- Add BUILD.bazel across tidal, tidal-net, tidal-server, tidalctl for bzlmod build - Add tidal/ crate docs (README, CHANGELOG, CONTRIBUTING, AGENTS, CLAUDE, API, ARCHITECTURE) and ai-lookup reference - Add docker standalone/cluster/deploy images, compose, and prometheus config - Harden WAL (batch format, writer, dedup, diagnostics), text syncer/collectors, and vector registry - Expand tidalctl CLI and tests; restructure WAL/visibility integration test suites - Refine tidal-net transport/client/server and tidal-server cluster/scatter-gather
22 KiB
m9p3: Retroactive Purge and Deterministic Rematerialization
Delivers
The purge_prior_contributions(user, community, epoch_range) API and the
deterministic rematerialization engine behind it. After this phase a user who
has left a community (m9p2 stop_forward) can retroactively remove every
contribution they ever shared into that community's overlay -- and the community's
hot+warm signal aggregates are rebuilt deterministically from the surviving
WAL events, so two identical purges produce byte-identical checkpoints. Purge is
durable (Tag::PurgeTombstone), CRDT-safe (scope_tombstones on
CrdtSignalState preserve commutativity/associativity/idempotence across
partition heals), and auditable (community queries surface a purge_watermark).
The local-profile-intact guarantee from m9p1 is upheld throughout: Local-scope
signals are never matched by a community purge.
This is the XL "remove and rebuild" phase. It introduces no new wire format (WAL V3 landed in m9p1; membership epochs landed in m9p2); it composes those primitives with a new replay/recompute path.
Deliverables:
TidalDb::purge_prior_contributions(user_id, community_id, epoch_range)->PurgeReceipt(newdb/purge.rs)PurgeTombstone { user_id, community_id, epoch_range, hlc, watermark_seqno }persisted toTag::PurgeTombstoneRematerializeEngine(newgovernance/rematerialize.rs): replays community WAL sorted by(hlc, seqno), drops tombstoned events, recomputes hot+warm tiers from scratchCrdtSignalStategainsscope_tombstones: BTreeMap<ScopeTombstoneKey, HlcTimestamp>so merge stays a true CRDT under purgepurge_watermark: Option<u64>added toResults.policy_metadata(thePolicyMetadatastruct introduced in m9p2)- Hard-negative leak guard:
apply_replication_unhideandreconcilehonor purge tombstones so a late pre-purge unhide cannot revive a purged hard negative - Determinism invariant: double-purge -> BLAKE3-equal checkpoint payloads (property test)
Dependencies
- Requires: m9p2 complete (
MembershipState,Membership,MembershipEpoch,epochranges,PolicyMetadataonResults,db/communities.rsjoin/leave/rejoin,stop_forward_at_nsgate); m9p1 complete (SignalScope,CommunityId,SignalProvenance, WAL V3 per-eventscope/writer_agent/share_policy_version/membership_epoch); M8 CRDT (CrdtSignalState,HlcTimestamp,ReconciliationEngine,StateSnapshot) - Files modified:
tidal/src/replication/crdt/signal_state.rs-- addscope_tombstones; thread tombstone application throughmergetidal/src/replication/reconcile.rs-- stop-forward / purge ordering: tombstone HLC dominates a late unhide (hard-negative leak guard)tidal/src/signals/ledger/core.rs--apply_wal_eventaccepts a purge filter;restore/replay machinery reused by rematerializetidal/src/entities/hard_neg.rs--apply_replication_unhideconsults purge tombstone before reviving an itemtidal/src/query/retrieve/types.rs--PolicyMetadata.purge_watermarktidal/src/db/mod.rs--purge_tombstonesregistry field; wirepurge.rsandrematerialize.rstidal/src/storage/keys.rs-- addTag::PurgeTombstone = 0x0Etidal/src/lib.rs-- re-exportpurge/rematerializetypes undergovernance
- Files created:
tidal/src/db/purge.rs--purge_prior_contributions,PurgeReceipt, tombstone write pathtidal/src/governance/rematerialize.rs--RematerializeEngine,PurgeTombstone,ScopeTombstoneKey, sorted replay + recompute
Research References
docs/research/tidaldb_wal.md-- WAL replay determinism, segment orderingdocs/research/tidaldb_signal_ledger.md-- running-decay recompute, hot/warm tier rebuild from raw eventsthoughts.md-- Part II.1 (WAL convergence), Part V.5 (quarantine-first removal), CRDT merge laws (Kulkarni et al. 2014, HLC)tidal/docs/planning/milestone-8/phase-3--CrdtSignalStatemerge laws (commutative/associative/idempotent) this phase must preservetidal/docs/planning/milestone-9/phase-1&phase-2--SignalScope,CommunityId,Membership,MembershipEpoch,PolicyMetadata(GIVEN; do not redefine)
