New security extractors: - insecure_deserialization, orm_injection, path_traversal, security_headers - ssrf, unvalidated_redirects, weak_password, xxe - Enhanced tls_version extractor with comprehensive cipher/protocol checks Architecture docs: - Scout-judge extraction pattern for LLM-based code analysis - LLM prompt evaluation framework - LLM eval implementation guide Core improvements: - stemedb-ontology README and client enhancements - WAL journal/segment instrumentation - Signing and ingestion refinements - Consumer health demo script Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
82 KiB
Aphoria Roadmap
Phase 0: StemeDB Foundation ✅
Tracked in: roadmap.md § 5D. Concept Hierarchy
Changes to the core database that Aphoria depends on. Shipped as Phase 5D of the main StemeDB roadmap.
| Aphoria Phase 0 | StemeDB Phase 5D | Status |
|---|---|---|
| 0.1 ConceptPath Type | 5D.1 ConceptPath Type | ✅ |
| 0.2 ConceptPath in Assertion | (implicit in 5D.1) | ✅ |
| 0.3 Hierarchical Index | 5D.4 Hierarchical Query | ✅ |
| 0.4 Alias Store | 5D.3 Alias Store + 5D.5 Alias Resolution | ✅ |
| 0.5 Source Class Inference | 5D.6 Source Class Inference | ✅ |
| 0.6 Concept API Endpoints | 5D.7 Concept API Endpoints | ✅ |
Spec: docs/specs/concept-hierarchy.md
Phase 2: CLI Core ✅
Phase 2 was built before Phase 1 (authoritative corpus expansion). The CLI pipeline works end-to-end with a bootstrapped corpus of 11 hardcoded assertions covering TLS, JWT, CORS, secrets, and rate limiting.
| Task | Status |
|---|---|
| 2.1 Project Walker | ✅ walker/mod.rs, walker/path_mapper.rs, walker/language.rs |
| 2.2 Extractors (10) | ✅ tls_verify, jwt_config, hardcoded_secrets, timeout_config, dep_versions, cors_config, rate_limit, weak_crypto, command_injection, sql_injection |
| 2.3 Ingestion Bridge | ✅ bridge.rs — BLAKE3 hashing, Ed25519 signing, claim→assertion conversion |
| 2.4 Conflict Query | ✅ episteme.rs — LocalEpisteme with check_conflicts() |
| 2.5 Report Output | ✅ report/ — table (comfy-table), JSON, SARIF 2.1.0, markdown |
| 2.6 Acknowledge Command | ✅ lib.rs acknowledge() |
| Baseline & Diff | ✅ lib.rs set_baseline(), show_diff() |
| Status Command | ✅ lib.rs show_status() |
183 tests pass. Clippy and fmt clean.
Phase 2 Code Quality Fixes ✅
Code review improvements to extractors:
| Issue | Fix | Status |
|---|---|---|
| DES/RC4 concept path misclassification | Split check_pattern() into check_hash_pattern() and check_encryption_pattern(); DES/RC4 now use crypto/encryption/algorithm path |
✅ |
| SHA1 edge case undocumented | Added comments and test documenting that SHA1 detection is intentionally broad (triggers for git hashes, etc.) | ✅ |
| JS exec() regex overly broad | Tightened regex to require child_process. prefix or non-word/non-dot preceding character; prevents RegExp.exec() false positives |
✅ |
Phase 2A: Concept Matching ✅
Status: Complete. Tail-path matching (2A.1), alias-aware queries (2A.2), and auto-alias creation (2A.3) all implemented.
2A.1 Leaf-Based Concept Matching (Aphoria-side fix) ✅
Implemented in episteme.rs via ConceptIndex:
make_key(subject, predicate)extracts tail 2 path segments + predicatebuild(assertions)creates in-memory index keyed by tail pathlookup(subject, predicate)finds matching authoritative assertionscheck_conflicts()usesConceptIndexinstead ofQueryEnginefor cross-scheme matching
Integration tests prove TLS and JWT conflicts are detected correctly.
2A.2 Alias Resolution in QueryEngine (StemeDB-side fix) ✅
Wired AliasStore into QueryEngine.execute():
- Added
resolve_aliases: boolfield toQuery(defaults tofalse) - Added
alias_store: Option<Arc<dyn AliasStore>>toQueryEngine - Added
.with_alias_store()builder method - When
resolve_aliases: true, expands subject viaAliasStore.resolve_all()before index lookup - Added
fetch_by_subjects()andfetch_by_subjects_predicate()for multi-subject deduplication - Modified
Query.matches()to skip subject filtering when aliases are resolved - Skips fast path (MV lookup) when
resolve_aliases: true - Gracefully degrades when no alias store is configured
7 unit tests in engine/tests/alias_resolution.rs. This is the architecturally correct long-term fix that complements leaf matching.
2A.3 Auto-Alias Creation ✅
When Aphoria ingests authoritative assertions and code claims that share leaf names, automatically create aliases:
code://rust/myapp/tls/cert_verification↔rfc://5246/tls/cert_verificationcode://rust/myapp/auth/jwt/audience_validation↔rfc://7519/jwt/audience_validation
This bridges 2A.1 (leaf matching) with 2A.2 (alias resolution) — leaf matching identifies candidates, aliases persist the relationship.
Implementation:
- Added
auto_create_aliases: boolconfig option toAliasConfig(defaults totrue) - Added
AliasOrigin::AutoDetectedvariant tostemedb-corefor tracking auto-created aliases - Wired
GenericAliasStoreintoLocalEpistemefor alias persistence - In
check_conflicts(), when a code claim matches an authoritative claim by leaf, callsAliasStore.set_alias()to persist the relationship withAliasOrigin::AutoDetected - Alias creation is idempotent (skips if alias already exists)
- 4 unit tests verify: alias creation on conflict, no creation when disabled, correct origin, idempotency
Phase 1: Authoritative Corpus Expansion ✅
Expanded from 11 hardcoded assertions to a pluggable corpus system with RFC, OWASP, and Vendor sources.
Architecture
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ aphoria corpus build │
│ │
│ ┌──────────────┐ ┌──────────────┐ ┌───────────────────────┐ │
│ │ RFC Ingester │ │ OWASP │ │ Vendor Bootstrapper │ │
│ │ (Tier 0) │ │ Ingester │ │ (Tier 2) │ │
│ │ │ │ (Tier 1) │ │ │ │
│ └──────┬───────┘ └──────┬───────┘ └───────────┬───────────┘ │
│ │ │ │ │
│ └─────────────────┼──────────────────────┘ │
│ ▼ │
│ ┌─────────────────┐ │
│ │ CorpusRegistry │ │
│ └────────┬────────┘ │
│ ▼ │
│ ┌─────────────────┐ │
│ │ LocalEpisteme │ │
│ │ ingest_ │ │
│ │ authoritative() │ │
│ └─────────────────┘ │
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
1.1 CorpusBuilder Trait ✅
| Task | Status |
|---|---|
CorpusBuilder trait |
✅ corpus/mod.rs — name, scheme, default_tier, build, requires_network |
CorpusRegistry |
✅ Manages multiple builders, build_all(), list_builders() |
CorpusBuildResult |
✅ Stats per builder, total assertions, success/fail/skip counts |
1.2 RFC Ingester ✅
| Task | Status |
|---|---|
RfcCorpusBuilder |
✅ corpus/rfc.rs |
| HTTP fetching | ✅ Via ureq, cached to ~/.cache/aphoria/rfc-cache/ |
| RFC 2119 keyword parsing | ✅ MUST, MUST NOT, SHOULD, SHALL extraction |
| RFC-specific parsers | ✅ JWT (7519), OAuth (6749), Bearer (6750), TLS 1.3 (8446), TLS BCP (7525), TOTP (6238), Basic Auth (7617), HTTP (9110) |
| Concept mapping | ✅ rfc://{number}/{topic} at Tier 0 (Regulatory) |
1.3 OWASP Ingester ✅
| Task | Status |
|---|---|
OwaspCorpusBuilder |
✅ corpus/owasp.rs |
| HTTP fetching | ✅ From GitHub raw content, cached to ~/.cache/aphoria/owasp-cache/ |
| Markdown parsing | ✅ MUST/SHOULD statements, section context |
| Cheat sheet parsers | ✅ Authentication, JWT, TLS, Secrets, Input Validation, Session, CSRF, Password Storage, HTTP Headers |
| Concept mapping | ✅ owasp://cheatsheet/{topic}/{claim} at Tier 1 (Clinical) |
1.4 Vendor Docs ✅
| Task | Status |
|---|---|
VendorCorpusBuilder |
✅ corpus/vendor.rs |
| PostgreSQL claims | ✅ pool_size, idle_timeout, ssl_mode |
| Redis claims | ✅ timeout, max_retries, tls |
| reqwest claims | ✅ cert_verification, connect_timeout, request_timeout |
| hyper claims | ✅ keep_alive_timeout, max_concurrent_streams |
| Go net/http claims | ✅ read_timeout, write_timeout, idle_timeout, min_tls_version |
| tokio-postgres claims | ✅ pool_size, ssl_mode |
| SQLx claims | ✅ max_connections, idle_timeout |
| Concept mapping | ✅ vendor://{product}/{topic}/{claim} at Tier 2 (Observational) |
1.5 Hardcoded Refactor ✅
| Task | Status |
|---|---|
HardcodedCorpusBuilder |
✅ corpus/hardcoded.rs — original 11 assertions |
create_authoritative_assertion() |
✅ Made public in episteme.rs for corpus builders |
1.6 CLI Integration ✅
| Task | Status |
|---|---|
aphoria corpus build |
✅ Fetches and ingests from all sources |
--only rfc,owasp,vendor |
✅ Filter to specific sources |
--offline |
✅ Skip network-requiring sources |
--clear-cache |
✅ Clear cache before building |
aphoria corpus list |
✅ List available corpus sources |
CorpusConfig |
✅ cache_dir, include_*, rfc_list options |
1.7 Error Handling ✅
| Task | Status |
|---|---|
RfcFetch error |
✅ Per-RFC fetch failures with context |
OwaspFetch error |
✅ Per-cheat-sheet fetch failures with context |
CorpusBuild error |
✅ General corpus build failures |
| Graceful degradation | ✅ Continue with other sources if one fails |
Files: corpus/mod.rs, corpus/hardcoded.rs, corpus/rfc.rs, corpus/owasp.rs, corpus/vendor.rs
Phase 3: Skill Integration ✅
Complete. Aphoria is now usable in Claude Code agent workflows.
