f32,
|
||||
|
||||
/// Total number of assertions made by this agent.
|
||||
pub assertions_count: u64,
|
||||
|
||||
/// Required PoW difficulty in bits (0 = exempt).
|
||||
pub pow_difficulty: u8,
|
||||
|
||||
/// Whether PoW is required for this agent's next submission.
|
||||
pub pow_required: bool,
|
||||
|
||||
/// Base quota limit (before tier multiplier).
|
||||
pub base_quota_limit: u64,
|
||||
|
||||
/// Effective quota limit after tier multiplier.
|
||||
pub effective_quota_limit: u64,
|
||||
|
||||
/// Quota multiplier for this tier.
|
||||
pub quota_multiplier: f32,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
impl AdmissionStatus {
|
||||
/// Create a new admission status from trust rank data.
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// # Arguments
|
||||
/// * `trust_score` - Agent's trust score (0.0-1.0)
|
||||
/// * `assertions_count` - Number of assertions made
|
||||
/// * `pow_difficulty` - Required PoW difficulty in bits
|
||||
pub fn new(trust_score: f32, assertions_count: u64, pow_difficulty: u8) -> Self {
|
||||
let tier = TrustTier::from_score(trust_score);
|
||||
let pow_required = pow_difficulty > 0;
|
||||
let quota_multiplier = tier.quota_multiplier();
|
||||
let base_quota_limit = BASE_QUOTA_LIMIT;
|
||||
let effective_quota_limit = tier.effective_quota_limit();
|
||||
|
||||
Self {
|
||||
tier,
|
||||
trust_score,
|
||||
assertions_count,
|
||||
pow_difficulty,
|
||||
pow_required,
|
||||
base_quota_limit,
|
||||
effective_quota_limit,
|
||||
quota_multiplier,
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Create a status for a new/unknown agent with default values.
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// New agents start at:
|
||||
/// - Trust score: 0.5 (Verified tier)
|
||||
/// - Assertions: 0
|
||||
/// - PoW difficulty: 16 bits (first 10 assertions)
|
||||
pub fn new_agent(initial_difficulty: u8) -> Self {
|
||||
Self::new(0.5, 0, initial_difficulty)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Result of an admission check.
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// This enum represents the three possible outcomes when checking admission:
|
||||
/// 1. Admitted - The agent can proceed (no PoW required, or valid PoW provided)
|
||||
/// 2. PowRequired - The agent must provide a PoW proof (HTTP 428)
|
||||
/// 3. PowFailed - The agent provided an invalid PoW proof (HTTP 428 with error)
|
||||
#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
|
||||
pub enum AdmissionStatusResult {
|
||||
/// Agent is admitted, can proceed with the request.
|
||||
Admitted(AdmissionStatus),
|
||||
|
||||
/// Agent must provide proof-of-work to proceed.
|
||||
/// The status contains the required difficulty.
|
||||
PowRequired(AdmissionStatus),
|
||||
|
||||
/// Agent provided an invalid proof-of-work.
|
||||
/// The status contains the required difficulty for retry.
|
||||
PowFailed {
|
||||
/// The agent's current status (for building retry response).
|
||||
status: AdmissionStatus,
|
||||
/// The specific error that caused verification to fail.
|
||||
error: PowError,
|
||||
},
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
impl AdmissionStatusResult {
|
||||
/// Check if the agent is admitted.
|
||||
#[must_use]
|
||||
pub fn is_admitted(&self) -> bool {
|
||||
matches!(self, AdmissionStatusResult::Admitted(_))
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Check if proof-of-work is required.
|
||||
#[must_use]
|
||||
pub fn requires_pow(&self) -> bool {
|
||||
matches!(self, AdmissionStatusResult::PowRequired(_))
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Check if the proof-of-work verification failed.
|
||||
#[must_use]
|
||||
pub fn pow_failed(&self) -> bool {
|
||||
matches!(self, AdmissionStatusResult::PowFailed { .. })
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Get the admission status regardless of outcome.
|
||||
#[must_use]
|
||||
pub fn status(&self) -> &AdmissionStatus {
|
||||
match self {
|
||||
AdmissionStatusResult::Admitted(s) => s,
|
||||
AdmissionStatusResult::PowRequired(s) => s,
|
||||
AdmissionStatusResult::PowFailed { status, .. } => status,
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Get the PoW error if verification failed.
|
||||
#[must_use]
|
||||
pub fn pow_error(&self) -> Option<&PowError> {
|
||||
match self {
|
||||
AdmissionStatusResult::PowFailed { error, .. } => Some(error),
|
||||
_ => None,
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[cfg(test)]
|
||||
mod tests {
|
||||
use super::*;
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_admission_status_new() {
|
||||
let status = AdmissionStatus::new(0.5, 10, 1);
|
||||
|
||||
assert_eq!(status.tier, TrustTier::Verified);
|
||||
assert!((status.trust_score - 0.5).abs() < f32::EPSILON);
|
||||
assert_eq!(status.assertions_count, 10);
|
||||
assert_eq!(status.pow_difficulty, 1);
|
||||
assert!(status.pow_required);
|
||||
assert_eq!(status.base_quota_limit, 10_000);
|
||||
assert_eq!(status.effective_quota_limit, 10_000);
|
||||
assert!((status.quota_multiplier - 1.0).abs() < f32::EPSILON);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_admission_status_new_agent() {
|
||||
let status = AdmissionStatus::new_agent(16);
|
||||
|
||||
assert_eq!(status.tier, TrustTier::Verified);
|
||||
assert!((status.trust_score - 0.5).abs() < f32::EPSILON);
|
||||
assert_eq!(status.assertions_count, 0);
|
||||
assert_eq!(status.pow_difficulty, 16);
|
||||
assert!(status.pow_required);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_admission_status_no_pow_required() {
|
||||
let status = AdmissionStatus::new(0.7, 100, 0);
|
||||
|
||||
assert_eq!(status.tier, TrustTier::Trusted);
|
||||
assert!(!status.pow_required);
|
||||
assert_eq!(status.pow_difficulty, 0);
|
||||
assert_eq!(status.effective_quota_limit, 20_000);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_admission_status_result_is_admitted() {
|
||||
let status = AdmissionStatus::new(0.5, 50, 0);
|
||||
let result = AdmissionStatusResult::Admitted(status);
|
||||
|
||||
assert!(result.is_admitted());
|
||||
assert!(!result.requires_pow());
|
||||
assert!(!result.pow_failed());
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_admission_status_result_pow_required() {
|
||||
let status = AdmissionStatus::new(0.3, 5, 16);
|
||||
let result = AdmissionStatusResult::PowRequired(status);
|
||||
|
||||
assert!(!result.is_admitted());
|
||||
assert!(result.requires_pow());
|
||||
assert!(!result.pow_failed());
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_admission_status_result_pow_failed() {
|
||||
let status = AdmissionStatus::new(0.3, 5, 16);
|
||||
let error = PowError::InsufficientDifficulty { required: 16, found: 8 };
|
||||
let result = AdmissionStatusResult::PowFailed { status, error };
|
||||
|
||||
assert!(!result.is_admitted());
|
||||
assert!(!result.requires_pow());
|
||||
assert!(result.pow_failed());
|
||||
assert!(matches!(
|
||||
result.pow_error(),
|
||||
Some(PowError::InsufficientDifficulty { required: 16, found: 8 })
|
||||
));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_tier_quota_calculation() {
|
||||
// Untrusted: 0.1x = 1,000
|
||||
let status = AdmissionStatus::new(0.1, 0, 16);
|
||||
assert_eq!(status.effective_quota_limit, 1_000);
|
||||
|
||||
// Limited: 0.5x = 5,000
|
||||
let status = AdmissionStatus::new(0.4, 0, 16);
|
||||
assert_eq!(status.effective_quota_limit, 5_000);
|
||||
|
||||
// Authority: 10.0x = 100,000
|
||||
let status = AdmissionStatus::new(0.95, 0, 0);
|
||||
assert_eq!(status.effective_quota_limit, 100_000);
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
381
crates/stemedb-storage/src/admission_store/store_impl.rs
Normal file
381
crates/stemedb-storage/src/admission_store/store_impl.rs
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,381 @@
|
||||
//! AdmissionStore implementation backed by TrustRankStore.
|
||||
//!
|
||||
//! This module provides the concrete implementation of AdmissionStore operations.
|
||||
//! It wraps the TrustRankStore to leverage existing trust score and assertion count
|
||||
//! data for admission control decisions.
|
||||
|
||||
use crate::error::Result;
|
||||
use crate::trust_rank_store::TrustRankStore;
|
||||
use async_trait::async_trait;
|
||||
use stemedb_core::types::{AdmissionConfig, PowError, PowProof};
|
||||
use tracing::{debug, instrument};
|
||||
|
||||
use super::model::AdmissionStatus;
|
||||
use super::AdmissionStore;
|
||||
|
||||
/// AdmissionStore implementation backed by TrustRankStore.
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// This implementation wraps an existing TrustRankStore and computes admission
|
||||
/// decisions based on the agent's trust score and assertion count.
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// # Design Decision
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// Rather than creating new storage keys, this implementation reuses the existing
|
||||
/// TrustRank data structure which already tracks:
|
||||
/// - `score: f32` - Maps to TrustTier
|
||||
/// - `assertions_count: u64` - Used for PoW graduation
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// This means admission control is automatically integrated with the reputation
|
||||
/// system and no schema migration is needed.
|
||||
#[derive(Clone)]
|
||||
pub struct GenericAdmissionStore<T> {
|
||||
trust_store: T,
|
||||
config: AdmissionConfig,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
impl<T: TrustRankStore> GenericAdmissionStore<T> {
|
||||
/// Create a new AdmissionStore backed by the given TrustRankStore.
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// Uses default admission configuration.
|
||||
pub fn new(trust_store: T) -> Self {
|
||||
Self { trust_store, config: AdmissionConfig::default() }
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Create a new AdmissionStore with custom configuration.
|
||||
pub fn with_config(trust_store: T, config: AdmissionConfig) -> Self {
|
||||
Self { trust_store, config }
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[async_trait]
|
||||
impl<T: TrustRankStore + 'static> AdmissionStore for GenericAdmissionStore<T> {
|
||||
#[instrument(skip(self), fields(agent_id = %hex::encode(agent_id)))]
|
||||
async fn get_admission_status(&self, agent_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<AdmissionStatus> {
|
||||
let trust_rank = self.trust_store.get_trust_rank(agent_id).await?;
|
||||
|
||||
let difficulty =
|
||||
self.config.compute_difficulty(trust_rank.assertions_count, trust_rank.score);
|
||||
|
||||
let status =
|
||||
AdmissionStatus::new(trust_rank.score, trust_rank.assertions_count, difficulty);
|
||||
|
||||
debug!(
|
||||
tier = %status.tier,
|
||||
trust_score = status.trust_score,
|
||||
assertions_count = status.assertions_count,
|
||||
pow_difficulty = status.pow_difficulty,
|
||||
pow_required = status.pow_required,
|
||||
"Retrieved admission status"
|
||||
);
|
||||
|
||||
Ok(status)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[instrument(skip(self, proof), fields(
|
||||
nonce = proof.nonce,
|
||||
timestamp = proof.timestamp,
|
||||
required_difficulty
|
||||
))]
|
||||
async fn verify_pow(
|
||||
&self,
|
||||
proof: &PowProof,
|
||||
required_difficulty: u8,
|
||||
server_time: u64,
|
||||
) -> Result<std::result::Result<(), PowError>> {
|
||||
// If difficulty is 0, no verification needed
|
||||
if required_difficulty == 0 {
|
||||
debug!("PoW exempt (difficulty 0)");
|
||||
return Ok(Ok(()));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Verify the proof
|
||||
let result = proof.verify(required_difficulty, self.config.pow_max_age, server_time);
|
||||
|
||||
match &result {
|
||||
Ok(()) => {
|
||||
debug!("PoW verified successfully");
|
||||
}
|
||||
Err(e) => {
|
||||
debug!(error = %e, "PoW verification failed");
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
Ok(result)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[instrument(skip(self), fields(agent_id = %hex::encode(agent_id)))]
|
||||
async fn compute_difficulty(&self, agent_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<u8> {
|
||||
let trust_rank = self.trust_store.get_trust_rank(agent_id).await?;
|
||||
let difficulty =
|
||||
self.config.compute_difficulty(trust_rank.assertions_count, trust_rank.score);
|
||||
|
||||
debug!(
|
||||
assertions_count = trust_rank.assertions_count,
|
||||
trust_score = trust_rank.score,
|
||||
difficulty,
|
||||
"Computed PoW difficulty"
|
||||
);
|
||||
|
||||
Ok(difficulty)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[instrument(skip(self), fields(agent_id = %hex::encode(agent_id), timestamp))]
|
||||
async fn record_assertion(&self, agent_id: &[u8; 32], timestamp: u64) -> Result<u64> {
|
||||
// Get current trust rank
|
||||
let mut trust_rank = self.trust_store.get_trust_rank(agent_id).await?;
|
||||
|
||||
// Increment assertion count
|
||||
let old_count = trust_rank.assertions_count;
|
||||
trust_rank.assertions_count = trust_rank.assertions_count.saturating_add(1);
|
||||
trust_rank.last_updated = timestamp;
|
||||
|
||||
// Store updated trust rank
|
||||
self.trust_store.put_trust_rank(&trust_rank).await?;
|
||||
|
||||
debug!(
|
||||
old_count,
|
||||
new_count = trust_rank.assertions_count,
|
||||
"Recorded assertion for admission tracking"
|
||||
);
|
||||
|
||||
Ok(trust_rank.assertions_count)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fn config(&self) -> &AdmissionConfig {
|
||||
&self.config
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[cfg(test)]
|
||||
mod tests {
|
||||
use super::*;
|
||||
use crate::trust_rank_store::{TrustAdjustment, TrustRank};
|
||||
use std::collections::HashMap;
|
||||
use std::sync::Mutex;
|
||||
|
||||
/// Mock TrustRankStore for testing.
