hush/docs/ARCHITECTURE.md

Architecture

One Go binary, one Redis key per secret, no database. The interesting parts are all about where the key sits and what destroys the ciphertext.

Components

browser ──► Traefik ──► hushd (projects ns, 1 replica) ──► Redis (databases ns, db 5)
                            │
                            ├─ stdout JSON ──► Vector (DaemonSet) ──► VictoriaLogs
                            └─ /metrics ─────► vmagent ──► vmsingle ──► vmalert ──► Alertmanager

hushd holds no durable state. Redis holds every secret and nothing else.

The zero-knowledge split

create:   plaintext ──[AES-256-GCM in the browser]──► ciphertext ──► POST /api/secrets
          key ──────────────────────────────────────► URL fragment, never sent

reveal:   POST /api/secrets/{id}/reveal ──► ciphertext ──[decrypt in browser]──► plaintext
          key read from location.hash

The fragment is the whole trick. Per RFC 3986 §3.5 the fragment is a client-side construct: browsers do not put it in the request line, so it never reaches Traefik, hushd, Redis, an access log, or a proxy. hushd receives a 256-bit AES-GCM ciphertext with a prepended 96-bit nonce and has no key material at any point.

Consequences worth stating plainly:

• A Redis dump is worthless. A hushd core dump is worthless. Our own operators cannot read a secret, and neither can anyone who compromises the service.
• A URL in someone's browser history contains the key. The fragment is not transmitted, but it is stored locally. This is the residual exposure and it is why TTLs are short.
• There is deliberately no server-side-encryption fallback mode. A second mode where the server sees plaintext would mean nobody could tell, from a link, which guarantee they had.

Why GET never touches storage

GET /s/{id} renders a static page and makes zero calls to Redis. It does not even check whether the id exists.

That is not laziness — it is the only way to be correct in the presence of link previewers. Slack, Teams, WhatsApp, iMessage and Outlook Safe Links fetch URLs before a human sees them. Any design that destroys on GET destroys most secrets in transit. Bot user-agent detection is a losing arms race; removing the side effect from GET is not.

A secondary benefit: because GET does not look the id up, the reveal page cannot leak whether an id exists. Existence is only ever answered by a POST, and that answer is identical for missing, revealed and expired.

Storage and destruction

One key per secret:

key    hush:s:<id>            id = 256 bits from crypto/rand, base64url (43 chars)
value  <ciphertext>           opaque bytes, ≤ 64 KiB
write  SET key val EX <ttl> NX
read   GETDEL key

GETDEL (Redis 6.2+; the cluster runs 7.4.8) is atomic, which is the reason it is used instead of GET followed by DEL. Two people opening the same link simultaneously cannot both receive the plaintext — exactly one GETDEL returns the value and the other returns nil. A GET+DEL pair has a window between the two commands where both callers succeed, and for a one-time secret that window is the entire product.

NX on write means an id collision never overwrites an existing secret. At 256 bits of entropy a collision will not happen; the flag costs nothing and turns a theoretical silent overwrite into a visible error.

TTL is Redis-native, so expiry needs no sweeper, no cron and nothing to wedge.

Eviction is an availability risk, not a confidentiality one

The shared Redis runs maxmemory-policy allkeys-lru with maxmemory 256MiB. Under memory pressure Redis may evict a hush key before its TTL fires. That means a secret can become unavailable early.

It cannot become more available: eviction only ever deletes. So the failure mode is "your recipient has to ask you again", never "the secret outlived its TTL" and never "someone read it twice". For a secret courier that is the correct direction to fail, and it is why 410 gone deliberately does not distinguish causes — the user-visible contract is identical either way.

Operationally this is watched via HushRedisUnreachable and the Redis memory alerts, not by trying to tell eviction and reveal apart. See OPERATIONS.md.

Identifiers and what gets logged

The id is the capability. Anyone holding it can reveal the secret, so it is treated like a bearer token:

• Never logged. Not at debug, not in an error, not in a panic.
• The log correlation handle is sid = sha256(id)[:12] — enough to follow one secret's create → reveal → gone across a corpus, useless for revealing it.
• Never in a metric label (that would put it in the time series index forever).

internal/secret.ID.LogHandle() is the only way to get a loggable form, and the ID type does not implement String() or MarshalText(), so it cannot be accidentally interpolated into a log line or JSON body. That is enforced by internal/secret/id_test.go.