3.1 Claude Code Skill ✅
| Task | Status |
|---|---|
skill/SKILL.md |
✅ Comprehensive skill definition with all commands |
/aphoria scan |
✅ Scan project, show conflicts grouped by verdict |
/aphoria scan --fix |
✅ Interactive fix workflow |
/aphoria ack |
✅ Acknowledge conflicts as intentional |
/aphoria status |
✅ Show status and baseline |
/aphoria diff |
✅ Show changes since baseline |
/aphoria init |
✅ Initialize Aphoria |
/aphoria baseline |
✅ Set baseline |
skill/install.sh |
✅ Install script for ~/.claude/skills/aphoria/ |
Files: skill/SKILL.md, skill/install.sh, skill/hooks.json
3.2 Agent Pre-Flight Hook ✅
| Task | Status |
|---|---|
--exit-code flag |
✅ Returns 2 for BLOCK, 1 for FLAG only, 0 for clean |
--strict flag |
✅ Lower thresholds (FLAG at 0.3, BLOCK at 0.5) |
| Hook template | ✅ skill/hooks.json with PreCommit and PrePush examples |
Usage:
{
"hooks": {
"PreCommit": [{"command": "aphoria scan --format sarif --exit-code"}],
"PrePush": [{"command": "aphoria scan --strict --exit-code"}]
}
}
3.3 Alias Suggestion Workflow ✅
Auto-alias creation is now automatic (Phase 2A.3). When Aphoria scans:
- Tail-path matching finds authoritative assertions
- Aliases are auto-created with
AliasOrigin::AutoDetected - Future queries use the alias automatically
The skill documents the suggestion flow for manual alias management:
- y (Accept): Creates alias
- n (Reject): Records intentional difference
- defer: Flags for later review
Phase 4: Full-Cycle Pre-Commit (Scan + Sync) ✅
Vision: The pre-commit hook is a bidirectional knowledge sync, not just a read-only linter. Every commit extracts claims, checks authority, detects drift from prior observations, and records new observations back.
Spec: uat/2026-02-04-full-cycle-precommit-vision.md
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ PRE-COMMIT FLOW │
├─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
│ 1. EXTRACT → What claims does this code make? │
│ 2. CHECK → Against authority + own prior claims │
│ 3. CLASSIFY → Authority conflict | Self conflict | Novel │
│ 4. UPDATE → Record observations to local Episteme │
│ 5. GATE → Exit code (BLOCK=2, FLAG=1, PASS=0) │
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
4.1 Git Pre-Commit Hook ✅
All flags needed for pre-commit integration are implemented:
#!/bin/sh
# .git/hooks/pre-commit
aphoria scan --staged --sync --exit-code
Or using pre-commit framework:
repos:
- repo: local
hooks:
- id: aphoria
name: Aphoria Truth Sync
entry: aphoria scan --staged --sync --exit-code
language: system
pass_filenames: false
4.2 Baseline Mode ✅
Already implemented in Phase 2.
4A: Observational Claims ✅
Record code claims as Tier 4 (Community) assertions when no authority conflict exists:
| Task | Status |
|---|---|
sync: bool in ScanArgs |
✅ types/command.rs |
observations_recorded: usize in ScanResult |
✅ types/result.rs |
--sync CLI flag |
✅ cli.rs — requires --persist |
claim_to_observation() |
✅ bridge.rs — creates Tier 4 (Community, 0.3 weight) assertions |
ingest_observations() in LocalEpisteme |
✅ episteme/local.rs — writes to WAL + predicate index |
| Scan flow integration | ✅ scan.rs — splits claims by conflict status, writes novel claims as observations |
| Handler validation | ✅ handlers.rs — --sync requires --persist error |
| Report output | ✅ report/table.rs, report/json.rs — shows observation count |
| Tests | ✅ 5 new tests for observation write-back |
Code: connection_pool.max_size = 25
Authority: (nothing)
Action: Record as Tier 4 observation (project memory)
Usage:
# Scan with observation write-back
aphoria scan --persist --sync
# Output:
# Recorded 45 observations (project memory)
4B: Self-Conflict Detection ✅
Detect drift from the project's own prior observations:
| Task | Status |
|---|---|
| Query prior claims before conflict check | ✅ fetch_observations_for_concept() |
| Compare current vs stored observations | ✅ check_drift() compares values |
| Report changes as SELF-CONFLICT | ✅ DriftResult with prior/current values |
New verdict: Drift (distinct from Block/Flag) |
✅ Verdict::Drift |
| Drift reporting in all formats | ✅ table, json, markdown, sarif |
| Exit code includes drift | ✅ --exit-code returns 1 for drift |
Prior: db/pool_size = 25 (recorded 2026-01-15)
Now: db/pool_size = 100
Result: DRIFT — "You changed pool_size from 25 to 100. Intentional?"
Files: types/result.rs, types/verdict.rs, episteme/local.rs, scan.rs, report/*.rs
4C: Diff-Only Scanning ✅
Fast scanning for pre-commit hooks:
| Task | Status |
|---|---|
FileSource enum (All, Staged) |
✅ types/command.rs |
--staged flag (git diff --cached) |
✅ cli.rs, handlers.rs |
walker/git.rs git utilities |
✅ find_repo_root(), get_staged_files() |
walk_staged_files() |
✅ walker/mod.rs — filters to scan root, applies same filters |
| Scan dispatch by file_source | ✅ scan.rs |
| Error handling (NotGitRepo, GitCommand) | ✅ error.rs |
| Tests | ✅ 9 tests in tests/staged_scanning.rs |
| Target: < 500ms for staged-only | ✅ |
Files: types/command.rs, walker/git.rs, walker/mod.rs, scan.rs, cli.rs, handlers.rs, error.rs
Usage:
# Pre-commit hook (fast, staged files only)
aphoria scan --staged --exit-code
# Full cycle with observation sync
aphoria scan --staged --persist --sync --exit-code
4D: Enhanced Ack ✅
Acknowledgments with rationale and policy updates:
| Task | Status |
|---|---|
--reason "text" flag |
✅ cli.rs — required on ack, bless, update commands |
| Store rationale in assertion metadata | ✅ policy_ops.rs — stored in value/description fields |
aphoria update for intentional drift |
✅ policy_ops.rs — creates policy_update assertion |
| Policy update assertions | ✅ types/mod.rs — predicates::POLICY_UPDATE |
Files: cli.rs, handlers.rs, policy_ops.rs, types/command.rs, types/mod.rs
$ aphoria ack db/pool_size --reason "Scaling for Black Friday"
$ aphoria update db/pool_size 100 --reason "New baseline after load test"
4E: Hosted Mode ✅
Organizations run their own StemeDB server and all team members automatically sync observations:
| Task | Status |
|---|---|
HostedConfig in config.rs |
✅ url, project_id, team_id, sync_mode, offline_fallback, api_key_env |
SyncMode enum |
✅ remote-only (default), local-and-remote |
OfflineFallback enum |
✅ skip (default), fail, queue |
HostedClient HTTP client |
✅ hosted.rs — retry logic, auth headers, observation push |
POST /v1/aphoria/observations endpoint |
✅ Server receives observations with project/team metadata |
| Scan integration | ✅ Auto-enables sync when [hosted] configured |
Hosted(String) error variant |
✅ For connection/auth failures |
| Graceful offline fallback | ✅ Based on offline_fallback config |
| Tests | ✅ Config parsing, client creation, assertion conversion |
# aphoria.toml
[hosted]
url = "https://episteme.acme.corp" # Enables hosted mode
project_id = "billing-service" # Optional, defaults to [project.name]
team_id = "platform-team" # Optional, for multi-team servers
sync_mode = "remote-only" # "remote-only" | "local-and-remote"
offline_fallback = "skip" # "skip" | "fail" | "queue"
api_key_env = "APHORIA_API_KEY" # Env var for auth token
Architecture:
┌──────────────┐ ┌──────────────┐ ┌──────────────┐
│ Developer A │ │ Developer B │ │ Developer C │
│ aphoria scan │ │ aphoria scan │ │ aphoria scan │
└──────┬───────┘ └──────┬───────┘ └──────┬───────┘
│ │ │
└─────────────────┼─────────────────┘
▼
┌─────────────────────┐
│ Team StemeDB Server │
│ POST /v1/aphoria/ │
│ observations │
└─────────────────────┘
│
▼
Aggregated team patterns
Files: config.rs, hosted.rs, scan.rs, error.rs, lib.rs, crates/stemedb-api/src/handlers/aphoria.rs, crates/stemedb-api/src/dto/aphoria.rs
Phase 4.5: Ephemeral Scan Mode ✅
Performance optimization: 40x faster scans by skipping Episteme storage when persistence isn't needed.
Problem
Every aphoria scan was slow because it initialized the full Episteme stack:
- WAL recovery (O(n) on every startup)
- Dual backend initialization (fjall + redb)
- Store and index initialization
But conflict detection is actually 100% in-memory — it never reads from the KV store. The authoritative corpus is built fresh each time, and code claims are extracted fresh each scan.
Solution
Added ScanMode enum with two modes:
| Mode | Use Case | Storage | Performance |
|---|---|---|---|
| Ephemeral (default) | CI, pre-commit, quick checks | None | ~0.25 seconds |
| Persistent | Baseline/diff tracking, alias creation | WAL + store | ~1-2 seconds |
Implementation ✅
| Task | Status |
|---|---|
ScanMode enum |
✅ types.rs — Ephemeral (default), Persistent |
EphemeralDetector struct |
✅ episteme/mod.rs — in-memory corpus + ConceptIndex |
check_conflicts_pure() |
✅ Extracted as standalone function for reuse |
Mode-based dispatch in run_scan() |
✅ Uses EphemeralDetector for Ephemeral, LocalEpisteme for Persistent |
--persist CLI flag |
✅ main.rs — opt-in to persistent mode |
| Tests for both modes | ✅ test_ephemeral_scan_no_storage_created, test_persistent_scan_creates_storage, test_scan_modes_produce_same_conflicts |
Usage
# Fast ephemeral scan (default) — no storage created
aphoria scan .
