Paste a secret, get a link, send it. The first person to open it and press
Reveal sees the secret; the link dies at that moment. The recipient needs a
browser and nothing else — no account, no client, no installed tooling.
The server cannot read what it stores. AES-256-GCM happens in the browser and
the key lives in the URL fragment, which browsers never transmit, so hushd
holds ciphertext and no key material. That is a property of where the key sits
rather than a promise about our conduct, which is why there is deliberately no
endpoint accepting a plaintext secret and no server-side-encryption fallback:
two guarantees behind one URL would be worse than one honest guarantee.
Three decisions carry the design:
* GET /s/{id} touches NO storage, not even to check existence. Slack, Teams,
WhatsApp, iMessage and Outlook Safe Links all fetch a URL before a human
sees it, so destroying on GET would destroy most secrets in transit and the
recipient's "already used" would be indistinguishable from interception.
Only POST /reveal consumes. Bot user-agent detection is an arms race;
removing the side effect from GET is not. Pinned by
TestGettingTheRevealPageNeverConsumesTheSecret.
* Destruction is one Redis GETDEL, which is atomic. GET-then-DEL has a window
where two simultaneous readers both win, and for a one-time secret that
window is the product. The store contract demands atomicity and the same
concurrency test runs against both implementations.
* Missing, already-revealed, expired and evicted are ONE indistinguishable
410. Separating them would confirm to a prober that a given link was real.
The secret id IS the capability, so secret.ID is a struct whose every
accidental path — %v, %s, String(), slog, json.Marshal — emits a redacted
handle or refuses, and the raw value needs an explicit Value(). The first
version tried to prevent leaks by implementing no String() at all; its own test
caught that Go's fmt prints unexported fields anyway, so forbidding the method
had removed the control rather than the leak.
Operationally: structured JSON on stdout in the fleet's wire format, which
Vector already collects with no annotation; six hush_* metrics on the chassis
registry with no id, IP or path in any label; five alert rules wired into
vmalert. The public Ingress enumerates /, /s/ and /api/ so /metrics, /healthz
and /readyz share the port but are unreachable from the internet — no
basic-auth middleware to maintain and get wrong.
Dependencies are vendored because go-chassis is private: the Woodpecker test
step and the in-cluster Kaniko build both run -mod=vendor with GOPROXY=off and
hold no git credential.
cmd/hush-mcp is a stdio MCP server doing the same client-side crypto locally,
so using hush from an agent preserves the same guarantee as using it from a
browser.
175 lines
4.3 KiB
Go
175 lines
4.3 KiB
Go
// Copyright 2019 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
|
|
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
|
|
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
|
|
|
|
package impl
|
|
|
|
import (
|
|
"sync"
|
|
|
|
"google.golang.org/protobuf/internal/errors"
|
|
"google.golang.org/protobuf/reflect/protoreflect"
|
|
"google.golang.org/protobuf/runtime/protoiface"
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
func (mi *MessageInfo) checkInitialized(in protoiface.CheckInitializedInput) (protoiface.CheckInitializedOutput, error) {
|
|
var p pointer
|
|
if ms, ok := in.Message.(*messageState); ok {
|
|
p = ms.pointer()
|
|
} else {
|
|
p = in.Message.(*messageReflectWrapper).pointer()
|
|
}
|
|
return protoiface.CheckInitializedOutput{}, mi.checkInitializedPointer(p)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (mi *MessageInfo) checkInitializedPointer(p pointer) error {
|
|
mi.init()
|
|
if !mi.needsInitCheck {
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
if p.IsNil() {
|
|
for _, f := range mi.orderedCoderFields {
|
|
if f.isRequired {
|
|
return errors.RequiredNotSet(string(mi.Desc.Fields().ByNumber(f.num).FullName()))
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