Acceptance Criteria (Phase Level)
TidalDb::purge_prior_contributions(user_id: u64, community_id: CommunityId, epoch_range: RangeInclusive<u32>) -> Result<PurgeReceipt>exists and is#[must_use]on its return- A
PurgeTombstone { user_id, community_id, epoch_range, hlc, watermark_seqno }is durably written toTag::PurgeTombstone(0x0E) before the rematerialization job runs; survives close/reopen - Purge triggers rematerialization synchronously and the returned
PurgeReceiptreportsevents_dropped,entities_rebuilt, andwatermark_seqno - Rematerialization replays the community WAL in a total order of
(hlc, seqno), skipping every event whose(user_id, community_id, membership_epoch)falls under any tombstone; surviving events recompute hot+warm tiers from zero - Determinism: running the same purge twice over the same WAL yields BLAKE3-equal checkpoint payloads (
hash_checkpoint_payload); property test asserts equality across >= 64 generated WAL/tombstone sequences - CRDT merge with
scope_tombstonesis still commutative, associative, and idempotent (proptest, mirroringsignal_state.rslaw tests); a tombstone with a dominating HLC always wins regardless of merge order Local-scope events are never selected by a community purge (local-profile-intact guarantee); a purge of community C leaves the user's local decay scores and windowed counts bit-identical- Hard-negative leak guard: after purge + simulated partition heal, a pre-purge
unhidewith an HLC older than the purge tombstone does NOT revive a purged hard negative (apply_replication_unhidereturnsfalse) - Community queries expose
purge_watermark: Some(seqno)inResults.policy_metadataafter a purge; pre-purge queries reportNone - Crash injection mid-tombstone-write and mid-rematerialize recovers to a consistent state on reopen (either purge fully applied or not at all)
- All m8/m9p1/m9p2 tests pass unchanged;
cargo fmtclean,cargo clippy -p tidaldb -D warningsclean,cargo test -p tidaldb --libgreen; tests are fast
Task Execution Order
Task 01: Tombstone Types ──────────┐
(PurgeTombstone, │
ScopeTombstoneKey, Tag 0x0E) │
├──> Task 03: scope_tombstones on CrdtSignalState
Task 02: Rematerialize Engine ─────┤ (merge-law preserving)
(sorted (hlc,seqno) replay, │ │
recompute hot+warm) │ v
├──> Task 04: purge_prior_contributions API
│ (db/purge.rs: write tombstone -> run engine -> receipt)
│ │
│ v
└──> Task 05: Hard-negative leak guard
(reconcile + apply_replication_unhide honor tombstone)
│
v
Task 06: Purge watermark in query metadata
│
v
Task 07: Determinism + crash property tests
Tasks 01 and 02 are parallelizable (disjoint files: governance/rematerialize.rs
type vs replay logic). Task 03 depends on 01 (tombstone key). Task 04 depends on
01+02+03 (it is the integration seam). Tasks 05, 06, 07 depend on 04.
Module Location
| File | Status | Contains |
|---|---|---|
tidal/src/governance/rematerialize.rs |
NEW | RematerializeEngine, PurgeTombstone, ScopeTombstoneKey, RematerializeReport, sorted replay |
tidal/src/db/purge.rs |
NEW | TidalDb::purge_prior_contributions, PurgeReceipt, tombstone persistence |
tidal/src/replication/crdt/signal_state.rs |
MODIFIED | scope_tombstones: BTreeMap<ScopeTombstoneKey, HlcTimestamp>; tombstone-aware merge |
tidal/src/replication/reconcile.rs |
MODIFIED | Purge-tombstone ordering in plan; tombstone HLC dominates late unhide |
tidal/src/signals/ledger/core.rs |
MODIFIED | apply_wal_event_filtered (purge predicate); replay reuse for rematerialize |
tidal/src/entities/hard_neg.rs |
MODIFIED | apply_replication_unhide consults purge tombstone before reviving |
tidal/src/query/retrieve/types.rs |
MODIFIED | PolicyMetadata.purge_watermark: Option<u64> |
tidal/src/storage/keys.rs |
MODIFIED | Tag::PurgeTombstone = 0x0E |
tidal/src/db/mod.rs |
MODIFIED | purge_tombstones registry field; module wiring |
tidal/src/lib.rs |
MODIFIED | governance re-exports for purge types |
Technical Design
Tombstone types (governance/rematerialize.rs)
use std::collections::BTreeMap;
use std::ops::RangeInclusive;
use crate::governance::scope::CommunityId;
use crate::replication::crdt::HlcTimestamp;
/// A durable record that a user's prior contributions to a community, over a
/// closed range of membership epochs, must be removed from community aggregates.