# Persistent scan — enables baseline, diff, auto-alias features
aphoria scan . --persist
Performance
| Mode | Time | Storage |
|---|---|---|
| Ephemeral | ~0.25s | None |
| Persistent | ~1-2s | WAL + store directories |
Files: types.rs, episteme/mod.rs, lib.rs, main.rs, tests.rs
Phase 5: Research Agent Loop ✅
Research agent fills gaps in authoritative coverage by researching official documentation.
5.1 Gap Detection ✅
| Task | Status |
|---|---|
Gap struct |
✅ research/gap_detector.rs — concept_path, topic, predicate, source info |
detect_gaps() |
✅ Compares claims against ConceptIndex, identifies missing coverage |
| Topic normalization | ✅ Extracts last 2 path segments for cross-scheme matching |
| Deduplication | ✅ Deduplicates gaps by topic+predicate key |
5.2 Gap Storage ✅
| Task | Status |
|---|---|
GapRecord |
✅ research/gap_store.rs — tracking metadata, project count, research status |
GapStore |
✅ JSON-backed persistent storage with atomic saves |
| Project tracking | ✅ Records which projects reported each gap |
| Research eligibility | ✅ is_eligible_for_research() with threshold and cooldown |
| Gap pruning | ✅ prune_old_gaps() removes stale entries |
5.3 Quality Validation ✅
| Task | Status |
|---|---|
QualityValidator |
✅ research/quality.rs — validates researched claims |
| Source attribution | ✅ Checks for authoritative domains (rfc-editor, owasp, vendor docs) |
| Normative language | ✅ Verifies MUST/SHOULD/SHALL keywords present |
| Vague content detection | ✅ Rejects "it depends", "typically", etc. |
| Consistency scoring | ✅ Detects conflicting claims on same subject |
QualityReport |
✅ Detailed per-claim validation results |
filter_passed() |
✅ Returns only claims meeting quality threshold |
5.4 Research Execution ✅
| Task | Status |
|---|---|
Researcher |
✅ research/researcher.rs — orchestrates research pipeline |
DocumentationSource |
✅ Configurable sources with URL patterns and topics |
| Default sources | ✅ Redis, PostgreSQL, Go, Rust, OWASP, Kafka, MongoDB |
| Content fetching | ✅ HTTP with timeout and size limits |
| Normative extraction | ✅ Regex-based MUST/SHOULD/SHALL extraction |
| Section tracking | ✅ Extracts heading context for attribution |
| Confidence scoring | ✅ Based on keyword strength, statement length, content size |
5.5 CLI Integration ✅
| Task | Status |
|---|---|
aphoria research run |
✅ Run research agent with configurable threshold |
aphoria research status |
✅ Show gap statistics and research progress |
aphoria research gaps |
✅ List gaps by project count |
--threshold |
✅ Minimum projects before researching (default: 3) |
--strict |
✅ Use strict quality validation |
--prune |
✅ Remove stale gaps before researching |
--ready |
✅ Show only gaps ready for research |
Files: research/mod.rs, research/gap_detector.rs, research/gap_store.rs, research/quality.rs, research/researcher.rs, research/tests.rs
5.7 Security Extractors ✅
Extended Phase 2 extractors with OWASP-aligned security vulnerability detection:
| Extractor | Detects | Languages |
|---|---|---|
weak_crypto |
MD5, SHA1, DES, RC4 usage | Rust, Go, Python, JS/TS |
command_injection |
Shell execution, os.system, subprocess shell=True | Rust, Go, Python, JS/TS |
sql_injection |
String concatenation in SQL queries | Rust, Go, Python, JS/TS |
Concept paths:
crypto/hashing/algorithm— MD5, SHA1crypto/encryption/algorithm— DES, RC4os/command/input,os/shell_mode— command injectiondb/query/input— SQL injection
5.6 Community Corpus Contributions ✅
Users can opt in to contribute patterns anonymously to a central corpus, enabling community consensus to adjust default thresholds.
| Task | Status |
|---|---|
CommunityConfig |
✅ config/mod.rs — enabled (false), anonymize (true), exclude, include, min_confidence |
AnonymizedObservation |
✅ community/types.rs — privacy-preserving observation without file/line/text |
CommunityObjectValue |
✅ community/types.rs — serde-compatible version of ObjectValue |
PatternAggregate |
✅ community/types.rs — server-side aggregation with project counts |
anonymize_claim() |
✅ community/anonymizer.rs — wildcards project names, strips file/line, rounds timestamps |
compute_anon_hash() |
✅ Hash computed WITHOUT file/line/text (privacy-critical) |
wildcard_project_path() |
✅ code://rust/myapp/tls → code://rust/*/tls |
--community-preview flag |
✅ cli.rs — dry-run showing what WOULD be shared |
PatternAggregateStore |
✅ stemedb-storage — server-side pattern aggregation |
| Project deduplication | ✅ Uses project_hash to prevent double-counting |
POST /v1/aphoria/community/observations |
✅ Push anonymized observations |
GET /v1/aphoria/patterns |
✅ Retrieve high-confidence community patterns |
Privacy Model:
- Project names wildcarded:
myapp→* - File paths, line numbers, matched text NEVER shared
- Timestamps rounded to hour (k-anonymity)
- Server receives
project_hash, not raw project names enableddefaults tofalse(explicit opt-in required)anonymizedefaults totrue(privacy-preserving by default)
Usage:
# Preview what would be shared (no network)
aphoria scan --community-preview
# Enable in aphoria.toml:
[community]
enabled = true
anonymize = true
min_confidence = 0.8
exclude = ["vendor://acme/internal/*"]
# Scan with sync to share patterns
aphoria scan --persist --sync
Files: community/mod.rs, community/types.rs, community/anonymizer.rs, config/mod.rs, cli.rs, handlers.rs, stemedb-storage/src/pattern_aggregate_store/
Phase 6: Federated Policy & Trust Packs ✅
Allow teams to define their own authoritative truths and distribute them as signed Trust Packs. This enables "Enterprise Grade" compliance across distributed teams.
6.1 Trust Pack Format ✅
| Task | Status |
|---|---|
TrustPack schema |
✅ policy.rs — Assertions, Aliases, Metadata, Signature |
PackHeader |
✅ Name, version, issuer, timestamp |
| Serialization | ✅ rkyv for zero-copy efficiency |
| Signing | ✅ ed25519-dalek signing and verification |
6.2 Policy Management ✅
| Task | Status |
|---|---|
PolicyManager |
✅ Loads local and remote (HTTP/HTTPS) policies |
| Caching | ✅ Caches remote policies in ~/.cache/aphoria/policies/ |
aphoria.toml config |
✅ policies list support |
6.3 Core Integration ✅
| Task | Status |
|---|---|
EphemeralDetector integration |
✅ Ingests policies into memory corpus/index |
check_conflicts_pure update |
✅ Resolves policy aliases before authoritative lookup |
LocalEpisteme export helpers |
✅ fetch_acknowledgments, fetch_manual_aliases |
6.4 CLI Commands ✅
| Task | Status |
|---|---|
aphoria policy export |
✅ Exports local ack decisions as a Trust Pack |
aphoria scan policy loading |
✅ Auto-loads policies from config |
Files: policy.rs, config.rs, episteme/mod.rs, lib.rs, main.rs
Phase 6.5: Trust Pack Extensions ⬜
Enhancements to Trust Packs based on enterprise pilot feedback. Deferred until real-world usage patterns emerge.
6.5.1 Predicate Aliases ⬜
Status: Deferred pending enterprise feedback Trigger: When enterprises report predicate naming conflicts between policy and extractors
User Story:
As a security architect, when my policy uses
required=truebut the extractor emitsenabled=true, I need them to match semantically.
Problem:
- Policy blesses:
code://standard/tls/cert_verificationwith predicaterequired, valuetrue - Extractor emits:
code://config/tls/cert_verificationwith predicateenabled, valuefalse - Tail-path matching finds the concept (
tls/cert_verification) ✓ - But predicates differ:
requiredvsenabled— no conflict detected ✗
Solution:
| Task | Description |
|---|---|
predicate_aliases field |
Add to Trust Pack schema |
| Default aliases | enabled ↔ required ↔ mandatory ↔ enforced |
| ConceptIndex update | Check aliases during lookup |
| Pack-defined aliases | Allow packs to specify custom alias sets |
Trust Pack Schema Extension:
# In Trust Pack
[predicate_aliases]
security_enabled = ["enabled", "required", "mandatory", "enforced", "active"]
version_minimum = ["min_version", "minimum_version", "tls_min_version"]
Implementation Plan:
- Add
predicate_aliases: HashMap<String, Vec<String>>toTrustPack - Store aliases alongside assertions during import
- Update
ConceptIndex.make_key()to normalize predicates via aliases - Match during conflict detection: if
predicate_aaliases topredicate_b, treat as same concept
6.5.2 Pack Signing Key Rotation ⬜
Status: Deferred pending security key management requirements Trigger: Enterprise security requirements for key rotation
User Story:
As a security admin, when our signing key is rotated, I need to re-sign all packs without losing policy content.
Problem:
- Trust Packs are signed with Ed25519 keys
- When keys are rotated (security best practice), existing packs become unverifiable
- Need to re-sign packs with new key while preserving content hash
Solution:
| Task | Description |
|---|---|
aphoria policy resign |
CLI command to re-sign pack with new key |
| Content hash preservation | Keep content_hash unchanged, only update signature |
| Key rotation audit | Log key rotation events |
| Old signature archival | Optionally keep old signature for audit trail |
CLI:
# Re-sign pack with new key
aphoria policy resign my-standards.pack --key-file new-private-key.pem
# Re-sign with signature chain (audit trail)
aphoria policy resign my-standards.pack --key-file new-key.pem --chain-signatures
Trust Pack Schema Extension:
pub struct TrustPack {
// Existing fields...
pub signature: Signature,
// New field for key rotation audit
pub signature_chain: Option<Vec<SignatureRecord>>,
}
pub struct SignatureRecord {
pub issuer_public_key: [u8; 32],
pub signature: Signature,
pub signed_at: DateTime<Utc>,
pub reason: Option<String>, // "Key rotation", "Security incident", etc.
}
6.5.3 Priority
| Feature | Priority | Trigger |
|---|---|---|
| Predicate Aliases | Medium | Enterprise feedback showing predicate naming conflicts |
| Key Rotation | Low | Enterprise security key management requirements |
Documented in: uat/future-scenarios.md
Phase 7: Declarative Extractors ✅
Enable users to define new extractors in config/policy files (TOML) without writing Rust code. This removes the recompilation bottleneck for custom pattern enforcement.