|
||||
struct MockTrustRankStore {
|
||||
ranks: Mutex<HashMap<[u8; 32], TrustRank>>,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
impl MockTrustRankStore {
|
||||
fn new() -> Self {
|
||||
Self { ranks: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()) }
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fn set_rank(&self, rank: TrustRank) {
|
||||
self.ranks.lock().expect("lock").insert(rank.agent_id, rank);
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[async_trait]
|
||||
impl TrustRankStore for MockTrustRankStore {
|
||||
async fn get_trust_rank(&self, agent_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<TrustRank> {
|
||||
let ranks = self.ranks.lock().expect("lock");
|
||||
Ok(ranks.get(agent_id).cloned().unwrap_or_else(|| TrustRank::new(*agent_id, 0)))
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
async fn update_trust_rank(
|
||||
&self,
|
||||
_agent_id: &[u8; 32],
|
||||
_delta: f32,
|
||||
_timestamp: u64,
|
||||
) -> Result<f32> {
|
||||
unimplemented!("not needed for admission tests")
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
async fn decay_trust_ranks(
|
||||
&self,
|
||||
_current_timestamp: u64,
|
||||
_half_life_seconds: Option<u64>,
|
||||
) -> Result<usize> {
|
||||
unimplemented!("not needed for admission tests")
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
async fn record_outcome(
|
||||
&self,
|
||||
_agent_id: &[u8; 32],
|
||||
_was_accurate: bool,
|
||||
_timestamp: u64,
|
||||
) -> Result<f32> {
|
||||
unimplemented!("not needed for admission tests")
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
async fn put_trust_rank(&self, trust_rank: &TrustRank) -> Result<()> {
|
||||
let mut ranks = self.ranks.lock().expect("lock");
|
||||
ranks.insert(trust_rank.agent_id, trust_rank.clone());
|
||||
Ok(())
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
async fn verify_agent_against_gold_standard(
|
||||
&self,
|
||||
_agent_id: &[u8; 32],
|
||||
_agent_object: &str,
|
||||
_gold_standard: &stemedb_core::types::GoldStandard,
|
||||
_timestamp: u64,
|
||||
) -> Result<TrustAdjustment> {
|
||||
unimplemented!("not needed for admission tests")
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[tokio::test]
|
||||
async fn test_new_agent_requires_pow() {
|
||||
let trust_store = MockTrustRankStore::new();
|
||||
let admission_store = GenericAdmissionStore::new(trust_store);
|
||||
|
||||
let agent_id = [1u8; 32];
|
||||
let status = admission_store.get_admission_status(&agent_id).await.expect("get status");
|
||||
|
||||
// New agent: default trust 0.5, 0 assertions
|
||||
assert!((status.trust_score - 0.5).abs() < f32::EPSILON);
|
||||
assert_eq!(status.assertions_count, 0);
|
||||
|
||||
// Should require PoW with initial difficulty
|
||||
assert!(status.pow_required);
|
||||
assert_eq!(status.pow_difficulty, 16);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[tokio::test]
|
||||
async fn test_graduated_agent_no_pow() {
|
||||
let trust_store = MockTrustRankStore::new();
|
||||
|
||||
// Set up an agent with 50+ assertions
|
||||
let mut rank = TrustRank::new([2u8; 32], 0);
|
||||
rank.assertions_count = 50;
|
||||
rank.score = 0.4; // Low trust but high assertion count
|
||||
trust_store.set_rank(rank);
|
||||
|
||||
let admission_store = GenericAdmissionStore::new(trust_store);
|
||||
|
||||
let agent_id = [2u8; 32];
|
||||
let status = admission_store.get_admission_status(&agent_id).await.expect("get status");
|
||||
|
||||
// 50+ assertions = exempt
|
||||
assert!(!status.pow_required);
|
||||
assert_eq!(status.pow_difficulty, 0);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[tokio::test]
|
||||
async fn test_trusted_agent_no_pow() {
|
||||
let trust_store = MockTrustRankStore::new();
|
||||
|
||||
// Set up an agent with high trust
|
||||
let mut rank = TrustRank::new([3u8; 32], 0);
|
||||
rank.score = 0.7; // High trust
|
||||
rank.assertions_count = 5; // Few assertions
|
||||
trust_store.set_rank(rank);
|
||||
|
||||
let admission_store = GenericAdmissionStore::new(trust_store);
|
||||
|
||||
let agent_id = [3u8; 32];
|
||||
let status = admission_store.get_admission_status(&agent_id).await.expect("get status");
|
||||
|
||||
// High trust = exempt (trust_exemption_score is 0.6 by default)
|
||||
assert!(!status.pow_required);
|
||||
assert_eq!(status.pow_difficulty, 0);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[tokio::test]
|
||||
async fn test_reduced_difficulty_after_10_assertions() {
|
||||
let trust_store = MockTrustRankStore::new();
|
||||
|
||||
// Set up an agent with 10-49 assertions
|
||||
let mut rank = TrustRank::new([4u8; 32], 0);
|
||||
rank.assertions_count = 15;
|
||||
rank.score = 0.4; // Low trust
|
||||
trust_store.set_rank(rank);
|
||||
|
||||
let admission_store = GenericAdmissionStore::new(trust_store);
|
||||
|
||||
let agent_id = [4u8; 32];
|
||||
let status = admission_store.get_admission_status(&agent_id).await.expect("get status");
|
||||
|
||||
// 10-49 assertions = reduced difficulty (1 bit)
|
||||
assert!(status.pow_required);
|
||||
assert_eq!(status.pow_difficulty, 1);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[tokio::test]
|
||||
async fn test_verify_pow_exempt() {
|
||||
let trust_store = MockTrustRankStore::new();
|
||||
let admission_store = GenericAdmissionStore::new(trust_store);
|
||||
|
||||
let agent_id = [5u8; 32];
|
||||
let proof = PowProof::new(0, agent_id, 1700000000);
|
||||
|
||||
// Difficulty 0 = always passes - just verify it doesn't error
|
||||
admission_store.verify_pow(&proof, 0, 1700000000).await.expect("verify").expect("ok");
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[tokio::test]
|
||||
async fn test_verify_pow_valid() {
|
||||
let trust_store = MockTrustRankStore::new();
|
||||
let admission_store = GenericAdmissionStore::new(trust_store);
|
||||
|
||||
let agent_id = [6u8; 32];
|
||||
let timestamp = 1700000000u64;
|
||||
|
||||
// Solve a real puzzle (low difficulty for fast test)
|
||||
let proof = PowProof::solve(agent_id, timestamp, 4);
|
||||
|
||||
// Should verify
|
||||
let result = admission_store.verify_pow(&proof, 4, timestamp).await.expect("verify");
|
||||
assert!(result.is_ok());
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[tokio::test]
|
||||
async fn test_verify_pow_expired() {
|
||||
let trust_store = MockTrustRankStore::new();
|
||||
let admission_store = GenericAdmissionStore::new(trust_store);
|
||||
|
||||
let agent_id = [7u8; 32];
|
||||
let old_timestamp = 1000u64;
|
||||
let server_time = 2000u64; // 1000 seconds later
|
||||
|
||||
let proof = PowProof::new(0, agent_id, old_timestamp);
|
||||
|
||||
// Should fail due to expired timestamp
|
||||
let result = admission_store.verify_pow(&proof, 1, server_time).await.expect("verify");
|
||||
assert!(matches!(result, Err(PowError::TimestampExpired { .. })));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[tokio::test]
|
||||
async fn test_record_assertion() {
|
||||
let trust_store = MockTrustRankStore::new();
|
||||
let admission_store = GenericAdmissionStore::new(trust_store);
|
||||
|
||||
let agent_id = [8u8; 32];
|
||||
let timestamp = 1700000000u64;
|
||||
|
||||
// Record first assertion
|
||||
let count = admission_store.record_assertion(&agent_id, timestamp).await.expect("record");
|
||||
assert_eq!(count, 1);
|
||||
|
||||
// Record second assertion
|
||||
let count =
|
||||
admission_store.record_assertion(&agent_id, timestamp + 1).await.expect("record");
|
||||
assert_eq!(count, 2);
|
||||
|
||||
// Check status
|
||||
let status = admission_store.get_admission_status(&agent_id).await.expect("get status");
|
||||
assert_eq!(status.assertions_count, 2);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[tokio::test]
|
||||
async fn test_tier_affects_quota() {
|
||||
let trust_store = MockTrustRankStore::new();
|
||||
|
||||
// Authority tier agent
|
||||
let mut rank = TrustRank::new([9u8; 32], 0);
|
||||
rank.score = 0.95;
|
||||
trust_store.set_rank(rank);
|
||||
|
||||
let admission_store = GenericAdmissionStore::new(trust_store);
|
||||
|
||||
let status = admission_store.get_admission_status(&[9u8; 32]).await.expect("get status");
|
||||
|
||||
assert_eq!(status.tier, stemedb_core::types::TrustTier::Authority);
|
||||
assert_eq!(status.effective_quota_limit, 100_000);
|
||||
assert!((status.quota_multiplier - 10.0).abs() < f32::EPSILON);
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
157
crates/stemedb-storage/src/domain_trust_store/mod.rs
Normal file
157
crates/stemedb-storage/src/domain_trust_store/mod.rs
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,157 @@
|
||||
//! Specialized storage for domain-specific trust tracking.
|
||||
//!
|
||||
//! The DomainTrustStore tracks per-agent expertise within specific domains.
|
||||
//! This enables fine-grained trust: an agent can be highly trusted in medicine
|
||||
//! but untrusted in finance.
|
||||
//!
|
||||
//! # Storage Layout
|
||||
//!
|
||||
//! | Key Pattern | Value | Purpose |
|
||||
//! |-------------|-------|---------|
|
||||
//! | `\x00DT:{agent}:{domain}` | Serialized DomainTrust | Domain-specific trust |
|
||||
//!
|
||||
//! # Use Case
|
||||
//!
|
||||
//! Combined with EigenTrust, domain trust enables weighted resolution:
|
||||
//! ```text
|
||||
//! effective_weight = confidence × eigentrust_score × domain_factor
|
||||
//! ```
|
||||
//!
|
||||
//! This ensures that an agent's assertions are weighted by both their
|
||||
//! global reputation AND their domain-specific expertise.
|
||||
|
||||
mod model;
|
||||
mod store_impl;
|
||||
|
||||
pub use model::*;
|
||||
pub use store_impl::*;
|
||||
|
||||
use crate::error::Result;
|
||||
use async_trait::async_trait;
|
||||
use std::sync::Arc;
|
||||
|
||||
/// Specialized storage trait for DomainTrust operations.
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// This trait provides domain-specific trust tracking for agents,
|
||||
/// enabling expertise-weighted assertion resolution.
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// # Example
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// ```ignore
|
||||
/// let domain_store = GenericDomainTrustStore::new(kv_store);
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// // Record domain-specific outcome
|
||||
/// let score = domain_store.record_domain_outcome(
|
||||
/// &agent_id,
|
||||
/// "treats_condition", // Domain auto-extracted
|
||||
/// true, // Was accurate
|
||||
/// timestamp,
|
||||
/// ).await?;
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// // Get effective trust (eigentrust × domain factor)
|
||||
/// let effective = domain_store.get_effective_trust(
|
||||
/// &agent_id,
|
||||
/// "treats_condition",
|
||||
/// eigentrust_score,
|
||||
/// ).await?;
|
||||
/// ```
|
||||
#[async_trait]
|
||||
pub trait DomainTrustStore: Send + Sync {
|
||||
/// Get the domain trust for an agent in a specific domain.
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// Returns a default DomainTrust (score 0.5) if not found.
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// # Arguments
|
||||
/// * `agent` - Agent's Ed25519 public key
|
||||
/// * `domain` - Domain name (e.g., "medicine", "finance")
|
||||
async fn get_domain_trust(&self, agent: &[u8; 32], domain: &str) -> Result<DomainTrust>;
|
||||
|
||||
/// Get all domain trust entries for an agent.
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// Returns all domains the agent has records in.
|
||||
async fn get_all_domains_for_agent(&self, agent: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<Vec<DomainTrust>>;
|
||||
|
||||
/// Record a domain-specific outcome.
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// This method:
|
||||
/// 1. Extracts the domain from the predicate
|
||||
/// 2. Loads or creates the DomainTrust for (agent, domain)
|
||||
/// 3. Updates accuracy tracking
|
||||
/// 4. Adjusts the domain score
|
||||
/// 5. Stores the updated DomainTrust
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// # Arguments
|
||||
/// * `agent` - Agent's Ed25519 public key
|
||||
/// * `predicate` - The assertion predicate (domain auto-extracted)
|
||||
/// * `was_accurate` - Whether the assertion was correct
|
||||
/// * `timestamp` - Unix timestamp
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// # Returns
|
||||
/// The new domain score after update
|
||||
async fn record_domain_outcome(
|
||||
&self,
|
||||
agent: &[u8; 32],
|
||||
predicate: &str,
|
||||
was_accurate: bool,
|
||||
timestamp: u64,
|
||||
) -> Result<f32>;
|
||||
|
||||
/// Store a DomainTrust directly (for testing or batch operations).
|
||||
async fn put_domain_trust(&self, dt: &DomainTrust) -> Result<()>;
|
||||
|
||||
/// Calculate effective trust for an assertion.
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// Combines the global EigenTrust score with domain-specific expertise:
|
||||
/// ```text
|
||||
/// effective_trust = eigentrust_score × domain_factor(domain_score)
|
||||
/// ```
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// # Arguments
|
||||
/// * `agent` - Agent's Ed25519 public key
|
||||
/// * `predicate` - The assertion predicate (domain auto-extracted)
|
||||
/// * `eigentrust_score` - The agent's global EigenTrust score
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// # Returns
|
||||
/// The effective trust score for this agent in this domain
|
||||
async fn get_effective_trust(
|
||||
&self,
|
||||
agent: &[u8; 32],
|
||||
predicate: &str,
|
||||
eigentrust_score: f32,
|
||||
) -> Result<f32>;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Blanket implementation for Arc<T> where T: DomainTrustStore
|
||||
#[async_trait]
|
||||
impl<T: DomainTrustStore + ?Sized> DomainTrustStore for Arc<T> {
|
||||
async fn get_domain_trust(&self, agent: &[u8; 32], domain: &str) -> Result<DomainTrust> {
|
||||
(**self).get_domain_trust(agent, domain).await
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
async fn get_all_domains_for_agent(&self, agent: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<Vec<DomainTrust>> {
|
||||
(**self).get_all_domains_for_agent(agent).await
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
async fn record_domain_outcome(
|
||||
&self,
|
||||
agent: &[u8; 32],
|
||||
predicate: &str,
|
||||
was_accurate: bool,
|
||||
timestamp: u64,
|
||||
) -> Result<f32> {
|
||||
(**self).record_domain_outcome(agent, predicate, was_accurate, timestamp).await
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
async fn put_domain_trust(&self, dt: &DomainTrust) -> Result<()> {
|
||||
(**self).put_domain_trust(dt).await
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
async fn get_effective_trust(
|
||||
&self,
|
||||
agent: &[u8; 32],
|
||||
predicate: &str,
|
||||
eigentrust_score: f32,
|
||||
) -> Result<f32> {
|
||||
(**self).get_effective_trust(agent, predicate, eigentrust_score).await
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
286
crates/stemedb-storage/src/domain_trust_store/model.rs
Normal file
286
crates/stemedb-storage/src/domain_trust_store/model.rs
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,286 @@
|
||||
//! DomainTrustStore data models for domain-specific trust tracking.
|
||||
//!
|
||||
//! This module defines the core data structures for per-domain expertise:
|
||||
//! - `DomainTrust`: An agent's trust score within a specific domain
|
||||
//! - Domain extraction from predicates
|
||||
|
||||
/// Default domain trust score for new agent-domain pairs.
|
||||
pub const DEFAULT_DOMAIN_SCORE: f32 = 0.5;
|
||||
|
||||
/// Domain trust for an agent within a specific domain.
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// Tracks an agent's expertise and accuracy within a domain (e.g., "medicine", "finance").
|
||||
/// This allows fine-grained trust: an agent can be highly trusted in medicine
|
||||
/// but untrusted in finance.
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// # Invariants
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// - `score` is in range [0.0, 1.0]
|
||||
/// - `assertions_count >= accuracy_count`
|
||||
#[derive(rkyv::Archive, rkyv::Deserialize, rkyv::Serialize, Debug, Clone, PartialEq)]
|
||||
#[archive(check_bytes)]
|
||||
pub struct DomainTrust {
|
||||
/// Agent's Ed25519 public key.
|
||||
pub agent_id: [u8; 32],
|
||||
/// Domain name (e.g., "medicine", "finance", "general").
|
||||
pub domain: String,
|
||||
/// Domain-specific trust score (0.0 to 1.0).
|
||||
pub score: f32,
|
||||
/// Total assertions made in this domain.
|
||||
pub assertions_count: u64,
|
||||
/// Assertions deemed accurate in this domain.
|
||||
pub accuracy_count: u64,
|
||||
/// Unix timestamp of last update.
|
||||
pub last_updated: u64,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
impl DomainTrust {
|
||||
/// Create a new domain trust entry with default score.
|
||||
pub fn new(agent_id: [u8; 32], domain: String, timestamp: u64) -> Self {
|
||||
Self {
|
||||
agent_id,
|
||||
domain,
|
||||
score: DEFAULT_DOMAIN_SCORE,
|
||||
assertions_count: 0,
|
||||
accuracy_count: 0,
|
||||
last_updated: timestamp,
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Record an outcome for this domain.
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// Updates the accuracy tracking and adjusts the score based on outcome.
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// # Arguments
|
||||
/// * `was_accurate` - Whether the assertion was correct
|
||||
/// * `timestamp` - Unix timestamp of this outcome
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// # Returns
|
||||
/// The new score after recording the outcome
|
||||
pub fn record_outcome(&mut self, was_accurate: bool, timestamp: u64) -> f32 {
|
||||
self.assertions_count = self.assertions_count.saturating_add(1);
|
||||
if was_accurate {
|
||||
self.accuracy_count = self.accuracy_count.saturating_add(1);
|
||||
}
|
||||
self.last_updated = timestamp;
|
||||
|
||||
// Adjust score based on accuracy
|
||||
// Accurate: +0.03, Inaccurate: -0.05 (penalty is higher)
|
||||
let delta = if was_accurate { 0.03 } else { -0.05 };
|
||||
self.score = (self.score + delta).clamp(0.0, 1.0);
|
||||
|
||||
self.score
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Calculate the agent's accuracy rate in this domain.
