Content Defense (Phase 7): - Add SimilarityIndex with MinHash/LSH for near-duplicate detection - Add QuarantineStore for flagged assertions awaiting admin review - Add CircuitBreakerStore for per-agent circuit breaker state - Add ContentDefenseLayer for ingestion pipeline integration - Add API endpoints for quarantine and circuit breaker management - Add research module with gap detection and documentation fetching Code Structure Improvements: - Extract research CLI commands to research_commands.rs - Extract API routers to routers.rs module - Extract key_codec extraction functions to separate module - Extract test modules to separate files across multiple crates - All files now under 500 line limit per pre-commit hook Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
202 lines
6.8 KiB
Markdown
202 lines
6.8 KiB
Markdown
# Phase 7 UAT: The Shield
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**Status:** Ready for Testing
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**Target Date:** 2026-02-03
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**Confidence:** High (7A, 7B complete; 7C core complete)
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## Summary
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Phase 7 (The Shield) defends against spam, Sybil attacks, and knowledge poisoning. This UAT validates the trust-at-scale infrastructure for opening Episteme to millions of agents.
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**Scope:**
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- 7A Admission Control: PoW-based spam protection, trust tiers, graduated quotas
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- 7B EigenTrust: Sybil-resistant global trust propagation
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- 7C Content Defense: Quality scoring, quarantine store, admin API (partial - MinHash/LSH pending)
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- 7D Circuit Breakers: NOT included (pending implementation)
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## Test Coverage (Verified)
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| Area | Tests | Status |
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|------|-------|--------|
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| Trust Graph Store | 23 | PASS |
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| Trust Rank Store | 22 | PASS |
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| Domain Trust Store | 18 | PASS |
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| Admission Store | 16 | PASS |
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| PoW types | 19 | PASS |
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| Content Defense (quality) | 13 | PASS |
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| Quarantine Store | 9 | PASS |
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| Trust Tier types | 8 | PASS |
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| API Admission integration | 6 | PASS |
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| Content Defense Layer | 5 | PASS |
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| **Total Phase 7** | **139** | **ALL PASS** |
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## Realistic Usage Scenarios
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### Scenario 1: New Agent Onboarding
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**Goal:** Verify graduated difficulty protects against spam bots while not blocking legitimate agents.
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```bash
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# 1. New agent with no history should require PoW
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curl -X GET http://localhost:3000/v1/admission/status \
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-H "X-Agent-Id: 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000001"
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# Expected: 200 with pow_required: true, difficulty: 16
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# 2. Submit first assertions with PoW proof
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# Agent must solve: BLAKE3(nonce || agent_id || timestamp) has 16 leading zero bits
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# This takes ~16 seconds on average
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# 3. After 10 assertions, difficulty drops to 1 bit (trivial)
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# 4. After 50 assertions OR trust > 0.6, PoW exempt
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```
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**Acceptance Criteria:**
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- [ ] New agents see `pow_required: true`, `difficulty: 16`
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- [ ] HTTP 428 returned when PoW missing/invalid
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- [ ] Difficulty graduates: 16 bits (1-10) → 1 bit (11-50) → 0 (51+)
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- [ ] Trusted agents (>0.6) are exempt regardless of assertion count
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### Scenario 2: Trust Tier Quotas
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**Goal:** Verify rate limiting scales with trust level.
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| Tier | Trust Range | Quota Multiplier | Hourly Limit |
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|------|-------------|------------------|--------------|
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| Untrusted | 0.0-0.3 | 0.1x | 1,000/hr |
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| Limited | 0.3-0.5 | 0.5x | 5,000/hr |
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| Verified | 0.5-0.7 | 1.0x | 10,000/hr |
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| Trusted | 0.7-0.9 | 2.0x | 20,000/hr |
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| Authority | 0.9-1.0 | 10.0x | 100,000/hr |
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**Acceptance Criteria:**
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- [ ] Quota headers present in responses (`X-RateLimit-*`)
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- [ ] Untrusted agents limited to 0.1x base quota
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- [ ] Authority agents get 10x quota
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- [ ] HTTP 429 returned when quota exceeded
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### Scenario 3: EigenTrust Sybil Resistance
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**Goal:** Verify isolated trust rings get near-zero global trust.