///
/// Tombstones are write-once and monotone: rematerialization skips any event
/// whose `(user_id, community_id, membership_epoch)` is covered, and CRDT merge
/// keeps the tombstone with the dominating [`HlcTimestamp`]. Persisted under
/// [`Tag::PurgeTombstone`](crate::storage::Tag) keyed by `(community_id, user_id)`.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, serde::Serialize, serde::Deserialize)]
pub struct PurgeTombstone {
/// The user whose contributions are being removed.
pub user_id: u64,
/// The community overlay the purge targets. Never `Local` scope.
pub community_id: CommunityId,
/// Inclusive membership-epoch range to purge (from m9p2 epochs).
pub epoch_range: RangeInclusive<u32>,
/// Causal stamp of the purge. Dominates any earlier unhide on merge.
pub hlc: HlcTimestamp,
/// WAL sequence number at which the purge took effect (the watermark
/// surfaced in query metadata for auditability).
pub watermark_seqno: u64,
}
impl PurgeTombstone {
/// Whether this tombstone covers a given contribution.
///
/// A community purge NEVER matches `Local`-scope contributions: the caller
/// only ever feeds community-scoped events here, but this stays explicit so
/// a routing bug cannot silently delete local history.
#[must_use]
pub fn covers(&self, user_id: u64, community_id: CommunityId, epoch: u32) -> bool {
self.user_id == user_id
&& self.community_id == community_id
&& self.epoch_range.contains(&epoch)
}
}
/// Key identifying a CRDT scope tombstone within a `(entity, signal_type)`
/// state. Ordered so merge is a deterministic fold over a `BTreeMap`.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, PartialOrd, Ord, Hash,
serde::Serialize, serde::Deserialize)]
pub struct ScopeTombstoneKey {
pub community_id: CommunityId,
pub user_id: u64,
/// Upper bound of the purged epoch range (covers `0..=epoch_hi`).
pub epoch_hi: u32,
}
Rematerialization engine (governance/rematerialize.rs)
/// Outcome of a deterministic rematerialization pass.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct RematerializeReport {
/// Events skipped because a tombstone covered them.
pub events_dropped: u64,
/// Events replayed into the rebuilt aggregates.
pub events_replayed: u64,
/// Distinct `(entity, signal_type)` ledger entries rebuilt.
pub entities_rebuilt: u64,
/// WAL sequence number the rebuild observed as the tail.
pub watermark_seqno: u64,
}
/// Replays a community's WAL in deterministic `(hlc, seqno)` order, drops
/// tombstoned contributions, and recomputes hot+warm signal tiers from scratch.
///
/// Determinism is the load-bearing property: two passes over the same WAL with
/// the same tombstone set MUST produce byte-identical checkpoint payloads. This
/// requires (1) a total order on events -- `(hlc, seqno)`, never `DashMap`
/// iteration order -- and (2) forward-only decay application so out-of-order
/// events never advance `last_update_ns` (the `HotSignalState::on_signal`
/// invariant from m1p4 is reused verbatim).
pub struct RematerializeEngine<'a> {
storage: &'a dyn crate::storage::StorageEngine,
tombstones: &'a [PurgeTombstone],
}
impl<'a> RematerializeEngine<'a> {
#[must_use]
pub fn new(
storage: &'a dyn crate::storage::StorageEngine,
tombstones: &'a [PurgeTombstone],
) -> Self {
Self { storage, tombstones }
}
/// Rebuild the community signal aggregates for `community_id` into a fresh
/// [`SignalLedger`], returning the rebuilt ledger and a report.