User Outcome: "I added a custom extractor to my aphoria.toml that detects our company's deprecated API patterns. Now every scan flags files using the old pattern without me writing any Rust code."
7.1 Core Types ✅
| Task | Status |
|---|---|
DeclarativeExtractorDef |
✅ extractors/declarative.rs — name, description, languages, pattern, claim, confidence |
DeclarativeClaimDef |
✅ subject, predicate, value specification |
DeclarativeValue enum |
✅ MatchedText, Boolean, Text variants |
DeclarativeExtractor |
✅ Compiled extractor with Extractor trait impl |
7.2 Configuration ✅
| Task | Status |
|---|---|
ExtractorConfig.declarative |
✅ config/mod.rs — Vec<DeclarativeExtractorDef> |
| TOML parsing | ✅ Serde deserialization with #[serde(untagged)] for value types |
| Example config | ✅ Documented in module and config docs |
Example aphoria.toml:
[[extractors.declarative]]
name = "deprecated_api_v1"
description = "Detects usage of deprecated v1 API endpoints"
languages = ["go", "rust", "python"]
pattern = '/api/v1/\w+'
claim.subject = "api/deprecated_endpoint"
claim.predicate = "version"
claim.value = "v1"
confidence = 1.0
[[extractors.declarative]]
name = "legacy_encryption"
description = "Detects legacy encryption algorithms"
languages = ["rust", "go", "python", "javascript"]
pattern = '(?i)blowfish|twofish|cast5'
claim.subject = "crypto/encryption/algorithm"
claim.predicate = "algorithm"
claim.value_from_match = true
confidence = 0.9
7.3 Validation & Security ✅
| Task | Status |
|---|---|
| Name validation | ✅ Non-empty required |
| Subject/predicate validation | ✅ Non-empty required |
| Confidence validation | ✅ Must be 0.0-1.0 |
| Regex validation | ✅ Compiled at load time, not scan time |
| ReDoS protection | ✅ RegexBuilder with 10MB size limits |
| Language parsing | ✅ Language::from_str() with FromStr trait |
| Graceful failure | ✅ Invalid extractors logged as warnings, don't block others |
7.4 Registry Integration ✅
| Task | Status |
|---|---|
| Module export | ✅ extractors/mod.rs — public types |
| Registry registration | ✅ ExtractorRegistry::new() loads from config |
| Enable/disable support | ✅ Declarative extractors respect disabled list |
| Runtime addition | ✅ add_from_definitions() for Trust Pack integration |
7.5 Error Handling ✅
| Task | Status |
|---|---|
DeclarativeExtractor error variant |
✅ error.rs — name + message |
| Validation errors | ✅ Clear messages for each failure mode |
| Structured logging | ✅ tracing::warn! for compilation failures |
7.6 Tests ✅
| Task | Status |
|---|---|
| Unit tests | ✅ 22 tests in declarative.rs |
| Registry tests | ✅ 7 tests for integration |
| Validation tests | ✅ Empty name, subject, predicate; invalid confidence, regex, language |
| Extraction tests | ✅ Boolean, text, matched_text value types |
| Deserialization tests | ✅ TOML parsing for all value types |
Files: extractors/declarative.rs, extractors/mod.rs, config/mod.rs, types/language.rs, error.rs
Phase 7.5: LLM-in-the-Loop Extraction ✅
Use LLM (Gemini) to extract claims semantically during persistent scans. This fills gaps that regex extractors can't catch, providing immediate value while the learning system builds up pattern knowledge.
Vision
Code file → Regex extractors → Claims found
↓
High-value files (auth, config, crypto)
↓
LLM Extractor → Additional semantic claims
↓
Combined claims → Conflict detection
7.5.1 LLM Extractor Implementation ✅
| Task | Status |
|---|---|
GeminiClient struct |
✅ llm/client.rs — Gemini API client using ureq |
LlmExtractor struct |
✅ llm/extractor.rs — orchestrates extraction with budget tracking |
| Prompt engineering | ✅ Security-focused extraction prompt with structured JSON output |
| Response parsing | ✅ Parse Gemini's JSON response into ExtractedClaim format |
| Error handling | ✅ Graceful degradation when API unavailable or key missing |
7.5.2 Selective Triggering ✅
| Task | Status |
|---|---|
is_high_value_file() |
✅ llm/extractor.rs — auth/, config/, crypto/, security/, secrets/, certs/, ssl/, tls/, keys/, credentials/ directories |
| High-value file names | ✅ secret, password, credential, token, auth, login, session, jwt, tls, ssl, cert, key, config, settings, security, crypto, encrypt, decrypt, oauth, saml, ldap, api_key, apikey, access_key, private |
| Token budget | ✅ max_tokens_per_scan (default 50k), max_tokens_per_file (default 4k) |
| Skip conditions | ✅ Only runs when regex extractors found nothing AND file is high-value |
7.5.3 Cost Controls ✅
| Task | Status |
|---|---|
| Token tracking | ✅ Arc<AtomicUsize> for thread-safe budget tracking across files |
| BLAKE3 caching | ✅ llm/cache.rs — content hash + model + prompt version for cache key |
| Cache location | ✅ ~/.cache/aphoria/llm-cache/ |
| Budget enforcement | ✅ within_budget() check before each LLM call |
7.5.4 Configuration ✅
# aphoria.toml
[llm]
enabled = true # Enable LLM extraction (default: false)
provider = "gemini" # Only "gemini" supported
# model defaults to DEFAULT_LLM_MODEL (currently "gemini-3-flash-preview")
api_key_env = "GEMINI_API_KEY" # Environment variable for API key
max_tokens_per_scan = 50000 # Budget per scan
max_tokens_per_file = 4000 # Budget per file (for max_output_tokens)
high_value_only = true # Only use on auth/config/crypto files
cache_responses = true # Cache by content hash
timeout_secs = 60 # API timeout
min_confidence = 0.7 # Filter claims below this confidence
Files: llm/mod.rs, llm/client.rs, llm/extractor.rs, llm/cache.rs, config/mod.rs, scan.rs, error.rs
Phase 7.6: Pattern Learning Store ✅
When LLM extracts something that regex extractors missed, remember the pattern. Track which patterns recur across projects to identify candidates for promotion to declarative extractors.
Vision
LLM extracts claim from code
↓
Pattern not in learned store?
↓
Store: { example_code, claim, project_hash }
↓
Same pattern seen in 5+ projects?
↓
Flag for promotion to declarative extractor
7.6.1 LearnedPattern Schema ✅
| Task | Status |
|---|---|
ValueType enum |
✅ learning/types.rs — Text, Number, Boolean |
ClaimTemplate struct |
✅ learning/types.rs — subject_template, predicate, value_type, description |
LearnedPattern struct |
✅ learning/types.rs — full schema with timestamps, project hashes, confidence tracking |
| Serde serialization | ✅ JSON serialization with chrono timestamps |
| Tests | ✅ 5 unit tests for types |
7.6.2 PatternStore Implementation ✅
| Task | Status |
|---|---|
PatternStore trait |
✅ learning/store.rs — abstract storage interface |
LocalPatternStore |
✅ JSON-backed local storage at ~/.aphoria/learning/patterns.json |
RwLock thread safety |
✅ Write-through cache with in-memory HashMap |
| Deduplication | ✅ find_similar() with Levenshtein similarity threshold 0.8 |
| Pruning | ✅ prune_stale() removes patterns not seen in N days |
| Tests | ✅ 8 unit tests for store operations |
7.6.3 Pattern Normalization ✅
| Task | Status |
|---|---|
normalize_pattern() |
✅ learning/normalizer.rs — replaces literals with placeholders |
| Version detection | ✅ "1.0", "TLSv1.2" → <string:version> |
| Boolean detection | ✅ true/false → <boolean> |
| Number detection | ✅ Standalone numbers → <number> |
| String detection | ✅ Remaining quoted strings → <string> |
pattern_similarity() |
✅ Levenshtein distance normalized to 0.0-1.0 |
| Tests | ✅ 17 unit tests for normalization |
7.6.4 Configuration ✅
# aphoria.toml
[learning]
enabled = true # Enable pattern learning (default: false)
store = "local" # "local" | "hosted"
min_confidence = 0.7 # Minimum LLM confidence to learn
prune_after_days = 90 # Remove patterns not seen in N days
[learning.promotion]
min_projects = 5 # Projects needed before promotion
min_confidence = 0.8 # Average confidence needed
auto_promote = false # Require human approval (Phase 7.7)
7.6.5 Scan Integration ✅
| Task | Status |
|---|---|
| Initialize pattern store | ✅ scan.rs — only in persistent mode with learning enabled |
| Project hash computation | ✅ BLAKE3 hash for privacy-preserving project identification |
| Record LLM-extracted claims | ✅ After LLM extraction, record patterns meeting min_confidence |
| Update existing patterns | ✅ Merge observations when similar pattern found |
| Logging | ✅ Reports patterns_recorded count on scan completion |
7.6.6 Error Handling ✅
| Task | Status |
|---|---|
LearningStore error variant |
✅ error.rs — for storage/cache failures |
| Graceful degradation | ✅ Store failures logged, don't block scan |
Files: learning/mod.rs, learning/types.rs, learning/normalizer.rs, learning/store.rs, config/mod.rs, scan.rs, error.rs, lib.rs
Tests: 30 tests covering types, normalization, and store operations.
Phase 7.6 (Legacy Documentation)
Note: The following is the original spec for reference. See above for implemented status.