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```
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Legitimate Network: Sybil Ring:
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Seed ─────> A X ──> Y
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│ │ │ │
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v v v v
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B ──────> C Z <── W
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```
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**Acceptance Criteria:**
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- [ ] Seed-connected agents (A, B, C) accumulate positive global trust
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- [ ] Isolated ring (X, Y, Z, W) converges to near-zero trust
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- [ ] Power iteration converges in <100 iterations (ε = 1e-4)
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- [ ] Domain-specific trust factors applied correctly
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### Scenario 4: Content Quality Filtering
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**Goal:** Verify spam/noise detection without blocking legitimate content.
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| Content Type | Expected Quality | Should Quarantine? |
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|--------------|------------------|-------------------|
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| Normal assertion: "Aspirin:treats:Headache" | >0.6 | No |
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| Low entropy: "aaaa:bbbb:cccc" | <0.4 | Yes |
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| Structured data with JSON | >0.7 (bonus) | No |
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| Untrusted agent + high confidence | <0.5 (penalty) | Yes |
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**Acceptance Criteria:**
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- [ ] Shannon entropy check flags random noise (< 1.5 bits/char)
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- [ ] Minimum subject/predicate length enforced (default 3 chars)
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- [ ] Structured data (JSON, URLs, dates) gets +0.1 bonus
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- [ ] Untrusted + high confidence gets -0.5 penalty
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- [ ] Quality < 0.4 triggers quarantine
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### Scenario 5: Quarantine Admin Workflow
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**Goal:** Verify suspicious content can be reviewed and processed.
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```bash
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# 1. List pending quarantine events
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curl http://localhost:3000/v1/admin/quarantine?limit=20
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# 2. Review specific event
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curl http://localhost:3000/v1/admin/quarantine/{hash}
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# 3. Approve or reject
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curl -X POST http://localhost:3000/v1/admin/quarantine/{hash}/approve
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curl -X POST http://localhost:3000/v1/admin/quarantine/{hash}/reject
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```
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**Acceptance Criteria:**
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- [ ] `GET /v1/admin/quarantine` lists pending events with reasons
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- [ ] `GET /v1/admin/quarantine/{hash}` returns full assertion bytes
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- [ ] `POST .../approve` moves assertion to main index
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- [ ] `POST .../reject` marks as reviewed but keeps quarantined
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- [ ] Quarantine reasons clearly indicate why flagged
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## Integration Points to Verify
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1. **Ingestion Pipeline Integration**
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- Content defense layer called before indexing
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- Quarantine bypasses normal index path
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- Bloom filter restored on restart
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2. **Trust Store Interplay**
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- EigenTrust feeds into TrustTier calculation
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- Domain trust factors into Authority lens weights
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- Trust decay applies to computed scores
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3. **API Middleware Chain**
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- AdmissionLayer checks PoW before rate limiting
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- MeterLayer applies tier-based quotas
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- Headers reflect current trust state
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## Known Limitations
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1. **7C Incomplete:** MinHash/LSH bucketing not implemented
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- Duplicate detection uses Bloom filter only (no near-duplicate)
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- Jaccard similarity threshold (0.9) not yet enforced
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2. **7D Not Started:** Circuit breakers pending
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- No automatic agent banning
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- No half-open recovery states
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3. **Performance Untested:**
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- EigenTrust computation on large graphs (>10k agents)
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- Bloom filter memory at scale
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- Quarantine store scan performance
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## Commands to Run
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```bash
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# Full test suite
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cargo test --workspace
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# Phase 7 specific crates
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cargo test -p stemedb-storage -- trust_graph
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cargo test -p stemedb-storage -- domain_trust
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cargo test -p stemedb-storage -- admission
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cargo test -p stemedb-storage -- quarantine
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cargo test -p stemedb-storage -- content_defense
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cargo test -p stemedb-ingest -- content_defense
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cargo test -p stemedb-api --test admission_integration
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cargo test -p stemedb-core -- trust_tier
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cargo test -p stemedb-core -- pow
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# Clippy must pass
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cargo clippy --workspace -- -D warnings
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# Go SDK examples
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cd sdk/go && go test ./...
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```
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## Success Criteria
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**Phase 7 UAT passes when:**
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1. All ~139 Phase 7 tests pass
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2. All 5 usage scenarios verified manually
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3. Clippy clean with no warnings
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4. Go SDK examples pass
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5. API endpoints return correct responses
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6. Quarantine workflow complete end-to-end
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## Related Documentation
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- [Admission Control API](./admission-control.md)
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- [Phase 6 UAT](./phase6-uat.md)
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- [Roadmap Phase 7](../../roadmap.md#phase-7-the-shield-trust-at-scale)
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