///
/// Steps:
/// 1. Scan community WAL events (V3 carries `scope`, `membership_epoch`).
/// 2. Sort by `(hlc, seqno)` -- a total order, stable across runs.
/// 3. For each event, skip if any tombstone `covers(user, community, epoch)`.
/// 4. Apply survivors via `SignalLedger::apply_wal_event` (forward decay).
///
/// # Errors
///
/// Returns `TidalError::Storage` on scan failure, `TidalError::Internal`
/// on a corrupt WAL record.
pub fn rematerialize(
&self,
community_id: CommunityId,
) -> crate::Result<(crate::signals::SignalLedger, RematerializeReport)> {
// ... sorted replay; see Task 02.
todo!()
}
}
Purge API (db/purge.rs)
/// Receipt returned by [`TidalDb::purge_prior_contributions`].
#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
#[must_use = "a purge receipt records the watermark callers need for audit/query metadata"]
pub struct PurgeReceipt {
/// The tombstone that was durably written.
pub tombstone: PurgeTombstone,
/// Events removed by rematerialization.
pub events_dropped: u64,
/// Ledger entries rebuilt.
pub entities_rebuilt: u64,
/// The purge watermark seqno (also surfaced in query `policy_metadata`).
pub watermark_seqno: u64,
}
impl TidalDb {
/// Retroactively remove a user's prior contributions to a community overlay
/// and deterministically rebuild that community's affected aggregates.
///
/// Precondition (enforced, not assumed): the user must be in
/// `MembershipState::Left` or `LeavingStopForward` for `community_id`
/// (m9p2). `community_id` is never `Local` scope -- local history is
/// untouchable by community purge.
///
/// Order of operations (crash-safe):
/// 1. Allocate `watermark_seqno` = current WAL tail and an `HlcTimestamp`.
/// 2. Durably write the [`PurgeTombstone`] to `Tag::PurgeTombstone`, fsync.
/// 3. Run [`RematerializeEngine`] and atomically checkpoint the rebuilt
/// community ledger (replacing the diverged hot/warm state).
/// 4. Record the watermark for query `policy_metadata`.
///
/// A crash between (2) and (3) is recovered on reopen by re-running
/// rematerialization from the durable tombstone -- the operation is
/// idempotent because the tombstone is the source of truth.
///
/// # Errors
///
/// - `TidalError::NotFound` if the user has no membership for the community.
/// - `TidalError::Query` if the user is still `Joined` (must stop-forward first).
/// - `TidalError::Storage` / `TidalError::Internal` on persistence failure.
pub fn purge_prior_contributions(
&self,
user_id: u64,
community_id: CommunityId,
epoch_range: std::ops::RangeInclusive<u32>,
) -> crate::Result<PurgeReceipt> {
// ... see Task 04.
todo!()
}
}
CRDT scope tombstones (replication/crdt/signal_state.rs)
// Added field on CrdtSignalState (a true state-based CRDT):
//
// /// Scope tombstones keep this state a CRDT under retroactive purge.
// /// LWW per key by HlcTimestamp; merge takes the dominating stamp. A
// /// BTreeMap (not HashMap) so the merge fold is deterministic order.
// scope_tombstones: BTreeMap<ScopeTombstoneKey, HlcTimestamp>,
impl CrdtSignalState {
/// Record a purge tombstone. Idempotent; LWW by `HlcTimestamp`.
pub fn apply_scope_tombstone(&mut self, key: ScopeTombstoneKey, hlc: HlcTimestamp) {
let slot = self.scope_tombstones.entry(key).or_insert(hlc);
if hlc > *slot {
*slot = hlc;
}
}
// merge() gains a final fold that unions scope_tombstones, keeping the
// dominating HlcTimestamp per key -- this preserves commutativity,
// associativity, and idempotence exactly like the existing node_buckets
// PNCounter merge. Tombstone application is order-independent (max wins).
}
Hard-negative leak guard (entities/hard_neg.rs)
impl HardNegIndex {
/// As `apply_replication_unhide`, but a pending purge tombstone whose HLC
/// dominates the unhide blocks the revive. This is the leak guard: a late
/// pre-purge `unhide` arriving after a heal must NOT bring a purged hard
/// negative back. Returns `true` only if the item was actually removed.