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// Returns 0.0 if no assertions have been made.
|
||||
pub fn accuracy_rate(&self) -> f32 {
|
||||
if self.assertions_count == 0 {
|
||||
return 0.0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
self.accuracy_count as f32 / self.assertions_count as f32
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Predicate-to-domain mapping rules.
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// This is a curated list of predicate patterns and their domains.
|
||||
/// Used by `extract_domain()` to categorize assertions.
|
||||
static DOMAIN_MAPPINGS: &[(&str, &str)] = &[
|
||||
// Medicine / Health
|
||||
("treats", "medicine"),
|
||||
("treats_condition", "medicine"),
|
||||
("has_side_effect", "medicine"),
|
||||
("contraindicated", "medicine"),
|
||||
("dosage", "medicine"),
|
||||
("symptoms", "medicine"),
|
||||
("diagnoses", "medicine"),
|
||||
("prescribed_for", "medicine"),
|
||||
("drug_interaction", "medicine"),
|
||||
("clinical_trial", "medicine"),
|
||||
// Finance
|
||||
("has_revenue", "finance"),
|
||||
("market_cap", "finance"),
|
||||
("stock_price", "finance"),
|
||||
("earnings", "finance"),
|
||||
("profit_margin", "finance"),
|
||||
("debt_ratio", "finance"),
|
||||
("dividend_yield", "finance"),
|
||||
("pe_ratio", "finance"),
|
||||
// Technology
|
||||
("implements", "technology"),
|
||||
("uses_framework", "technology"),
|
||||
("depends_on", "technology"),
|
||||
("version", "technology"),
|
||||
("api_endpoint", "technology"),
|
||||
("deprecates", "technology"),
|
||||
// Science
|
||||
("atomic_weight", "science"),
|
||||
("chemical_formula", "science"),
|
||||
("discovered_by", "science"),
|
||||
("speed_of", "science"),
|
||||
("temperature", "science"),
|
||||
("pressure", "science"),
|
||||
// Geography
|
||||
("located_in", "geography"),
|
||||
("capital_of", "geography"),
|
||||
("population", "geography"),
|
||||
("coordinates", "geography"),
|
||||
("borders", "geography"),
|
||||
("area", "geography"),
|
||||
// Legal
|
||||
("enacted_by", "legal"),
|
||||
("effective_date", "legal"),
|
||||
("jurisdiction", "legal"),
|
||||
("supersedes", "legal"),
|
||||
("penalty", "legal"),
|
||||
// General (catch-all patterns)
|
||||
("has_name", "general"),
|
||||
("has_type", "general"),
|
||||
("is_a", "general"),
|
||||
("part_of", "general"),
|
||||
];
|
||||
|
||||
/// Extract the domain from a predicate string.
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// Uses a curated mapping of predicate patterns to domains.
|
||||
/// Falls back to "general" if no specific mapping is found.
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// # Examples
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// ```ignore
|
||||
/// assert_eq!(extract_domain("treats_condition"), "medicine");
|
||||
/// assert_eq!(extract_domain("has_revenue"), "finance");
|
||||
/// assert_eq!(extract_domain("unknown_predicate"), "general");
|
||||
/// ```
|
||||
pub fn extract_domain(predicate: &str) -> String {
|
||||
let predicate_lower = predicate.to_lowercase();
|
||||
|
||||
// Check exact matches first
|
||||
for (pattern, domain) in DOMAIN_MAPPINGS {
|
||||
if predicate_lower == *pattern {
|
||||
return (*domain).to_string();
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Check prefix matches (e.g., "treats_xyz" → "medicine")
|
||||
for (pattern, domain) in DOMAIN_MAPPINGS {
|
||||
if predicate_lower.starts_with(pattern) {
|
||||
return (*domain).to_string();
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Check contains matches (e.g., "xyz_treats_abc" → "medicine")
|
||||
for (pattern, domain) in DOMAIN_MAPPINGS {
|
||||
if predicate_lower.contains(pattern) {
|
||||
return (*domain).to_string();
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Default to general domain
|
||||
"general".to_string()
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Calculate the domain factor for weighting assertions.
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// Returns a multiplier based on the agent's domain trust score.
|
||||
/// This is used to scale the global EigenTrust score by domain expertise.
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// # Formula
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// `factor = 0.5 + (domain_score * 0.5)`
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// - Score 0.0 → Factor 0.5 (halved weight)
|
||||
/// - Score 0.5 → Factor 0.75 (default, slight reduction)
|
||||
/// - Score 1.0 → Factor 1.0 (full weight)
|
||||
pub fn domain_factor(domain_score: f32) -> f32 {
|
||||
0.5 + (domain_score.clamp(0.0, 1.0) * 0.5)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[cfg(test)]
|
||||
mod tests {
|
||||
use super::*;
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_domain_trust_new() {
|
||||
let dt = DomainTrust::new([1u8; 32], "medicine".to_string(), 1000);
|
||||
assert!((dt.score - 0.5).abs() < f32::EPSILON);
|
||||
assert_eq!(dt.assertions_count, 0);
|
||||
assert_eq!(dt.accuracy_count, 0);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_domain_trust_record_outcome_accurate() {
|
||||
let mut dt = DomainTrust::new([1u8; 32], "medicine".to_string(), 1000);
|
||||
let new_score = dt.record_outcome(true, 2000);
|
||||
|
||||
assert!((new_score - 0.53).abs() < 0.01);
|
||||
assert_eq!(dt.assertions_count, 1);
|
||||
assert_eq!(dt.accuracy_count, 1);
|
||||
assert_eq!(dt.last_updated, 2000);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_domain_trust_record_outcome_inaccurate() {
|
||||
let mut dt = DomainTrust::new([1u8; 32], "medicine".to_string(), 1000);
|
||||
let new_score = dt.record_outcome(false, 2000);
|
||||
|
||||
assert!((new_score - 0.45).abs() < 0.01);
|
||||
assert_eq!(dt.assertions_count, 1);
|
||||
assert_eq!(dt.accuracy_count, 0);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_domain_trust_accuracy_rate() {
|
||||
let mut dt = DomainTrust::new([1u8; 32], "medicine".to_string(), 1000);
|
||||
|
||||
// No assertions yet
|
||||
assert!((dt.accuracy_rate() - 0.0).abs() < f32::EPSILON);
|
||||
|
||||
// 3 accurate, 1 inaccurate = 75% accuracy
|
||||
dt.record_outcome(true, 1001);
|
||||
dt.record_outcome(true, 1002);
|
||||
dt.record_outcome(true, 1003);
|
||||
dt.record_outcome(false, 1004);
|
||||
|
||||
assert!((dt.accuracy_rate() - 0.75).abs() < 0.01);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_extract_domain_exact_match() {
|
||||
assert_eq!(extract_domain("treats_condition"), "medicine");
|
||||
assert_eq!(extract_domain("has_revenue"), "finance");
|
||||
assert_eq!(extract_domain("implements"), "technology");
|
||||
assert_eq!(extract_domain("located_in"), "geography");
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_extract_domain_prefix_match() {
|
||||
assert_eq!(extract_domain("treats_xyz"), "medicine");
|
||||
assert_eq!(extract_domain("stock_price_daily"), "finance");
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_extract_domain_case_insensitive() {
|
||||
assert_eq!(extract_domain("TREATS_CONDITION"), "medicine");
|
||||
assert_eq!(extract_domain("Has_Revenue"), "finance");
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_extract_domain_default_general() {
|
||||
assert_eq!(extract_domain("unknown_predicate"), "general");
|
||||
assert_eq!(extract_domain("foo_bar_baz"), "general");
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_domain_factor() {
|
||||
assert!((domain_factor(0.0) - 0.5).abs() < f32::EPSILON);
|
||||
assert!((domain_factor(0.5) - 0.75).abs() < f32::EPSILON);
|
||||
assert!((domain_factor(1.0) - 1.0).abs() < f32::EPSILON);
|
||||
|
||||
// Clamping
|
||||
assert!((domain_factor(-1.0) - 0.5).abs() < f32::EPSILON);
|
||||
assert!((domain_factor(2.0) - 1.0).abs() < f32::EPSILON);
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
374
crates/stemedb-storage/src/domain_trust_store/store_impl.rs
Normal file
374
crates/stemedb-storage/src/domain_trust_store/store_impl.rs
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,374 @@
|
||||
//! DomainTrustStore implementation backed by a generic KVStore.
|
||||
//!
|
||||
//! This module provides the concrete implementation of DomainTrustStore operations,
|
||||
//! including CRUD operations and effective trust calculation.
|
||||
|
||||
use crate::error::Result;
|
||||
use crate::key_codec;
|
||||
use crate::traits::KVStore;
|
||||
use async_trait::async_trait;
|
||||
use tracing::{debug, instrument};
|
||||
|
||||
use super::model::{domain_factor, extract_domain, DomainTrust};
|
||||
use super::DomainTrustStore;
|
||||
|
||||
/// DomainTrustStore implementation backed by a generic KVStore.
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// This implementation stores DomainTrust data at `\x00DT:{agent_hex}:{domain}`
|
||||
/// and provides all operations for domain-specific trust management.
|
||||
pub struct GenericDomainTrustStore<S> {
|
||||
store: S,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
impl<S: KVStore> GenericDomainTrustStore<S> {
|
||||
/// Create a new DomainTrustStore backed by the given KVStore.
|
||||
pub fn new(store: S) -> Self {
|
||||
Self { store }
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Serialize a DomainTrust using the canonical serde helpers.
|
||||
fn serialize_domain_trust(dt: &DomainTrust) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
|
||||
crate::serde_helpers::serialize(dt)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Deserialize a DomainTrust using the canonical serde helpers.
|
||||
fn deserialize_domain_trust(data: &[u8]) -> Result<DomainTrust> {
|
||||
crate::serde_helpers::deserialize(data)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[async_trait]
|
||||
impl<S: KVStore + 'static> DomainTrustStore for GenericDomainTrustStore<S> {
|
||||
#[instrument(skip(self), fields(agent = %hex::encode(agent), domain))]
|
||||
async fn get_domain_trust(&self, agent: &[u8; 32], domain: &str) -> Result<DomainTrust> {
|
||||
let agent_hex = hex::encode(agent);
|
||||
let key = key_codec::domain_trust_key(&agent_hex, domain);
|
||||
|
||||
match self.store.get(&key).await? {
|
||||
Some(data) => {
|
||||
let dt = Self::deserialize_domain_trust(&data)?;
|
||||
debug!(score = dt.score, assertions = dt.assertions_count, "Retrieved DomainTrust");
|
||||
Ok(dt)
|
||||
}
|
||||
None => {
|
||||
// New agent-domain pair, return default
|
||||
let now = std::time::SystemTime::now()
|
||||
.duration_since(std::time::UNIX_EPOCH)
|
||||
.map(|d| d.as_secs())
|
||||
.unwrap_or(0);
|
||||
let dt = DomainTrust::new(*agent, domain.to_string(), now);
|
||||
debug!(score = dt.score, "Created default DomainTrust for new agent-domain pair");
|
||||
Ok(dt)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[instrument(skip(self), fields(agent = %hex::encode(agent)))]
|
||||
async fn get_all_domains_for_agent(&self, agent: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<Vec<DomainTrust>> {
|
||||
let agent_hex = hex::encode(agent);
|
||||
let prefix = key_codec::domain_trust_agent_prefix(&agent_hex);
|
||||
let entries = self.store.scan_prefix(&prefix).await?;
|
||||
|
||||
let mut domains = Vec::with_capacity(entries.len());
|
||||
for (_, data) in entries {
|
||||
let dt = Self::deserialize_domain_trust(&data)?;
|
||||
domains.push(dt);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
debug!(count = domains.len(), "Retrieved all domains for agent");
|
||||
Ok(domains)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[instrument(skip(self), fields(
|
||||
agent = %hex::encode(agent),
|
||||
predicate,
|
||||
was_accurate
|
||||
))]
|
||||
async fn record_domain_outcome(
|
||||
&self,
|
||||
agent: &[u8; 32],
|
||||
predicate: &str,
|
||||
was_accurate: bool,
|
||||
timestamp: u64,
|
||||
) -> Result<f32> {
|
||||
// Extract domain from predicate
|
||||
let domain = extract_domain(predicate);
|
||||
debug!(domain = %domain, "Extracted domain from predicate");
|
||||
|
||||
// Get or create domain trust
|
||||
let mut dt = self.get_domain_trust(agent, &domain).await?;
|
||||
|
||||
// Record the outcome
|
||||
let new_score = dt.record_outcome(was_accurate, timestamp);
|
||||
|
||||
// Store updated domain trust
|
||||
let agent_hex = hex::encode(agent);
|
||||
let key = key_codec::domain_trust_key(&agent_hex, &domain);
|
||||
let serialized = Self::serialize_domain_trust(&dt)?;
|
||||
self.store.put(&key, &serialized).await?;
|
||||
|
||||
debug!(
|
||||
new_score,
|
||||
accuracy_rate = dt.accuracy_rate(),
|
||||
"Recorded domain outcome and updated DomainTrust"
|
||||
);
|
||||
Ok(new_score)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[instrument(skip(self, dt), fields(
|
||||
agent = %hex::encode(dt.agent_id),
|
||||
domain = %dt.domain
|
||||
))]
|
||||
async fn put_domain_trust(&self, dt: &DomainTrust) -> Result<()> {
|
||||
let agent_hex = hex::encode(dt.agent_id);
|
||||
let key = key_codec::domain_trust_key(&agent_hex, &dt.domain);
|
||||
let serialized = Self::serialize_domain_trust(dt)?;
|
||||
self.store.put(&key, &serialized).await?;
|
||||
|
||||
debug!(score = dt.score, "Stored DomainTrust");
|
||||
Ok(())
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[instrument(skip(self), fields(
|
||||
agent = %hex::encode(agent),
|
||||
predicate,
|
||||
eigentrust_score
|
||||
))]
|
||||
async fn get_effective_trust(
|
||||
&self,
|
||||
agent: &[u8; 32],
|
||||
predicate: &str,
|
||||
eigentrust_score: f32,
|
||||
) -> Result<f32> {
|
||||
// Extract domain from predicate
|
||||
let domain = extract_domain(predicate);
|
||||
|
||||
// Get domain trust (returns default 0.5 if not found)
|
||||
let dt = self.get_domain_trust(agent, &domain).await?;
|
||||
|
||||
// Calculate effective trust
|
||||
let factor = domain_factor(dt.score);
|
||||
let effective = eigentrust_score * factor;
|
||||
|
||||
debug!(
|
||||
domain = %domain,
|
||||
domain_score = dt.score,
|
||||
factor,
|
||||
effective,
|
||||
"Calculated effective trust"
|
||||
);
|
||||
|
||||
Ok(effective)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[cfg(test)]
|
||||
mod tests {
|
||||
use super::*;
|
||||
use crate::HybridStore;
|
||||
use std::sync::Arc;
|
||||
|
||||
fn agent(id: u8) -> [u8; 32] {
|
||||
let mut arr = [0u8; 32];
|
||||
arr[0] = id;
|
||||
arr
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[tokio::test]
|
||||
async fn test_get_domain_trust_default() {
|
||||
let store = Arc::new(HybridStore::open_temp().expect("Failed to create store"));
|
||||
let domain_store = GenericDomainTrustStore::new(store);
|
||||
|
||||
// Non-existent should return default
|
||||
let dt = domain_store.get_domain_trust(&agent(1), "medicine").await.expect("get");
|
||||
|
||||
assert_eq!(dt.agent_id, agent(1));
|
||||
assert_eq!(dt.domain, "medicine");
|
||||
assert!((dt.score - 0.5).abs() < f32::EPSILON); // Default score
|
||||
assert_eq!(dt.assertions_count, 0);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[tokio::test]
|
||||
async fn test_put_and_get_domain_trust() {
|
||||
let store = Arc::new(HybridStore::open_temp().expect("Failed to create store"));
|
||||
let domain_store = GenericDomainTrustStore::new(store);
|
||||
|
||||
let mut dt = DomainTrust::new(agent(1), "medicine".to_string(), 1000);
|
||||
dt.score = 0.8;
|
||||
dt.assertions_count = 10;
|
||||
dt.accuracy_count = 8;
|
||||
|
||||
domain_store.put_domain_trust(&dt).await.expect("put");
|
||||
|
||||
let retrieved = domain_store.get_domain_trust(&agent(1), "medicine").await.expect("get");
|
||||
assert!((retrieved.score - 0.8).abs() < f32::EPSILON);
|
||||
assert_eq!(retrieved.assertions_count, 10);
|
||||
assert_eq!(retrieved.accuracy_count, 8);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[tokio::test]
|
||||
async fn test_record_domain_outcome_accurate() {
|
||||
let store = Arc::new(HybridStore::open_temp().expect("Failed to create store"));
|
||||
