hush/docs/DEPLOY.md
jx12n 138ab7306e
Some checks failed
ci/woodpecker/push/woodpecker Pipeline failed
release: build through the cluster, not through its public address
Four consecutive Kaniko pushes failed with
`dial tcp 208.122.204.172:443: connect: connection refused` while zot and
Traefik were both healthy and my laptop reached the same URL fine.

Measured from a pod in the same namespace, with the same labels the build Job
carries: 14 of 24 requests to https://registry.threesix.ai/v2/ succeeded, and
8 of 8 succeeded against Traefik's ClusterIP with the same SNI. So the flaky
leg is pod -> the cluster's own public address, and the build was taking it
for both the clone and the push.

The Job now carries hostAliases pinning git.threesix.ai and
registry.threesix.ai to Traefik's ClusterIP, read from the Service at release
time. The image is still named registry.threesix.ai/hush/api:SHA — the route
changes, the reference does not, and the kubelet pull path is untouched.

No retry loop: a retry would have made a 40% failure rate invisible instead of
fixed.

docs/DEPLOY.md no longer duplicates the Job YAML. That duplicate is why the
push guard drifted onto the wrong remote, and a second copy of a spec nobody
runs is worth less than a pointer to the one that runs.
2026-09-05 14:28:42 -06:00

9.4 KiB

Deploying hush

Live at https://hush.threesix.ai, one replica in the projects namespace on the orchard9 k3s cluster.

git push origin main → Gitea webhook → Woodpecker → Kaniko (amd64, in-cluster)
  → Zot registry → kubectl set image → projects/hush

origin must be Gitea (git.threesix.ai); that remote carries the webhook. The GitHub mirror is a backup and pushing there deploys nothing.

Never build the image locally

Two reasons, both of which cost real time to discover:

  1. A laptop build on Apple Silicon produces arm64; the cluster runs amd64.
  2. registry.threesix.ai accepts only OCI image manifests — not Docker schema2, and not an OCI index. docker push and crane push both fail MANIFEST_INVALID, and buildx wraps even a single-platform build in an index.

Kaniko sidesteps both. If you must build outside the pipeline, use a Job — see "Bootstrap" below, which is exactly what the first deploy did.

Dependencies are vendored, deliberately

github.com/orchard9/go-chassis is a private module. Neither the Woodpecker test container nor the Kaniko build holds a git credential, so a build that resolved dependencies from the network would fail:

$ curl https://proxy.golang.org/github.com/orchard9/go-chassis/@v/list
404  ... could not read Username for 'https://github.com'

So vendor/ is committed and both CI and the Dockerfile run -mod=vendor with GOPROXY=off. GOPROXY=off is the important half: it turns "silently fetched from somewhere" into a hard failure. make vendor is the only way versions move, and make verify proves the tree still builds with no network.

One-time setup, already done

Recorded because it is what a rebuild would need, and none of it is in git.

1. Redis ACL user

hush connects as its own ACL user, scoped to ~hush:*, on db 5 (0 and 3 and 4 are taken by pantheon/rdev, reel, and jit):

redis-cli ACL SETUSER hush on '>PASSWORD' '~hush:*' resetchannels \
  -@all +ping +set +getdel +incr +pexpire +pttl +select
redis-cli ACL SAVE     # persists to /data/users.acl

+getdel is the one to notice. No other service's ACL user has it, because no other service needs an atomic read-and-destroy. Omit it and creates keep working while every reveal fails NOPERM — a service that accepts secrets and cannot deliver them. +incr +pexpire +pttl are the rate limiter.

2. The credential

A JSON object in GCP Secret Manager, pulled into the namespace by ESO:

gcloud secrets create k3sf-hush-credentials --project orchard9 \
  --replication-policy=automatic --data-file=- <<< \
  '{"REDIS_URL":"redis://hush:PASSWORD@redis.databases.svc.cluster.local:6379/5"}'

ExternalSecret/hush-credentials (in deployments/k8s/hush.yaml) syncs it to a Secret of the same name. Confirm with:

kubectl -n projects get externalsecret hush-credentials \
  -o jsonpath='{.status.conditions[0].reason}'   # want SecretSynced

3. DNS

hush.threesix.ai208.122.204.172, A record, DNS-only (not proxied), TTL 120 — matching every other *.threesix.ai service. There is no wildcard on the zone, so each host needs its own record. cert-manager then issues TLS over HTTP-01 with no DNS credential needed.

hush.orchard9.ai was the original intent and is not what shipped. orchard9.ai is on GoDaddy and no GoDaddy credential exists in rdev, the cluster, or ~/.squiddy-dns. Moving the host there needs that credential; everything else is a one-line Ingress change plus a new record.

4. Alert rules

vmalert has no ConfigMap auto-discovery. Three coordinated edits in orchard9-k3sf, and missing any one leaves the rules silently absent:

  1. observability/hush-alerting-rules.yaml — the ConfigMap
  2. observability/kustomization.yaml — list it under resources:
  3. observability/victoria-metrics.yaml — vmalert needs a matching -rule=/etc/rules-hush/*.yaml, volumeMount and volume

make alerts-check asks vmalert what it actually loaded, and separately checks that every series the rules reference exists — a rule reading a metric nothing exports can never fire and looks exactly like a healthy service.