var presence presence
|
|
if mi.presenceOffset.IsValid() {
|
|
presence = p.Apply(mi.presenceOffset).PresenceInfo()
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if mi.extensionOffset.IsValid() {
|
|
e := p.Apply(mi.extensionOffset).Extensions()
|
|
if err := mi.isInitExtensions(e); err != nil {
|
|
return err
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
for _, f := range mi.orderedCoderFields {
|
|
if !f.isRequired && f.funcs.isInit == nil {
|
|
continue
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if f.presenceIndex != noPresence {
|
|
if !presence.Present(f.presenceIndex) {
|
|
if f.isRequired {
|
|
return errors.RequiredNotSet(string(mi.Desc.Fields().ByNumber(f.num).FullName()))
|
|
}
|
|
continue
|
|
}
|
|
if f.funcs.isInit != nil {
|
|
f.mi.init()
|
|
if f.mi.needsInitCheck {
|
|
if f.isLazy && p.Apply(f.offset).AtomicGetPointer().IsNil() {
|
|
lazy := *p.Apply(mi.lazyOffset).LazyInfoPtr()
|
|
if !lazy.AllowedPartial() {
|
|
// Nothing to see here, it was checked on unmarshal
|
|
continue
|
|
}
|
|
mi.lazyUnmarshal(p, f.num)
|
|
}
|
|
if err := f.funcs.isInit(p.Apply(f.offset), f); err != nil {
|
|
return err
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
continue
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
fptr := p.Apply(f.offset)
|
|
if f.isPointer && fptr.Elem().IsNil() {
|
|
if f.isRequired {
|
|
return errors.RequiredNotSet(string(mi.Desc.Fields().ByNumber(f.num).FullName()))
|
|
}
|
|
continue
|
|
}
|
|
if f.funcs.isInit == nil {
|
|
continue
|
|
}
|
|
if err := f.funcs.isInit(fptr, f); err != nil {
|
|
return err
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (mi *MessageInfo) isInitExtensions(ext *map[int32]ExtensionField) error {
|
|
if ext == nil {
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
for _, x := range *ext {
|
|
ei := getExtensionFieldInfo(x.Type())
|
|
if ei.funcs.isInit == nil || x.isUnexpandedLazy() {
|
|
continue
|
|
}
|
|
v := x.Value()
|
|
if !v.IsValid() {
|
|
continue
|
|
}
|
|
if err := ei.funcs.isInit(v); err != nil {
|
|
return err
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
var (
|
|
needsInitCheckMu sync.Mutex
|
|
needsInitCheckMap sync.Map
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
// needsInitCheck reports whether a message needs to be checked for partial initialization.
|
|
//
|
|
// It returns true if the message transitively includes any required or extension fields.
|
|
func needsInitCheck(md protoreflect.MessageDescriptor) bool {
|
|
if v, ok := needsInitCheckMap.Load(md); ok {
|
|
if has, ok := v.(bool); ok {
|
|
return has
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
needsInitCheckMu.Lock()
|
|
defer needsInitCheckMu.Unlock()
|
|
return needsInitCheckLocked(md)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func needsInitCheckLocked(md protoreflect.MessageDescriptor) (has bool) {
|
|
if v, ok := needsInitCheckMap.Load(md); ok {
|
|
// If has is true, we've previously determined that this message
|
|
// needs init checks.
|
|
//
|
|
// If has is false, we've previously determined that it can never
|
|
// be uninitialized.
|
|
//
|
|
// If has is not a bool, we've just encountered a cycle in the
|
|
// message graph. In this case, it is safe to return false: If
|
|
// the message does have required fields, we'll detect them later
|
|
// in the graph traversal.
|
|
has, ok := v.(bool)
|
|
return ok && has
|
|
}
|
|
needsInitCheckMap.Store(md, struct{}{}) // avoid cycles while descending into this message
|
|
defer func() {
|
|
needsInitCheckMap.Store(md, has)
|
|
}()
|
|
if md.RequiredNumbers().Len() > 0 {
|
|
return true
|
|
}
|
|
if md.ExtensionRanges().Len() > 0 {
|
|
return true
|
|
}
|
|
for i := 0; i < md.Fields().Len(); i++ {
|
|
fd := md.Fields().Get(i)
|
|
// Map keys are never messages, so just consider the map value.
|
|
if fd.IsMap() {
|
|
fd = fd.MapValue()
|
|
}
|
|
fmd := fd.Message()
|
|
if fmd != nil && needsInitCheckLocked(fmd) {
|
|
return true
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return false
|
|
}
|