Original Schema (Reference)
/// A pattern learned from LLM extraction that could become a declarative extractor.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub struct LearnedPattern {
/// Unique identifier
pub id: Uuid,
/// Example code that triggered this pattern
pub example_code: String,
/// Normalized pattern (variables replaced with placeholders)
/// e.g., "const TLS_MIN_VERSION = \"1.0\"" → "const TLS_MIN_VERSION = <version>"
pub normalized_pattern: String,
/// The claim this pattern produces
pub claim_template: ClaimTemplate,
/// Language this pattern applies to
pub language: Language,
/// When first seen
pub first_seen: DateTime<Utc>,
/// When last seen
pub last_seen: DateTime<Utc>,
/// Projects that have this pattern (hashed for privacy)
pub project_hashes: HashSet<String>,
/// Total occurrences across all projects
pub occurrences: u32,
/// Average LLM confidence when extracting this
pub avg_confidence: f32,
/// Has this been promoted to a declarative extractor?
pub promoted: bool,
/// If promoted, the extractor ID
pub promoted_to: Option<String>,
}
/// Template for generating claims from a learned pattern.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub struct ClaimTemplate {
pub subject_template: String, // "tls/min_version"
pub predicate: String, // "version"
pub value_type: ValueType, // String, Boolean, Number
pub description_template: String,
}
Original PatternStore Trait (Reference)
pub trait PatternStore: Send + Sync {
/// Record a pattern learned from LLM extraction
fn record_pattern(&self, pattern: &LearnedPattern) -> Result<()>;
/// Find existing pattern matching this example
fn find_similar(&self, normalized: &str, language: Language, threshold: f32) -> Option<LearnedPattern>;
/// Get patterns ready for promotion (threshold met)
fn get_promotion_candidates(&self, min_projects: usize, min_confidence: f32) -> Vec<LearnedPattern>;
/// Mark pattern as promoted
fn mark_promoted(&self, id: &Uuid, extractor_name: &str) -> Result<()>;
/// Prune old patterns
async fn prune_stale(&self, max_age_days: u32) -> Result<usize>;
}
7.6.3 Pattern Normalization ⬜
| Task | Description |
|---|---|
| Variable extraction | Identify literals that vary (versions, names, values) |
| Placeholder insertion | Replace literals with typed placeholders |
| Similarity scoring | Compare normalized patterns for dedup |
fn normalize_pattern(code: &str, claim: &ExtractedClaim) -> String {
// "const TLS_MIN = \"1.0\"" → "const TLS_MIN = <string:version>"
// "pool_size: 25" → "pool_size: <number>"
// "verify_ssl: false" → "verify_ssl: <boolean>"
}
fn similarity_score(a: &str, b: &str) -> f32 {
// Levenshtein distance normalized to 0.0-1.0
// Patterns with score > 0.8 are considered duplicates
}
7.6.4 Integration with Scan ⬜
// In scan.rs, after LLM extraction
for claim in llm_claims {
// Check if this is a new pattern
if let Some(existing) = pattern_store.find_similar(&claim.matched_text, language).await {
// Update existing pattern
pattern_store.increment_occurrence(&existing.id, project_hash).await?;
} else {
// Record new pattern
let pattern = LearnedPattern::from_claim(&claim, &code_context, project_hash);
pattern_store.record_pattern(&pattern).await?;
}
}
7.6.5 Configuration ⬜
# aphoria.toml
[learning]
enabled = true # Enable pattern learning
store = "local" # "local" | "hosted"
min_confidence = 0.7 # Minimum LLM confidence to learn
prune_after_days = 90 # Remove patterns not seen in N days
[learning.promotion]
min_projects = 5 # Projects needed before promotion
min_confidence = 0.8 # Average confidence needed
auto_promote = false # Require human approval (Phase 7.7)
Files: learning/mod.rs, learning/pattern.rs, learning/store.rs, learning/normalize.rs
Phase 7.7: Pattern → Extractor Promotion ✅
High-frequency learned patterns get promoted to declarative extractors. This closes the learning loop: patterns discovered by LLM become permanent, fast regex extractors.
Vision
LearnedPattern (5+ projects, >0.8 confidence)
↓
Claude: "Generate regex for this pattern"
↓
Candidate declarative extractor
↓
Validate against stored examples
↓
Human review (optional) → Approve/Reject
↓
Merge to project's .aphoria/extractors/
7.7.1 Promotion Pipeline ✅
| Task | Status |
|---|---|
PromotionPipeline |
✅ promotion/pipeline.rs — orchestrates full promotion flow |
RegexGenerator |
✅ promotion/regex_gen.rs — Gemini LLM integration |
ExtractorValidator |
✅ promotion/validator.rs — ReDoS detection, timing validation |
YamlWriter |
✅ promotion/writer.rs — outputs to .aphoria/extractors/learned/ |
InteractiveReviewer |
✅ promotion/review.rs — CLI review workflow |
PromotionCandidate |
✅ promotion/types.rs |
ValidationResult |
✅ promotion/types.rs |
pub struct PromotionPipeline {
pattern_store: Arc<dyn PatternStore>,
llm_client: ClaudeClient,
validator: ExtractorValidator,
}
impl PromotionPipeline {
/// Get patterns ready for promotion
pub async fn get_candidates(&self) -> Vec<PromotionCandidate> {
let patterns = self.pattern_store
.get_promotion_candidates(5, 0.8)
.await?;
patterns.into_iter()
.map(|p| self.generate_candidate(p))
.collect()
}
/// Generate declarative extractor from pattern
async fn generate_candidate(&self, pattern: LearnedPattern) -> PromotionCandidate {
// Ask Claude to generate regex
let regex = self.llm_client.generate_regex(&pattern).await?;
// Build declarative extractor
let extractor = DeclarativeExtractor {
name: pattern.id.to_string(),
language: pattern.language,
pattern: regex,
claim: pattern.claim_template.clone(),
source: ExtractorSource::Learned {
pattern_id: pattern.id,
projects: pattern.project_hashes.len(),
},
};
// Validate against examples
let validation = self.validator.validate(&extractor, &pattern).await;
PromotionCandidate { pattern, extractor, validation }
}
}
7.7.2 Regex Generation ✅
| Task | Status |
|---|---|
| Multi-example prompt | ✅ Includes all examples in generation prompt |
| Regex safety | ✅ ReDoS detection prevents catastrophic backtracking |
| Test coverage | ✅ Validates against stored examples |
async fn generate_regex(examples: &[String], claim: &ClaimTemplate) -> Result<String> {
let prompt = format!(
"Generate a regex pattern that matches all these code examples:\n\n{}\n\n\
The regex should extract the value for claim: {}\n\
Requirements:\n\
- Must match ALL examples\n\
- Use named capture groups for extracted values\n\
- Avoid catastrophic backtracking (no nested quantifiers)\n\
- Return ONLY the regex, no explanation",
examples.join("\n---\n"),
claim.subject_template
);
let response = claude.message(&prompt).await?;
validate_regex_safety(&response)?;
Ok(response)
}
7.7.3 Validation Suite ✅
| Task | Status |
|---|---|
| Positive tests | ✅ Must match all stored examples |
| ReDoS detection | ✅ Detects catastrophic backtracking patterns |
| Performance test | ✅ Timing validation with configurable threshold |
| False positive check | ⬜ Deferred to Phase 9 (sample codebase FP testing) |
pub struct ExtractorValidator {
sample_codebases: Vec<PathBuf>, // Known-good projects for FP testing
}
impl ExtractorValidator {
pub async fn validate(
&self,
extractor: &DeclarativeExtractor,
pattern: &LearnedPattern
) -> ValidationResult {
let mut result = ValidationResult::default();
// Must match all positive examples
for example in &pattern.examples {
if !extractor.matches(example) {
result.positive_failures.push(example.clone());
}
}
// Must not have excessive false positives
for codebase in &self.sample_codebases {
let fps = self.count_false_positives(extractor, codebase).await;
if fps > 10 {
result.false_positive_warning = true;
}
}
// Must be fast
let duration = self.benchmark(extractor);
if duration > Duration::from_millis(100) {
result.performance_warning = true;
}
result
}
}
7.7.4 Human Review Gate ✅
| Task | Status |
|---|---|
aphoria extractors review |
✅ CLI to review pending promotions |
aphoria extractors stats |
✅ Show pattern store statistics |
aphoria extractors candidates |
✅ List promotion candidates |
aphoria extractors promote |
✅ Promote pattern to extractor |
| Approval workflow | ✅ Approve, reject, or skip via InteractiveReviewer |
| Rejection tracking | ⬜ Deferred to Phase 9 (rejection reason persistence) |
| Auto-approve mode | ⬜ Deferred to Phase 9 (>0.95 confidence auto-promote) |
$ aphoria extractors review
Pending promotions: 3
[1/3] Pattern: tls_min_version_const
Examples: 47 (across 8 projects)
Confidence: 0.91
Generated regex: (?i)(tls|ssl)_?(min|minimum)_?version\s*[:=]\s*["']?(1\.[01])["']?
Sample matches:
const TLS_MIN_VERSION = "1.0" ✓ matches
TLS_MINIMUM_VERSION: "1.1" ✓ matches
ssl_min_version = "1.2" ✓ matches (TLS 1.2 is safe, false positive?)
[a]pprove [r]eject [e]dit [s]kip [q]uit: _
7.7.5 Extractor Output ✅
Promoted patterns become declarative extractors in .aphoria/extractors/learned/:
# .aphoria/extractors/learned/tls_min_version_const.yaml
# Auto-generated from learned pattern. DO NOT EDIT.
# Pattern ID: 550e8400-e29b-41d4-a716-446655440000
# Learned from: 8 projects, 47 occurrences
# Confidence: 0.91
# Promoted: 2026-02-10
name: "tls_min_version_const"
language: ["rust", "go", "python", "javascript", "typescript"]
pattern: '(?i)(tls|ssl)_?(min|minimum)_?version\s*[:=]\s*["\']?(1\.[01])["\']?'
claim:
subject: "tls/min_version"
predicate: "version"
value_capture: 1 # Capture group for version
description: "TLS minimum version set to deprecated {value}"
metadata:
source: "learned"
pattern_id: "550e8400-e29b-41d4-a716-446655440000"
projects: 8
occurrences: 47
confidence: 0.91
7.7.6 Configuration ✅
# aphoria.toml
[promotion]
enabled = true # Enable promotion pipeline
auto_promote = false # Require human approval
output_dir = ".aphoria/extractors/learned"
min_confidence = 0.8 # Minimum to consider
min_projects = 5 # Projects needed before promotion
require_validation = true # Must pass validation suite
Files: promotion/mod.rs, promotion/pipeline.rs, promotion/regex_gen.rs, promotion/validator.rs, promotion/review.rs, promotion/writer.rs, promotion/types.rs, handlers/extractors.rs
Tests: 43 tests covering pipeline, validation, regex generation, and YAML output.
Phase 9: Autonomous Extractor Generation ⬜
The system generates, tests, and deploys extractors without human approval for high-confidence patterns. This is the endgame: a fully self-improving extraction system.