let domain_store = GenericDomainTrustStore::new(store);
|
||||
|
||||
// Record accurate outcome for medicine domain
|
||||
let new_score = domain_store
|
||||
.record_domain_outcome(&agent(1), "treats_condition", true, 1000)
|
||||
.await
|
||||
.expect("record");
|
||||
|
||||
// Score should increase from 0.5 → 0.53
|
||||
assert!((new_score - 0.53).abs() < 0.01);
|
||||
|
||||
// Check the domain was extracted correctly
|
||||
let dt = domain_store.get_domain_trust(&agent(1), "medicine").await.expect("get");
|
||||
assert_eq!(dt.assertions_count, 1);
|
||||
assert_eq!(dt.accuracy_count, 1);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[tokio::test]
|
||||
async fn test_record_domain_outcome_inaccurate() {
|
||||
let store = Arc::new(HybridStore::open_temp().expect("Failed to create store"));
|
||||
let domain_store = GenericDomainTrustStore::new(store);
|
||||
|
||||
// Record inaccurate outcome
|
||||
let new_score = domain_store
|
||||
.record_domain_outcome(&agent(1), "has_revenue", false, 1000)
|
||||
.await
|
||||
.expect("record");
|
||||
|
||||
// Score should decrease from 0.5 → 0.45
|
||||
assert!((new_score - 0.45).abs() < 0.01);
|
||||
|
||||
// Check the domain was extracted correctly (finance)
|
||||
let dt = domain_store.get_domain_trust(&agent(1), "finance").await.expect("get");
|
||||
assert_eq!(dt.assertions_count, 1);
|
||||
assert_eq!(dt.accuracy_count, 0);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[tokio::test]
|
||||
async fn test_get_all_domains_for_agent() {
|
||||
let store = Arc::new(HybridStore::open_temp().expect("Failed to create store"));
|
||||
let domain_store = GenericDomainTrustStore::new(store);
|
||||
|
||||
// Agent 1 has activity in multiple domains
|
||||
domain_store
|
||||
.record_domain_outcome(&agent(1), "treats_condition", true, 1000)
|
||||
.await
|
||||
.expect("record");
|
||||
domain_store
|
||||
.record_domain_outcome(&agent(1), "has_revenue", true, 1001)
|
||||
.await
|
||||
.expect("record");
|
||||
domain_store
|
||||
.record_domain_outcome(&agent(1), "located_in", true, 1002)
|
||||
.await
|
||||
.expect("record");
|
||||
|
||||
let domains = domain_store.get_all_domains_for_agent(&agent(1)).await.expect("get");
|
||||
assert_eq!(domains.len(), 3);
|
||||
|
||||
// Check domains are correct
|
||||
let domain_names: Vec<&str> = domains.iter().map(|dt| dt.domain.as_str()).collect();
|
||||
assert!(domain_names.contains(&"medicine"));
|
||||
assert!(domain_names.contains(&"finance"));
|
||||
assert!(domain_names.contains(&"geography"));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[tokio::test]
|
||||
async fn test_get_effective_trust() {
|
||||
let store = Arc::new(HybridStore::open_temp().expect("Failed to create store"));
|
||||
let domain_store = GenericDomainTrustStore::new(store);
|
||||
|
||||
// Set up: agent has 0.8 domain score in medicine
|
||||
let mut dt = DomainTrust::new(agent(1), "medicine".to_string(), 1000);
|
||||
dt.score = 0.8;
|
||||
domain_store.put_domain_trust(&dt).await.expect("put");
|
||||
|
||||
// Effective trust with 0.6 eigentrust
|
||||
// factor = 0.5 + (0.8 * 0.5) = 0.9
|
||||
// effective = 0.6 * 0.9 = 0.54
|
||||
let effective = domain_store
|
||||
.get_effective_trust(&agent(1), "treats_condition", 0.6)
|
||||
.await
|
||||
.expect("get");
|
||||
|
||||
assert!((effective - 0.54).abs() < 0.01);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[tokio::test]
|
||||
async fn test_get_effective_trust_default_domain() {
|
||||
let store = Arc::new(HybridStore::open_temp().expect("Failed to create store"));
|
||||
let domain_store = GenericDomainTrustStore::new(store);
|
||||
|
||||
// No domain trust set (default 0.5)
|
||||
// factor = 0.5 + (0.5 * 0.5) = 0.75
|
||||
// effective = 0.6 * 0.75 = 0.45
|
||||
let effective = domain_store
|
||||
.get_effective_trust(&agent(1), "treats_condition", 0.6)
|
||||
.await
|
||||
.expect("get");
|
||||
|
||||
assert!((effective - 0.45).abs() < 0.01);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[tokio::test]
|
||||
async fn test_domain_expertise_affects_resolution() {
|
||||
// Scenario: Two agents with same eigentrust, different domain expertise
|
||||
let store = Arc::new(HybridStore::open_temp().expect("Failed to create store"));
|
||||
let domain_store = GenericDomainTrustStore::new(store);
|
||||
|
||||
// Agent 1: Expert in medicine (score 0.9)
|
||||
let mut dt1 = DomainTrust::new(agent(1), "medicine".to_string(), 1000);
|
||||
dt1.score = 0.9;
|
||||
domain_store.put_domain_trust(&dt1).await.expect("put");
|
||||
|
||||
// Agent 2: Novice in medicine (score 0.3)
|
||||
let mut dt2 = DomainTrust::new(agent(2), "medicine".to_string(), 1000);
|
||||
dt2.score = 0.3;
|
||||
domain_store.put_domain_trust(&dt2).await.expect("put");
|
||||
|
||||
// Both have same global eigentrust (0.7)
|
||||
let effective1 = domain_store
|
||||
.get_effective_trust(&agent(1), "treats_condition", 0.7)
|
||||
.await
|
||||
.expect("get");
|
||||
let effective2 = domain_store
|
||||
.get_effective_trust(&agent(2), "treats_condition", 0.7)
|
||||
.await
|
||||
.expect("get");
|
||||
|
||||
// Agent 1 (expert) should have significantly higher effective trust
|
||||
assert!(effective1 > effective2 * 1.3, "Expert: {}, Novice: {}", effective1, effective2);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[tokio::test]
|
||||
async fn test_domain_isolation() {
|
||||
// Scenario: Agent is expert in medicine but not in finance
|
||||
let store = Arc::new(HybridStore::open_temp().expect("Failed to create store"));
|
||||
let domain_store = GenericDomainTrustStore::new(store);
|
||||
|
||||
// Agent is expert in medicine
|
||||
let mut dt = DomainTrust::new(agent(1), "medicine".to_string(), 1000);
|
||||
dt.score = 0.95;
|
||||
domain_store.put_domain_trust(&dt).await.expect("put");
|
||||
|
||||
// Agent has poor track record in finance
|
||||
let mut dt2 = DomainTrust::new(agent(1), "finance".to_string(), 1000);
|
||||
dt2.score = 0.2;
|
||||
domain_store.put_domain_trust(&dt2).await.expect("put");
|
||||
|
||||
// Effective trust in medicine is high
|
||||
let effective_med = domain_store
|
||||
.get_effective_trust(&agent(1), "treats_condition", 0.8)
|
||||
.await
|
||||
.expect("get");
|
||||
|
||||
// Effective trust in finance is low
|
||||
let effective_fin =
|
||||
domain_store.get_effective_trust(&agent(1), "has_revenue", 0.8).await.expect("get");
|
||||
|
||||
assert!(effective_med > 0.7, "Medicine effective trust: {}", effective_med);
|
||||
assert!(effective_fin < 0.5, "Finance effective trust: {}", effective_fin);
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
@ -271,11 +271,7 @@ pub fn hash_subject_key(hash_hex: &str) -> Vec<u8> {
|
||||
global_key(b"HASH_SUBJECT:", hash_hex.as_bytes())
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// ── Vector Index Persistence ─────────────────────────────────────────
|
||||
//
|
||||
// These keys are reserved for KV-backed cursor persistence (future phase).
|
||||
// Currently, PersistentVectorIndex stores version in filename and cursors
|
||||
// are rebuilt from WAL replay.
|
||||
// ── Vector/Visual Index Persistence (future KV-backed cursor persistence) ────
|
||||
|
||||
/// Vector index metadata key: `\x00VI:meta`
|
||||
#[allow(dead_code)]
|
||||
@ -284,23 +280,17 @@ pub fn vi_meta_key() -> Vec<u8> {
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Vector index hot cursor key: `\x00VI:hot_cursor`
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// Stores the WAL offset from which the hot index should replay on restart.
|
||||
#[allow(dead_code)]
|
||||
pub fn vi_hot_cursor_key() -> Vec<u8> {
|
||||
global_key(b"VI:hot_cursor", b"")
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Vector index cold version key: `\x00VI:cold_version`
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// Stores the version number of the current cold index snapshot.
|
||||
#[allow(dead_code)]
|
||||
pub fn vi_cold_version_key() -> Vec<u8> {
|
||||
global_key(b"VI:cold_version", b"")
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// ── Visual Index Persistence ─────────────────────────────────────────
|
||||
|
||||
/// Visual index metadata key: `\x00VH:meta`
|
||||
#[allow(dead_code)]
|
||||
pub fn vh_meta_key() -> Vec<u8> {
|
||||
@ -330,6 +320,93 @@ pub fn alias_scan_prefix() -> Vec<u8> {
|
||||
global_key(b"CA:", b"")
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// ── Trust Graph Keys ─────────────────────────────────────────────────
|
||||
|
||||
/// Trust edge key: `\x00TG:{from_hex}:{to_hex}`
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// Stores a TrustEdge from one agent to another.
|
||||
pub fn trust_edge_key(from_hex: &str, to_hex: &str) -> Vec<u8> {
|
||||
let suffix = format!("{}:{}", from_hex, to_hex);
|
||||
global_key(b"TG:", suffix.as_bytes())
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Trust edge from-prefix: `\x00TG:{from_hex}:`
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// Scan all edges where `from_agent` is the source (outgoing edges).
|
||||
pub fn trust_edge_from_prefix(from_hex: &str) -> Vec<u8> {
|
||||
let suffix = format!("{}:", from_hex);
|
||||
global_key(b"TG:", suffix.as_bytes())
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Trust edge reverse key: `\x00TGR:{to_hex}:{from_hex}`
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// Reverse index for fast lookup of incoming edges (who trusts this agent).
|
||||
pub fn trust_edge_reverse_key(to_hex: &str, from_hex: &str) -> Vec<u8> {
|
||||
let suffix = format!("{}:{}", to_hex, from_hex);
|
||||
global_key(b"TGR:", suffix.as_bytes())
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Trust edge reverse prefix: `\x00TGR:{to_hex}:`
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// Scan all edges where `to_agent` is the target (incoming edges).
|
||||
pub fn trust_edge_reverse_prefix(to_hex: &str) -> Vec<u8> {
|
||||
let suffix = format!("{}:", to_hex);
|
||||
global_key(b"TGR:", suffix.as_bytes())
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Trust graph scan prefix: `\x00TG:`
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// Scan all trust edges in the graph.
|
||||
pub fn trust_graph_scan_prefix() -> Vec<u8> {
|
||||
global_key(b"TG:", b"")
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// EigenTrust state key: `\x00ET:state`
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// Stores the computed EigenTrust state (global trust scores).
|
||||
pub fn eigentrust_state_key() -> Vec<u8> {
|
||||
global_key(b"ET:state", b"")
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Seed trust key: `\x00ET:seed:{agent_hex}`
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// Stores the seed trust value for a pre-trusted agent.
|
||||
pub fn seed_trust_key(agent_hex: &str) -> Vec<u8> {
|
||||
global_key(b"ET:seed:", agent_hex.as_bytes())
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Seed trust scan prefix: `\x00ET:seed:`
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// Scan all seed trust entries.
|
||||
pub fn seed_trust_scan_prefix() -> Vec<u8> {
|
||||
global_key(b"ET:seed:", b"")
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// ── Domain Trust Keys ────────────────────────────────────────────────
|
||||
|
||||
/// Domain trust key: `\x00DT:{agent_hex}:{domain}`
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// Stores domain-specific trust for an agent.
|
||||
pub fn domain_trust_key(agent_hex: &str, domain: &str) -> Vec<u8> {
|
||||
let suffix = format!("{}:{}", agent_hex, domain);
|
||||
global_key(b"DT:", suffix.as_bytes())
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Domain trust agent prefix: `\x00DT:{agent_hex}:`
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// Scan all domains for a specific agent.
|
||||
pub fn domain_trust_agent_prefix(agent_hex: &str) -> Vec<u8> {
|
||||
let suffix = format!("{}:", agent_hex);
|
||||
global_key(b"DT:", suffix.as_bytes())
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Domain trust scan prefix: `\x00DT:`
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// Scan all domain trust entries.
|
||||
pub fn domain_trust_scan_prefix() -> Vec<u8> {
|
||||
global_key(b"DT:", b"")
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// ── Key extraction / parsing ────────────────────────────────────────
|
||||
|
||||
/// Extract subject from a `\x00SUBJECTS:{subject}` key.
|
||||
|
||||
@ -141,10 +141,16 @@
|
||||
//! }
|
||||
//! ```
|
||||
|
||||
/// Admission control storage for graduated PoW and trust tiers.
|
||||
pub mod admission_store;
|
||||
/// CRDT (Conflict-free Replicated Data Type) implementations for distributed StemeDB.
|
||||
pub mod crdt;
|
||||
/// Domain-specific trust tracking for per-domain expertise.
|
||||
pub mod domain_trust_store;
|
||||
/// Central key encoding/decoding for subject-prefix range sharding.
|
||||
pub mod key_codec;
|
||||
/// EigenTrust trust graph for Sybil-resistant reputation.
|
||||
pub mod trust_graph_store;
|
||||
|
||||
/// Shared checkpoint file format for index persistence.
|
||||
pub mod checkpoint_format;
|
||||
@ -186,8 +192,14 @@ pub mod visual_index;
|
||||
/// High-velocity vote storage (The Ballot Box).
|
||||
pub mod vote_store;
|
||||
|
||||
pub use admission_store::{
|
||||
AdmissionCheck, AdmissionStatus, AdmissionStatusResult, AdmissionStore, GenericAdmissionStore,
|
||||
};
|
||||
pub use alias_store::{AliasStore, GenericAliasStore};
|
||||
pub use audit_store::{AuditStore, GenericAuditStore};
|
||||
pub use domain_trust_store::{
|
||||
domain_factor, extract_domain, DomainTrust, DomainTrustStore, GenericDomainTrustStore,
|
||||
};
|
||||
pub use error::{Result, StorageError};
|
||||
pub use escalation_store::{EscalationStore, GenericEscalationStore};
|
||||
pub use gold_standard_store::{GenericGoldStandardStore, GoldStandardStore};
|
||||
@ -199,6 +211,10 @@ pub use quota_store::{
|
||||
};
|
||||
pub use supersession_store::{GenericSupersessionStore, SupersessionStore};
|
||||
pub use traits::KVStore;
|
||||
pub use trust_graph_store::{
|
||||
compute_eigentrust_scores, EigenTrustConfig, EigenTrustResult, EigenTrustState,
|
||||
GenericTrustGraphStore, TrustEdge, TrustGraphStore,
|
||||
};
|
||||
pub use trust_pack_store::{GenericTrustPackStore, TrustPackStore};
|
||||
pub use trust_rank_store::{GenericTrustRankStore, TrustRank, TrustRankStore};
|
||||
pub use vector_index::{
|
||||
|
||||
487
crates/stemedb-storage/src/trust_graph_store/eigentrust.rs
Normal file
487
crates/stemedb-storage/src/trust_graph_store/eigentrust.rs
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,487 @@
|
||||
//! EigenTrust power iteration algorithm.
|
||||
//!
|
||||
//! Implements the EigenTrust algorithm for computing global trust scores
|
||||
//! in a web of trust. The algorithm is Sybil-resistant because trust
|
||||
//! only flows from pre-trusted seed agents.
|
||||
//!
|
||||
//! # Algorithm
|
||||
//!
|
||||
//! The EigenTrust algorithm computes global trust scores using power iteration:
|
||||
//!
|
||||
//! ```text
|
||||
//! T = (1-α)C^T * T + α * P
|
||||
//! ```
|
||||
//!
|
||||
//! Where:
|
||||
//! - T: Trust vector (what we're computing)
|
||||
//! - C: Row-normalized adjacency matrix (trust edges)
|
||||
//! - P: Seed trust vector (pre-trusted agents)
|
||||
//! - α: Damping factor (probability of jumping to a seed)
|
||||
//!
|
||||
//! # Sybil Resistance
|
||||
//!
|
||||
//! The key insight is that isolated rings of agents (not connected to seeds)
|
||||
//! receive NO propagated trust. Only seed-connected agents accumulate meaningful trust.
|
||||
|
||||
use super::model::{AgentScore, EigenTrustConfig, EigenTrustResult, EigenTrustState, TrustEdge};
|
||||
use std::collections::HashMap;
|
||||
use tracing::{debug, instrument};
|
||||
|
||||
/// Compute EigenTrust scores using power iteration.