#[must_use]
pub fn apply_replication_unhide_guarded(
&self,
user_id: u64,
item_id: u32,
ts: HlcTimestamp,
purge_hlc: Option<HlcTimestamp>,
) -> bool {
if matches!(purge_hlc, Some(p) if ts <= p) {
return false; // tombstone dominates; do not revive.
}
self.apply_replication_unhide(user_id, item_id, ts)
}
}
Query metadata (query/retrieve/types.rs)
// PolicyMetadata is introduced in m9p2 (carries membership_epoch). m9p3 adds:
//
// /// WAL seqno at which the most recent purge for this community took effect.
// /// `None` if no purge has been applied. Auditability: a client can prove a
// /// query reflects state at or after a given purge.
// pub purge_watermark: Option<u64>,
Notes
Determinism is the single load-bearing invariant
Rematerialization MUST sort events by (hlc, seqno) and apply forward-decay
identically each run. Never iterate DashMap for replay order -- it is
hash-sharded and non-deterministic. The known hazard (m8p3 / m1p4): an
out-of-order event must NOT advance last_update_ns in HotSignalState
(signals/hot.rs); it pre-decays its own weight instead. Reuse that exact path.
Verify by BLAKE3-hashing checkpoint payloads after two identical purges
(hash_checkpoint_payload in signals/checkpoint/integrity.rs) and asserting
equality.
CRDT merge laws survive scope tombstones
CrdtSignalState is the project's canonical state-based CRDT (commutative,
associative, idempotent -- see its proptests). Adding scope_tombstones must
not break these. Tombstone application is max-by-HLC per key, which is exactly
the algebra of the existing node_buckets PNCounter merge: order-independent
and idempotent. Extend the existing proptest strategy to generate tombstones and
re-assert prop_merge_commutative / prop_merge_associative /
prop_merge_idempotent_on_replay. Use a BTreeMap (not HashMap) for the
tombstone field so the merge fold and any serialization are deterministic.
Local-profile-intact: the silent-data-loss trap
A community purge must filter strictly on SignalScope::Community(community_id).
A routing bug that lets a community purge match Local-scope events is silent
data loss of the user's own profile. PurgeTombstone::covers is intentionally
explicit, and every UAT asserts the local feed is bit-identical across the purge.
Local-scope events never shipped (m9p1) and are never present in the community
WAL the engine scans, but the filter is belt-and-suspenders.
<1s gates are NOT the sweeper
m9p2's stop-forward gate and m10p2's revocation are O(1) atomic reads on the
write path. Purge is a heavier (potentially multi-segment replay) operation and
is explicitly NOT on that latency budget -- but it must never route through the
60s sweeper (db/sweeper.rs) for correctness. The stop-forward gate already
guarantees no new contributions enter; purge then cleans history at its own pace.
Crash safety: tombstone is the source of truth
Write the tombstone durably BEFORE running rematerialization. If we crash mid-
rebuild, reopen replays rematerialization from the durable tombstone -- idempotent
because the tombstone, not the rebuilt aggregate, is authoritative. Use the
existing crash-injection points (CheckpointPreFlush, WalPreAggregate) to
prove recovery rebuilds identical state. WAL/checkpoint backward-compat is
non-negotiable: this phase reads V1/V2/V3 events; it adds no new wire format.
Hard-negative leak guard ordering
apply_replication_unhide (hard_neg.rs:118) uses union/LWW: a late pre-purge
unhide with a higher HLC than the original hide would normally revive the item.
The purge tombstone's HLC must dominate, so reconcile.rs (plan, ~line 233)
and the guarded unhide path compare against the purge HLC first. A purged item
stays purged across partition heal and failover -- this is the explicit UAT
requirement that hard negatives from U do not leak back after replay.
Done When
A user who has stop-forwarded out of community C can call
purge_prior_contributions(user, C, epoch_range), see a durable tombstone in
Tag::PurgeTombstone, get a PurgeReceipt with the watermark seqno, and observe
that C's ranking outputs no longer reflect any of their purged contributions.
Re-running the identical purge produces a byte-identical checkpoint (BLAKE3-equal).
The user's local profile decay scores and windowed counts are unchanged. After a
simulated partition heal, a pre-purge unhide does not revive a purged hard
negative. Community queries report purge_watermark: Some(seqno). All prior
M8/M9 tests pass; cargo fmt, cargo clippy -p tidaldb -D warnings, and
cargo test -p tidaldb --lib are clean.