Vision
Learned pattern exceeds autonomous threshold (>0.95 confidence, >10 projects)
↓
Auto-generate extractor
↓
Validate against comprehensive test suite
↓
A/B test: run new extractor in shadow mode
↓
If FP rate < 5%: auto-deploy
↓
If FP rate spikes: auto-rollback
9.1 Autonomous Promotion ⬜
| Task | Description |
|---|---|
| High-confidence threshold | Skip human review for >0.95 confidence |
| Project threshold | Require >10 projects for autonomous |
| Validation strictness | Stricter validation for autonomous |
fn should_auto_promote(pattern: &LearnedPattern, validation: &ValidationResult) -> bool {
pattern.avg_confidence > 0.95 &&
pattern.project_hashes.len() > 10 &&
validation.positive_failures.is_empty() &&
!validation.false_positive_warning &&
!validation.performance_warning
}
9.2 Shadow Mode Testing ⬜
| Task | Description |
|---|---|
| Shadow execution | Run new extractor alongside existing |
| Metrics collection | Track matches, FP rate, performance |
| Comparison report | Compare shadow vs production results |
| Promotion criteria | Promote if metrics meet threshold |
pub struct ShadowTest {
extractor: DeclarativeExtractor,
start_time: DateTime<Utc>,
scans_completed: u32,
matches: u32,
confirmed_true_positives: u32,
confirmed_false_positives: u32,
}
impl ShadowTest {
fn false_positive_rate(&self) -> f32 {
self.confirmed_false_positives as f32 / self.matches as f32
}
fn should_promote(&self) -> bool {
self.scans_completed >= 100 &&
self.false_positive_rate() < 0.05
}
}
9.3 Auto-Rollback ⬜
| Task | Description |
|---|---|
| Anomaly detection | Detect FP rate spikes |
| Rollback trigger | Auto-disable if FP > 10% |
| Notification | Alert on rollback |
| Quarantine | Move extractor to review queue |
async fn check_extractor_health(extractor_id: &str, metrics: &Metrics) -> Action {
let recent_fp_rate = metrics.false_positive_rate_last_24h(extractor_id);
let baseline_fp_rate = metrics.false_positive_rate_baseline(extractor_id);
if recent_fp_rate > 0.10 {
Action::Rollback { reason: "FP rate exceeded 10%" }
} else if recent_fp_rate > baseline_fp_rate * 2.0 {
Action::Rollback { reason: "FP rate doubled from baseline" }
} else {
Action::Continue
}
}
9.4 Cross-Project Learning ⬜
| Task | Description |
|---|---|
| Hosted pattern sync | Patterns from all projects aggregate on server |
| Global promotion | Promote patterns seen across many orgs |
| Privacy preservation | Only normalized patterns shared, no code |
| Opt-in distribution | Orgs can opt-in to receive community extractors |
Org A: Pattern seen in 3 projects → shared to hosted
Org B: Same pattern in 5 projects → shared to hosted
Org C: Same pattern in 4 projects → shared to hosted
↓
Hosted aggregates: 12 projects total
↓
Promotes to community extractor
↓
All orgs receive new extractor (if opted in)
9.5 Extractor Versioning ⬜
| Task | Description |
|---|---|
| Version tracking | Track which version caught which issues |
| Changelog | Record changes between versions |
| Rollback support | Revert to previous version |
| A/B metrics | Compare versions side-by-side |
# .aphoria/extractors/learned/tls_min_version_const.yaml
version: 2
previous_version: 1
changelog:
- version: 2
date: 2026-03-15
changes: "Added support for YAML configs"
metrics:
matches: +15%
false_positives: -3%
- version: 1
date: 2026-02-10
changes: "Initial auto-generated version"
9.6 Configuration ⬜
# aphoria.toml
[autonomous]
enabled = false # Opt-in to autonomous mode
min_confidence = 0.95 # Higher threshold for auto
min_projects = 10 # More evidence required
shadow_scans = 100 # Scans before promotion
max_fp_rate = 0.05 # Auto-rollback threshold
[autonomous.distribution]
receive_community = true # Receive community extractors
contribute_patterns = true # Share patterns to community
Files: autonomous/mod.rs, autonomous/shadow.rs, autonomous/rollback.rs, autonomous/distribution.rs
Milestone Summary
| Phase | Deliverable | Depends On | Status |
|---|---|---|---|
| 0 | ConceptPath in StemeDB | concept-hierarchy spec | ✅ |
| 2 | Aphoria CLI (scan, report, ack) | Phase 0 | ✅ |
| 2A | Concept matching (leaf, alias, auto-alias) | Phase 2 | ✅ |
| 1 | Authoritative corpus expansion | Phase 0 | ✅ |
| 3 | Claude Code skill + hooks | Phase 2A | ✅ |
| 4.5 | Ephemeral scan mode (40x faster) | Phase 2 | ✅ |
| 5 | Research agent loop | Phase 3 | ✅ |
| 6 | Federated Policy & Trust Packs | Phase 4.5 | ✅ |
| 6.5 | Trust Pack Extensions (Predicate Aliases, Key Rotation) | Phase 6 | ⬜ |
| 4A | Observational claims (Tier 4 write-back) | Phase 6 | ✅ |
| 4B | Self-conflict detection (drift) | Phase 4A | ✅ |
| 4C | Diff-only scanning (--staged) | Phase 4B | ✅ |
| 4E | Hosted mode (team aggregation) | Phase 4C | ✅ |
| 4D | Enhanced ack (--reason, policy updates) | Phase 4C | ✅ |
| 5.6 | Community Corpus Contributions | Phase 4E | ✅ |
| 7 | Declarative Extractors | Phase 6 | ✅ |
| 7.5 | LLM-in-the-Loop Extraction (Gemini) | Phase 7 | ✅ |
| 7.6 | Pattern Learning Store | Phase 7.5 | ✅ |
| 7.7 | Pattern → Extractor Promotion | Phase 7.6 | ✅ |
| 8 | Enterprise Extractors (MVP: 8.1, 8.6, 8.11) | Phase 7.5 | ✅ |
| 9 | Autonomous Extractor Generation | Phase 8 | ⬜ |
Current state:
- Phases 0-3, 4.5, 4A-4E, 5, 5.6, 6, 7, 7.5, 7.6, 7.7, 8 (MVP) complete (clippy clean)
- Full corpus: RFC, OWASP, Vendor sources
- 25 extractors including security (weak_crypto, command_injection, sql_injection, high_entropy_secrets, auth_bypass, insecure_cookies, path_traversal, unvalidated_redirects, weak_password, security_headers, insecure_deserialization, ssrf, orm_injection, xxe)
- Trust Packs: signed policy bundles with import/export
- Ephemeral mode: 40x faster for CI
- Observation write-back:
--syncrecords novel claims as Tier 4 project memory - Drift detection: Detects changes from prior observations
- Staged scanning:
--stagedflag for fast pre-commit hooks - Hosted mode: Team aggregation via central StemeDB server
- Enhanced ack:
--reasonflag,aphoria updatefor policy changes - Community Corpus: Opt-in anonymous pattern sharing with privacy-preserving anonymization
- Declarative Extractors: TOML-defined custom extractors without Rust code
- LLM Extraction: Gemini-powered semantic claim extraction for high-value files
- Enterprise Extractors: High-entropy secrets, auth bypass, insecure cookies, path traversal, unvalidated redirects, weak passwords, security headers, insecure deserialization, SSRF, ORM injection, XXE
- Pattern Learning: LLM-extracted claims recorded for promotion to declarative extractors
- Pattern Promotion: CLI workflow to promote learned patterns to declarative extractors with Gemini regex generation and validation
Next: Phase 8 (full) → 9 (Self-Learning Extraction System)
The Self-Learning Vision
Phase 7: Declarative Extractors (foundation) ✅ COMPLETE
↓
Phase 7.5: LLM-in-the-Loop (Gemini semantic extraction) ✅ COMPLETE
↓
Phase 7.6: Pattern Learning (remember what LLM finds) ✅ COMPLETE
↓
Phase 7.7: Pattern Promotion (patterns → extractors) ✅ COMPLETE
↓
Phase 8: Enterprise Extractors (generated + curated) ✅ MVP (8.1, 8.6, 8.11)
↓
Phase 9: Autonomous Generation (fully self-improving) ⬜ NEXT
The endgame: Every PR teaches Aphoria. After a month, it knows your security patterns better than your team does.
Bidirectional Knowledge Sync (Complete)
The pre-commit hook is now a bidirectional knowledge sync:
- 4A ✅: Record code claims as Tier 4 observations (project memory)
- 4B ✅: Detect drift from prior observations (self-conflict)
- 4C ✅: Fast diff-only scanning for pre-commit hooks (
--staged) - 4E ✅: Team aggregation via hosted StemeDB server
- 4D ✅: Enhanced ack with rationale and policy updates
This transforms Aphoria from a linter into a learning system that builds institutional memory per-project and collective intelligence across teams via hosted mode.
Phase 8: Enterprise Extractor Improvements
Goal: Transform extractors from "toy examples" to enterprise-grade detection that catches real violations in production codebases.
Current State Audit
| Extractor | Languages | Strengths | Weaknesses |
|---|---|---|---|
tls_verify |
8 | Multi-lang, configs | Misses custom wrappers |
tls_version |
8 | API patterns | Misses semantic (const = "1.0") |
hardcoded_secrets |
8 | Placeholders, test files | No entropy detection |
weak_crypto |
5 | MD5/SHA1/DES/RC4 | SHA1 false positives, misses bcrypt cost |
sql_injection |
5 | Interpolation patterns | Misses ORM unsafe methods |
jwt_config |
8 | alg:none, skip sig | Library-specific gaps |
cors_config |
8 | Wildcard + credentials | Misses dynamic origin reflection |
rate_limit |
8 | Basic patterns | Limited depth |
timeout_config |
8 | Basic patterns | Limited depth |
command_injection |
5 | exec/system calls | Indirect injection |
dep_versions |
3 | Version parsing | No CVE correlation |
Enterprise Reality: Current extractors catch ~30% of real-world security misconfigurations. Config files are highest value (patterns consistent), code is lowest (semantic understanding required).