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// # Arguments
|
||||
/// * `edges` - All trust edges in the graph
|
||||
/// * `seed_trust` - Pre-trusted agents and their seed weights (will be normalized)
|
||||
/// * `config` - Algorithm configuration
|
||||
/// * `timestamp` - Unix timestamp for the result
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// # Returns
|
||||
/// `EigenTrustResult` containing the computed state and convergence status.
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// # Sybil Resistance
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// Agents not connected to the seed trust network receive near-zero trust.
|
||||
/// This is achieved through the α * P term in the power iteration:
|
||||
/// - α = 0.1 means 10% of trust comes directly from seeds each iteration
|
||||
/// - Isolated rings have no path to seeds, so their trust decays to zero
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// # Performance
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// - Time: O(iterations * edges)
|
||||
/// - Space: O(agents)
|
||||
/// - Typical convergence: 10-15 iterations
|
||||
#[instrument(skip(edges, seed_trust), fields(edge_count = edges.len(), seed_count = seed_trust.len()))]
|
||||
pub fn compute_eigentrust_scores(
|
||||
edges: &[TrustEdge],
|
||||
seed_trust: &[([u8; 32], f32)],
|
||||
config: &EigenTrustConfig,
|
||||
timestamp: u64,
|
||||
) -> EigenTrustResult {
|
||||
// Handle empty graph
|
||||
if edges.is_empty() && seed_trust.is_empty() {
|
||||
debug!("Empty graph, returning empty state");
|
||||
return EigenTrustResult { state: EigenTrustState::empty(timestamp), converged: true };
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Build agent → index mapping
|
||||
let mut agent_to_idx: HashMap<[u8; 32], usize> = HashMap::new();
|
||||
let mut idx_to_agent: Vec<[u8; 32]> = Vec::new();
|
||||
|
||||
for edge in edges {
|
||||
if !agent_to_idx.contains_key(&edge.from_agent) {
|
||||
agent_to_idx.insert(edge.from_agent, idx_to_agent.len());
|
||||
idx_to_agent.push(edge.from_agent);
|
||||
}
|
||||
if !agent_to_idx.contains_key(&edge.to_agent) {
|
||||
agent_to_idx.insert(edge.to_agent, idx_to_agent.len());
|
||||
idx_to_agent.push(edge.to_agent);
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Add seed agents that might not have edges
|
||||
for (agent, _) in seed_trust {
|
||||
if !agent_to_idx.contains_key(agent) {
|
||||
agent_to_idx.insert(*agent, idx_to_agent.len());
|
||||
idx_to_agent.push(*agent);
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
let n = idx_to_agent.len();
|
||||
if n == 0 {
|
||||
debug!("No agents in graph, returning empty state");
|
||||
return EigenTrustResult { state: EigenTrustState::empty(timestamp), converged: true };
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
debug!(agent_count = n, "Building adjacency matrix");
|
||||
|
||||
// Build row-normalized adjacency matrix C
|
||||
// C[i][j] = normalized weight from i to j
|
||||
// We store as Vec<Vec<(target_idx, weight)>> for sparse representation
|
||||
let mut outgoing: Vec<Vec<(usize, f32)>> = vec![Vec::new(); n];
|
||||
let mut out_sum: Vec<f32> = vec![0.0; n];
|
||||
|
||||
for edge in edges {
|
||||
if !edge.is_valid() {
|
||||
continue;
|
||||
}
|
||||
if let (Some(&from_idx), Some(&to_idx)) =
|
||||
(agent_to_idx.get(&edge.from_agent), agent_to_idx.get(&edge.to_agent))
|
||||
{
|
||||
outgoing[from_idx].push((to_idx, edge.weight));
|
||||
out_sum[from_idx] += edge.weight;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Normalize outgoing weights (row normalization)
|
||||
for (i, edges_list) in outgoing.iter_mut().enumerate() {
|
||||
let sum = out_sum[i];
|
||||
if sum > 0.0 {
|
||||
for (_, weight) in edges_list.iter_mut() {
|
||||
*weight /= sum;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Build seed vector P (normalized)
|
||||
let mut p: Vec<f32> = vec![0.0; n];
|
||||
let mut p_sum = 0.0_f32;
|
||||
|
||||
for (agent, weight) in seed_trust {
|
||||
if let Some(&idx) = agent_to_idx.get(agent) {
|
||||
p[idx] = *weight;
|
||||
p_sum += *weight;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Normalize P
|
||||
if p_sum > 0.0 {
|
||||
for pi in &mut p {
|
||||
*pi /= p_sum;
|
||||
}
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
// No seed trust: uniform distribution (fallback, not recommended)
|
||||
debug!("Warning: No seed trust provided, using uniform distribution");
|
||||
for pi in &mut p {
|
||||
*pi = 1.0 / n as f32;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Initialize trust vector T = P
|
||||
let mut t: Vec<f32> = p.clone();
|
||||
|
||||
// Power iteration: T = (1-α) * C^T * T + α * P
|
||||
let alpha = config.alpha;
|
||||
let one_minus_alpha = 1.0 - alpha;
|
||||
let mut iterations = 0_u32;
|
||||
let mut convergence_delta = f32::MAX;
|
||||
|
||||
for iter in 0..config.max_iterations {
|
||||
iterations = iter + 1;
|
||||
|
||||
// Compute new_t = (1-α) * C^T * t + α * p
|
||||
let mut new_t: Vec<f32> = vec![0.0; n];
|
||||
|
||||
// C^T * t: for each node i, collect trust from nodes that trust i
|
||||
// This is equivalent to: for each node j with outgoing edge to i,
|
||||
// add normalized_weight * t[j] to new_t[i]
|
||||
for (j, edges_list) in outgoing.iter().enumerate() {
|
||||
let t_j = t[j];
|
||||
for &(i, weight) in edges_list {
|
||||
new_t[i] += weight * t_j;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Handle dangling nodes (nodes with no outgoing edges)
|
||||
// Distribute their trust uniformly to seeds
|
||||
let mut dangling_mass = 0.0_f32;
|
||||
for (j, sum) in out_sum.iter().enumerate() {
|
||||
if *sum == 0.0 {
|
||||
dangling_mass += t[j];
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
if dangling_mass > 0.0 {
|
||||
for (i, pi) in p.iter().enumerate() {
|
||||
new_t[i] += dangling_mass * pi;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Apply (1-α) factor and add α * p
|
||||
for i in 0..n {
|
||||
new_t[i] = one_minus_alpha * new_t[i] + alpha * p[i];
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Compute L1 norm of change
|
||||
convergence_delta = 0.0;
|
||||
for i in 0..n {
|
||||
convergence_delta += (new_t[i] - t[i]).abs();
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
debug!(iteration = iterations, delta = convergence_delta, "Power iteration step");
|
||||
|
||||
// Update t
|
||||
t = new_t;
|
||||
|
||||
// Check convergence
|
||||
if convergence_delta < config.epsilon {
|
||||
debug!(iterations, delta = convergence_delta, "Converged");
|
||||
break;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Normalize final scores to sum to 1.0
|
||||
let t_sum: f32 = t.iter().sum();
|
||||
if t_sum > 0.0 {
|
||||
for ti in &mut t {
|
||||
*ti /= t_sum;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Build result
|
||||
let scores: Vec<AgentScore> = idx_to_agent
|
||||
.into_iter()
|
||||
.zip(t)
|
||||
.map(|(agent, score)| AgentScore::new(agent, score))
|
||||
.collect();
|
||||
|
||||
let converged = convergence_delta < config.epsilon;
|
||||
|
||||
debug!(
|
||||
iterations,
|
||||
converged,
|
||||
delta = convergence_delta,
|
||||
agents = scores.len(),
|
||||
"EigenTrust computation complete"
|
||||
);
|
||||
|
||||
EigenTrustResult {
|
||||
state: EigenTrustState { scores, computed_at: timestamp, iterations, convergence_delta },
|
||||
converged,
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[cfg(test)]
|
||||
mod tests {
|
||||
use super::*;
|
||||
|
||||
fn agent(id: u8) -> [u8; 32] {
|
||||
let mut arr = [0u8; 32];
|
||||
arr[0] = id;
|
||||
arr
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_empty_graph() {
|
||||
let result = compute_eigentrust_scores(&[], &[], &EigenTrustConfig::default(), 1000);
|
||||
|
||||
assert!(result.converged);
|
||||
assert!(result.state.scores.is_empty());
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_single_seed_no_edges() {
|
||||
let seeds = vec![(agent(1), 1.0)];
|
||||
let result = compute_eigentrust_scores(&[], &seeds, &EigenTrustConfig::default(), 1000);
|
||||
|
||||
assert!(result.converged);
|
||||
assert_eq!(result.state.scores.len(), 1);
|
||||
|
||||
// Single seed gets all the trust
|
||||
let score = result.state.get_score(&agent(1));
|
||||
assert!((score - 1.0).abs() < 0.01);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_simple_chain() {
|
||||
// Seed → A → B
|
||||
// Seed trusts A, A trusts B
|
||||
let seed = agent(0);
|
||||
let a = agent(1);
|
||||
let b = agent(2);
|
||||
|
||||
let edges =
|
||||
vec![TrustEdge::new(seed, a, 1.0, 1000, None), TrustEdge::new(a, b, 1.0, 1000, None)];
|
||||
let seeds = vec![(seed, 1.0)];
|
||||
|
||||
let result = compute_eigentrust_scores(&edges, &seeds, &EigenTrustConfig::default(), 1000);
|
||||
|
||||
assert!(result.converged);
|
||||
|
||||
// Seed should have highest trust (directly seeded)
|
||||
// A should have next highest (trusted by seed)
|
||||
// B should have lowest (trusted by A)
|
||||
let seed_score = result.state.get_score(&seed);
|
||||
let a_score = result.state.get_score(&a);
|
||||
let b_score = result.state.get_score(&b);
|
||||
|
||||
assert!(seed_score > a_score);
|
||||
assert!(a_score > b_score);
|
||||
assert!(b_score > 0.0);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_isolated_ring_gets_low_trust() {
|
||||
// This is the key Sybil resistance test
|
||||
//
|
||||
// Network:
|
||||
// - Seed agent S with seed trust
|
||||
// - Isolated ring: A → B → C → A (no connection to S)
|
||||
//
|
||||
// Expected: Ring agents get near-zero trust
|
||||
|
||||
let s = agent(0);
|
||||
let a = agent(1);
|
||||
let b = agent(2);
|
||||
let c = agent(3);
|
||||
|
||||
// S has no edges (just seed trust)
|
||||
// A → B → C → A forms isolated ring
|
||||
let edges = vec![
|
||||
TrustEdge::new(a, b, 1.0, 1000, None),
|
||||
TrustEdge::new(b, c, 1.0, 1000, None),
|
||||
TrustEdge::new(c, a, 1.0, 1000, None),
|
||||
];
|
||||
let seeds = vec![(s, 1.0)];
|
||||
|
||||
let result = compute_eigentrust_scores(&edges, &seeds, &EigenTrustConfig::default(), 1000);
|
||||
|
||||
assert!(result.converged);
|
||||
|
||||
// Seed retains most trust (since it's the only pre-trusted agent)
|
||||
let s_score = result.state.get_score(&s);
|
||||
assert!(s_score > 0.9, "Seed score should be high: {}", s_score);
|
||||
|
||||
// Ring agents should have near-zero trust (not connected to seed)
|
||||
let a_score = result.state.get_score(&a);
|
||||
let b_score = result.state.get_score(&b);
|
||||
let c_score = result.state.get_score(&c);
|
||||
|
||||
assert!(a_score < 0.05, "Isolated agent A should have low trust: {}", a_score);
|
||||
assert!(b_score < 0.05, "Isolated agent B should have low trust: {}", b_score);
|
||||
assert!(c_score < 0.05, "Isolated agent C should have low trust: {}", c_score);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_ring_connected_to_seed_gets_trust() {
|
||||
// Network:
|
||||
// - Seed S → A (S trusts A)
|
||||
// - A → B → C → A (ring connected to seed via A)
|
||||
//
|
||||
// Expected: Ring agents get trust because connected to seed
|
||||
|
||||
let s = agent(0);
|
||||
let a = agent(1);
|
||||
let b = agent(2);
|
||||
let c = agent(3);
|
||||
|
||||
let edges = vec![
|
||||
TrustEdge::new(s, a, 1.0, 1000, None), // Seed trusts A
|
||||
TrustEdge::new(a, b, 1.0, 1000, None),
|
||||
TrustEdge::new(b, c, 1.0, 1000, None),
|
||||
TrustEdge::new(c, a, 1.0, 1000, None),
|
||||
];
|
||||
let seeds = vec![(s, 1.0)];
|
||||
|
||||
let result = compute_eigentrust_scores(&edges, &seeds, &EigenTrustConfig::default(), 1000);
|
||||
|
||||
assert!(result.converged);
|
||||
|
||||
// All agents should have non-trivial trust
|
||||
let s_score = result.state.get_score(&s);
|
||||
let a_score = result.state.get_score(&a);
|
||||
let b_score = result.state.get_score(&b);
|
||||
let c_score = result.state.get_score(&c);
|
||||
|
||||
assert!(s_score > 0.0);
|
||||
assert!(a_score > 0.1, "Agent A connected to seed should have trust: {}", a_score);
|
||||
assert!(b_score > 0.05, "Agent B should have some trust: {}", b_score);
|
||||
assert!(c_score > 0.05, "Agent C should have some trust: {}", c_score);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_multiple_seeds() {
|
||||
// Two seeds, each trusts one agent
|
||||
let s1 = agent(0);
|
||||
let s2 = agent(1);
|
||||
let a = agent(2);
|
||||
let b = agent(3);
|
||||
|
||||
let edges =
|
||||
vec![TrustEdge::new(s1, a, 1.0, 1000, None), TrustEdge::new(s2, b, 1.0, 1000, None)];
|
||||
let seeds = vec![(s1, 1.0), (s2, 1.0)];
|
||||
|
||||
let result = compute_eigentrust_scores(&edges, &seeds, &EigenTrustConfig::default(), 1000);
|
||||
|
||||
assert!(result.converged);
|
||||
|
||||
// Both seeds and their trusted agents should have trust
|
||||
let s1_score = result.state.get_score(&s1);
|
||||
let s2_score = result.state.get_score(&s2);
|
||||
let a_score = result.state.get_score(&a);
|
||||
let b_score = result.state.get_score(&b);
|
||||
|
||||
// Seeds should have roughly equal trust (equal seed weight)
|
||||
assert!((s1_score - s2_score).abs() < 0.1);
|
||||
// Trusted agents should have roughly equal trust
|
||||
assert!((a_score - b_score).abs() < 0.1);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_weighted_edges() {
|
||||
// Seed trusts A strongly, B weakly
|
||||
let s = agent(0);
|
||||
let a = agent(1);
|
||||
let b = agent(2);
|
||||
|
||||
let edges = vec![
|
||||
TrustEdge::new(s, a, 0.9, 1000, None), // Strong trust
|
||||
TrustEdge::new(s, b, 0.1, 1000, None), // Weak trust
|
||||
];
|
||||
let seeds = vec![(s, 1.0)];
|
||||
|
||||
let result = compute_eigentrust_scores(&edges, &seeds, &EigenTrustConfig::default(), 1000);
|
||||
|
||||
assert!(result.converged);
|
||||
|
||||
let a_score = result.state.get_score(&a);
|
||||
let b_score = result.state.get_score(&b);
|
||||
|
||||
// A should have significantly more trust than B
|
||||
assert!(a_score > b_score * 2.0, "A: {}, B: {}", a_score, b_score);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_invalid_edges_ignored() {
|
||||
// Self-trust and zero-weight edges should be ignored
|
||||
let s = agent(0);
|
||||
let a = agent(1);
|
||||
|
||||
let edges = vec![
|
||||
TrustEdge::new(s, a, 1.0, 1000, None), // Valid
|
||||
TrustEdge::new(a, a, 1.0, 1000, None), // Invalid: self-trust
|
||||
TrustEdge::new(s, a, 0.0, 1000, None), // Invalid: zero weight
|
||||
];
|
||||
let seeds = vec![(s, 1.0)];
|
||||
|
||||
let result = compute_eigentrust_scores(&edges, &seeds, &EigenTrustConfig::default(), 1000);
|
||||
|
||||
assert!(result.converged);
|
||||
// Should not crash or produce weird results
|
||||
assert!(result.state.scores.len() >= 2);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_convergence_within_max_iterations() {
|
||||
// Even a moderately complex graph should converge in 20 iterations
|
||||
let seed = agent(0);
|
||||
let mut edges = Vec::new();
|
||||
|
||||
// Create a star topology: seed trusts 10 agents
|
||||
for i in 1..=10 {
|
||||
edges.push(TrustEdge::new(seed, agent(i), 1.0, 1000, None));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
let seeds = vec![(seed, 1.0)];
|
||||
let config = EigenTrustConfig::default();
|
||||
|
||||
let result = compute_eigentrust_scores(&edges, &seeds, &config, 1000);
|
||||
|
||||
assert!(result.converged, "Should converge within {} iterations", config.max_iterations);
|
||||
assert!(result.state.iterations < config.max_iterations);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_scores_sum_to_one() {
|
||||
let s = agent(0);
|
||||
let a = agent(1);
|
||||
let b = agent(2);
|
||||
|
||||
let edges =
|
||||
vec![TrustEdge::new(s, a, 1.0, 1000, None), TrustEdge::new(a, b, 1.0, 1000, None)];
|
||||
let seeds = vec![(s, 1.0)];
|
||||
|
||||
let result = compute_eigentrust_scores(&edges, &seeds, &EigenTrustConfig::default(), 1000);
|
||||
|
||||
let sum: f32 = result.state.scores.iter().map(|s| s.score).sum();
|
||||
assert!((sum - 1.0).abs() < 0.01, "Scores should sum to 1.0, got {}", sum);
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
219
crates/stemedb-storage/src/trust_graph_store/mod.rs
Normal file
219
crates/stemedb-storage/src/trust_graph_store/mod.rs
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,219 @@
|
||||
//! Specialized storage for EigenTrust trust graph.