Bootstrap (what the first deploy did)

The pipeline's deploy step runs kubectl set image, so a Deployment must exist first. But the committed image tag cannot be :latest: the cluster's stable-controller-images.orchard9.ai admission policy refuses latest|main|master|dev|edge|canary|nightly|snapshot, because a floating tag cannot pin a rollback.

So the manifest carries :bootstrap, which is policy-legal and does not exist. Apply everything, then build once by hand:

make deploy-manifests        # pod sits in ImagePullBackOff — expected

SHA=$(git rev-parse --short=8 HEAD)
kubectl -n projects create job hush-build-$SHA --dry-run=client -o yaml ... # see below
kubectl -n projects set image deployment/hush hushd=registry.threesix.ai/hush/api:$SHA

That :bootstrap tag is also why the public route lives in its own file, deployments/k8s/ingress.yaml. A new public path — every handler needs one, or it 404s at the edge while working fine in make dev — is make deploy-ingress, which applies that object alone. Applying the whole directory to publish a path would roll the workload back onto the unpullable bootstrap image.

The build Job itself is not reproduced here. scripts/release.sh emits it, and a copy in this file drifts from the copy that runs — which is how the script's own push guard ended up checking the wrong remote. Read it there; make release is the same path, and it needs no CI credential because the Gitea repo is public.

One thing about that Job is worth stating outside the script, because it is a property of the cluster rather than of hush: git.threesix.ai and registry.threesix.ai resolve to the cluster's public address, and reaching that address from inside a pod hairpins unreliably. Measured 2026-09-05: 14 of 24 requests from a pod succeeded, four consecutive kaniko pushes were refused with connection refused, and Traefik's ClusterIP answered 8 of 8. The Job therefore carries hostAliases pinning both names to that ClusterIP. Anything else that builds in-cluster — Woodpecker's Kaniko step included — is exposed to the same hairpin and will fail the same way, intermittently.

Woodpecker: activated

jordan/hush is repo 139 in Woodpecker, active, with the webhook installed on the Gitea side. A push to main builds and deploys.

Activation is POST /api/repos?forge_remote_id=<numeric gitea repo id> — the numeric id (183 here), not owner/name:

GID=$(curl -s -H "Authorization: token $THREE_SIX_GITEA" \
        https://git.threesix.ai/api/v1/repos/jordan/hush | jq -r .id)
curl -X POST "https://ci.threesix.ai/api/repos?forge_remote_id=$GID" \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $THREE_SIX_WOODPECKER"

The credential

Use $THREE_SIX_WOODPECKER (and $THREE_SIX_GITEA for Gitea). Both are in the operator's environment.

The copy in rdev/rdev-credentials was stale and returned 401 User not authorized on /api/user — which is worth knowing how to diagnose, because a 401 on POST /api/repos looks exactly like a malformed forge_remote_id. GET /api/user separates the two: it is auth-only, so a 401 there is the token and a 200 there means the request shape is what is wrong.

That stale copy is fixed at the source: k3sf-rdev-admin-key in GCP Secret Manager (property WOODPECKER_API_TOKEN) now carries the working token, ESO resynced it, and the token read out of rdev/rdev-credentials returns 200. The other properties in that secret were preserved. Do not patch the k8s Secret directly — it is ESO-owned and a direct edit is reverted on the next refresh.

# force a resync rather than waiting out refreshInterval: 1h
kubectl -n rdev annotate externalsecret rdev-credentials force-sync="$(date +%s)" --overwrite

make release — the path that needs no CI credential

Still useful with CI working: it is the hotfix and rollback path when the pipeline is down, and it was how the first deploy happened.

make release

It refuses on a dirty or unpushed tree, because Kaniko builds from the pushed git ref and would otherwise silently build something other than what you are looking at. It also asserts the live image equals the one just built, since set image matching nothing is silent and the rollout would "succeed" on the old pod.

Rollback

Every build is SHA-tagged, so rollback is naming the previous one:

kubectl -n projects rollout undo deployment/hush
# or explicitly
kubectl -n projects set image deployment/hush hushd=registry.threesix.ai/hush/api:<older-sha>

Nothing to migrate and no schema: Redis holds only TTL'd ciphertext, and a rollback cannot invalidate an outstanding link because the id and the wire format are stable.

Verifying a deploy

make deploy-status                       # rollout, pods, ingress, certificate
BASE=https://hush.threesix.ai make smoke  # real crypto, create → reveal → gone
make logs                                # the lifecycle in VictoriaLogs
make alerts-check                        # rules loaded, series present

make smoke is the one that matters. It encrypts with a real AES-256-GCM key, posts only ciphertext, reveals once, decrypts, and then asserts the second reveal is 410, that three GETs did not consume the secret, that missing and malformed ids are indistinguishable, and that a plaintext field is refused.