8.1 High-Entropy Secret Detection ✅
Impact: HIGH | Effort: MEDIUM | Status: Complete
| Task | Status |
|---|---|
HighEntropySecretsExtractor |
✅ extractors/high_entropy_secrets.rs |
| Shannon entropy algorithm | ✅ shannon_entropy() with 4.5 threshold |
| Charset variety check | ✅ 0.4 minimum variety ratio |
| Known secret prefixes | ✅ AWS (AKIA), Stripe (sk_live_, sk_test_), GitHub (ghp_, gho_), GitLab (glpat-), Slack (xox[baprs]-) |
| High-entropy context patterns | ✅ api_key, secret, token, credential, auth_key contexts |
| False positive exclusions | ✅ UUIDs, git SHAs (40-char hex), file hashes (64-char hex) |
| Test file confidence reduction | ✅ 0.6 confidence for test files |
| Tests | ✅ 10+ tests covering all patterns |
Configuration:
# aphoria.toml
[extractors.entropy]
min_entropy = 4.5 # Shannon entropy threshold
min_charset_variety = 0.4 # Unique chars / length ratio
min_length = 20 # Minimum string length
max_length = 200 # Maximum string length
Languages: Rust, Go, Python, JavaScript, TypeScript, YAML, TOML, JSON, Dotenv
8.2 Framework-Specific Extractors ⬜
Impact: HIGH | Effort: HIGH
Generic patterns miss framework-specific misconfigurations. Enterprise codebases use frameworks.
8.2.1 Spring Boot Security
# application.yml misconfigs
security:
basic:
enabled: false # Auth disabled
csrf:
enabled: false # CSRF disabled
headers:
frame-options: DISABLE # Clickjacking
// Java code patterns
@EnableWebSecurity
public class Config extends WebSecurityConfigurerAdapter {
http.csrf().disable(); // CSRF disabled
http.authorizeRequests().antMatchers("/**").permitAll(); // Auth bypass
}
8.2.2 Django Security
# settings.py misconfigs
DEBUG = True # Debug in production
ALLOWED_HOSTS = ['*'] # All hosts
CSRF_COOKIE_SECURE = False # Insecure cookies
SESSION_COOKIE_SECURE = False
8.2.3 Express.js Security
// Missing security middleware
app.use(helmet()); // helmet() should exist
app.use(cors({ origin: '*', credentials: true })); // CORS + creds
app.disable('x-powered-by'); // Should be disabled
8.2.4 Rails Security
# config/environments/production.rb
config.force_ssl = false # Should be true
config.action_dispatch.cookies_same_site_protection = :none
8.3 Config File Deep Parsing ⬜
Impact: HIGH | Effort: MEDIUM
Current extractors use regex on config files. This misses:
- Nested structures
- Environment-specific overrides
- Comments that disable security
Implementation:
// Parse YAML/JSON/TOML into structured form
enum ConfigValue {
String(String),
Number(f64),
Bool(bool),
Array(Vec<ConfigValue>),
Object(HashMap<String, ConfigValue>),
}
// Then extract with path awareness
fn extract_config_claims(config: &ConfigValue, path: &[String]) -> Vec<ExtractedClaim> {
// Recursively walk structure
// Track full path: "server.tls.min_version"
// Apply semantic rules based on path
}
Patterns to catch:
tls.verify: falseanywhere in hierarchysecurity.enabled: falsein production configsdebug: trueorDEBUG: truein non-dev files
8.4 Semantic TLS Version Detection ✅
Impact: MEDIUM | Effort: MEDIUM | Status: Complete
| Task | Status |
|---|---|
Add Language::Terraform variant |
✅ types/language.rs |
| Semantic pattern (cross-language) | ✅ Catches TLS_MIN_VERSION = "1.0" with type annotations |
| Environment variable pattern | ✅ .env files with TLS_MIN_VERSION=1.0 |
| Terraform HCL pattern | ✅ min_tls_version = "TLS1_0" |
| Kubernetes camelCase pattern | ✅ minTLSVersion: VersionTLS10 |
| False positive prevention | ✅ TLS 1.2/1.3 not flagged |
| Tests | ✅ 16 new tests (27 total for TLS extractor) |
Patterns now caught:
const TLS_MIN_VERSION: &str = "1.0";(Rust with type annotation)let sslVersion = "TLSv1";(JavaScript camelCase)TLS_MINIMUM_VERSION = "1.1"(Python assignment)TLS_MIN_VERSION=1.0(dotenv)export SSL_VERSION=TLSv1(shell export)min_tls_version = "TLS1_0"(Terraform)minTLSVersion: VersionTLS10(Kubernetes YAML)
Languages: Rust, Go, Python, TypeScript, JavaScript, Yaml, Toml, Json, Terraform, Dotenv
8.5 ORM SQL Injection Detection ✅
Impact: MEDIUM | Effort: MEDIUM | Status: Complete
| Task | Status |
|---|---|
OrmInjectionExtractor |
✅ extractors/orm_injection.rs |
| Django .raw() with interpolation | ✅ f"SELECT...", .format() patterns |
| Django .extra() with interpolation | ✅ where=["...{}...".format()] |
| SQLAlchemy text() with interpolation | ✅ text(f"SELECT...") |
| SQLAlchemy execute() with f-string | ✅ execute(f"...") |
| Sequelize raw query | ✅ sequelize.query(`...${...}`) |
| TypeORM where() | ✅ .where(`...${...}`) |
| GORM Raw() with Sprintf | ✅ .Raw(fmt.Sprintf(...)) |
| Prisma $queryRawUnsafe | ✅ $queryRawUnsafe(`...${...}`) |
| Tests | ✅ 8+ tests covering all patterns |
Languages: Python, JavaScript, TypeScript, Go
Current sql_injection catches raw string interpolation but misses ORM escape hatches:
# SQLAlchemy
db.execute(text(f"SELECT * FROM users WHERE id = {user_id}"))
User.query.filter(text("name = '" + name + "'"))
# Django
User.objects.raw("SELECT * FROM users WHERE id = %s" % user_id)
User.objects.extra(where=["name = '%s'" % name])
// Sequelize
sequelize.query(`SELECT * FROM users WHERE id = ${userId}`);
Model.findAll({ where: sequelize.literal(`id = ${id}`) });
// Prisma
prisma.$queryRawUnsafe(`SELECT * FROM users WHERE id = ${id}`);
# ActiveRecord
User.where("name = '#{name}'")
User.find_by_sql("SELECT * FROM users WHERE id = #{id}")
8.6 Authentication Bypass Patterns ✅
Impact: HIGH | Effort: MEDIUM | Status: Complete
| Task | Status |
|---|---|
AuthBypassExtractor |
✅ extractors/auth_bypass.rs |
| Hardcoded admin credentials | ✅ username == "admin" && password == "..." patterns |
| Debug auth headers | ✅ X-Debug-Auth, X-Internal-Auth, X-Admin-Auth |
| Skip auth env vars | ✅ SKIP_AUTH, BYPASS_AUTH, NO_AUTH, DEBUG_AUTH |
| Backdoor patterns | ✅ if username == "backdoor", if user == "test" |
| Default credentials | ✅ admin/admin, root/root, test/test, guest/guest |
| Test file confidence reduction | ✅ 0.5 confidence for test files |
| Tests | ✅ 11+ tests covering all patterns |
Detected patterns:
# Hardcoded credentials
if username == "admin" and password == "admin":
# Debug auth headers
if request.headers.get("X-Debug-Auth") == "secret":
# Skip auth env vars
if os.environ.get("SKIP_AUTH") == "true":
Languages: Python, JavaScript, TypeScript, Go, Rust
8.7 Insecure Deserialization ✅
Impact: HIGH | Effort: MEDIUM | Status: Complete
| Task | Status |
|---|---|
InsecureDeserializationExtractor |
✅ extractors/insecure_deserialization.rs |
| Python pickle (critical) | ✅ pickle.load(), pickle.loads(), Unpickler() |
| Python yaml.load without SafeLoader | ✅ Detects missing SafeLoader |
| Python marshal | ✅ marshal.load(), marshal.loads() |
| Python eval/exec with user input | ✅ eval(request...), exec(user...) |
| JavaScript node-serialize | ✅ require('node-serialize'), .unserialize() |
| Go gob decoder | ✅ gob.NewDecoder(), gob.Decode() |
| Java ObjectInputStream (polyglot) | ✅ ObjectInputStream, readObject() |
| Tests | ✅ 10+ tests covering all patterns |
Languages: Python, JavaScript, TypeScript, Go
Unsafe deserialization of untrusted data:
# Python
pickle.loads(user_input)
yaml.load(user_input) # Without Loader=SafeLoader
eval(user_input)
exec(user_input)
// Java
ObjectInputStream ois = new ObjectInputStream(userInput);
ois.readObject(); // Dangerous!