|
||||
//!
|
||||
//! The TrustGraphStore provides a web of trust where agents can express
|
||||
//! trust in other agents. This trust graph is used to compute global
|
||||
//! EigenTrust scores that are Sybil-resistant.
|
||||
//!
|
||||
//! # Storage Layout
|
||||
//!
|
||||
//! | Key Pattern | Value | Purpose |
|
||||
//! |-------------|-------|---------|
|
||||
//! | `\x00TG:{from}:{to}` | Serialized TrustEdge | Trust edge (forward) |
|
||||
//! | `\x00TGR:{to}:{from}` | Serialized TrustEdge | Trust edge (reverse index) |
|
||||
//! | `\x00ET:state` | Serialized EigenTrustState | Computed global scores |
|
||||
//! | `\x00ET:seed:{agent}` | f32 bytes | Seed trust for pre-trusted agents |
|
||||
//!
|
||||
//! # Sybil Resistance
|
||||
//!
|
||||
//! The EigenTrust algorithm ensures that isolated rings of colluding agents
|
||||
//! cannot accumulate trust. Only agents connected to pre-trusted seeds
|
||||
//! can gain meaningful reputation.
|
||||
|
||||
mod eigentrust;
|
||||
mod model;
|
||||
mod store_impl;
|
||||
#[cfg(test)]
|
||||
mod store_tests;
|
||||
|
||||
pub use eigentrust::compute_eigentrust_scores;
|
||||
pub use model::*;
|
||||
pub use store_impl::*;
|
||||
|
||||
use crate::error::Result;
|
||||
use async_trait::async_trait;
|
||||
use std::sync::Arc;
|
||||
|
||||
/// Specialized storage trait for TrustGraph operations.
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// This trait provides trust graph management for the EigenTrust system,
|
||||
/// enabling Sybil-resistant reputation across the network.
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// # Example
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// ```ignore
|
||||
/// let trust_store = GenericTrustGraphStore::new(kv_store);
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// // Add trust relationship
|
||||
/// let edge = TrustEdge::new(agent_a, agent_b, 0.8, timestamp, None);
|
||||
/// trust_store.add_trust_edge(&edge).await?;
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// // Compute EigenTrust scores
|
||||
/// let state = trust_store.compute_eigentrust(&EigenTrustConfig::default()).await?;
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// // Query score
|
||||
/// let score = trust_store.get_eigentrust_score(&agent_b).await?;
|
||||
/// ```
|
||||
#[async_trait]
|
||||
pub trait TrustGraphStore: Send + Sync {
|
||||
// ── Edge CRUD ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
|
||||
|
||||
/// Add or update a trust edge in the graph.
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// This creates both the forward index (`TG:{from}:{to}`) and
|
||||
/// reverse index (`TGR:{to}:{from}`) for efficient bidirectional queries.
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// # Arguments
|
||||
/// * `edge` - The trust edge to add
|
||||
async fn add_trust_edge(&self, edge: &TrustEdge) -> Result<()>;
|
||||
|
||||
/// Remove a trust edge from the graph.
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// # Arguments
|
||||
/// * `from` - Agent granting trust
|
||||
/// * `to` - Agent receiving trust
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// # Returns
|
||||
/// `true` if the edge existed and was removed, `false` if not found
|
||||
async fn remove_trust_edge(&self, from: &[u8; 32], to: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<bool>;
|
||||
|
||||
/// Get a specific trust edge.
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// # Arguments
|
||||
/// * `from` - Agent granting trust
|
||||
/// * `to` - Agent receiving trust
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// # Returns
|
||||
/// The trust edge if it exists
|
||||
async fn get_trust_edge(&self, from: &[u8; 32], to: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<Option<TrustEdge>>;
|
||||
|
||||
// ── Graph traversal ──────────────────────────────────────────────────
|
||||
|
||||
/// Get all outgoing trust edges from an agent.
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// Returns (to_agent, weight) pairs for agents that this agent trusts.
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// # Arguments
|
||||
/// * `from` - Agent granting trust
|
||||
async fn get_trusts(&self, from: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<Vec<([u8; 32], f32)>>;
|
||||
|
||||
/// Get all incoming trust edges to an agent.
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// Returns (from_agent, weight) pairs for agents that trust this agent.
|
||||
/// Uses the reverse index for efficient queries.
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// # Arguments
|
||||
/// * `to` - Agent receiving trust
|
||||
async fn get_trusted_by(&self, to: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<Vec<([u8; 32], f32)>>;
|
||||
|
||||
/// Get all edges in the trust graph.
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// Used by the EigenTrust computation. May be expensive for large graphs.
|
||||
async fn get_all_edges(&self) -> Result<Vec<TrustEdge>>;
|
||||
|
||||
// ── Seed trust ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────
|
||||
|
||||
/// Set seed trust for a pre-trusted agent.
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// Seed trust defines the "P" vector in EigenTrust. These are agents
|
||||
/// that are pre-trusted (e.g., verified organizations, system admins).
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// # Arguments
|
||||
/// * `agent` - Agent to pre-trust
|
||||
/// * `trust` - Seed trust weight (0.0 to 1.0)
|
||||
async fn set_seed_trust(&self, agent: &[u8; 32], trust: f32) -> Result<()>;
|
||||
|
||||
/// Get seed trust for an agent.
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// Returns 0.0 if the agent has no seed trust.
|
||||
async fn get_seed_trust(&self, agent: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<f32>;
|
||||
|
||||
/// Get all seed trust entries.
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// Used by the EigenTrust computation to build the P vector.
|
||||
async fn get_all_seed_trust(&self) -> Result<Vec<([u8; 32], f32)>>;
|
||||
|
||||
/// Remove seed trust for an agent.
|
||||
async fn remove_seed_trust(&self, agent: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<bool>;
|
||||
|
||||
// ── EigenTrust computation ───────────────────────────────────────────
|
||||
|
||||
/// Compute EigenTrust scores for all agents in the graph.
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// This runs the power iteration algorithm and stores the result.
|
||||
/// Should be called periodically (e.g., daily) to update global scores.
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// # Arguments
|
||||
/// * `config` - Algorithm configuration
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// # Returns
|
||||
/// The computed state
|
||||
async fn compute_eigentrust(&self, config: &EigenTrustConfig) -> Result<EigenTrustState>;
|
||||
|
||||
/// Get the current EigenTrust state (previously computed scores).
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// Returns `None` if EigenTrust has never been computed.
|
||||
async fn get_eigentrust_state(&self) -> Result<Option<EigenTrustState>>;
|
||||
|
||||
/// Get the EigenTrust score for a specific agent.
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// Returns 0.0 if:
|
||||
/// - The agent is not in the graph
|
||||
/// - EigenTrust has never been computed
|
||||
async fn get_eigentrust_score(&self, agent: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<f32>;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Blanket implementation for Arc<T> where T: TrustGraphStore
|
||||
#[async_trait]
|
||||
impl<T: TrustGraphStore + ?Sized> TrustGraphStore for Arc<T> {
|
||||
async fn add_trust_edge(&self, edge: &TrustEdge) -> Result<()> {
|
||||
(**self).add_trust_edge(edge).await
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
async fn remove_trust_edge(&self, from: &[u8; 32], to: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<bool> {
|
||||
(**self).remove_trust_edge(from, to).await
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
async fn get_trust_edge(&self, from: &[u8; 32], to: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<Option<TrustEdge>> {
|
||||
(**self).get_trust_edge(from, to).await
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
async fn get_trusts(&self, from: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<Vec<([u8; 32], f32)>> {
|
||||
(**self).get_trusts(from).await
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
async fn get_trusted_by(&self, to: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<Vec<([u8; 32], f32)>> {
|
||||
(**self).get_trusted_by(to).await
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
async fn get_all_edges(&self) -> Result<Vec<TrustEdge>> {
|
||||
(**self).get_all_edges().await
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
async fn set_seed_trust(&self, agent: &[u8; 32], trust: f32) -> Result<()> {
|
||||
(**self).set_seed_trust(agent, trust).await
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
async fn get_seed_trust(&self, agent: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<f32> {
|
||||
(**self).get_seed_trust(agent).await
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
async fn get_all_seed_trust(&self) -> Result<Vec<([u8; 32], f32)>> {
|
||||
(**self).get_all_seed_trust().await
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
async fn remove_seed_trust(&self, agent: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<bool> {
|
||||
(**self).remove_seed_trust(agent).await
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
async fn compute_eigentrust(&self, config: &EigenTrustConfig) -> Result<EigenTrustState> {
|
||||
(**self).compute_eigentrust(config).await
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
async fn get_eigentrust_state(&self) -> Result<Option<EigenTrustState>> {
|
||||
(**self).get_eigentrust_state().await
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
async fn get_eigentrust_score(&self, agent: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<f32> {
|
||||
(**self).get_eigentrust_score(agent).await
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
244
crates/stemedb-storage/src/trust_graph_store/model.rs
Normal file
244
crates/stemedb-storage/src/trust_graph_store/model.rs
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,244 @@
|
||||
//! TrustGraphStore data models for EigenTrust computation.
|
||||
//!
|
||||
//! This module defines the core data structures for the trust graph:
|
||||
//! - `TrustEdge`: A directed trust relationship between agents
|
||||
//! - `EigenTrustState`: The computed global trust scores
|
||||
//! - `EigenTrustConfig`: Configuration for power iteration
|
||||
|
||||
/// Default alpha (damping factor) for EigenTrust.
|
||||
/// 0.1 means 90% of trust flows through the graph, 10% from seeds.
|
||||
pub const DEFAULT_ALPHA: f32 = 0.1;
|
||||
|
||||
/// Default maximum iterations for power iteration convergence.
|
||||
pub const DEFAULT_MAX_ITERATIONS: u32 = 20;
|
||||
|
||||
/// Default convergence threshold (epsilon).
|
||||
pub const DEFAULT_EPSILON: f32 = 1e-6;
|
||||
|
||||
/// A directed trust edge from one agent to another.
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// # Invariants
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// - `weight` is in range [0.0, 1.0]
|
||||
/// - `from_agent` and `to_agent` are Ed25519 public keys
|
||||
/// - An agent cannot trust themselves (from_agent != to_agent)
|
||||
#[derive(rkyv::Archive, rkyv::Deserialize, rkyv::Serialize, Debug, Clone, PartialEq)]
|
||||
#[archive(check_bytes)]
|
||||
pub struct TrustEdge {
|
||||
/// Agent granting trust (Ed25519 public key).
|
||||
pub from_agent: [u8; 32],
|
||||
/// Agent receiving trust (Ed25519 public key).
|
||||
pub to_agent: [u8; 32],
|
||||
/// Trust weight (0.0 = no trust, 1.0 = full trust).
|
||||
pub weight: f32,
|
||||
/// Unix timestamp when this edge was created.
|
||||
pub created_at: u64,
|
||||
/// Optional human-readable reason for the trust relationship.
|
||||
pub reason: Option<String>,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
impl TrustEdge {
|
||||
/// Create a new trust edge.
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// # Arguments
|
||||
/// * `from_agent` - Agent granting trust
|
||||
/// * `to_agent` - Agent receiving trust
|
||||
/// * `weight` - Trust weight (clamped to [0.0, 1.0])
|
||||
/// * `created_at` - Unix timestamp
|
||||
/// * `reason` - Optional reason for trust
|
||||
pub fn new(
|
||||
from_agent: [u8; 32],
|
||||
to_agent: [u8; 32],
|
||||
weight: f32,
|
||||
created_at: u64,
|
||||
reason: Option<String>,
|
||||
) -> Self {
|
||||
Self { from_agent, to_agent, weight: weight.clamp(0.0, 1.0), created_at, reason }
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Check if this edge represents valid trust (non-zero weight, different agents).
|
||||
pub fn is_valid(&self) -> bool {
|
||||
self.weight > 0.0 && self.from_agent != self.to_agent
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Configuration for EigenTrust power iteration.
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// # Parameters
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// - `alpha`: Damping factor. Controls how much trust flows from seeds vs. graph.
|
||||
/// - α = 0.0: All trust from graph (vulnerable to Sybil attacks)
|
||||
/// - α = 1.0: All trust from seeds (no graph propagation)
|
||||
/// - α = 0.1 (default): 90% graph, 10% seeds (balanced)
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// - `max_iterations`: Safety limit for convergence.
|
||||
/// - Most graphs converge in 10-15 iterations
|
||||
/// - Default 20 provides safety margin
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// - `epsilon`: Convergence threshold (L1 norm of change).
|
||||
/// - 1e-6 is sufficient for most applications
|
||||
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy)]
|
||||
pub struct EigenTrustConfig {
|
||||
/// Damping factor: probability of jumping to a seed (default 0.1).
|
||||
pub alpha: f32,
|
||||
/// Maximum iterations before stopping (default 20).
|
||||
pub max_iterations: u32,
|
||||
/// Convergence threshold (default 1e-6).
|
||||
pub epsilon: f32,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
impl Default for EigenTrustConfig {
|
||||
fn default() -> Self {
|
||||
Self {
|
||||
alpha: DEFAULT_ALPHA,
|
||||
max_iterations: DEFAULT_MAX_ITERATIONS,
|
||||
epsilon: DEFAULT_EPSILON,
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
impl EigenTrustConfig {
|
||||
/// Create a new config with custom parameters.
|
||||
pub fn new(alpha: f32, max_iterations: u32, epsilon: f32) -> Self {
|
||||
Self { alpha: alpha.clamp(0.0, 1.0), max_iterations, epsilon }
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// An agent-score pair for EigenTrust state serialization.
|
||||
#[derive(rkyv::Archive, rkyv::Deserialize, rkyv::Serialize, Debug, Clone, PartialEq)]
|
||||
#[archive(check_bytes)]
|
||||
pub struct AgentScore {
|
||||
/// Agent's Ed25519 public key.
|
||||
pub agent: [u8; 32],
|
||||
/// Global trust score (normalized to sum to 1.0 across all agents).
|
||||
pub score: f32,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
impl AgentScore {
|
||||
/// Create a new agent-score pair.
|
||||
pub fn new(agent: [u8; 32], score: f32) -> Self {
|
||||
Self { agent, score }
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// The computed EigenTrust state after power iteration.
