# m11p7 inter-node TLS — cluster CA + the shared node cert (cert-manager).
#
# The whole cluster runs over mutual TLS: gRPC replication (mTLS — client certs
# required) and the inter-node HTTP plane (server TLS + signed node tokens). This
# manifest provisions the material with cert-manager so renewal is automatic and
# hot — cert-manager rewrites the mounted Secret, the kubelet swaps the `..data`
# symlink, and tidalDB's content-hash cert poller hot-swaps the in-memory cert
# with ZERO connection drop (no pod restart). See docs/runbooks/cluster.md §10.
#
# Prereq: cert-manager installed in the cluster (https://cert-manager.io). If you
# do not run cert-manager, provision the same Secret out-of-band — e.g. with
# `scripts/gen-cluster-certs.sh` (openssl) — keeping the keys `tls.crt`, `tls.key`,
# `ca.crt`.
#
# ONE shared node cert with a WILDCARD pod SAN (the standard StatefulSet pattern):
# any pod may present it for its own DNS name, and a peer dialing
# `tidaldb-N.tidaldb-peers...` verifies the name against the SAN list. The
# wildcard `*.tidaldb-peers...` covers EVERY pod ordinal (tidaldb-0, -1, … -N),
# so scaling the StatefulSet up or down with `--seed` needs NO cert re-issue
# (m12p5: the prior cert enumerated tidaldb-0/1/2 only, so T4 scale-to-5 broke
# mTLS on tidaldb-3/4). rustls/webpki matches a wildcard against the single
# leftmost DNS label per RFC 6125, which is exactly the pod-ordinal label.
# A REAL two-tier PKI (not a self-signed leaf). cert-manager's `selfSigned`
# issuer bootstraps a CA *certificate* (isCA: true); a `ca:` issuer backed by
# that CA then signs the node leaf. The leaf Secret's `ca.crt` is therefore the
# CA cert (basicConstraints CA:TRUE) — a valid trust anchor.
#
# m12p5: the prior shape issued the node leaf DIRECTLY from a `selfSigned` issuer,
# producing a self-signed end-entity cert with CA:FALSE whose `ca.crt` is a COPY
# of the leaf. Lenient TLS stacks (reqwest async, openssl-with-`-k`) tolerated it,
# but a STRICT webpki verifier — exactly what the seed-join blocking reqwest client
# uses — rejected the peer cert as `UnknownIssuer`, so a scale-up joiner could
# never discover a leader (it burned the whole 120 s window, crash-looping). A
# CA:TRUE anchor verifies cleanly for strict AND lenient clients alike.
---
apiVersion: cert-manager.io/v1
kind: Issuer
metadata:
  name: tidaldb-selfsigned-bootstrap
  namespace: tidaldb-cluster
  labels:
    app.kubernetes.io/name: tidaldb
    app.kubernetes.io/part-of: tidaldb
spec:
  # Bootstrap only: signs the CA certificate below (which IS a CA). Swap the CA
  # cert's issuerRef for your org PKI to chain to an existing root instead.
  selfSigned: {}
---
apiVersion: cert-manager.io/v1
kind: Certificate
metadata:
  name: tidaldb-cluster-ca
  namespace: tidaldb-cluster
  labels:
    app.kubernetes.io/name: tidaldb
    app.kubernetes.io/part-of: tidaldb
spec:
  # The cluster's private ROOT CA — a real CA cert (basicConstraints CA:TRUE).
  # cert-manager writes its cert+key into this Secret; the `ca:` issuer signs the
  # node leaf with it.
  isCA: true
  commonName: tidaldb-cluster-ca
  secretName: tidaldb-cluster-ca
  duration: 87600h    # 10y — the root outlives many leaf rotations
  renewBefore: 8760h  # 1y
  privateKey:
    algorithm: ECDSA
    size: 256
  issuerRef:
    name: tidaldb-selfsigned-bootstrap
    kind: Issuer
    group: cert-manager.io
---
apiVersion: cert-manager.io/v1
kind: Issuer
metadata:
  name: tidaldb-cluster-ca-issuer
  namespace: tidaldb-cluster
  labels:
    app.kubernetes.io/name: tidaldb
    app.kubernetes.io/part-of: tidaldb
spec:
  # CA issuer backed by the root CA above — signs the node leaf, so the leaf
  # chains to a CA:TRUE anchor.
  ca:
    secretName: tidaldb-cluster-ca
---
apiVersion: cert-manager.io/v1
kind: Certificate
metadata:
  name: tidaldb-cluster-tls
  namespace: tidaldb-cluster
  labels:
    app.kubernetes.io/name: tidaldb
    app.kubernetes.io/part-of: tidaldb
spec:
  # cert-manager writes tls.crt / tls.key / ca.crt into this Secret; the
  # StatefulSet mounts it read-only at /etc/tidaldb/tls. ca.crt is now the ROOT
  # CA cert (CA:TRUE), tls.crt the leaf SIGNED by it.
  secretName: tidaldb-cluster-tls
  # Renew well before expiry; each renewal is hot-swapped without a restart.
  duration: 2160h    # 90d
  renewBefore: 720h  # 30d
  isCA: false
  usages:
    - server auth   # the gRPC + HTTP server identity
    - client auth   # the gRPC mTLS client identity (peer dials)
  # SANs: a WILDCARD over every pod's stable headless-Service DNS (covers any
  # ordinal, so scale-up/down needs no cert re-issue), the explicit initial-pod
  # names (belt-and-suspenders for any strict verifier that distrusts a wildcard-
  # only leaf), plus the headless and client Services. Keep
  # `scripts/gen-cluster-certs.sh` in sync.
  dnsNames:
    - "*.tidaldb-peers.tidaldb-cluster.svc.cluster.local"
    - tidaldb-0.tidaldb-peers.tidaldb-cluster.svc.cluster.local
    - tidaldb-1.tidaldb-peers.tidaldb-cluster.svc.cluster.local
    - tidaldb-2.tidaldb-peers.tidaldb-cluster.svc.cluster.local
    - tidaldb-peers.tidaldb-cluster.svc.cluster.local
    - tidaldb.tidaldb-cluster.svc.cluster.local
  issuerRef:
    name: tidaldb-cluster-ca-issuer
    kind: Issuer
    group: cert-manager.io