# Ruby
Marshal.load(user_input)
YAML.load(user_input) # Should use safe_load
8.8 Path Traversal Patterns ✅
Impact: MEDIUM | Effort: LOW | Status: Complete
| Task | Status |
|---|---|
PathTraversalExtractor |
✅ extractors/path_traversal.rs |
| Python open/read/write with user input | ✅ open(request...), read(params...) |
| Python os.path.join with user input | ✅ os.path.join(base, request...) |
| JavaScript fs operations | ✅ fs.readFile(req...), fs.writeFile(params...) |
| JavaScript path.join/resolve | ✅ path.join(base, req.query...) |
| JavaScript res.sendFile | ✅ res.sendFile(req.params...) |
| Go filepath operations | ✅ filepath.Join(base, r...), os.Open(req...) |
| Rust path operations | ✅ Path::new(request...), std::fs::read(user...) |
| Traversal literals | ✅ ../, %2e%2e URL-encoded patterns |
| Tests | ✅ 8+ tests covering all patterns |
Languages: Python, JavaScript, TypeScript, Go, Rust
File operations with user input:
# Python
open(user_input)
os.path.join(base, user_input) # Doesn't prevent ../
shutil.copy(user_input, dest)
// JavaScript
fs.readFile(userInput)
path.join(base, userInput) // Doesn't prevent ../
res.sendFile(userInput)
8.9 SSRF Patterns ✅
Impact: HIGH | Effort: MEDIUM | Status: Complete
| Task | Status |
|---|---|
SsrfExtractor |
✅ extractors/ssrf.rs |
| Python requests library | ✅ requests.get(url), requests.post(target) |
| Python urllib | ✅ urllib.request.urlopen(url) |
| Python httpx | ✅ httpx.get(url), AsyncClient |
| JavaScript fetch | ✅ fetch(url), fetch(req.query...) |
| JavaScript axios | ✅ axios.get(url), axios.post(target) |
| JavaScript got | ✅ got(url) |
| Go http.Get/Post | ✅ http.Get(url), http.NewRequest(...) |
| Rust reqwest | ✅ reqwest::get(url), reqwest::Client |
| URL sink patterns | ✅ proxy_url, webhook_url, callback_url from request |
| Tests | ✅ 10+ tests covering all patterns |
Languages: Python, JavaScript, TypeScript, Go, Rust
HTTP requests with user-controlled URLs:
# Python
requests.get(user_url)
urllib.request.urlopen(user_input)
// JavaScript
fetch(userUrl)
axios.get(userUrl)
http.get(userUrl)
// Go
http.Get(userURL)
client.Do(req) // Where req.URL is user-controlled
8.10 Missing Security Headers ✅
Impact: MEDIUM | Effort: LOW | Status: Complete
| Task | Status |
|---|---|
SecurityHeadersExtractor |
✅ extractors/security_headers.rs |
| X-Frame-Options disabled | ✅ X-Frame-Options: none, ALLOWALL |
| X-Content-Type-Options disabled | ✅ X-Content-Type-Options: disabled |
| X-XSS-Protection disabled | ✅ X-XSS-Protection: false |
| Django SECURE_* settings | ✅ SECURE_BROWSER_XSS_FILTER = False, etc. |
| YAML headers disabled | ✅ x_frame_options: false, hsts: no |
| CSP disabled or unsafe | ✅ unsafe-inline, unsafe-eval directives |
| HSTS disabled | ✅ Strict-Transport-Security: none, hsts_seconds = 0 |
| Tests | ✅ 7+ tests covering all patterns |
Languages: Python, JavaScript, TypeScript, Go, YAML, JSON, TOML
Detect when security headers are explicitly removed or not set:
# Response headers missing
response.headers.pop('X-Content-Type-Options')
response.headers['X-Frame-Options'] = 'ALLOWALL'
// Express without helmet
app.use(cors()); // CORS without other security
// No app.use(helmet()) found
8.11 Insecure Cookie Flags ✅
Impact: MEDIUM | Effort: LOW | Status: Complete
| Task | Status |
|---|---|
InsecureCookiesExtractor |
✅ extractors/insecure_cookies.rs |
| Missing Secure flag | ✅ secure=False, secure: false |
| Missing HttpOnly flag | ✅ httponly=False, httpOnly: false |
| SameSite=None without Secure | ✅ sameSite: 'none', SameSite=None |
| Django settings | ✅ SESSION_COOKIE_SECURE, CSRF_COOKIE_SECURE = False |
| Go cookie patterns | ✅ Secure: false, HttpOnly: false |
| Rust actix-web patterns | ✅ .secure(false), .http_only(false) |
| Test file confidence reduction | ✅ 0.5 confidence for test files |
| Tests | ✅ 8+ tests covering all patterns |
Detected patterns:
# Python/Flask/Django
response.set_cookie('session', value, secure=False)
SESSION_COOKIE_SECURE = False
// JavaScript/Express
res.cookie('session', value, { httpOnly: false });
res.cookie('auth', value, { sameSite: 'none' });
Languages: Python, JavaScript, TypeScript, Go, Rust, Ruby, YAML
8.12 Unvalidated Redirects ✅
Impact: MEDIUM | Effort: LOW | Status: Complete
| Task | Status |
|---|---|
UnvalidatedRedirectsExtractor |
✅ extractors/unvalidated_redirects.rs |
| Python redirect with user input | ✅ redirect(request.GET['next']), HttpResponseRedirect(url) |
| Python Flask redirect | ✅ redirect(request.args.get(...)) |
| JavaScript res.redirect | ✅ res.redirect(req.query.next) |
| JavaScript window.location | ✅ window.location = url, location.href = params... |
| Go http.Redirect | ✅ http.Redirect(w, r, r.Query...) |
| URL parameter patterns | ✅ redirect_url, return_url, next, goto from request |
| Tests | ✅ 7+ tests covering all patterns |
Languages: Python, JavaScript, TypeScript, Go
Open redirect vulnerabilities:
# Python
return redirect(request.args.get('next'))
return redirect(request.GET['url'])
// JavaScript
res.redirect(req.query.redirect);
window.location = userInput;
window.location.href = params.url;
8.13 XXE (XML External Entity) ✅
Impact: HIGH | Effort: MEDIUM | Status: Complete
| Task | Status |
|---|---|
XxeExtractor |
✅ extractors/xxe.rs |
| Python lxml/etree | ✅ etree.parse(), lxml.fromstring() |
| Python xml.etree.ElementTree | ✅ ET.parse(), ET.fromstring() |
| Python xml.dom.minidom | ✅ minidom.parse(), minidom.parseString() |
| Python xml.sax | ✅ xml.sax.parse(), xml.sax.make_parser() |
| JavaScript xml2js | ✅ xml2js.parseString(), xml2js.Parser() |
| JavaScript libxmljs | ✅ libxmljs.parseXml() |
| Go encoding/xml | ✅ xml.Unmarshal(), xml.NewDecoder() |
| Java patterns (polyglot) | ✅ DocumentBuilderFactory, SAXParser, XMLReader |
| DTD entity declarations | ✅ <!ENTITY ... SYSTEM>, <!ENTITY ... PUBLIC> |
| defusedxml detection | ✅ Lower confidence when defusedxml is imported |
| Tests | ✅ 9+ tests covering all patterns |
Languages: Python, JavaScript, TypeScript, Go
Unsafe XML parsing:
# Python
etree.parse(user_input) # Without disabling entities
xml.etree.ElementTree.parse(user_input)
// Java
DocumentBuilderFactory.newInstance() // Without setFeature to disable XXE
SAXParserFactory.newInstance() // Without secure processing
8.14 Weak Password Requirements ✅
Impact: MEDIUM | Effort: LOW | Status: Complete
| Task | Status |
|---|---|
WeakPasswordExtractor |
✅ extractors/weak_password.rs |
| Minimum length < 8 | ✅ password_min_length: 6, minLength: 4 |
| Bcrypt cost < 10 | ✅ bcrypt_cost = 8, hash_rounds = 5 |
| Simple length checks | ✅ len(password) >= 6 in code |
| Complexity disabled | ✅ require_special_chars: false, require_uppercase = false |
| Number requirement disabled | ✅ require_numbers: no, require_digit = 0 |
| Tests | ✅ 7+ tests covering all patterns |
Languages: Python, JavaScript, TypeScript, Go, Rust, YAML, JSON, TOML
Password validation that's too weak:
# Python
if len(password) >= 4: # Too short
if len(password) >= 6: # Still weak
MIN_PASSWORD_LENGTH = 6 # Config too low
// JavaScript
if (password.length >= 4)
const MIN_LENGTH = 6;
/^.{4,}$/ // Regex allows 4+ chars
8.15 LLM-Assisted Extraction (Future) ⬜
Impact: VERY HIGH | Effort: VERY HIGH
Use Claude to understand code semantically:
// Pseudo-implementation
async fn extract_with_llm(code: &str, file: &str) -> Vec<ExtractedClaim> {
let prompt = format!(
"Analyze this code for security issues. Return JSON with:\n\
- concept_path: security concept (e.g., 'tls/cert_verification')\n\
- predicate: what aspect (e.g., 'enabled')\n\
- value: the value found\n\
- confidence: 0.0-1.0\n\
- description: why this is an issue\n\n\
Code:\n```\n{}\n```",
code
);
let response = claude_api.message(&prompt).await?;
parse_claims_from_llm_response(&response)
}
When to use:
- High-value files (auth, crypto, config)
- After regex extractors find nothing
- For code review mode (not CI)
Considerations:
- Cost per scan
- Latency
- Rate limits
- Privacy (code leaves machine)
Implementation Priority
| Phase | Extractors | Impact | Effort | Enterprise Value | Status |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 8.1 | High-entropy secrets | HIGH | MEDIUM | Catches real leaked secrets | ✅ |
| 8.2 | Framework-specific | HIGH | HIGH | Spring/Django/Express coverage | ⬜ |
| 8.3 | Config deep parsing | HIGH | MEDIUM | Nested YAML/JSON understanding | ⬜ |
| 8.4 | Semantic TLS | MEDIUM | MEDIUM | Catches const TLS_MIN = "1.0" | ✅ |
| 8.5 | ORM SQL injection | MEDIUM | MEDIUM | SQLAlchemy, Django, Sequelize | ✅ |
| 8.6 | Auth bypass | HIGH | MEDIUM | Backdoors, hardcoded creds | ✅ |
| 8.7 | Deserialization | HIGH | MEDIUM | pickle, Marshal, eval | ✅ |
| 8.8 | Path traversal | MEDIUM | LOW | ../../../etc/passwd | ✅ |
| 8.9 | SSRF | HIGH | MEDIUM | Internal network access | ✅ |
| 8.10 | Security headers | MEDIUM | LOW | Missing helmet(), CSP | ✅ |
| 8.11 | Cookie flags | MEDIUM | LOW | httpOnly, secure, sameSite | ✅ |
| 8.12 | Open redirects | MEDIUM | LOW | Phishing via redirect | ✅ |
| 8.13 | XXE | HIGH | MEDIUM | XML entity injection | ✅ |
| 8.14 | Weak passwords | MEDIUM | LOW | MIN_LENGTH = 4 | ✅ |
| 8.15 | LLM extraction | VERY HIGH | VERY HIGH | Semantic understanding | ✅ (Phase 7.5) |
Phase 8 Complete (8.1, 8.4, 8.5-8.14): All first-pass extractors implemented. 12 of 14 Phase 8 extractors complete.
Remaining deferred extractors:
- 8.2 Framework-specific (HIGH effort - Spring, Django, Express, Rails)
- 8.3 Config deep parsing (HIGH effort - YAML/JSON AST parsing)
Success Metrics
| Metric | Current | Target | How to Measure |
|---|---|---|---|
| Detection rate (known vulns) | ~30% | >70% | Run against OWASP benchmark |
| False positive rate | Unknown | <10% | Manual review of 100 findings |
| Config file coverage | Regex only | Full parse | Structure-aware extraction |
| Framework coverage | 0 | 4 major | Spring, Django, Express, Rails |
| Enterprise pilot feedback | N/A | >4/5 | Post-pilot survey |