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// This represents a snapshot of global trust scores for all agents
|
||||
/// in the trust graph at a specific point in time.
|
||||
#[derive(rkyv::Archive, rkyv::Deserialize, rkyv::Serialize, Debug, Clone)]
|
||||
#[archive(check_bytes)]
|
||||
pub struct EigenTrustState {
|
||||
/// Agent ID → global trust score pairs.
|
||||
/// Scores are normalized to sum to 1.0.
|
||||
pub scores: Vec<AgentScore>,
|
||||
/// Unix timestamp when this state was computed.
|
||||
pub computed_at: u64,
|
||||
/// Number of iterations to converge.
|
||||
pub iterations: u32,
|
||||
/// Final L1 norm of change (convergence delta).
|
||||
pub convergence_delta: f32,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
impl EigenTrustState {
|
||||
/// Create an empty state (no agents).
|
||||
pub fn empty(timestamp: u64) -> Self {
|
||||
Self { scores: Vec::new(), computed_at: timestamp, iterations: 0, convergence_delta: 0.0 }
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Get the trust score for a specific agent.
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// Returns 0.0 if the agent is not in the graph.
|
||||
pub fn get_score(&self, agent: &[u8; 32]) -> f32 {
|
||||
self.scores.iter().find(|s| &s.agent == agent).map(|s| s.score).unwrap_or(0.0)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Check if the computation converged.
|
||||
pub fn converged(&self, config: &EigenTrustConfig) -> bool {
|
||||
self.convergence_delta < config.epsilon
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Result of EigenTrust computation.
|
||||
#[derive(Debug)]
|
||||
pub struct EigenTrustResult {
|
||||
/// The computed state.
|
||||
pub state: EigenTrustState,
|
||||
/// Whether the algorithm converged within max_iterations.
|
||||
pub converged: bool,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[cfg(test)]
|
||||
mod tests {
|
||||
use super::*;
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_trust_edge_new_clamps_weight() {
|
||||
let edge = TrustEdge::new([1u8; 32], [2u8; 32], 1.5, 1000, None);
|
||||
assert!((edge.weight - 1.0).abs() < f32::EPSILON);
|
||||
|
||||
let edge = TrustEdge::new([1u8; 32], [2u8; 32], -0.5, 1000, None);
|
||||
assert!((edge.weight - 0.0).abs() < f32::EPSILON);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_trust_edge_is_valid() {
|
||||
// Valid edge
|
||||
let edge = TrustEdge::new([1u8; 32], [2u8; 32], 0.8, 1000, None);
|
||||
assert!(edge.is_valid());
|
||||
|
||||
// Zero weight = invalid
|
||||
let edge = TrustEdge::new([1u8; 32], [2u8; 32], 0.0, 1000, None);
|
||||
assert!(!edge.is_valid());
|
||||
|
||||
// Self-trust = invalid
|
||||
let edge = TrustEdge::new([1u8; 32], [1u8; 32], 0.8, 1000, None);
|
||||
assert!(!edge.is_valid());
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_eigentrust_config_default() {
|
||||
let config = EigenTrustConfig::default();
|
||||
assert!((config.alpha - 0.1).abs() < f32::EPSILON);
|
||||
assert_eq!(config.max_iterations, 20);
|
||||
assert!((config.epsilon - 1e-6).abs() < f32::EPSILON);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_eigentrust_state_get_score() {
|
||||
let state = EigenTrustState {
|
||||
scores: vec![
|
||||
AgentScore::new([1u8; 32], 0.5),
|
||||
AgentScore::new([2u8; 32], 0.3),
|
||||
AgentScore::new([3u8; 32], 0.2),
|
||||
],
|
||||
computed_at: 1000,
|
||||
iterations: 10,
|
||||
convergence_delta: 1e-8,
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
assert!((state.get_score(&[1u8; 32]) - 0.5).abs() < f32::EPSILON);
|
||||
assert!((state.get_score(&[2u8; 32]) - 0.3).abs() < f32::EPSILON);
|
||||
assert!((state.get_score(&[99u8; 32]) - 0.0).abs() < f32::EPSILON); // Missing agent
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_eigentrust_state_converged() {
|
||||
let config = EigenTrustConfig::default();
|
||||
|
||||
let converged_state = EigenTrustState {
|
||||
scores: vec![],
|
||||
computed_at: 1000,
|
||||
iterations: 10,
|
||||
convergence_delta: 1e-8,
|
||||
};
|
||||
assert!(converged_state.converged(&config));
|
||||
|
||||
let not_converged_state = EigenTrustState {
|
||||
scores: vec![],
|
||||
computed_at: 1000,
|
||||
iterations: 20,
|
||||
convergence_delta: 1e-4,
|
||||
};
|
||||
assert!(!not_converged_state.converged(&config));
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
327
crates/stemedb-storage/src/trust_graph_store/store_impl.rs
Normal file
327
crates/stemedb-storage/src/trust_graph_store/store_impl.rs
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,327 @@
|
||||
//! TrustGraphStore implementation backed by a generic KVStore.
|
||||
//!
|
||||
//! This module provides the concrete implementation of TrustGraphStore operations,
|
||||
//! including edge management, seed trust, and EigenTrust computation.
|
||||
|
||||
use crate::error::Result;
|
||||
use crate::key_codec;
|
||||
use crate::traits::KVStore;
|
||||
use async_trait::async_trait;
|
||||
use tracing::{debug, instrument};
|
||||
|
||||
use super::eigentrust::compute_eigentrust_scores;
|
||||
use super::model::{EigenTrustConfig, EigenTrustState, TrustEdge};
|
||||
use super::TrustGraphStore;
|
||||
|
||||
/// TrustGraphStore implementation backed by a generic KVStore.
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// This implementation stores trust edges and EigenTrust state using the
|
||||
/// key patterns defined in `key_codec`.
|
||||
pub struct GenericTrustGraphStore<S> {
|
||||
store: S,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
impl<S: KVStore> GenericTrustGraphStore<S> {
|
||||
/// Create a new TrustGraphStore backed by the given KVStore.
|
||||
pub fn new(store: S) -> Self {
|
||||
Self { store }
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Serialize a TrustEdge using the canonical serde helpers.
|
||||
fn serialize_edge(edge: &TrustEdge) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
|
||||
crate::serde_helpers::serialize(edge)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Deserialize a TrustEdge using the canonical serde helpers.
|
||||
fn deserialize_edge(data: &[u8]) -> Result<TrustEdge> {
|
||||
crate::serde_helpers::deserialize(data)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Serialize an EigenTrustState using the canonical serde helpers.
|
||||
fn serialize_state(state: &EigenTrustState) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
|
||||
crate::serde_helpers::serialize(state)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Deserialize an EigenTrustState using the canonical serde helpers.
|
||||
fn deserialize_state(data: &[u8]) -> Result<EigenTrustState> {
|
||||
crate::serde_helpers::deserialize(data)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Extract agent ID from a seed trust key.
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// Key format: `\x00ET:seed:{agent_hex}`
|
||||
fn extract_agent_from_seed_key(key: &[u8]) -> Option<[u8; 32]> {
|
||||
let prefix = b"\x00ET:seed:";
|
||||
if !key.starts_with(prefix) {
|
||||
return None;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
let hex_str = std::str::from_utf8(&key[prefix.len()..]).ok()?;
|
||||
let bytes = hex::decode(hex_str).ok()?;
|
||||
if bytes.len() != 32 {
|
||||
return None;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
let mut arr = [0u8; 32];
|
||||
arr.copy_from_slice(&bytes);
|
||||
Some(arr)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Extract (from, to) agent IDs from a trust edge key.
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// Key format: `\x00TG:{from_hex}:{to_hex}`
|
||||
fn extract_agents_from_edge_key(key: &[u8]) -> Option<([u8; 32], [u8; 32])> {
|
||||
let prefix = b"\x00TG:";
|
||||
if !key.starts_with(prefix) {
|
||||
return None;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
let rest = std::str::from_utf8(&key[prefix.len()..]).ok()?;
|
||||
let parts: Vec<&str> = rest.split(':').collect();
|
||||
if parts.len() != 2 {
|
||||
return None;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
let from_bytes = hex::decode(parts[0]).ok()?;
|
||||
let to_bytes = hex::decode(parts[1]).ok()?;
|
||||
|
||||
if from_bytes.len() != 32 || to_bytes.len() != 32 {
|
||||
return None;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
let mut from = [0u8; 32];
|
||||
let mut to = [0u8; 32];
|
||||
from.copy_from_slice(&from_bytes);
|
||||
to.copy_from_slice(&to_bytes);
|
||||
|
||||
Some((from, to))
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[async_trait]
|
||||
impl<S: KVStore + 'static> TrustGraphStore for GenericTrustGraphStore<S> {
|
||||
#[instrument(skip(self, edge), fields(
|
||||
from = %hex::encode(edge.from_agent),
|
||||
to = %hex::encode(edge.to_agent),
|
||||
weight = edge.weight
|
||||
))]
|
||||
async fn add_trust_edge(&self, edge: &TrustEdge) -> Result<()> {
|
||||
let from_hex = hex::encode(edge.from_agent);
|
||||
let to_hex = hex::encode(edge.to_agent);
|
||||
|
||||
// Store forward index
|
||||
let forward_key = key_codec::trust_edge_key(&from_hex, &to_hex);
|
||||
let serialized = Self::serialize_edge(edge)?;
|
||||
self.store.put(&forward_key, &serialized).await?;
|
||||
|
||||
// Store reverse index (same data, different key)
|
||||
let reverse_key = key_codec::trust_edge_reverse_key(&to_hex, &from_hex);
|
||||
self.store.put(&reverse_key, &serialized).await?;
|
||||
|
||||
debug!("Added trust edge");
|
||||
Ok(())
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[instrument(skip(self), fields(from = %hex::encode(from), to = %hex::encode(to)))]
|
||||
async fn remove_trust_edge(&self, from: &[u8; 32], to: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<bool> {
|
||||
let from_hex = hex::encode(from);
|
||||
let to_hex = hex::encode(to);
|
||||
|
||||
let forward_key = key_codec::trust_edge_key(&from_hex, &to_hex);
|
||||
let exists = self.store.get(&forward_key).await?.is_some();
|
||||
|
||||
if exists {
|
||||
// Delete forward index
|
||||
self.store.delete(&forward_key).await?;
|
||||
|
||||
// Delete reverse index
|
||||
let reverse_key = key_codec::trust_edge_reverse_key(&to_hex, &from_hex);
|
||||
self.store.delete(&reverse_key).await?;
|
||||
|
||||
debug!("Removed trust edge");
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
Ok(exists)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[instrument(skip(self), fields(from = %hex::encode(from), to = %hex::encode(to)))]
|
||||
async fn get_trust_edge(&self, from: &[u8; 32], to: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<Option<TrustEdge>> {
|
||||
let from_hex = hex::encode(from);
|
||||
let to_hex = hex::encode(to);
|
||||
|
||||
let key = key_codec::trust_edge_key(&from_hex, &to_hex);
|
||||
match self.store.get(&key).await? {
|
||||
Some(data) => {
|
||||
let edge = Self::deserialize_edge(&data)?;
|
||||
Ok(Some(edge))
|
||||
}
|
||||
None => Ok(None),
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[instrument(skip(self), fields(from = %hex::encode(from)))]
|
||||
async fn get_trusts(&self, from: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<Vec<([u8; 32], f32)>> {
|
||||
let from_hex = hex::encode(from);
|
||||
let prefix = key_codec::trust_edge_from_prefix(&from_hex);
|
||||
let entries = self.store.scan_prefix(&prefix).await?;
|
||||
|
||||
let mut trusts = Vec::with_capacity(entries.len());
|
||||
for (_, data) in entries {
|
||||
let edge = Self::deserialize_edge(&data)?;
|
||||
trusts.push((edge.to_agent, edge.weight));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
debug!(count = trusts.len(), "Retrieved outgoing trust edges");
|
||||
Ok(trusts)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[instrument(skip(self), fields(to = %hex::encode(to)))]
|
||||
async fn get_trusted_by(&self, to: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<Vec<([u8; 32], f32)>> {
|
||||
let to_hex = hex::encode(to);
|
||||
let prefix = key_codec::trust_edge_reverse_prefix(&to_hex);
|
||||
let entries = self.store.scan_prefix(&prefix).await?;
|
||||
|
||||
let mut trusted_by = Vec::with_capacity(entries.len());
|
||||
for (_, data) in entries {
|
||||
let edge = Self::deserialize_edge(&data)?;
|
||||
trusted_by.push((edge.from_agent, edge.weight));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
debug!(count = trusted_by.len(), "Retrieved incoming trust edges");
|
||||
Ok(trusted_by)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[instrument(skip(self))]
|
||||
async fn get_all_edges(&self) -> Result<Vec<TrustEdge>> {
|
||||
let prefix = key_codec::trust_graph_scan_prefix();
|
||||
let entries = self.store.scan_prefix(&prefix).await?;
|
||||
|
||||
let mut edges = Vec::with_capacity(entries.len());
|
||||
for (key, data) in entries {
|
||||
// Only process forward index keys (skip reverse index)
|
||||
if Self::extract_agents_from_edge_key(&key).is_some() {
|
||||
let edge = Self::deserialize_edge(&data)?;
|
||||
edges.push(edge);
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
debug!(count = edges.len(), "Retrieved all trust edges");
|
||||
Ok(edges)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[instrument(skip(self), fields(agent = %hex::encode(agent), trust))]
|
||||
async fn set_seed_trust(&self, agent: &[u8; 32], trust: f32) -> Result<()> {
|
||||
let agent_hex = hex::encode(agent);
|
||||
let key = key_codec::seed_trust_key(&agent_hex);
|
||||
|
||||
// Store as f32 bytes
|
||||
let clamped = trust.clamp(0.0, 1.0);
|
||||
let bytes = clamped.to_le_bytes();
|
||||
self.store.put(&key, &bytes).await?;
|
||||
|
||||
debug!("Set seed trust");
|
||||
Ok(())
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[instrument(skip(self), fields(agent = %hex::encode(agent)))]
|
||||
async fn get_seed_trust(&self, agent: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<f32> {
|
||||
let agent_hex = hex::encode(agent);
|
||||
let key = key_codec::seed_trust_key(&agent_hex);
|
||||
|
||||
match self.store.get(&key).await? {
|
||||
Some(data) if data.len() == 4 => {
|
||||
let bytes: [u8; 4] = data[..4].try_into().map_err(|_| {
|
||||
crate::error::StorageError::Serialization("Invalid f32 bytes".to_string())
|
||||
})?;
|
||||
Ok(f32::from_le_bytes(bytes))
|
||||
}
|
||||
_ => Ok(0.0),
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[instrument(skip(self))]
|
||||
async fn get_all_seed_trust(&self) -> Result<Vec<([u8; 32], f32)>> {
|
||||
let prefix = key_codec::seed_trust_scan_prefix();
|
||||
let entries = self.store.scan_prefix(&prefix).await?;
|
||||
|
||||
let mut seeds = Vec::with_capacity(entries.len());
|
||||
for (key, data) in entries {
|
||||
if let Some(agent) = Self::extract_agent_from_seed_key(&key) {
|
||||
if data.len() == 4 {
|
||||
let bytes: [u8; 4] = data[..4].try_into().map_err(|_| {
|
||||
crate::error::StorageError::Serialization("Invalid f32 bytes".to_string())
|
||||
})?;
|
||||
let trust = f32::from_le_bytes(bytes);
|
||||
seeds.push((agent, trust));
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
debug!(count = seeds.len(), "Retrieved all seed trust entries");
|
||||
Ok(seeds)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[instrument(skip(self), fields(agent = %hex::encode(agent)))]
|
||||
async fn remove_seed_trust(&self, agent: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<bool> {
|
||||
let agent_hex = hex::encode(agent);
|
||||
let key = key_codec::seed_trust_key(&agent_hex);
|
||||
|
||||
let exists = self.store.get(&key).await?.is_some();
|
||||
if exists {
|
||||
self.store.delete(&key).await?;
|
||||
debug!("Removed seed trust");
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
Ok(exists)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[instrument(skip(self, config))]
|
||||
async fn compute_eigentrust(&self, config: &EigenTrustConfig) -> Result<EigenTrustState> {
|
||||
// Get all edges and seed trust
|
||||
let edges = self.get_all_edges().await?;
|
||||
let seeds = self.get_all_seed_trust().await?;
|
||||
|
||||
// Get current timestamp
|
||||
let timestamp = std::time::SystemTime::now()
|
||||
.duration_since(std::time::UNIX_EPOCH)
|
||||
.map(|d| d.as_secs())
|
||||
.unwrap_or(0);
|
||||
|
||||
// Run EigenTrust algorithm
|
||||
let result = compute_eigentrust_scores(&edges, &seeds, config, timestamp);
|
||||
|
||||
// Store the computed state
|
||||
let state_key = key_codec::eigentrust_state_key();
|
||||
let serialized = Self::serialize_state(&result.state)?;
|
||||
self.store.put(&state_key, &serialized).await?;
|
||||
|
||||
debug!(
|
||||
converged = result.converged,
|
||||
iterations = result.state.iterations,
|
||||
agents = result.state.scores.len(),
|
||||
"Computed and stored EigenTrust state"
|
||||
);
|
||||
|
||||
Ok(result.state)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[instrument(skip(self))]
|
||||
async fn get_eigentrust_state(&self) -> Result<Option<EigenTrustState>> {
|
||||
let key = key_codec::eigentrust_state_key();
|
||||
match self.store.get(&key).await? {
|
||||
Some(data) => {
|
||||
let state = Self::deserialize_state(&data)?;
|
||||
Ok(Some(state))
|
||||
}
|
||||
None => Ok(None),
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[instrument(skip(self), fields(agent = %hex::encode(agent)))]
|
||||
async fn get_eigentrust_score(&self, agent: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<f32> {
|
||||
match self.get_eigentrust_state().await? {
|
||||
Some(state) => Ok(state.get_score(agent)),
|
||||
None => Ok(0.0),
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
217
crates/stemedb-storage/src/trust_graph_store/store_tests.rs
Normal file
217
crates/stemedb-storage/src/trust_graph_store/store_tests.rs
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,217 @@
|
||||
//! Tests for TrustGraphStore implementation.