The chassis logger additionally redacts any field named secret, token, password, api_key, authorization and friends. Field names here avoid those words entirely (ciphertext, sid, ttl_seconds) so nothing depends on that backstop.

Request path

GET  /                     create page (static HTML+JS, no storage access)
GET  /s/{id}               reveal page (static HTML+JS, no storage access)
POST /api/secrets          store ciphertext                    rate limited
POST /api/secrets/{id}/reveal   GETDEL, destroy, return once   rate limited
GET  /healthz              liveness — 200 while draining
GET  /readyz               readiness — Redis PING, 503 while draining
GET  /metrics              Prometheus

Built on github.com/orchard9/go-chassis, which supplies routing, request ids, the panic recovery envelope, RED metrics, secure headers, the two-phase drain, and /healthz, /readyz, /metrics. hush contributes handlers, a store, a rate limiter and templates — not a framework.

The pages override the chassis CSP

The chassis policy is written for a JSON API: default-src 'none'; frame-ancestors 'none'. The two pages are HTML with inline script and inline style, so internal/web.render replaces that header with a per-response nonce policy:

default-src 'none'; script-src 'nonce-<r>'; style-src 'nonce-<r>';
connect-src 'self'; form-action 'none'; base-uri 'none'; frame-ancestors 'none'

Three decisions, each with a failure it prevents:

• A header, and only a header. Two policies delivered on one response intersect, so a permissive <meta> cannot re-enable what the header forbids. Shipping both is how the pages ended up with their own crypto and their own fetch blocked while the <meta> read as permitted. frame-ancestors is also ignored outright in <meta>, so it exists only as a header.
• A nonce, not 'unsafe-inline'. The guarantee is that nothing but this reviewed same-document script can reach the key in the fragment; 'unsafe-inline' would extend that permission to anything an injection got onto the page.
• Fresh per response, url-alphabet base64. A reused nonce is worth 'unsafe-inline' to an attacker who can wait for the next load, and + or / in the value would be escaped to character references inside the HTML attribute, making what the browser enforces depend on entity decoding. The nonce is fixed-length, so it adds no id-correlated variation to the reveal page — TestTheRevealPageDoesNotDiscloseWhetherASecretExists compares the page with it masked and asserts constant length.

The public Ingress routes / (exact), /s/ and /api/ only. /metrics, /healthz and /readyz share the port but are unreachable from the internet; vmagent scrapes the pod IP directly. This is why there is no metrics basic-auth middleware to maintain.

Abuse posture

Create is anonymous by design, which makes the service a free blob host and a phishing kit borrowing a threesix.ai name. Mitigations, all cheap:

Control	Value
Ciphertext cap	64 KiB, enforced before Redis
Request body cap	128 KiB, enforced by the chassis at the edge
TTL clamp	5m … 7d, out-of-range is a 422, not a silent clamp
Rate limit	30 creates / 10 min / IP, Redis fixed-window
Id entropy	256 bits — enumeration is not a threat model
No listing route	there is no way to ask "what secrets exist"
Identical gone	missing, revealed and expired are one response

If it is ever abused, HUSH_REQUIRE_AUTH=true puts create behind the chassis authenticator while leaving reveal anonymous — the asymmetry the design assumes. Reveal must stay anonymous: the recipient is external and has no credential.

Failure modes

Failure	Behaviour
Redis down	/readyz 503, pod leaves the Service, creates and reveals 503. No secret is lost that was already written.
Redis evicts a key early	That link returns 410 gone. Sender must re-send.
hushd restarts	Nothing lost; all state is in Redis.
Two simultaneous reveals	Exactly one wins, atomically.
Body over 128 KiB	413 at the edge, never reaches a handler.
Ciphertext over 64 KiB	422 ciphertext_too_large.
Malformed base64	422 ciphertext_invalid. hushd validates the encoding but cannot validate the plaintext.
Clock skew	TTL is Redis-relative, so skew between hushd and the browser cannot extend a secret's life.

What is deliberately absent

Accounts. Passphrases on top of the link. File uploads. Multi-read links. An audit UI. Email delivery. Each is a real request and each doubles the surface.

The one with a genuine argument is notify-on-read: it confirms delivery and, if it fires before the recipient says they opened it, that is a compromise signal. It needs an email path, notify already exists to provide one, and it is the first thing to add if hush proves useful.