|
||||
|
||||
use super::model::{EigenTrustConfig, TrustEdge};
|
||||
use super::store_impl::GenericTrustGraphStore;
|
||||
use super::TrustGraphStore;
|
||||
use crate::HybridStore;
|
||||
use std::sync::Arc;
|
||||
|
||||
fn agent(id: u8) -> [u8; 32] {
|
||||
let mut arr = [0u8; 32];
|
||||
arr[0] = id;
|
||||
arr
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[tokio::test]
|
||||
async fn test_add_and_get_trust_edge() {
|
||||
let store = Arc::new(HybridStore::open_temp().expect("Failed to create store"));
|
||||
let trust_store = GenericTrustGraphStore::new(store);
|
||||
|
||||
let edge = TrustEdge::new(agent(1), agent(2), 0.8, 1000, Some("Test".to_string()));
|
||||
trust_store.add_trust_edge(&edge).await.expect("add");
|
||||
|
||||
let retrieved = trust_store.get_trust_edge(&agent(1), &agent(2)).await.expect("get");
|
||||
assert!(retrieved.is_some());
|
||||
|
||||
let retrieved_edge = retrieved.expect("edge");
|
||||
assert_eq!(retrieved_edge.from_agent, agent(1));
|
||||
assert_eq!(retrieved_edge.to_agent, agent(2));
|
||||
assert!((retrieved_edge.weight - 0.8).abs() < f32::EPSILON);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[tokio::test]
|
||||
async fn test_remove_trust_edge() {
|
||||
let store = Arc::new(HybridStore::open_temp().expect("Failed to create store"));
|
||||
let trust_store = GenericTrustGraphStore::new(store);
|
||||
|
||||
let edge = TrustEdge::new(agent(1), agent(2), 0.8, 1000, None);
|
||||
trust_store.add_trust_edge(&edge).await.expect("add");
|
||||
|
||||
// Remove should return true
|
||||
let removed = trust_store.remove_trust_edge(&agent(1), &agent(2)).await.expect("remove");
|
||||
assert!(removed);
|
||||
|
||||
// Edge should be gone
|
||||
let retrieved = trust_store.get_trust_edge(&agent(1), &agent(2)).await.expect("get");
|
||||
assert!(retrieved.is_none());
|
||||
|
||||
// Remove again should return false
|
||||
let removed_again = trust_store.remove_trust_edge(&agent(1), &agent(2)).await.expect("remove");
|
||||
assert!(!removed_again);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[tokio::test]
|
||||
async fn test_get_trusts_outgoing() {
|
||||
let store = Arc::new(HybridStore::open_temp().expect("Failed to create store"));
|
||||
let trust_store = GenericTrustGraphStore::new(store);
|
||||
|
||||
// Agent 1 trusts agents 2, 3, 4
|
||||
trust_store
|
||||
.add_trust_edge(&TrustEdge::new(agent(1), agent(2), 0.8, 1000, None))
|
||||
.await
|
||||
.expect("add");
|
||||
trust_store
|
||||
.add_trust_edge(&TrustEdge::new(agent(1), agent(3), 0.6, 1000, None))
|
||||
.await
|
||||
.expect("add");
|
||||
trust_store
|
||||
.add_trust_edge(&TrustEdge::new(agent(1), agent(4), 0.4, 1000, None))
|
||||
.await
|
||||
.expect("add");
|
||||
|
||||
let trusts = trust_store.get_trusts(&agent(1)).await.expect("get");
|
||||
assert_eq!(trusts.len(), 3);
|
||||
|
||||
// Verify weights
|
||||
let weight_2 = trusts.iter().find(|(a, _)| *a == agent(2)).map(|(_, w)| *w);
|
||||
let weight_3 = trusts.iter().find(|(a, _)| *a == agent(3)).map(|(_, w)| *w);
|
||||
let weight_4 = trusts.iter().find(|(a, _)| *a == agent(4)).map(|(_, w)| *w);
|
||||
|
||||
assert!((weight_2.expect("weight") - 0.8).abs() < f32::EPSILON);
|
||||
assert!((weight_3.expect("weight") - 0.6).abs() < f32::EPSILON);
|
||||
assert!((weight_4.expect("weight") - 0.4).abs() < f32::EPSILON);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[tokio::test]
|
||||
async fn test_get_trusted_by_incoming() {
|
||||
let store = Arc::new(HybridStore::open_temp().expect("Failed to create store"));
|
||||
let trust_store = GenericTrustGraphStore::new(store);
|
||||
|
||||
// Agents 1, 2, 3 all trust agent 4
|
||||
trust_store
|
||||
.add_trust_edge(&TrustEdge::new(agent(1), agent(4), 0.8, 1000, None))
|
||||
.await
|
||||
.expect("add");
|
||||
trust_store
|
||||
.add_trust_edge(&TrustEdge::new(agent(2), agent(4), 0.6, 1000, None))
|
||||
.await
|
||||
.expect("add");
|
||||
trust_store
|
||||
.add_trust_edge(&TrustEdge::new(agent(3), agent(4), 0.4, 1000, None))
|
||||
.await
|
||||
.expect("add");
|
||||
|
||||
let trusted_by = trust_store.get_trusted_by(&agent(4)).await.expect("get");
|
||||
assert_eq!(trusted_by.len(), 3);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[tokio::test]
|
||||
async fn test_seed_trust_crud() {
|
||||
let store = Arc::new(HybridStore::open_temp().expect("Failed to create store"));
|
||||
let trust_store = GenericTrustGraphStore::new(store);
|
||||
|
||||
// Set seed trust
|
||||
trust_store.set_seed_trust(&agent(1), 1.0).await.expect("set");
|
||||
trust_store.set_seed_trust(&agent(2), 0.5).await.expect("set");
|
||||
|
||||
// Get individual
|
||||
let trust1 = trust_store.get_seed_trust(&agent(1)).await.expect("get");
|
||||
let trust2 = trust_store.get_seed_trust(&agent(2)).await.expect("get");
|
||||
let trust3 = trust_store.get_seed_trust(&agent(3)).await.expect("get");
|
||||
|
||||
assert!((trust1 - 1.0).abs() < f32::EPSILON);
|
||||
assert!((trust2 - 0.5).abs() < f32::EPSILON);
|
||||
assert!((trust3 - 0.0).abs() < f32::EPSILON); // Not set
|
||||
|
||||
// Get all
|
||||
let all_seeds = trust_store.get_all_seed_trust().await.expect("get all");
|
||||
assert_eq!(all_seeds.len(), 2);
|
||||
|
||||
// Remove
|
||||
let removed = trust_store.remove_seed_trust(&agent(1)).await.expect("remove");
|
||||
assert!(removed);
|
||||
|
||||
let all_seeds = trust_store.get_all_seed_trust().await.expect("get all");
|
||||
assert_eq!(all_seeds.len(), 1);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[tokio::test]
|
||||
async fn test_compute_and_get_eigentrust() {
|
||||
let store = Arc::new(HybridStore::open_temp().expect("Failed to create store"));
|
||||
let trust_store = GenericTrustGraphStore::new(store);
|
||||
|
||||
// Set up: seed trusts agent 2, agent 2 trusts agent 3
|
||||
trust_store.set_seed_trust(&agent(1), 1.0).await.expect("set");
|
||||
trust_store
|
||||
.add_trust_edge(&TrustEdge::new(agent(1), agent(2), 1.0, 1000, None))
|
||||
.await
|
||||
.expect("add");
|
||||
trust_store
|
||||
.add_trust_edge(&TrustEdge::new(agent(2), agent(3), 1.0, 1000, None))
|
||||
.await
|
||||
.expect("add");
|
||||
|
||||
// Compute EigenTrust
|
||||
let state =
|
||||
trust_store.compute_eigentrust(&EigenTrustConfig::default()).await.expect("compute");
|
||||
|
||||
assert!(state.scores.len() >= 3);
|
||||
assert!(state.iterations > 0);
|
||||
|
||||
// Get state
|
||||
let retrieved = trust_store.get_eigentrust_state().await.expect("get");
|
||||
assert!(retrieved.is_some());
|
||||
|
||||
// Get individual score
|
||||
let score = trust_store.get_eigentrust_score(&agent(1)).await.expect("get");
|
||||
assert!(score > 0.0);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[tokio::test]
|
||||
async fn test_eigentrust_score_without_computation() {
|
||||
let store = Arc::new(HybridStore::open_temp().expect("Failed to create store"));
|
||||
let trust_store = GenericTrustGraphStore::new(store);
|
||||
|
||||
// Without computing, should return 0.0
|
||||
let score = trust_store.get_eigentrust_score(&agent(1)).await.expect("get");
|
||||
assert!((score - 0.0).abs() < f32::EPSILON);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[tokio::test]
|
||||
async fn test_sybil_resistance_isolated_ring() {
|
||||
let store = Arc::new(HybridStore::open_temp().expect("Failed to create store"));
|
||||
let trust_store = GenericTrustGraphStore::new(store);
|
||||
|
||||
// Seed with no edges
|
||||
trust_store.set_seed_trust(&agent(0), 1.0).await.expect("set");
|
||||
|
||||
// Isolated ring: 1 → 2 → 3 → 1 (not connected to seed)
|
||||
trust_store
|
||||
.add_trust_edge(&TrustEdge::new(agent(1), agent(2), 1.0, 1000, None))
|
||||
.await
|
||||
.expect("add");
|
||||
trust_store
|
||||
.add_trust_edge(&TrustEdge::new(agent(2), agent(3), 1.0, 1000, None))
|
||||
.await
|
||||
.expect("add");
|
||||
trust_store
|
||||
.add_trust_edge(&TrustEdge::new(agent(3), agent(1), 1.0, 1000, None))
|
||||
.await
|
||||
.expect("add");
|
||||
|
||||
let state =
|
||||
trust_store.compute_eigentrust(&EigenTrustConfig::default()).await.expect("compute");
|
||||
|
||||
// Seed should have high trust
|
||||
let seed_score = state.get_score(&agent(0));
|
||||
assert!(seed_score > 0.9, "Seed should have high trust: {}", seed_score);
|
||||
|
||||
// Isolated ring should have near-zero trust
|
||||
let ring1_score = state.get_score(&agent(1));
|
||||
let ring2_score = state.get_score(&agent(2));
|
||||
let ring3_score = state.get_score(&agent(3));
|
||||
|
||||
assert!(ring1_score < 0.05, "Isolated agent 1 should have low trust: {}", ring1_score);
|
||||
assert!(ring2_score < 0.05, "Isolated agent 2 should have low trust: {}", ring2_score);
|
||||
assert!(ring3_score < 0.05, "Isolated agent 3 should have low trust: {}", ring3_score);
|
||||
}
|
||||
@ -32,6 +32,7 @@ pub use store_impl::*;
|
||||
|
||||
use crate::error::Result;
|
||||
use async_trait::async_trait;
|
||||
use std::sync::Arc;
|
||||
|
||||
/// Specialized storage trait for TrustRank operations.
|
||||
///
|
||||
@ -148,3 +149,54 @@ pub trait TrustRankStore: Send + Sync {
|
||||
timestamp: u64,
|
||||
) -> Result<model::TrustAdjustment>;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Blanket implementation for Arc<T> where T: TrustRankStore
|
||||
// This enables sharing TrustRankStore across threads and components.
|
||||
#[async_trait]
|
||||
impl<T: TrustRankStore + ?Sized> TrustRankStore for Arc<T> {
|
||||
async fn get_trust_rank(&self, agent_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<TrustRank> {
|
||||
(**self).get_trust_rank(agent_id).await
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
async fn update_trust_rank(
|
||||
&self,
|
||||
agent_id: &[u8; 32],
|
||||
delta: f32,
|
||||
timestamp: u64,
|
||||
) -> Result<f32> {
|
||||
(**self).update_trust_rank(agent_id, delta, timestamp).await
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
async fn decay_trust_ranks(
|
||||
&self,
|
||||
current_timestamp: u64,
|
||||
half_life_seconds: Option<u64>,
|
||||
) -> Result<usize> {
|
||||
(**self).decay_trust_ranks(current_timestamp, half_life_seconds).await
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
async fn record_outcome(
|
||||
&self,
|
||||
agent_id: &[u8; 32],
|
||||
was_accurate: bool,
|
||||
timestamp: u64,
|
||||
) -> Result<f32> {
|
||||
(**self).record_outcome(agent_id, was_accurate, timestamp).await
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
async fn put_trust_rank(&self, trust_rank: &TrustRank) -> Result<()> {
|
||||
(**self).put_trust_rank(trust_rank).await
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
async fn verify_agent_against_gold_standard(
|
||||
&self,
|
||||
agent_id: &[u8; 32],
|
||||
agent_object: &str,
|
||||
gold_standard: &stemedb_core::types::GoldStandard,
|
||||
timestamp: u64,
|
||||
) -> Result<model::TrustAdjustment> {
|
||||
(**self)
|
||||
.verify_agent_against_gold_standard(agent_id, agent_object, gold_standard, timestamp)
|
||||
.await
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@ -37,6 +37,8 @@ async-trait = "0.1"
|
||||
# Utilities
|
||||
hex = "0.4"
|
||||
blake3 = "1.5"
|
||||
parking_lot = "0.12"
|
||||
|
||||
[dev-dependencies]
|
||||
tempfile = "3.10"
|
||||
stemedb-lens = { path = "../stemedb-lens" }
|
||||
|
||||
Some files were not shown because too many files have changed in this diff Show More
Loading…
Reference in New Issue
Block a user